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ABSTRACT
Territorial issues have historically assumed a central role in 
international relations. Despite considerations relating to, for 
example, human rights and economic and social cooperation, the 
territorially based view of international law remains the fundamental 
model and is subscribed to by third world States.
The acquisition of territory in Africa by the European powers 
in the nineteenth century involved the characterisation of the status 
of the various African communities. These were accepted as holding 
title to their territory, but not regarded as full subjects of 
international law. Cession was the primary technique used in the 
colonisation of Africa.
The right of peoples to self-determination is today one of the 
leading principles of international law and this has implications as 
regards the law of territory. The right, which has emerged through 
the United Nations by means of Charter Interpretation, has been fairly 
specifically defined in State practice. It may be seen as the right of 
the people of a non self governing colonial territory to determine its 
own political future within the borders of the colonially defined 
territory. The obligatory nature of the colonially determined borders 
Is reinforced in Internationa! la, by rules about succession to 
boundary treaties. Self-determination has alao had an Impact as 
regards the recognised criteria for Statehood, but it has not been 
deemed applicable to secession from independent States.
Also relevant to the la» of territory Is the question of the use 
of force, both particularly »1th regard to, for example, the 
acqulsltltlon of territory by force, and more generally as regards 
wars of self-determination.
1CHAPTER 1 - TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international community is formed first and foremost by 
States, which were defined by Vattel as "political bodies, societies 
of men who have united together and combined their forces in order 
to procure their mutual welfare and security".1 23 The element missing 
from this definition relates to the need for a territorial basis for 
such political bodies. This necessity, however, is self-evident.
2As Oppenheim has noted, "a State without a territory is not possible". 
This does not mean that territoriality is a criterion of personality 
in international law, but Statehood is inconceivable in the absence 
of a reasonably defined geographical base. The frontiers of such an 
entity need not be established beyond dispute, nor is there any 
prescribed minimum of territory for the existence of a State, but 
some piece of land is essential before one can accept the establishment 
and continuation of a State.
Territory is, of course, itself a geographical conception relating 
to physical areas of the globe, but its centrality in law and 
international law in particular derives from the fact that it 
constitutes the tangible framework for the manifestation of power by 
the accepted authorities of the State in question. The principle 
whereby such a State is deemed to exercise exclusive power over its 
territory can be seen as a fundamental axiom of classical international
3
law. More than this, Hill declares that "international relations in
(1) The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, vol.2, 1758, 
p. 3.
(2) International Law, vol.I, 8th ed. 1955, p.451.
(3) See Delbez, "Du Territoire dans ses Rapports avec l'Etat"
39 Revue GenSrale de Droit International Public, 1932.
their more vital aspects, revolve about the possession of territory". 
This crucial role, thus played by territory and its attendant legal 
concepts, has been evident in all stages of the development of 
international law and changes in the nature and structure of 
international law cannot but be expressed in the light of this fact.
I - The Role of Territory
The notion of territory as an essential element in the
sovereignty of a particular society geographically located was known
5to the ancient Greeks. The Roman attitude was predicated upon the
creation and defence of a large empire, with relatively fluid borders,
and subsisted in the light of a belief in the universality of its
domination, but the post-Roman era saw for many reasons, including
religion, the rise of the concept of society as based primarily
upon personal allegiance rather than territory. As Gottmann puts it,
"for a millenium the significance of territory in Europe was to be
0
reduced to very little indeed, even on the local scale". Political 
and social life revolved around individual and tribal allegiance to 
a sovereign and to the Church. From about the fourteenth century- 
communities began to be seen in terms of territorial entities and 
the notion of a State as understood in contemporary thought began
7to develop. It was, however, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that
marked a crucial point towards the creation of modern international
8law, based as it has been upon defined territorial units. The 45678
(4) Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations, 1945, p,3,
(5) See Plato’s Laws, Bk.4, 704-10, and Bk.5, 737. Aristotle's 
Politics, Bk.7, Chapters IV and V. See also Gottmann, The 
Significance of Territory. 1973, pp.17-26.
(6) Op.cit. p.27,
(7) Ibid pp.36-44.
(8) See Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations. 1954, p.115.
4
3Treaties of Westphalia taken as a whole may be regarded as the first
sustained attempt to establish a world order "on the basis of States
exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and
9subordinated to no earthly authority". This order involved the 
recognition of all independent States as having equal rights of 
sovereign jurisdiction over a determined territory. This sovereign 
equality of States was founded upon the exclusivity of action of 
each State within its defined territory and the right of all States 
to participate within the sphere of international relations. Since 
such States were territorially delineated, the introduction of the 
Westphalia system marked the demise of the concept of personal 
allegiance as the foundation of political society. But the break 
between the two was not clean. The concept of sovereignty drew to 
some extent upon the ideas associated with feudalism, since the 
latter defined power in terms of territory,1® while the State 
developed into the framework and symbol of national identity to 
which citizens owed a form of personal allegiance. Nevertheless, 
the development of international law upon the basis of the exclusive 
authority of the State within an accepted territorial framework 
meant that territory became, as O'Connell has suggested, "perhaps 
the fundamental concept of international law".1* From this 
Westphalian view, it follows logically that "this problem of the 
legal ordering of territorial stability and territorial change lies 
at the heart of the whole problem of the legal ordering of 910
(9) Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" in International 
Law in the Twentieth Century (ed. Gross), 1969, p.25 .
(10) See eg. Schoenbom, "La Nature Juridique du Territoire",
30 HR (1929 V) pp.85, 97-8.
(11) International Law, 2nd ed. vol.l, 1970, p.403 .
4international society". The Westphalian concept of the territorial 
sovereign State, therefore, has remained the basis of most analyses 
of international law, although not without challenge. Before the 
territorial basis of international society is further considered, 
however, a few comments will be made regarding the functions of 
territory.
Gottmann specifies two main functions, viz. the need for a
shelter for security and the possibility of acting as a springboard
for opportunity. Both these functions require an internal
organisation of the territory and a subsequent organisation of its 
13external relations. They are complementary in that once a 
community feels secure in its land, it will seek to develop 
relations with other communities, but both processes are closely 
linked. One influences and sometimes determines the other. The 
nature of a community's success in achieving a measure of stable 
tenure over its territory will often have a profound impact upon 
neighbouring societies, both in a positive sense as an example and 
in a negative sense as an area for satisfaction of acquisitive 
instincts. On the other hand, the search for security may conflict 
with the desire for developing horizons of opportunity. Self- 
sufficiency and international intercourse do not always complement 
each other. The concept of territory will not only express the 
power-balance between co-existing or competing entities, it also 
reflects the relationship between the people and the geographical 
space they inhabit. The mystical nature of territory is not a new 123
(12) Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law.
1963, p.87. See also Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case, 
2 RIAA (1928) pp.829, 838.
12
(13) Op.cit. p .14 .
5phenomenon. It was known and manifested in religious terms in
14the civilisations of Egypt, Greece, Ancient Israel and Rome.
Modern nationalism in the vast majority of cases points to a deep
almost spiritual connection between land and people. This can be
related to the basic psychological needs of mankind, in terms of
the need for security and a sense of group identity, for instance.
Scelle has written that "the concern for the preservation of
habitat exists as a passionate psychological reflex in all human 
15communities". Gottmann declares that territory is a
16"psychosomatic phenomenon of the community" , since it is 
intimately involved in the purposes and aims of the particular 
society in question, as perceived by its inhabitants. Territory 
is the physical aspect of the life of the community as an entity 
and therefore reflects and conditions the identity of that community. 
It has also been the prime means by which in modern international 
relations peoples have conducted their external affairs.
Territory therefore plays not only a definitional role, but a 
constitutive one historically as well. It is the link between a 
people, its identity as a State and its international role. It has 
thus been of crucial importance in Westphalian international law, 
and even more so since the American and French revolutions in the 
eighteenth century inaugurated the era of that people-territory nexus 
recognised as nationalism.
If the notion of territory in international law has evolved in 
response to the needs of peoples and individuals and as a result 1456
(14) See eg. Schoenborn loc.cit. pp.92-4.
(15) Introduction a l'Etude du Droit, 1951, vol.I, pt.l, p.87 
quoted in Gottmann op.cit. p.14.
(16) Op.cit. p.15. Emphasis in original.
6of historical developments affecting the world order, and if, as 
will be seen, fundamental principles of international law reflect 
and reinforce this, the question arises as to the functions of 
territory today. As far as security is concerned, modern develop­
ments have shown that the mere possession of territory cannot of 
itself guarantee the protection of its inhabitants. The era of 
aviation, missiles and various devices of mass destruction has 
meant that no State can provide absolute security for its people. 
Therefore, States have sought to establish their security by 
other means, such as mutual deterrence, international agreements, 
international organisations and so on. Boundaries as the 
geographical barriers protecting the inhabitants of a territory 
now play a much more humble role. Modern technology has also 
meant that the function of territory as a means of excluding the 
activities of other entities has been much diminished. Pollution 
and the after-effects of other industrial and scientific advances 
cannot always be confined within the territorial limits of the 
State wherein the process takes place. The problem of nuclear
fall-out affecting third States is just one further example of 
17this. The growth of multi-national industry and the development 
of international economic institutions has meant that in this 
sphere also, the power and influence of States within their own 
territories is much circumscribed. Ball has been quoted as saying 
that the multi-national corporation "not only promises the most 
efficient use of world resources, but as an institution it poses 
the greatest challenge to the power of the nation-State since the 
temporal position of the Roman Church began to decline in the 15th 17
(17) See the Nuclear Tests case, ICJ Reports, 1974, p.253.
74- .. 18 1920*century".
These factors have led a number of writers to postulate the
decline of the Westphalian system of International law based
fundamentally on sovereign territorial States. De Vlsscher noted
that territory, which since the end of the middle ages had provided
the firmest base for international relations and ensured their
19stability, no longer possessed the same significance. Gottmann
has stressed that the movement toward Statehood and national
sovereignty based upon exclusive territorial jurisdiction seems to
have reached its apogee and that "by 1970 sovereignty has been
by-passed, and a new fluidity has infiltrated the recently shaped
20map of multiple national States". Dembinski writes that new
technological developments have minimised the importance of the 
21territorial factor, while international law specialists have not
really appreciated the changes that have occurred that impinge
22upon the theory of the supremacy of the territorial State.
Indeed, one of the reasons for the failure of international law 
to adapt to the problem of contemporary international relations 
is seen as its concentration upon territory as the fundamental
(18) House Comm, on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong. 2d. Sess.,
Rep. of Official visit to Congress by a Delegation of the 
European Parliament 40 (Comm. Print. 1973), cited in Falk,
"A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects 
and Proposals" 84 Yale Law Jnl. (1975), pp.969, 1006.
(19) Theory and Reality in Public International Law, 1968, p.405.
(20) Op.cit. pp.126-7. See also Delbez loc.cit. pp.705-6 for 
an early view.
(21) "Le Territoire et le Développement du Droit International" 
Annuaire Suisse de Droit International (1975) pp.121, 145.
(22) Ibid p.123.
concept of international law. This theme has been particularly
developed by Falk, who has declared that "the State system is
being superseded by a series of interlocking social, economic
Political, technological and ecological tendencies" . 23 4 2567 The
world order system is moving away from the dominant statist
conception enshrined in the Westphalian model towards one based
upon "an augmented capacity for central guidance and an increased
25role for non-territorial actors". In other words, structural
changes in the political, economic, social and cultural
environments are altering the fundamental basis upon which the
exclusivity of the territorial State developed. As a result of
this, the State-centred framework of international law is in the
process of being modified to accommodate these changes in the
world system. One may add to this the influence of the revival
26of natural law thinking and the consequent growth of an
International cooperation approach as the hallmark of developing
27functional interdependence. A further consequence has been 
the growing emphasis upon human rights in international law and 
the legal protection of individuals and non-State groups. 28
23
(23) ibid p .121. See also Schou, "Le Role du Territoire d
le Droit International" Nordisk Tidsskrift for Internati 
Ret (Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium 10), 1939, pp>17 ^g81
(24) Loc.cit. p.973.
(25) ibid p.1020. See also ibid p.969.
(26) See eg. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human ri «•»,*» . _
jenks, The Common Law of Mankind. 19587" *— *950;
(27) Eg. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International r.n„. lg
(28) See generally, Sohn and Buergenthal, The Intern
Protection of Human Rights. 1973. ~— ~  22J*1
One may note Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations 
* which declared that one of the purposes of the organisation 
was the development of friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, while Article 1(3) referred to 
international cooperation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and 
to the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, lahgu.gs O' raligloa.29 301 Such principle, are Primarily
applicable to non-St.te »title. and are therefore Illustrative 
of the »ove away fro» the dominance of the territorial conoept. 
The principle of self-deter»i».tion, which it 1. auh.itted 1. 
no. of vital importance with regard to the international la.
. -„„mifically stated to be the right of "allof territory, is spec
, „30 „a ls tbUs not restricted to established sovereignpeoples" and i
State.. The rise and growth of tho inoroaalng number of
International organisations also undsriln.a tha need felt in
for cooperation and coordination beyond the world community «
that provided within tho »«lot confine, of a rigidly
territorially based State system. The range and universality
of such ioatitutions hears withes, to th. defac.a of the
 ^ 31 it has also been accepted that theterritorial State system. I n
Westphalian state concept of international relations is
(29) See further Articles 55 91.
. i of the International Covenants on Human(30) see eg. d the Declaration on Principles of
Rights, 1966» an concerning Friendly Relations and
International i»a ln accordance with the CharterCooperation among State» a
of the United Nations, 1970.
ThB Law of International Institutions.(31) See generally Bowett, ----- — ------------------- ---
3rd ed. 1975.
inadequate for the exploration and exploitation of areas of
relative inaccessibility requiring highly advanced technology,
the two examples being outer space and the sea-bed and ocean
floor of the high seas. In both cases, the international
community has declared that the territorial concept is invalid.
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
32in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1967, declared
that outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, was not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty and that its exploration and use was to be for the
benefit of mankind as a whole. Celestial bodies were to be
used solely for peaceful purposes and no weapons of mass
destruction were to be placed in outer space or in orbit 
33around the Earth. As far as the deep sea-bed is concerned,
the Declaration of Principles governing the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of
34National Jurisdiction, 1970, stated that the area in 
question, as well as its resources, were the "common heritage 
of mankind" and were not subject to appropriation by 
States or persons and that no State could claim or exercise 324
(32) Entered into force on 10 October 1967. See also General 
Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI), 1962 (XVIII) and 1884 (SVIII).
(33) See on the law of space, Fawcett, International Law and 
the Uses of Outer Space, 1968; Jenks, Space Law, 1965 and 
McDougall, Lasswell and Vlasic Law and Public Order in 
Space, 1963.
(34) Adopted on 17 December 1970 in resolution 2749 (XXV) by 
108 votes to 0, with 14 abstentions. See also Assembly 
resolutions 2340 (XXII), 2467 (XXIII) and 2574 (XXIV).
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof. The 
recourse to a collectivist doctrine of use in the one case and 
.ownership and use in the other reveals the perceived limitations 
of the territorial doctrine. Certain interests were deemed 
common to all mankind and a territorial solution deemed 
inappropriate, impossible and inequitable.
Thus, it appears that trends are emerging in international 
relations challenging or at least restraining the dominant 
territorial conception of world affairs. It remains to be 
seen how far such trends have become enshrined in contemporary 
International law and more particularly how far African States 
and practice have accepted either the territorial or global 
approaches. Bur first one must note the extent of State 
territory. It clearly includes its land areas, subterranean 
areas, waters, rivers, lakes, the airspace above the land, etc. 
and the territorial sea. The exclusive economic zone concept 
would not, it appears, fall within the territory of a State. 
Article 55 of the 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating Text 
declares that "the exclusive economic zone is an area beyond 
®nd adjacent to the territorial sea subject to the specific 
legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights 
and jurisdictions of the Coastal State and the rights and 
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions 35
(35) Those principles were reaffirmed in Articles 3 and 4 of
Part I, Informal Single Negotiating Text produced in 1975 
by the Chairmen of the three main committees of the 
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/Conf,62/WP.8/ 
Part I and in Articles 136 and 137 of the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text of the 6th session of the Conference in 
July 1977, see A/Conf,62/WP.10. They would clearly appear, 
therefore, in any new Convention on the Law of the Sea.
12
of the present Convention". Oppenheim declares that in
addition to the "real parts" of State territory, there exist
also certain "fictional parts". As examples, he cites the
cases of the official residence of foreign diplomatic envoys,
public vessels on the high seas and in territorial waters of
37foreign States and merchant vessels on the high seas.
However, this would appear to involve a confusion between 
territory and jurisdiction. A State may exercise its 
jurisdiction perfectly legitimately in situations that are 
not to be classified as territorial. There is no requirement 
in international law for State territory to be geographically 
indivisible and contiguous. Pakistan prior to 1971 was 
divided into two widely separated geographical parts.
Many of the most fundamental principles of international
law are predicated upon the concept of the territorial
exclusivity of the State, and are aimed at protecting it.
The sovereignty and equality of States, the "basic constitutional
39doctrine of the law of nations" in Brownlie's words, involves 36789
(36) Article 56 specified the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
the coastal State, and Article 58 sets out the rights and 
duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone.
(37) Op.cit. p.461.
(38) Note that the International Law Commission in its commentary 
on the Draft Articles relating to Diplomatic Immunity 
declared that it was guided by the theory of functional 
necessity justifying diplomatic privileges and immunities 
while bearing in mind the representative character of the 
mission and head of mission. It clearly rejected the 
extraterritoriality theory, see Yearbook of the ILC, 1958, 
vol.II pp.94-5. See also Sahovic and Bishop, "The Authority 
of the State: Its Range With Respect to Persons and Places" 
in Manual of Public International Law (ed. Sorensen),
1968, pp.311, 313-4.
(39) Principles of Public International Law, 2nd ed. 1973, p.280.
a number of crucial propositions. These were expressed in
the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law in
the following terms: "All States enjoy sovereign equality.
They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of
the international community, notwithstanding differences of
an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular,
sovereign equality includes the following elements: (a) States
are juridically equal; (b) Each State enjoys the rights
inherent in full sovereignty; (c) Each State has the duty
to respect the personality of other States; (d) The territorial
integrity and political independence of the States are
inviolable; (e) Each State has the right freely to choose
and develop its political, social, economic and cultural
systems; (f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in
good faith with its international obligations and to live in
40peace with other States." The rules relating to the use of 
force are similarly based on and intended to protect the 
territorial concept. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter declares 
that "all Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State",** 401
(40) Brownlie expresses the principal corollaries of the 
sovereignty and equality of States as "(1) a jurisdiction, 
prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent 
population living there; (2) a duty of non-intervention 
in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other States;
and (3) the dependence of obligations arising from customary 
law and treaties on the consent of the obliger." 
op.cit. p.280 (footnotes omitted). Article 2(1) of the 
UN Charter states that "the Organisation is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all Its Members".
(41) Note that Article 51 of the Charter refers to the "inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence". See 
further infra Chapter 7, p.443 et seq.
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Article 1 of the Consensus Definition of Aggression adopted 
42In 1974 stated that "aggression is the use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
43set out in this definition". In the sphere of State
responsibility for internationally unlawful acts, the
International Court of Justice emphasised "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
44for acts contrary to the rights of other States" and this
was extended in the 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on
the Human Environment, principle 21 of which stated that
"States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their Jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
45of national jurisdiction". The Lotus case emphasised that 4235
(42) Without a vote, in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX).
(43) Article 3 specifies that the invasion or attack by the 
armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, 
or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting 
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the 
use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof would qualify as aggression. Article 5 emphasises 
that no territorial acquisition or special advantage 
resulting from aggression are or shall be recognised as 
lawful. See generally Stone, Conflict Through Consensus. 1977.
(44) The Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.6, 22. The 
Court noted that the exclusivity of control of the territorial 
State might affect the proof obtainable by the other State
in the former's territory and thus a more liberal recourse 
to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence, ibid p.19. 
See also the Trail Smelter arbitration, 3 RIAA p.1905, and 
Eagleton, Responsibility of States in International Law, 1928 
and the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, 
Yearbook of the ILC, 1976, vol.I, pp.19-91, and vol.II, 
part 2, pp.69-122.
(45) See Sohn, "The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment" 
14 Harvard International Law Journal (1973) p.423, and 
Techoff and Utton (eds), International Environmental Law. 1974.
46the exercise of jurisdiction was primarily territorially based,
while within its territory, the laws of a State apply to all
47except where treaty provisions otherwise stipulate. The
supremacy of the authority of the territorial law was further
noted in the Diplomatic Asylum case, in which the court held
that "derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognised
““^ess its legal basis is established in each case" and asylum
48was such a derogation. The right of passage between
Portuguese enclaves over Indian territory was recognised by the
International Court as "subject to full recognition and exercise
of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without
49any immunity in favour of Portugal". The rules governing
recognition and State succession are also closely bound up with
the territorial conception of international relations. Thus,
it can be seen that many of the fundamental principles of
international law are aimed at the protection and preservation
of the dominant Statist order founded upon territorial
exclusivity. Such a system is by its very nature static, with
the use of force constituting one of the most dynamic elements
regarding the modification'of the existing distribution of 
50territory. The room left for the development and growth of
(46) pcij Series A, no.10, p.18.
(47) See U.S. Nationals in Morocco, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.176.
The right of a State to apply social legislation to 
strangers on its territory was affirmed in the Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 
Governing the Guardianship of Infants. ICJ Reports,
1958, p.55.
(48) icj Reports, 1950, pp.266, 275.
(49) icj Reports, 1960, pp.6, 45. Cf. the Declaration of Judge 
Basdevant ibid p.49, the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Wellington Koo ibid, p.68, and the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Spender, ibid, p.114.
(46 78950) See Dembinski loc.cit. p.127.
non-State entities within the dominant order was consequently
rather limited. Even the League of Nations was primarily
aimed at the preservation of international security and thus
the freezing of the territorial status quo in the light of the
concept of collective security. Members of the League agreed
to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all members against external 
51aggression. However, in this it failed as the events of the
1930's clearly demonstrated. The Charter of the United Nations
marks a change since, as noted above, the concepts of self-
determination, human rights and international social, economic
and cultural cooperation were firmly inserted and further
developed via later resolutions, declarations, conferences, etc.
However, the UN itself is founded upon the sovereign equality
of Members, the protection of State's territorial integrity
and political independence from the threat or use of force,
the maintenance of international peace and security and the
provision in Article 2(7) preventing the organisation from
intervening in matters essentially within the domestic
52jurisdiction of any State. In the expansion of State 512
(51) See Bowett op.cit. pp.15-20; Stone, Legal Controls 
of International Conflict, 1959, Chapter 4, and
Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations. 1973.
(52) Note also that each Member has one vote in the General 
Assembly and that the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice in contentious matters is based on 
the consent of the parties, see Article 36 of the 
Statute of the ICJ, while in the case of advisory matters 
a State cannot be compelled to submit a dispute to a 
tribunal without its consent, Eastern Carelia case,
PCIJ Series B no.5 (1923). But see as regards the 
modification of this rule, the Peace Treaties case,
ICJ Reports 1971, pp.16, 24, and the Western Sahara case, 
ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 22-27.
jurisdiction and sovereignty this century, it is instructive 
to note that territorialist conceptions have on the whole 
prevailed. This is so with regard to the recognition of the
sovereignty of States over airspace above their land territory,
and with respect to the development of the notions of the
contiguous zone, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
In the case of the latter concepts, the principle used has not
been that of the extension of territory to comprise such areas
but rather the recognition of coastal States' "sovereign rights"
54with regard to such areas. While this distinction is a very
important one, the point to be made is that the concept of
res communis as applied to the high seas and the deep sea-bed
and ocean floor has been progressively whittled away in favour
55of the extension of State authority and control.
Perhaps the major principle of international law that would 
appear to have challenged the dominant territorial 
doctrine with success has been that of self-determination. 534
53
(53) The customary rule to this effect developed rapidly 
in the early years of this century, see Oppenheim 
op.cit. pp.517-9 and Article 1 of the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944.
(54) see eg. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, 1958, Article 24 of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, 1958 (which talks of controls to be exercised 
by Coastal States in the Contiguous Zone) and Article 
56 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, 1977, 
of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
By way of contrast, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention 
(see previous footnote) specifies that "every State 
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory". Emphasis added.
(55) See eg. Phillips, "The Exclusive Economic Zone as a 
Concept in International Law" 26 ICLQ (1977) p.5.
This principle, deemed applicable to all peoples, has been
the legal weapon in the process of decolonising the 
56European empires. In the process, it ensured that the
territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory
was accepted as having under the Charter, "a status separate
and distinct from the territory of the State administering
it" until such time as the people in question had exercised
57the right of self-determination. The exercise of the
right resulted in the disruption of the recognised territorial
sphere of the administering State and to that extent proved
an exception to the principle of the territorial integrity
of existing States. Although Article 2(7) of the UN Charter
was pleaded as a way of forestalling UN debates and
resolutions on decolonisation issues, it came to be
accepted that such matters did not fall "essentially
58within the domestic jurisdiction" of States. The range
of concern of international law had moved beyond, it seemed,
territorial exclusivity. Such a view, which may be related
to the proposition stated by the Permanent Court of
International Justice that the question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a
State was an essentially relative question which depended
59upon the development of international relations, was 56789
(56) See further on the nature and contents of this 
principle, Chapters 3 and 4, infra, pp.102 and 171.
(57) The Declaration on Principles of International Law,
1970, contained in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).
(58) Infra, Chapter 3, p,125, note 107.
(59) Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco.
PCIJ Series B no.4, p.24.
reflected also In the Institution of the mandate and
trusteeship systems for these were predicated upon the
creation of a special status for particular territories.
This special status involved the division of sovereignty
with three distinct entities with varying degrees of
powers, viz. the people of the territory, the administering
60power and the League of Nations or United Nations.
Despite the different categories of mandates and the
61different formulations of mandate and trust responsibilities,
and the reference to non-self-governing territories in the 
62UN Charter, as the International Court of Justice noted,
"the subsequent development of international law ... made
the principle of self-determination applicable to all of 
6 3them". Therefore, in a sense, the principle of self- 
determination superseded prior obligations. This does not 
mean that such obligations ceased to exist, but rather that 
one could subsume them within the more general category 
of self-determination. However, as will be seen, self- 
determination as a legal principle under international law 
has been restricted to the colonial situation, although it 
does have greater potential in the light of its meaning in 
political theory. Where a non-self-governing territory has 60123
(60) See eg. the Separate Opinion of Judge Bustamante, 
South-West Africa case, ICJ Reports 1962 pp.6, 357, 
and the dissenting opinion of Judge Nervo ibid p.458. 
See also Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations. 
1930.
(61) See Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and 
Chapter XII of the UN Charter.
(62) Chapter XI of the Charter.
(63) The Namibia case, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.ll, 31.
See also the Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, 
pp.12, 31.
coupled with that of territorial integrity will operate to
protect the territorial unity and framework of the new
State. Indeed, a basic presumption of the application of
self-determination is that it will be exercised by the •
people in question within the territorial framework of the
entity as administered by the colonial power before
independence. In the light of this, it is to be wondered
how far indeed the principle of self-determination has
affected the territorial basis of international law. The
answer, it appears, is not to a substantial extent. The
territorial framework of the non-self-governing entity has
64been, with only a few exceptions, substantially accepted
as the identification pattern for the exercise of the
right to self-determination. Once a State has obtained
independence, international law imposes a duty upon other 
65States to respect and preserve this territorial arrangement.
It is clear that in a number of areas patterns of 
functional cooperation have modified the Statist-centred 
conception of international law, while further inroads have 
been made with regard to the international protection of 
human rights and self-determination, although in the latter 
instances, potentiality for change far exceeds actual 
change. However, the territorially-based view of international 
law still retains its position as the fundamental paradigm.
It is instructive to note that Third World States 645
(64) Eg. Palestine and Ruanda-Urundl.
(65) Although not upon the citizens of that State, see 
further infra Chapter 5, p.330.
attained independence, the principle of self-determination
are vitally concerned with the maintenance of their
independence and the concept of the sovereign equality of
States within a defined territorial sphere is being
continually re-emphasised. The first three principles of
the Organisation of African Unity, as enshrined in Article
3 of the Charter, emphasise the sovereign equality of
States, non-interference in the internal affairs of
States and respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to
independent existence. In the field of economic development,
which together with decolonisation has constituted a prime
concern of African as well as other Third World States, the
notion of State sovereignty has been declared to be the
fundamental principle. In the Charter of Economic Rights
66and Duties of States, for example, this emerges quite 
clearly. Article 1 proclaims that States have the sovereign 
and inalienable right to choose their own economic, as well 
as political, social and cultural systems without outside 
interference. Article 2 declares that every State possesses 
full permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural 
resources and economic activities and provides that States 
may regulate foreign investment in their jurisdiction, 
transnational corporation activities and nationalisations 
of foreign property according to their own domestic laws 
(and therefore not in accordance with international law 6
(66) Adopted in resolution 3281 (XXIX) by the General 
Assembly by 120 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions. 
The UK and USA voted against, while Canada, Japan 
and the Netherlands abstained.
6 7principles necessarily). While this Charter is not to 
be taken as part of customary law, and it is not an inter­
national convention, it does illustrate how the vast 
majority of States in the world community see the inter­
national legal order in the light of the concept of 
territorial exclusiveness. The demise of the Westphalian 
dogma is not therefore imminent. On the contrary in a 
number of areas it has been fervently adopted by the newly 
independent States and other countries of the Third World, 
in a quite specific manner. The global, or inter­
territorial approach is, however, of developing importance
in certain fields, but not to the extent envisaged by some 
68writers. The two approaches are not exclusive, it should
be noted, but may exist side by side as dual tendencies in 
69international life. But it is submitted that the 
territorial pattern of international law remains the 
dominant one even if its predominance has been modified.
II - Territorial Sovereignty
The concept of territorial sovereignty is concerned 
with the nature of the authority exercised by the State 
over its territory. The ideas of territory and sovereignty 
are closely linked in international law, since the concept 
of territory itself is concerned with those geographical 6789
(67) See also Articles 4, 5, 10, 12, 13 and 27, and the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order.
(68) See eg. Dembinski loc.cit. and Gottmann op.cit.
(69) As for example: economic development law, note the 
growing importance of UN Conferences on Trade and 
Development and the work of the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law.
areas over which sovereignty or sovereign rights may be
exercised. Territorial sovereignty is, therefore, centred
upon the rights and powers coincident upon territory in
the geographical sense. As such it has provided the basis
70for modern international law. Territorial sovereignty
is essential before one can talk of a State. Huber noted 
in the Island of Palmas case, the leading case on the 
subject, that "sovereignty in relation to a portion of the 
surface of the globe is the legal condition necessary for
the inclusion of such portion in the territory of any
71particular State". Jennings referred to the "mission 
and purpose of traditional international law" as being the
delimitation of the exercise of sovereign power on a
72territorial basis, while Judge Huber regarded the 
principle of the exclusive competence of the State in 
regard to its own territory as the point of departure in
73settling most questions that concern international relations.
74What then is the nature of sovereignty over territory?
Brierly emphasises that it refers not to a relation of 701234
(70) Maine wrote that "if sovereignty had not been 
associated with the proprietorship of a limited 
portion of the earth, had not, in other words, 
become territorial, three parts of the Grotian 
theory would have been incapable of application", 
Ancient Law, 1861, p.66.
(71) 2 RIAA (1928) pp.829, 838. See The Report of the
Commission of Jurists in the Aaland Islands case, 
LNOJ Suppl. no.3, p.6.
(72) Op.cit. p.2.
(73) 2 RIAA (1928) pp.829, 838.
(74) "That much abused word" according to Brierly,
The Law of Nations, 6th ed. 1963, p,162.
itself, but to the characteristics of rights over territory
and is a convenient way of contrasting "the fullest rights
over territory known to the law" with certain minor territorial
75rights, for example, leases and servitudes. Territorial
sovereignty has a positive and a negative aspect. The former
relates to the exclusive competence of the State with respect
to its own territory, and in Huber's words "sovereignty in the
relation between States signifies independence. Independence
in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of 
76a State". The negative aspect of the notion relates to
the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of
other States, for instance, regarding their right to integrity 
77and inviolability. Thus territorial sovereignty in fact 
marks a link between a particular people and a particular 
territory, so that within that area that people may exercise 
through the medium of the State its jurisdiction while being 
distinguished from other peoples exercising jurisdiction over 
other areas. It consists of a coherent body of rights and 
duties imposed upon States in relation to specific pieces of 
territory. 7568
persons to persons, nor to the independence of the State
(75) ibid.
(76) 2 RIAA (1928) pp.829, 838.
(77) ibid p.839.
(78) See the separate opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu 
Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.4, 43. Bastid notes 
that "sur son territoire, l'Etat est en droit d'exclure 
l'action des autes Etats. Mais, par contre, la 
souveraineté territoriale est source d'obligations 
internationales" see "Les Problèmes Territoriaux dans
la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice" 
107 H.R. (1962 III) pp.360, 367.
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It is important to distinguish the two notions of sovereignty
and property here. They may be related to the distinction made in
79Roman law between imperium and dominium, which appear to have
80been subsequently confused with the rise of feudalism.
O'Connell believes that as a result of the foundation of common
law theories of land in feudal law "sovereignty and property are
indistinguishable conceptions to the Anglo-American lawyer" and
held this capable of having repercussions with regard, for example,
81to the developing law of the sea-bed. International law,
however, built upon the Roman law distinction of imperium and
dominium. Vattel noted that there existed two elements relating
to the connection between a nation and the territory it inhabits.
The first was ownership, by virtue of which the nation could use
the territory for its needs, benefit from it and dispose of it,
and the second was sovereignty or "the right of supreme
jurisdiction by which the nation regulates and controls at will
82whatever goes on in the territory". The entire space over which
a nation extended its sovereignty and which formed the sphere of
83its jurisdiction was termed its domain. The distinction between 
sovereignty and property, or ownership, is an important one and 
may be related to a variety of needs in international law. As 
defined, it could help one appreciate the nature of mandated and 
trusteeship situations, as well as other cases where absolute 798012
(79) See Schoenborn loc.cit. p.96.
(80) Westlake, International Law Part I, 1904, p.86. See also 
Cavaglieri, "Regies Generales du Droit de la Paix" 26 H.R. 
(1929 I) pp.315, 385.
(81) Op.cit. pp.403-4.
(82) Op.cit. p.84. See also Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 
1625, vol.II, chapter III, s.4.2.
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sovereignty is not in the hands of one State alone. Whether it 
could be used to solve problems relating to the use of res communis, 
such as the sea-bed, is more doubtful.
The Western Sahara case clearly demonstrates that the concept
of territorial sovereignty involved far more than personal ties
of allegiance between a people and a ruler and certain rights
relating to the land in question. While the court accepted that
there did exist at the relevant time (the period of Spanish
colonisation) "legal ties of allegiance" between the Sultan of
Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western
Sahara and "some rights relating to the land, which constituted
legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the
court, and the territory of Western Sahara", no ties of
84territorial sovereignty were involved. The differentiating
factor in Morocco’s case appeared to be the absence of the exercise
85of effective internal sovereignty over Western Sahara, and in
Mauritania's case the fact that the "Mauritanian entity" did not
have the "character of a personality or corporate entity distinct
86from the several emirates and tribes which composed it". Judge
Ammoun, however, regarded such personal ties as equivalent to State
ties and therefore transmuted, as it were, into ties of territorial
sovereignty merely by virtue of the existence of a particular
87territory relative to the accepted personal ties. This cannot be 834567
(83) ibid.
(84) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 48, 64 and 68.
(85) Ibid p .47.
(86) Ibid p.63.
(87) Ibid pp.93-4.
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accepted, for the notion of territory in the context of territorial 
sovereignty denotes more than the existence of a defined geographical 
space. It refers additionally to a particular kind of relationship 
between people and space, as characterised by the existence of an 
effective governmental authority. As the Commission of Jurists noted 
ih the Aaland Islands case, "if the essential basis of ... 
territorial sovereignty is lacking, either because the State is not 
yet fully formed or because it is undergoing transformation or 
dissolution, the situation is obscure and uncertain from a legal 
point of view, and will not become clear until the period of 
development is completed and a definite new situation, which is
8;
normal in respect to territorial sovereignty, has been established."
Thus, the link between territorial sovereignty and Statehood becomes
manifest. Judge de Castro, on the other hand, took the view that
such personal ties as were involved in the Saharan situation as
regards both the Sultan of Morocco and the "Mauritanian entity"
89could not be regarded as binding ties. Whether such ties could 
be regarded as legal or not, and it is a complex and difficult issue, 
they could not affect the decolonisation process or the principle of 
self-determination. This was the court's view, correctly expressed
it is suggested." Such ties, however, could have an influence upon
.. 91rne various procedures concerned in the decolonisation process,
although what this might amount to was not explored by the court.
Presumably, it might affect the nature of any questions that might
be asked in a plebiscite seeking the views of the population of the 89
(88) LNOJ Suppl. no.3, 1920, p.6
(89) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 164
(90) Ibid p.68
(91) Ibid p.64
territory on the future political status of the territory in 
question. As such, these personal ties etc. cannot be regarded as 
being of significant importance within the general context of 
territorial sovereignty.
A number of theories have been elaborated to explain the nature 
of the relationship between State and territory. The patrimonial 
theory appears to be the oldest of such theories. According to 
this approach, territory is regarded as a piece of property 
pertaining to the ruler. Based upon feudal ideas of land tenure, 
it confused the concepts of sovereignty and property, or imgerium 
and dominium. In this form, the theory lasted for a number of 
centuries,92 and evolved into the so-called object theory (or 
Property theory or Eigentumstheorie) . This continued the notion of 
territorial sovereignty as concerning a real right, within the 
context of property. In other words, the State was regarded as
- i+a territory much as in private law an exercising its power over its ternv y
o.„cr .„„Id treat hie pdeeeeeioae.93 ®ile tbie theory explain. ,h.
Juridical fact that State, »ay d i . p c  »1 °f their territory,
94„, uv, +hA notion of Federal States it faces problems in dealing with the notio
.„=«er the question of why a State end it does not appear to answer H
i oil of its territory. In spite of 
disappears upon the disposal
(92)
(93)
See Schoenborn loc.cit. pp,100-2
Cavaglieri noted that "le droit de 1 Etat sur son i 
est un droit de nature reelle, un dominlum, dont li 
et les effets appartiennent au droit public". Loc.cit. p.385, 
See also Donati, Stato E Territorio, 1924
territoire 
La nature
U C V  v  — - ---  ----
, and flee as regards servitudes
<94) Schoenborn loc.cit. P*11 » 
ibid pp.108-12
this, the theory is of significance in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The approach that such an abstract distinction exists between State
96and territory can be compared with the subjectivist doctrine or
97space or quality theory (or eigenschaftstheorie or taumstheorie),
according to which the territory of a State is regarded not as
something separate but as an integral part of the personality of the
State itself. An attack on the territory of a State is seen therefore
not as affecting the property or possession of the State but as a
violation of the personality of the victim State. The emphasis is
thus upon lmperlum rather than dominium. However, there are a number
of drawbacks with regard to this view. It appears to suggest that
any change in territorial extent, whether by cession or by
acquisition, seriously affects the personality of the State itself.
It is difficult to assimilate with regard to federal States and
condominiums, and there are problems in explaining the existence of
98leases. By way of contrast, the objectivist or competence theory 
99(kompetenztheorie), linked with the Austrian "pure theory of law" 
school,95 678100 sees the territory of a State as the area of State 
Jurisdiction or the space in which the State exercises its 
competence. Kelsen wrote that "the unity of the State territory, 
and therefore the territorial unity of the State, is a juristic and
(95) See Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., 1924, 
p.125 et seq.; Lawrence The Principles of International Law. 
7th ed. , 1929, p,136 et seq., and O'Connell, State Succession 
In Municipal Law and International Law. vol.I, 1967, p.22.
(96) See Delbez loc.cit. p.711.
(97) See Schoenborn loc.cit. p.114 and O'Connell op.cit. 
footnote 95 pp.22-3.
(98) See Delbez loc.cit. p.712.
(99) Schoenborn loc.cit. p.117, and O'Connell op.cit. 
footnote 95, p.23.
(100) See Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1949.
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not a geographical unity, for the territory of a State is legally
nothing but the territorial space of validity of the national legal
order called a S t a t e " I n  other words, the notion of territory
is minimised and seen merely as a limiting factor as regards the
exercise of the power of the State. Thus, Kelsen defines State
territory as "that space within which a State is authorised by
general international law to perform all acts provided for by its
national law or .... the space within which according to general
international law the organs determined by a national legal order
102are authorised to execute this order". This theory has
103attracted support. Oppenheim declares that "the importance of
State territory lies in the fact that it is the space within which
104the State exercises its supreme authority". Lauterpacht has 
attempted to combine this approach, which is sophisticated and can 
readily account for situations of split sovereignty, with the 
advantages of the objects theory. He has written that if one 
accepts a State as the totality of individuals organised in a State, 
rather than as an absolute and mystical entity, there is then no 
objection or artificiality in regarding the State as the owner of 
territory. Indeed the objects theory is the most attractive theory 
to account for the cession of territory. However, territory is also 
the basis on which and the area in which a State exercises 
jurisdiction in conformity with international and municipal law. 10234
(101) Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., 1966, p.307
(102) Ibid p.308
(103) See eg. Delbez loc.cit. p.712; Schoenborn loc.cit. p,124 and 
Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective. vol.III, 
1970, pp.12-13, who notes that territorial sovereignty may be 
adequately defined as "the plenitude of exclusive competencies 
(sic) appertaining to a State under public international law 
within the boundaries of a definite portion of the globe".
(104) Op.cit. p.452
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Thus, "territory is both the object of the State's right and the
space within which its sovereignty and jurisdiction are exercised".
In addition, territorial sovereignty is not an absolute element, it 
X06may be divided, and property "is a bundle of rights capable of
107modification, division and adjustment". This composite approach
appears the most acceptable one, not only because most proponents
in fact have sought to synthesise the various elements involved
rather than adhere strictly to one or other of the three major 
108doctrines, but because a highly flexible view of the concept of 
territorial sovereignty appears the most satisfactory. Territorial 
sovereignty should be examined on the basis of its provision of 
opportunities for cooperation and development rather than in a 
rigid straightjacket.
If territorial sovereignty is to be seen in terms of a
particular relationship between State, people and territory and the
concomitant possession by the State of a collection of powers,
rights, duties, etc, as regards the territory in question, the
problem arises as to the source of such powers, etc. There are
two possibilities, either they emerge as a consequence or an
attribute of sovereignty itself, or they are granted to the State
109by the rules of international law. The sovereignty argument 
leans against the latter view since it "has against it the 1056789
(105) International Law, vol.I, 1970, pp.367-9.
(106) Eg. Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case, PCIJ Series A/B 
no.71, p.103 (1937), and O'Connell op.cit. Chapter 10.
Instances of divided sovereignty Include mandated and trust 
territories, condominiums, servitudes, etc.
(107) International Law vol.I, 1970, p.377,
(108) See O'Connell op.cit. footnote 95 p.27,
(109) See on sovereignty, Schwarzenberger, International Law and 
Order. 1971, Chapter 5; Larson, Sovereignty Within the Law. 
1965, and Stankiewicz (ed.) In Defence of Sovereignty. 1969.
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conviction of States to which nothing is more distasteful than the
idea that the power they yield is granted them by the international
o r d e r " . T h e  sovereignty approach, in De Visscher's view, is
derived from the psychological ties that exist between a nation and
its territory and is founded upon the notion of power as delineating
that territory.10 11 1234 Yet the sovereignty approach in the true sense is
valid only if one posits the supremacy of municipal law. It is
believed that the better view is to accept the primacy of
international law, at least as far as the relative distribution of
competences. It was stated in the Lotus case that "all that can be
required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which
international law places upon its jurisdiction; without these limits
112its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty".
This same minimal approach is adopted by Waldock, who wrote that
international law limits the competence of States but beyond that is
the domain of free action, ie. domestic jurisdiction, "the reserved
113domain begins where international law ends". But it is clear
that the delineation of the area of domestic jurisdiction is within
114the competence of international law. As Kelsen wrote, "the 
international legal order determines how the validity of the national
(110) Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International, 3rd ed., 1929 
(trans. by Gidel), p.51, cited in De Visscher op.cit, p.205.
(111) De Visscher op.cit. p.206. The international argument is seen 
as minimising the full human and national significance of 
territory, ibid. Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel case 
declared that sovereignty "has its foundation in national 
sentiment and in the psychology of the peoples", ICJ Reports, 
1949, pp.4, 43.
(112) PCIJ, Series A, no.10 (1927) p.18.
(113) "The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before International Legal 
Tribunals" 31 BYIL 1954, pp.96, 142.
(114) See eg. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ 
Series B no.4, p.24. Cf. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex, PCIJ Series A/B no.46, p.167, and Judge Read 
dissenting in the Anglo-Iranlan Oil Co. case, ICJ Reports,
1952, p .143.
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legal order Is restricted to a certain space and what are the
boundaries of this space".115 167* Both the reason for and the sphere of
the validity of national law are determined by the principle of
116efficacy, which is a notion of international law. It would
therefore follow that States’ rights would flow from the norms of
117international law rather than from the fact of Statehood itself.
Thus the collection of competences associated with the concept of
territorial sovereignty may be seen as derived ultimately from the
norms of the international legal order itself. But this should not
be understood so as to detract from the important social and
psychological role played by the State in the life of a community.
Sovereignty in international law reflects the need for security and
stability, but it also constitutes, in Alvarez's words, "an
institution, an international social function of a psychological 
118character". Territorial sovereignty is the answer provided by 
international law as regards the needs for security, stability and 
identity felt by a particular group within a certain area. It also 
constitutes the method by which a community may enter upon the 
international scene and by virtue of sovereign equality of States 
play a particular role in the development of the international system.
It is submitted that as regards these two functions, the concept of 
territory and the sovereignty of States associated with it has been 
enthusiastically adopted by Third World States, although without 
foregoing the advantages of the global approach.
(115) Op.cit. p.308.
(116) Kelsen, "Sovereignty and International Law" in Stankiewicz (ed.) 
op.cit. p .120.
(117) But cf. Wheaton who notes that "every State has certain sovereign 
rights, to which it is entitled as an independent moral being;
in other words because it is a State", Elements of International 
Law, 6th ed. vol.I, 1929, p.150.
(u 8) Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.4, 43.
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III - Title to Territory
The concept of title involves in essence a description of those
legal and factual elements which by virtue of the norms of
international law must be present before territorial sovereignty
may be validly acquired or maintained. It also expresses the
fullest extent of competences that may be exercised by a State over
its territory, and in this sense reflects a theoretical rather than
an actual position since States continually consent to the limitation
of their competences by agreements with other subjects of
international law. Jennings regards the primary meaning of title
as "the vestitive facts which the law recognises as creating a right".
120Title may be relative, although it will operate erga omnes, and it
121is closely linked with the notion of effective control, although 
122not inevitably so.
IV - The Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty
In classical international law, five modes
viz. occupation of terra nullius, prescription,
123and subjugation (or conquest), and these are 19203
of acquisition exist, 
cession, accretion 
further divided into
(119) Op.cit. p.4. See also Salmond on Jurisprudence. 12th ed., 1966 
p.331, where it is noted that "the title is the de facto 
antecedent, of which the right is the de jure consequent".
The Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International, 
1960, sub.voc. defines "title" as "terme qui, pris dans le sens 
de titre juridique, désigné tout fait, acte ou situation qui 
est la cause et le fondement d’un droit". See also Brownlie 
op.cit. pp.126-7.
(120) See eg. the Eastern Greenland case, PCIJ Series A/B no.53 p.46.
(121) See eg. the Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, p.829.
(122) Eg. in the case of belligerent occupation.
(123) To this some would add adjudication, see eg. Starke, 
Introduction to International Law, 8th ed. 1977, p.184, but 
cf. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law,
3rd ed. 1977, p.144.
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original or derivative modes.124 There are, however, a number of
problems associated with the traditional method of classification
based as it is on Roman law principles.125 12678* The neat doctrinal
categories are often extremely difficult to apply in practice
A set of facts may have applicability to more than one of the modes
of acquisition. This is particularly so with regard to the modes of
occupation and prescription. Theoretically, the distinction is
narked. Occupation relates to the acquisition of terra nuln,,„
by a State in an effective manner, while prescription (or more
accurately acquisitive prescription) refers to the acquisition of
territory not terra nullius by effective control. However, in many
cases the status of the territory at the relevant time may be
unsure. International tribunals have often not applied the class!
126criteria, thus leading to the suspicion that such classifications
are not of great significance although their underlying principles
will be. In addition, the status of acquisitive prescription is
127itself controversial. As far as the other modes are concerned,
228accretion (or accession) and cession, being the transfer of
129sovereignty over territory from one State to another, are 
relatively straightforward, but the status of conquest as a mode of
(124) See Oppenheim op.cit. p.546; Brownlie op.cit. pp.134-5 and
Jennings op.cit. p.6 et seq. A number of writers have stated 
that such a distinction is of little importance, see eg.
De Louter, Le Droit International Public Positif. vol.I,
1920, p.340; Verzijl op.cit. p.347 and Johnson, "Consolidation 
as a Root of Title in International Law" CLJ, 1955, pp.215, 217.
(125) See O ’Connell op.cit. p.405.
(126) See eg. the Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA p.829, The Eastern 
Greenland case, PCIJ Series A/B no.53, and the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case, ICJ Reports, 1953, p.47.
(127) See Oppenheim op.cit. p.575; Blum Historic Titles in International
Law, 1965, Chapter 2, and Brownlie op.cit. pp.1 5 6 - 1 6 3 . ~  -
(128) »'The increase of land through new formations", Oppenheim op.cit. 
p.563.
(129) Ibid p.547.
acquisition is now highly questionable. It is submitted that the
acquisition of territory by force is now accepted as illegal in 
130international law, while a treaty providing for the transfer of
131territory may be void for duress. It is thus clear that a new
132framework for the elucidation of the relevant rules is required.
Another serious defect of the classic modes that should be noted,
relates to the acquisition of title by newly emerged States. This
situation cannot be satisfactorily analysed in terms of the 
133traditional modes. The absence of any reference to the 
principle of self-determination merely compounds the problems.
It is believed that in such a situation recourse must be made 
to the fundamental rules underlying the international order and the 
interests that are manifest therein. Such interests revolve around 
the need for stability and territorial stability in particular in 
international relations, the desire to prevent illegal acts and 
situations from generating rights and thus consciously subverting 
international justice and equity and the need to accept the realities 
of State sovereignty. In addition, the positive seeking of just ends, 
such as the preservation and establishment of human rights and the 
right to self-determination, must also be brought into account.
These interests may be expressed through the media of a number of 
legal doctrines,1“*4 which are of broader scope than the exposition 13024
(130) See infra Chapter 7, p.525.
(131) See Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969, See also Yearbook of the ILC, 1963, vol.II, p.197 and 
ibid 1966, vol.II, pp.246-7.
(132) See Johnson loc.cit. p.215
(133) See infra Chapter 6 , p.368.
(134) See especially the important article by Schwarzenberger,
"Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge" in International 
Law in the Twentieth Century (ed. Gross), 1969, p.287.
of the classic modes and thus eliminate unnecessary distinctions 
at certain levels.
The doctrine of sovereignty in international law relates to
the collection of rights, powers and duties adhering to each
particular State. By virtue of this doctrine, a State may limit
135its powers and dispose of parts of its territory. Thus, the
cession of regions may be seen as a logical consequence of the
possession of sovereignty under international law. Title passes
X36by virtue of an act of sovereignty, so that the cessionary
State can only receive those rights etc. ceded by the former 
137sovereign. Similarly, territory acquired by accretion, such
as additions of land to the seashore by operation of nature, is
really acquired as a direct consequence of the sovereignty of the
State over the appurtenent land. As Schwarzenberger has noted,
"the title to newly created land rests primarily on the unilateral
assumption of jurisdiction in situations in which, for all
practical purposes, the territorial sovereign has a monopoly of 
138changes". In a sense, this relatively minor mode of acquisition 
reflects geographical reality and is attendant upon sovereignty. 
Coupled with this concept is that of effectiveness, but this 
principle is of far wider application and permeates the whole of 135678
(135) But see infra p.355.
(136) Cavaglieri notes the doctrine which declares that sovereignty 
is not transmissible between States. The cessionary State 
will exercise its power and sovereignty over the region 
rendered terra nullius by the withdrawal of the ceding State's 
sovereign power, loc.cit. p.403.
(137) See Reparation Commission v German Government, AD, 1923-4,
no.199. Huber stated in the Island of Palmas case that "it is 
evident that Spain could not transfer more rights than she 
herself possessed". 2 RIAA pp.829.
(138) Op.cit. p.292. Huber declared that the new land accrued to a 
"portion of territory where there exists an actual sovereignty 
capable of extending to a spot which falls within its sphere of 
activity". 2 RIAA, pp.829, 839.
the law of territory. Its importance is a consequence of the
structure of international law, with its fundamentally horizontal
nature and emphasis upon the State as both the creator and subject
and object of international law. In many ways, the principle of
effectiveness underlies much of international law, for it stands
as a test for the existence of particular facts which may have
particular legal consequences. All legal systems possess
mechanisms for the determination of those facts and situations to
which it is provided legal consequences will attach. International
law, however, because of its decentralised and horizontal structure,
attaches more importance to the criterion of effectiveness as a
139creator of legal results. In no sphere of international law
is this more apparent than with regard to the law relating to the
acquisition of territorial sovereignty. To such an extent is this
so, that one may regard the principle of effectiveness as the basic
applicable doctrine regarding the acquisition of territory,
although in particular cases it will operate in conjunction with
other relevant rules, such as sovereignty and recognition. Within
the category of effective control, delineated as it is by the
international community, one may find those situations previously
classified as those of occupation or prescription. Apart from the
fact that occupation in the traditional exposition of the acquisition
of territory relates only to terrajmlUu£, of which there is
. + for both it and prescription revolvevirtually none today, the test for dot-h
„„ .. „ „rtn+rnl It would seem, therefore,around the notion of effective control.
, 4»», fh« modes since the guiding principleunnecessary to so distinguish the mooes * 139
fit 420-32, and De Visscher(139) see in particular Kelsen op.cit.
op.cit. pp.318-32.
is identical. The fact that international tribunals have in 
general not analysed territorial acquisitions in terms ot these 
two categories reinforces this conclusion. De Visscher's 
discussion of the concept of consolidation by historic title 
stresses that "proven long use, which is its foundation, merely 
represents a complex of interests and relations which in 
themselves have the effect of attaching a territory or an expanse 
of sea to a given State. It is these interests and relations, 
varying from one case to another, and not the passage of a fixed 
term, unknown in any event to international law, that are taken 
into direct account by the judge to decide in concreto on the
141existence or non-existence of a consolitation by historic titles".
Thus, the crucial test is that of effective control, rather than
passage of time, and it matters not what the status of the
142territory was prior to the start of the control. As Johnson has
written, De Visscher has simplified the problem considerably for one
can now include under one heading "straightforward possession" and
143"adverse possession". As Jennings notes, this analysis "is a 
penetrating and illuminating observation of the way courts actually 14023
140
(140) it should, however, be noted that acquisition by prescription 
may be harder than acquisition by occupation, since there is 
a presumption against loss of title by the former sovereign, 
and since acquiescence by the former sovereign is required.
(141) Op.cit. p.209. See also the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,
ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.116, 138.
(142) Ibid. Prescription depends upon the possession by one State of 
the territory of another and relies upon the passage of time 
and the acquiescence of the displaced sovereign, see Johnson, 
"Acquisitive Prescription in International Law" 27 BYIL (1950) 
pp.332, 349 and 353. See also Becket, "Les Questions d’Int£r@t 
G£n£ral au point de vue juridique dans la Jurisprudence de la 
Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale" 50 HR (1934 IV)
pp.189, 218-55. Occupation does not apply to maritime areas, 
see De Visscher op.cit. p.209.
(143) Op.cit. footnote 124 p.223.
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tackle questions of title to territorial sovereignty". But one
should mention that the passage in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case
145relied on by De Visscher was really concerned with general
146acquiescence with regard to a maritime area, while the criticism
has been made that De Visscher has over-emphasised the aspect of the
"complex of interests and relations which in themselves have the
effect of attaching a territory or an expanse of sea to a given 
147State". These defects may be remedied, it is suggested, by
reliance upon effectiveness rather than consolidation as the
appropriate term. The fact that the original possession was
contrary to law rather than in pursuance of it is certainly relevant
within the context of effective control, but it is not felt that
148this in itself displaces the contention submitted. Both
occupation and prescription are primarily based upon the acquiring 
of title by virtue of effective possession and control. Although 
the time element has been seen as important for prescription, as 
distinct from occupation, it really is concerned with the effectivity 
of such possession.
The principle of effective control applies in different ways to 
different situations, but the essence is that "the continuous and
149peaceful display of territorial sovereignty ... is as good as title". 
Such control has to be exercised by the State with the intention of 1456789
(144) Op.cit. p.26.
(145) ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.116, 138-9, and see also ibid p.130.
(146) See MacCibbon, "The Scope of Acquiescence in International 
Law" 31 BYIL (1954) pp.143, 160.
(147) Jennings op.cit. pp.25-6. Emphasis added.
(148) See O'Connell op.cit. p.407. Note also Jennings' criticism 
that the notion of consolidation is based upon "the merest 
hint in the case reports" op.cit. p.27.
(149) Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 839.
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seeking control, although the latter aspect may only be evident 
after a certain lapse of time. What amounts to effective control 
will vary with regard to the circumstances of the case, for example 
the geographical nature of the region and the existence or not of
competing claims. This was expressed by Huber in the Island of Palmas
150 151case, and reiterated in the Eastern Greenland, Cllpperton
X52 153Island and Minquiers and Ecrehos cases. Nor is it necessary
154for the control to be effective equally throughout the region.
The doctrine of effectiveness has displaced the earlier doctrines of
discovery and symbolic annexation as in themselves sufficient to 
155generate title, as well as the validity of geographical contiguity
alone as the basis of title,15® while the so-called hinterland theory
as regards territory in Africa in the nineteenth century never became
157established as a viable doctrine. It should also be noted that
Article 35 of the General Act of the Congress of Berlin, 1885, laid
down that the signatories recognised the obligation to "Insure the
establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the
158coast of the African continent". 150234678
(150) 2 RIAA, pp.829, 840.
(151) PCIJ, Series A/B no.53.
(152) 2 RIAA, p.1105.
(153) icj Reports, 1953, p.47.
(154) See the Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 840. See also 
Von der Heydte, "Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual 
Effectiveness in International Law", 29 AJIL (1935) pp.448,
462-3.
(155) Ibid p.846. See also Von der Heydte op.cit. p.448 et seq.
(156) Ibid p.869. See also the Beagle Channel award HMSO (1977) 
and Jennings op.cit. pp.74-6.
(157) Hill, Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations, 1945, 
p.152. See also infra Chapter 5, and Westlake op.cit. pp.114-5.
(158) See Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States, 1951, 
pp.95-6.
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Effectiveness may also, depending on the circumstances of the
particular case, have a temporal as well as a spatial dimension.
This was most forcefully expressed by Judge Huber with regard to the
doctrine of inter-temporal law. He noted that "the growing
insistence with which international law ... has demanded that the
occupation shall be effective would be inconceivable if effectiveness
were required only for the act of acquisition and not equally for
the maintenance of the right", although it was conceded that this
stringent test would not be posed regarding territories with an
160"established order of things". Nevertheless, the requirement that
the existence of a right as distinct from its creation has to be
justified in terms of the evolving rules of international law is
161highly controversial. The better view would be to see this as only
one element in the bundle of factors relevant to the determination
of effective control. Its value would clearly be greatly minimised
. 162in the absence of a serious competitor to title. It Is also
suggested that further relevant factors with regard to the ascertain­
ment of effective control are the public or open nature of the control
alleged (a clandestine occupation could not really be considered to be
16 3effective with regard to the international community) and any
164consent or acquiescence on the part of a party directly concerned. 15960234
(159) The Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 839.
(160) Ibid, presumably a State.
(161) See eg. Jennings op.cit. pp.28-31 and Jessup, 22 AJIL (1928) 
pp.735, 739-40. See also Mlnquiers and Ecrehos case ICJ 
Reports, 1953, pp.47, 56.
(162) Note also the strong tendency not to change a "state of things" 
which actually exists and has existed for a long time", the 
Grisbadarna case, I Scott, Hague Court Reports, pp.121, 130.
(163) See Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 868 and 870.
(164) We are not referring here to consent or acquiescence as regards 
the creation of rules of international law.
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The latter element, a requirement of prescription, would appear rather 
to be of evidential value concerning effective control (if of crucial 
value) than a substantive requirement for title. Thus, the dominant 
principle regarding the acquisition of territory would seem to be 
that of effectiveness for reasons relating to stability and the nature 
of the international system. This principle comprises a series of 
elements, and clearly the more such elements are satisfied the 
stronger and more certain will the title be. But this principle,
165
which relies upon acts performed or assimilated by a State authority, 
must be seen in conjunction with the important principle of recognition.
With regard to this principle, one must distinguish between 
international recognition and bilateral recognition. In the former 
case, one is concerned with the acceptance of a particular situation 
as a valid one despite any ambiguous or illegal origin by the inter­
national community as a whole, while in the latter case one or more 
States recognise a particular situation and may therefore be estopped 
from denying the validity of the same in the future, that is the 
situation is opposable to such States but not necessarily to others.
The two may shade into one another, but it is believed that a 
fundamental distinction lies between the two. Bilateral recognition
is important as regards evidence of effective control and should
166therefore be treated as an element within that principle.
International recognition involves not only the development of rules 165*
(165) Not all such acts would operate within the context of title 
creation; see the Frontier Lands case, ICJ Reports, 1959, 
pp.209, 229, and the Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12.
See the Eastern Greenland case, PCIJ Series A/B no.53, pp.51-2.
See also Jennings op.cit. pp.38-45; Schwarzenberger op.cit. 
pp.295-6 and Blum op.cit. pp.49-52.
(166)
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of international law, but may validate situations of dubious origin,
A series of recognitions may validate an unlawful acquisition of 
168territory, for example, while the principle may be regarded as
an exception to the proposition, nemo dat quod non habet. A further
instance of what might be termed international recognition acting in
a constitutive fashion is the doctrine of uti possidetis, for this
creates a legally obligatory situation with regard to all or a defined
section of the international community. Similarly, the doctrine may
prevent effective control from founding title, as for example in the 
169Namibia situation, and may form an exception to the general rule
170that a State is free to dispose of its own territory. The impact
of a series of UN General Assembly resolutions, and this will
particularly be relevant with regard to self-determination issues,
cannot be regarded as of no value in the field of title to territory.
The use of the right of self-determination can be important as regards
title. As a manifestation through international recognition of a legal
rule it is important as a constituent of Statehood. As such it may
172deny title in situations of effective control, it imposes a duty 167*902
167
(167) Blum states that recognition "is one of the main means of 
expressing consent in international relations" op.cit. p.49, 
Schwarzenberger refers to its "wide actual, and a still 
greater potential, scope", "Fundamental Principles of 
International Law" 87 HR (1955 II) pp.195, 228.
(168) See Akehurst op.cit., p.147, but cf. Brownlie op.cit. p.173.
(169) see further infra Chapter 4, p.191.
(170) Eg. the Bantustans situation, see infra, Chapter 6, p.355.
(171) See Jennings op.cit. p.85 and Brownlie op.cit. p.164, Brownlie 
notes that the "strength of institutionalised and general 
recognition is obvious" ibid.
(172) Eg. in the Rhodesian and Bantustan situations, infra pp.355 and 352. 
Note that non-recognition does not invalidate a valid title. It 
withholds validation from a title which is invalid for some other 
reason.
45
to transfer territorial sovereignty and may be the means whereby title
173may be held pending Statehood. It has also been suggested that
the consent of the people of an area to be ceded is required to be
174shown by a plebiscite, but State practice does not really support
this argument. Also of relevance in this area are the rules relating
175to the use of force and the acquisition of territory.
V - Africa and Territory
Pre-colonial Africa did not consist of a series of European-
style States existing within fixed borders. On the other hand,
identifiable empires and States were evident in certain areas of the 
176Continent. The notion of the boundary line, however, was not 
known in Africa, while the use of frontier zones was widespread. 
Reasons for this include the lack of demographic constraint and the 
existence of a large number of natural separation zones, such as 
deserts and forests. Anene has identified three types of frontier 
in existence in the nineteenth century. The frontiers of contact 
involved situations where political and cultural groups lived and 
worked together, for example, as occurred in the West African States 
of the Yorubas and Dahomey and in the East African State of Buganda 
and its neighbours. Frontiers of separation consisted of 
geographical buffer zones physically dividing communities and not 
claimed by any authority, as for instance in the central Sudanic 
belt around States such as Bornu and the Fulani empire. The third 
type of frontier is to be explained rather in terms of enclaves or 173456
(173) See infra Chapter 6, p.368.
(174) See Oppenheim op.cit. p.551.
(175) See further infra Chapter 7, p.525.
(176) See generally Oliver and Fage, A Short History of Africa.
3rd ed. 1970; Mair, Primitive Government, 1962; ibid African 
Kingdoms. 1977, and Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (eds.),
African Political Systems. 1940.
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considerable overlapping of various groups than as conventional
borders, and the examples cited are the migrating tribes of the
177Tuareg and the Masai. Thus, frontiers possessed at this time a
178highly dynamic and fluid character. In such a situation, the
nation-State with a stable territorial base was very much the
179exception even in pre-colonial Africa. This is not to say that
the notion of a State or territorially-based centralised political
entity did not exist in Africa. Around the turn of the first
millenium, for instance, a series of States existed in the Sudanic
belt stretching across north-central Africa from the Red Sea to the
mouth of the Senegal river. And other examples may be seen at
179(a)other times and places in Africa. Not all African communities
formed States, of course. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard note that in 
addition to societies with some form of centralised authority, 
administrative machinery and judicial institutions, in which 
cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the 
distribution of power and authority, societies existed without such 
governmental machinery and with no sharp divisions of rank, status 1789
(177) The arbitrator in the Barotse award of 1905 referred to the 
"notorious instability of the tribes and their frequent 
intermingling" making a precise boundary delimitation between 
the UK and Portugal on the basis of the territorial extent of 
the Barotse kingdom impossible, see Hertslet, Map of Africa 
by Treaty, 3rd ed. 1909 vol.XII, p.1076.
(178) The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1970, pp.5-6. See
also Yakemtchouk, L'Afrique en Droit International, 1971, pp.67-9.
(179) Colson has written that "political and ethnic boundaries rarely 
coincided in pre-colonial Africa", "African Society at the Time 
of the Scramble" in Gann and Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in 
Africa, 1870-1960, vol.I, 1969, p.31. Anene has referred to 
the endemic warfare between neighbouring groups at this time, 
op.cit. p.7. The nature of African societies and their political 
structure and history are beyond the scope of this work.
(179a) See generally Oliver and Fage, op.cit. and Davidson, Africa in 
History, 1974.
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179 Cb)or wealth. ' Accordingly, the territorial aspect regarding the
respective political organisations differed. In the former case,
the administrative unit was a territorial unit and political right
and obligations were territorially delimited, while in the latter
case the unit was not a territorial one defined by an administrative
system but was instead a local community defined in terms of lineage 
179(c)ties. However, it does appear as if the concept of territory
was viewed rather differently than in Europe. Bozeman writes with
regard to ancient African and later Moslem communities that
"territorial consolidation was nowhere a major concern".
Additionally, land was traditionally seen as "the spatial expression
of social relations rather than of strategic, material or ideological
X 79(g )functions", and migrations were continually taking place.
The great African societies were neither territorial States nor nation­
states in the western sense of the terms and the personality of the 
King or paramount chief was the crucial factor in such organisations. 
Such African States were marked "by the absence either of regionally 
shared conceptions about the territorial and national configuration
of political entities or of traditionally fixed or reliable rules for
179(f)the conduct of Statecraft and intertribal relations.
(179b) Op.cit. p.5.
(179c) Ibid pp.10-11. Maine writes that the political tie of
kinship marks the start of the history of political ideas 
and the change to an alternative basis of common political 
action, such as "local contiguity", amounts to a startling 
and complete revolution, op.cit. p.76.
(179d) Conflict in Africa, 1976, p.122.
(179e) Ibid.
(179f) Ibid pp.131-2. Examples are given of the Ghana, Mali and
Gao empires in West Africa, Bantu States in Southern Africa 
and Congolese Kingdoms in Central Africa, ibid pp.132-3.
Anene notes that between most African traditional communities 
"boundaries, as lines separating States, did not exist", 
op.cit. p.5.
The Islamic conception of territory differed also from the
modern European paradigm. Flory has pointed out how territory in 
Islamic law was not connected with the State, but rather with the 
socio-religions concept of the Umma, or community founded upon the 
Moslem religion, which, unlike Christianity, did not develop a
X80dichotomy between spiritual and temporal spheres of existence. 
Territory was defined, therefore, not with regard to political power 
wielded within a delimited space as in Europe, but in terms of 
religious manifestations. The Dar el Islam was the dynamic frame­
work within which the community of believers lived and worked and
was not to be identified with State territorial sovereignty
181developed in European thought. The Dar el Islam extended as far
as the Moslem community and was thus not a static structure but a
182very flexible one, developing as the community developed.
To some extent this was recognised by the International Court
the Western Sahara case. Morocco asked the court to take
account of the special structure of the Sherifian State, founded as
it was upon the common religious bond of Islam existing among the
peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan of
Morocco through their caids or sheikhs rather than on the notion 
184of territory. The court accepted this and noted that international
law did not specify the type of structure a State had to adopt, but
at the same time the allegiance offered to the authority of the State, 180234
_______ •
(180) "La Notion de Territoire Arabe et son Application au Probleme 
du Sahara" AFDI, 1957, pp.73,76.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Ibid pp.78-81.
(183) ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12.
(184) Ibid pp.43-4.
If it was to be referable to th. sovereignty ol the ruler .... . 
clean, be real and ««nested in acts evidencing acceptance of hi. 
political authority, otherwise there will be no genuine display or 
exercise of State authority".185 Although authority was in pre. 
colonial Africa often defined in personal rather than territorial 
terms, communities were accepted as having rights over the land the 
inhabited and utilised and the role of territory was indispensable 
in the existence of such communities.186 187 in the colonial period 
the territories as colonially defined acquired a personality and 
integrity of their own, and upon independence formed the frame­
work of the new nations for the purpose of identity and sovereignty
The fundamental principle relating to decolonisation as seen by 
the African States is that of self-determination. By virtue of thi 
principle, they attained independence within a specified territorial 
space, and proclaimed the right for the peoples of the non-self- 
governing territories, ruled by minority White regimes. This 
principle also operates after independence as a guarantee of political 
independence and territorial integrity, and it is also utilised to 
express State sovereignty as regards the natural wealth and 
resources of States. It therefore ensures the demise of the non- 
self-governing territory and thereafter acts to reinforce the doctrine 
of State sovereignty.
(185) Ibid p.44. The "Mauritanian Entity" was not a legal entity 
since it was not an entity capable of availing itself of 
obligations incumbent upon its constituent elements, although 
they did possess certain rights, including rights over the 
lands through which they migrated, ibid pp.63-5. But cf.
Judge Ammoun ibid p.102.
(186) See Allott, "Boundaries and the Law in Africa" in African 
Boundary Problems, (ed. Widstrand) 1969, p.10.
(187) See Coleman, "Tradition and Nationalism in Tropical Africa"
in New States in the Modern World (ed. Kilson), 1975, pp.12-15,
African attitudes to territory are thus firmly based upon the 
traditional European concepts as expressed through the fundamental 
principles of international law, with the added emphasis of relying 
to a large extent upon the manifold principles associated with self 
determination. There has been relatively little concern with the 
classic modes of acquisition of territorial sovereignty as such but 
much analysis of the related principles dealing with secession 
Statehood, the use of force and the settlement of boundary disputes 
Although State sovereignty and territorial sovereignty rank as crucial 
starting positions, African States have paradoxically invested much 
effort in collective activities through the UN and the OAU. Stress 
upon the sovereignty of States has not discouraged an approach to 
international relations which leans heavily upon international 
institutions. Economic instability and political insecurity have 
bred both nationalism and internationalism.
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CHAPTER 2 - THE COLONISATION OF AFRICA
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the impact of
Europe upon Africa in general terms was relatively slight. Except for
certain areas, African communities retained considerable freedom for
independent development.^ In fact, the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries marked in Africa a significant stage in the development of
indigenous States as well as witnessing population movements in southern
2Africa and the rise of commercialism in West Africa. As far as
European trade with Africa was concerned, prior to 1880, it constituted
only a small part of the total foreign commerce of Europe. Hargreaves
notes that the share of trade with West Africa in Europe's overseas trade
3was under one per cent. By the late 1870s, however, the increasing 
activity in Africa by explorers, merchants, missionaries, engineers and 
soldiers led both to a greater impact upon indigenous societies and to a 
growing awareness in Europe's political capitals of the advantages to be 
derived from a more forward policy with respect to the African continent. 
No longer were the European States primarily interested in trading 
advantages and coastal forts, the radically new phase inaugurated in the 
late 1870s demonstrated a concern with territorial acquisition and the 
extension of the national sovereignties of an expanding Europe. The 
reasons for this change are many and complex and beyond the scope of this 
work, but in addition to religious, scientific, economic and Ideological 
motivations one may note the role played by territorial acquisition in
(1) Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned, vol.I, The Loaded Pause, 
1885-1889, 1974, p.5.
(2) Ibid. Note also the increasing influence in this period of Islam, 
see Oliver and Fage, A Short History of Africa, 3rd ed. 1970, p.180.
(3) Ibid p.l.
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Africa in the process of maintaining the uneasy balance of power in 
4Europe. To some extent because of this, the whole episode of the 
"scramble for Africa" was cloaked with the aura of legality and the care 
taken in preserving legal form and conforming with the principles of 
international law was very marked. This was not in the first instance 
out of a sense of duty either generally or towards the African 
populations, but rather to protect the title claimed from challenge by 
other European powers. In this process of territorial acquisition, the 
European powers observed most of the rules and formalities of inter-
5
national negotiation and treaty-making. However, where such alleged
titles went without contradiction by other European States, various
6mistakes and inadequacies went unnoticed, but where the claim was
disputed a close examination of the "title deeds" was to be expected and
any weaknesses discovered caused acute embarrassment and occasionally
7led to an abandonment of the claim.
The modes of acquisition of territory used by the European States 
with regard to African lands ranged from treaties of cession to conquest 
and the gradual transformation of the colonial protectorates, while the 
notion of spheres of influence proved of some relevance in the process. 4567
(4) See generally Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 1961, 
and Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa. 1963.
(5) Alexandrowicz, "The Role of Treaties in the European-African 
Confrontation in the Nineteenth Century" in African International 
Legal History (ed. Mensah-Brown), 1975, pp.27, 28.
(6) For example, the British claim to "Mount Mfumbiro" as falling within 
the British sphere of influence by virtue of the 1890 Anglo-German 
agreement was based on alleged treaties concluded by Stanley. In the 
event the claim was not contested and it was not until much later 
that it was discovered that no mountain of that name existed, but 
rather that Mfumbiro was the name of a plain near the imaginary 
mountain. See Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd ed. 1909, 
vol.3, p.124, and Jentgen, Les Frontieres du Ruanda-Urundi et le 
Regime International de Tutelle, 1957, pp.22-3.
(7) For example, the ultimately successful challenge to a British treaty 
made by Lugard with Nikki on the present Nigeria-Dahomey (Benin) 
border on the grounds inter alia that the African signing the treaty 
had no power whatsoever to sign, see Touval, "Treaties, Borders and 
the Partition of Africa" 7 Journal of African History, 1966, pp.279, 
281-2.
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An analysis of the methods then in operation and the way in which 
territory was acquired is of more than purely historical interest, since 
the vast majority of African borders today were in the first instance 
delimited by treaties between the European powers. Had the new African 
States decided upon independence to embark upon a general re-arrangement 
of territorial borders, as at one time seemed not improbable, the question 
of the nature of the colonial acquisitions would be of little actual value. 
However, the colonially defined frontiers were reaffirmed and upheld. 
Therefore, the process of colonial delimitation and title remains 
relevant, particularly with respect to the large number of boundary 
disputes existing in modern Africa. The parties to such conflicts 
invariably base their claims upon European treaties and the validity and
g
extent of such treaties can have important repercussions today.
The charge that the colonial partititon of Africa divided tribes and
united antagonists in uneasy relationship is easily sustained, but it is
important to note that the nation-State in the European sense did not
really develop in Africa. Fluid frontiers characterised the continent and
where identifiable States arose they invariably contained a variety of
tribal groups. On the other hand, defined communities such as the Ibos of
West Africa or the Kikuyu of East Africa did not create an administratively
centralised structure, but lived politically disorganised but culturally 
gunited. The disruptive effect, thus, of European colonisation, though 
certainly a significant factor in African history, should not be treated 
in isolation and exaggerated. 89
(8) See eg. the Gabon-Equatorial Guinea dispute, infra Chapter 8 and the 
Ethiopian-Sudan dispute, infra Chapter 8.
(9) Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1970, pp.5-12. See 
also Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, 1962, p.62, as regards the definite 
boundaries possessed by the Yoruba ethnic group.
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1 " The Modes of Acquisition of Territory in Africa in Colonial Times 
The methods of acquiring title adopted by the European powers in 
nineteenth century Africa demonstrate not only the way in which the 
international law modes of territorial acquisition were interpreted in a 
large-scale operation, but also the views of the European powers as to the 
status in international law of the Heads of the African communities 
encountered and, of course, of those communities themselves.
(1) Pe.Ç,UEatlon_agd The Concent of vini[n
The concept of t. „ .  »ulliup „ap developed lp ^
acquisition of territory by occupation, i,. the peaceable acquisition of 
sovereignty over territory othervise than by cession or succession.10 In 
order for this to occur, the territory had to be terra nulllus or a 
territoire sane «nitre in the French phrase. Thus, a determination of 
»hat entity could constitute a maître was called for. Salomon noted that 
virtually all international controversies dealing „ith the notion of the 
occupation of territory have been based upon the different »ays in which 
the res nullius has been defined.^
While i t  is  clear that certain types of territory are without doubt 
terra nullius, for eaample uninhabited areas, abandoned territories (res 
12derelicts) and areas inhabited by relatively few persons totally iacking 
in any hind of social or political organisation, there has been 
considerable ambiguity concerning the situation where the territory is 
inhabited by recognisable entities. In such cases, a number of different
( 1 0 )
( U )
(12)
See Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports. 1975. pp.ig( so gee j 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2nd ©d 1Ô73 p.180, and the Island of Palmas arbitration, 2 RIAA p.829, '
De L'Occupation des Territoires sans Maîtres. 1889, p.200
t involves the relinquishment of actual possession by the 
lonmen the intention not to resume possession, see
■ [ ; r e^ n . t l o . . l  Law, vol.l, 8th Pd. 1955, pp.579-80.
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theses have been presented.* 13 14 The view t h a+ ,6 view that peoples possessed sovereign
rights thus precluding the acquisition of their territn. kir Cerritory by means of
occupation unden international la» »aa put tor».« by , number of the 
founding fathers of the law o, nations. These included, Vitoria. Soto,
Las Casas, Ayala, Gentllis, Selden and Orotius.“  The essence of this’ 
attitude was that the acquisition of sovereignty over the lands o, .„Ch 
peoples depended upon the concept of conquest not occupation, and 
accordingly discussion centred around the notion of just »ar s„d th. 
legality of hostilities against non-Christians. The second theory 
concerning the relationship between a people and its land under inter­
national law recognised that such peoples could exercise sovereign rights 
in certain circonstances only. Vattel, for example, declared that where 
th. occupying State was in need of more land, it could acquire by 
occupation that part at the territory of indigenous wandering tribes, 
which could be deemed to be in excess of the letter's requirements. This 
followed from the obligation to cultivate the earth which meant that 
tribes could not take for themselves more land than they had need of . 15
The third approach that con be identified is the one that appeared to 
dominate throughout the later nineteenth century when Africa was bei 
divided amongst the competing European powers. This 1«________ /  ■mis thesis propounded the
(13) See Lindley, The Acquisition and Government. of Bsrimn«, .. 
International Law, 1926, PP à ï l - 2 ? r ^ w i ^ T ^International, Pub lic , v o l.l , 1925, pp.697 et s e ^ T W ^ T ^ r  „ Théorique et Pratique, sur 1 «occupation comme MnH«» d'AcaueM J— *- Territoires en Droit International. 1896. ™~~ — •~a——■ ■ r ...l g£
(14) Lindley op.cit. pp.12-14. But cf. Westlake's view that Vit-« -. * ' "and other theorists were not so much impugning the t i t  * * Soto»and Portugal as trying to influence their conduct f Paln
orLPublic IntegflUonal^Law, 1914, p.139. B l a c k s t o ï T ^ s l ï f ^ f r ^  only deserts and uncultivated lands could be obtain«* , area that occupation, cultivated lands being acquired by means ° fcession. Commentaries on the Laws of England, ^  1765 pp6l06°7
(15) Lindley op .c it, p.17. See also Vattel, The Law of Nati™* . .  ...Principles of Natural Law, 1916 ed, pp,37^Tand 85Hf----~~°
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view that the organised tribes or peoples of non-European !ands had no
sovereign rights over their territories and thus no sovereign title which
could be used to bar acquisition ol title by means of effective occupation.
The Inhabitants, therefore, were merely factually and not legally in
occupation of the territory, which could be treated as terra nulllus and
acquired by any State in accordance with the requirements of international
law. Foremost among such theorists was Westlake, who took the view that
government was the international test of civilisatinn16 ^v-iviiisation and that those
communities unable to furnish a government readily recognisable as such to 
western eyes could not hold territorial title.16“ This marked the high 
point of the exclusivity concept of the State in international la. as 
fostered by nineteenth century positivism.17 Oppenhelm noted that "only 
such territory can be the object of occupation as belongs to no State 
whether it is entirely uninhabited, for instance an island, or inhabited 
by natives whose community is not to be considered a State".18 Jennings 
has written that occupation was accepted as "the appropriation by a State
(16) Op.cit. pp.143-5. See also Lawrence, The Principles of International 
Law, 7th ed. 1929. ~  ~~ ~ -
(16a> Westlake perceived such a government partly in terms of the
preservation of security, but "when people of European race come 
into contact with American or African tribes, the prime necessity 
is a government under the protection of which the former may carry 
on the complex life to which they have been accustomed in their 
homes", op.cit. p.143. See also Jennings, "The Progress of 
International Law", 34 BYIL, 1958, p.334.
(17) See Alexandrowicz, The European-African Con frontatinn, 1973  ^ p 6
Lorimer declared that recognition of State-existence depends on the intent of the receiving party to reciprocate and non-Christian States could not be expected to provide th is, The Institu tes of the Law of Nations, v o l.I , 1883, pp.113-25* He also noted that S tates’ relative value depended on a number of factors, including "moral and in tellectual qualities", ibid, pp,182-8« Wheaton wrote that "the public law, with sligh t exceptions has always been,and s t i l l  is  limited to the c iv ilised  and Christian people of Europe or to those 
of European origin", Elementg j ^ Intern at lonal Law, 8th ed. 1866pp.17-8. See also Kent, Commentary on International_Law, 2nd ed
1878, p.8, and Pbillimore, Commentaries upon international Law,
3rd ed. vol.I, 1879, pp.23-4.
(18) Op.cit. p.555. See also Brierly, The_ Lj.w.of Nations. 6th ed. 1963,
p.163.■'
of a territory which is not at the time subject to the <
J Cl to the sovereignty of any
State..., Natives living under a tribal oreanisatirm«ax organisation were not regarded
as a State for this purpose" . 19
The problem of terra aulllu. .as examined ia the oral pleadiaes ta 
the yesterajjahar, case aad ia the opiate» the lateraatl„„al Court. 20 
the court had beea revested to aas.ar two dueetioaa, of „hich the 
stated, ”».s Western Sahara („to d. Oro aad Sakiet „  B.mra> ,, ^  ^  o(
coloalsatioa by Spaia a territory belong!», to ao oae (terra auliius)?. .21
Ia the pleadiags. Ambassador Bedjaoui oa behalf of the a i „  ,tae Algeria» goverameat
particularly carefully aaalysod the coacept of terra aullius. It was 
emphasised that the concept linked with the acquisition of territory by 
occupation alone constituted a basis for all the imperialisms and all the
phenomena of oppression in the history of ciillisation It ... a* * *■ w«s a device
which involved the "thingification" of numerous peoples since it divorced
them from the process of territorial sovereignty. 22 The original function
of the concept and its most valuable success concerned the regulation of
international relationships with respect to the peaceful extension of
State sovereignty to uninhabited areas, such as polar regions, deserts and
new islands, but it became perverted by application to inhabited
territories. In Roman Antiquity, any territory which was not Roman w
terra nullius. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries any territor
which did not belong to a Christian sovereign was terra «»in .ra nuHius, and in the
nineteenth century any territory which did not belong to a civilised
23
nulllua. Such a hlatorlcal survey js uaad to demonstrate howwas terra
<19> The Acquisition of Territory in International r.... 1063 2o
(20) ICJ Reports, 1975, p.12.
(21) General Assembly resolution 3293 (XXIX).
(22) Pleadings, CR.75/18, p.29.
(23) Ibid, pp.36-55. See also Pleadings CR.75/19, pp,2-23
la* has followed on meehl, from power, , U 1.  the development the 
concept 1» the nineteenth century saw It primarily .a .  method of 
adlustms relationships between the col„„lsi„e po. er8 them8elves, rat„er 
than as between the coloniser and the colonised.
It was utilised to emphasise that night was rlrht 24 ,ign . in the course
Of tine, Europe« rivalries precipitated what Bedjaoul termed the over­
heating of the concept of terra nullius and led to the development of 
effective occupation as a method of ac,„lring territory not tho
sovereignty of a civilised State.25 The endogenous function of the 
concept, that is  in Its regulation of the distribution of territories 
between imperial powers, was reflected in the attitudes of the Berlin 
Conference of 1881-5 convened to regulate the ■ ■ scramble for Africa".
These were characterised by the Algerian agent In the statement that 
"a territory owned b, no one, and thus „pen to occupation by ,„y E„ropaan 
colonising State, was an, territory which that aame State decided to
regard as such, with the agreement of the other States of the European 
20club". In accordance with this approach, it was claimed that in the
late nineteenth century the distinctions between occupations of terra
nullius and conquest, cession and acquisitive prescription of other
territories were "ruthlessly set aside by the practice of States and
27appeared ridiculously unreal". The practice of entering intn „into agreements
with indigenous groups had the sole purpose of being opposable to the 
other European States, which could not then claim the particular territory 
as terra nullius.
(24) Pleadings, CR.75/18, pp.33-4,
(25) Pleadings, CR.75/19, pp.4-5.
(26) Ibid, p.39,
(27) Ibid, p.36.
(28) Ibid, p,17.
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This critique of the use of the concept of
ncept of terra nuilius as the legal
spearhead of European colonisation in the last century is , ,entury is a valuable one
and is a reminder of the -inf-tm,,..
intimate relationship between la., po.er and
territory, as .ell as demonstrating one aspect of the manner in .h,ch 
European international la. began to achieve an almost universal
application in practice. Ho.ever, the degree of i t ,  an
X its accuracy can be
seriously questioned. In fact, a perusal of state practice of t„
vtacriee of the period
reveals that Africa .as not regarded as terra n„iu „s ,us and that occupation
was not therefore available as a mode of a a°de °f squiring legal title to
territory. Territory .as acquired on the continent primarily hy means of 
agreements of cession with local leaders 29
"  "ee”s Bedjaoui by
concentrating upon the European scramble aspect, or the „„a* «r tne endogenous aspect,
has minimised the erogenous aspect, or the relationship bet.een the 
European po.er and the colonised territory to such an orient that the 
doctrine of occupation of terra nuilius under international la. has become 
confused with the political occupation (In the sens, of colonisation) of 
Africa. To this «tent, he has apparently misunderstood the scope o, the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-5 »hich did not establish that the method of
acquiring territory in Africa .as by .ay of occupation (in «, ,
' tne legal sense)
but rather used the term "occupation., as a general expression comprising 
.1 1 modes of acquisition, to be Interpreted synonymously »lth acqul8ltlon 
or appropriation.
in fact, the International Court made the same point T+ .P°«it. i t  declared
that although "occupation" was used often in a n o n - t « ^  ,ennical sense to
mean acquisition of sovereignty, this did not necessarily or \
signify that sovereignty was actually acquired by wav «f-----;---- - -------- — ----— ---------- — —....... ........ * y of an occupation of '
OD c it p .34. See Alexandrowicz o p .c it. footnote 5, p.64. (29) O'Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. 1970, v o l .l ,pp!408-9 and sources therein cited.
a.* Tudee Ammoun was guilty of the same misinterpretation. See <30> I S  ¿.ports, 1975, PP .12 , 86 and ICJ Beports, 1971, pp. 16 , 86.
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a terra nullius in the legal sense of these expressions, 31 32
As regards Western Sahara, the Algerian argument could in fact lead
only to one result, namely, that under the international law of the period
the territory was indeed terra nullius. This made the conclusion
inevitable that "it is enough for Western Sahara to have been colonised
for one to be obliged.... to infer inevitably that Spain and Europe had
considered it to be terra nullius, totally disregarding the owner of the 
32territory". Algeria, however, was unhappy at this conclusion, which
would appear to have rendered the request to the International Court
redundant since it required a positive response to the first question and
33thus no consideration of the second question. Accordingly, it suggested 
two alternative lines of proceeding, both of them of significance. On the 
one hand, it was proposed that colonialist law be disregarded and 
reference made to the legal system operative in the area at the relevant 
time, while on the other it was postulated that the application of inter­
temporal law with consequent recourse to the principles developed by 
international law might provide a satisfactory answer to the problems of 
the situation. Both of these solutions were methods of getting around 
the problem posed by the view that Western Sahara was terra nullius at 
the time of Spanish colonisation and bringing to the fore the crucial role 
to be played by the wishes of the population regarding its political role. 34
The other States involved in the Sahara case appear to be unanimous 
in their conclusion that the territory was not at the relevant time terra 
nullius, 35 but their reasons for this were not identical. Spain had
(31) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 39.
(32) Pleadings, CR,75/19, p.40.
(33) The request stated that "if the answer to the first question is in 
the negative, (2 ) what were the legal ties between this territory 
*md the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?"
(34) These solutions will be examined infra, p.97 et seq.
(35) Pleadings, CR.75/6, p.23.
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declared before the UN General Assembly that it had never regarded the
36territory as terra nullius. In its written statement, it noted that an
area was terra nullius if not under the sovereignty of a State authority, 37
while the issue was not discussed in the Spanish submissions in the oral
38pleadings. In view of the fact that Spain denied that either Morocco
or the Mauritanian entity possessed sovereign rights over the Saharan
territory at the time in question, or that the tribes of the area
constituted a State, it should logically have accepted that the territory
39was terra nullius. This it did not do and thus its position remained 
to that extent confused and ambiguous.
Morocco and Mauritania both criticised the Algerian approach as 
equating terra nullius with colonised territories or territories that were
being colonised. Morocco declared that the Algerian argument was "a real
40piece of intellectual conjuring", while Mauritania held that the inter­
national law of the period should not be represented as worse than it was.
A humanistic stand did exist, it was averred, which ensured the consent of 
populations in the process of territorial acquisition in order to render
41
the cession of sovereignty valid. Despite the Moroccan-Mauritanian view 
that Algeria had over-extended the concept of terra nuilius and dismissed 
the importance of the numerous agreements made between the colonising powers 
and the inhabitants of the territories concerned, they appeared to differ 
slightly as to why Western Sahara was not terra nullius during the period
(36) A/C.4/SR.2130, p.24. See also Judge Dillard, ICJ Reports, 1975, 
pp.12, 123,
(37) Spanish Written Statement, paras. 264 and 265.
(38) Except for a peripheral reference to the concept in discussing the 
development of spheres of influence and protectorates, Pleadings 
CR.75/23, p.58.
(39) A/C.4/Sr.2130, p.24. During this discussion in the 4th Committee,
Spain appeared to be suggesting at one point that the territory was 
not terra nullius since "the Sahara was populated by Saharans", but 
this view of terra nullius as purely uninhabited areas was dropped ibid.
(40) Pleadings, CR.75/26, p.45.
(41) Pleadings, CR.75/29, pp.31-2.
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in question. Morocco declared that the territory was not terra nullius
since Morocco was at the time a recognised State and its presence in the
territory was thus in the nature of State sovereignty, and that this
42automatically disposed of the problem. At a later stage, this attitude
was carefully modified to take account of Mauritania's claims in the
light of the accord reached between the two. Mauritania all along
maintained that the territory was not terra nullius since international
law at the time recognised the legal personality of tribes and therefore
did not regard their lands as terra nullius, and the part of Western
Sahara linked with the so-called Mauritanian entity clearly fell into 
44this category. Morocco, therefore, appeared to adopt a slightly 
ambiguous median position between the Statist approach of Spain on the one 
hand and the wide approach preferred by Mauritania on the other.
A number of judges of the International Court in the Sahara case 
were a little unhappy as regards the nature of the question posed on terra 
nullius. Judge Gros maintained that the question as to whether the 
territory was terra nullius at the time of Spanish colonisation was not a 
legal one, but purely academic and served no useful purpose. This was 
because none of the States interested in the territory's status at the 
time of colonisation had relied upon the concept of terra nullius. 42 35
(42) Moroccan Written Statement, Introduction pp , 6 et seq., Part I p.9 
and Part II pp.99-100. See also Pleadings CR.75/12, pp.2-4.
(43) Morocco declared that "the court will ascertain that the Sahara was 
not terra nullius at the time of Spanish colonisation, and that it 
was, without any geographical void, an aggregation of Moroccan and 
Mauritanian lands, where Moroccans and Mauritanians exercised 
political authority in different forms and places", Pleadings, 
CR.75/6, p*8 .
(44) Pleadings, CR.75/17, p.17. Mauritania noted that there was no problem of res nullius in the part of the territory linked with Morocco since the latter was an entity recognised as a State at 
the time, ibid.
(45) ICJ Reports, 1975, P P > ^ , 74, His contention that States at the 
time spoke only of zones of influence is not strictly accurate,
ibid.
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It was, therefore, a sterile exercise to ask the court to discuss a
46hypothetical situation. Judge Petren declared that the question was
without object in the context of the Western Sahara case, and it was
pointless and inappropriate for the court to answer it . 46 7 Judge Dillard
emphasised that Spain's original title was not in question nor had any
State in fact asserted that Western Sahara was at the relevant time terra
nullius. 48 4950 However, the question was of some legal relevance in the case
since it served as an introduction to the second question dealing with
the alleged Moroccan and Mauritanian ties with the territory. A
determination that the territory was terra nullius would automatically
dispose of the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims. To this extent, the first
question was of interest. As Judge Dillard pointed out, it "helped clear
49the decks for question II". It helped establish the requisite framework
for the examination of the Moroccan and Mauritanian contentions. This
incidentally, raises the problem as to why two questions, since one
question dealing with the legal status of the territory at the date of
50colonisation would appear to have been adequate. The answer to this is 
to be sought in the political processes leading up to the adoption of 
resolution 3292 (XXIX) and the contending pressures from the various 
parties, which created the guidelines for the court’s advisory opinion.
In any case, the opportunity it provided for an analysis of the nature of 
terra nullius was fortunately grasped.
(46) Ibid, p.75.
(47) Ibid, pp.113 and 114.
(48) Ibid, p.123. See also ibid, p.74,
(49) Ibid, p.124.
(50) See Judges De Castro, ibid p.171, Dillard ibid p.124, Gros ibid 
p,74 and Ignacio-Pinto ibid p,78.
In its functional examination of the concept of terra nullius, the 
court ignored any reference to the processes of colonisation and declared 
that the concept was a legal term of art used in connection with the 
mode of acquiring sovereignty over territory known as occupation. 51 it 
was also clearly emphasised that the question had to be understood in the 
light of the law in force at the time of colonisation. 52 The court noted 
the differences of opinion between jurists regarding the concept, which 
have been briefly noted above, and then proceeded to place full emphasis 
upon the State practice of the era in question. The court unambiguously 
asserted that "the State practice of the relevant period indicates that 
territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organisation were not regarded as terra nullius" . 53 54 This posthumous 
rehabilitation of the classic authors of international law and side­
stepping of those late nineteenth century theorists denying any form of 
international legal personality inherent in non-European style State 
entities, places considerable stress upon the numerous agreements 
concluded between the European colonising powers and the local 
communities. It elevated them from the status of mere methods by which
European powers demonstrated their occupation of a particular territory
54as against each other to documents of a central character in the
55
acquisition of sovereignty over territory.
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(51) Ibid, p.37.
(52) Ibid.
<53) Ibid. This, however, does raise a problem not c o n s i d e r  kcourt and that is the extent of the terra in question J by the of a sparsely inhabited area, such as parts of South«™ I* *he case Patagonia in the early nineteenth century, one mie-ht- k. Jfrica and an area which is  partly terra nullius and p a r t l f o c L ^ J T *  Witha fashion as to render classification of the ♦  pied in sucha complicated matter. territory as a whole
(5 4) See for example Pleadings, CR.75/19, p .1 7 (Algeria)
(55) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 39. Cf. Judge Huber in the *
Palmas case, 2 R1AA, pp.829, 858.
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Agreements dismissed as "trinket treaties"56 or "glass-bead"
57 _ „treaties therefore did have legal significance 58 t v ,» js * a iuucance. The unanimity of the
court's opinion reinforces this determination of the situation. As far
as Western Sahara was concerned, the court declared that the territory
was not terra nullius on the grounds that the inhabitants, although
nomadic, were socially and politically organised with chiefs competent to
represent them and that Spain recognised this. Spain had all along
treated its acquisition of the territory as achieved by virtue of a series
of agreements with the independent tribes of the area. In fact its
decree of 26 December 1884, treated by the court as the starting date of
the time of colonisation, proclaimed the establishment of a protectorate
based upon local agreements and as Judge Dillard noted, one cannot
59protect a terra nullius. For this Judge, it was the nature of the 
Spanish presence as expressed through numerous treaties of protection 
that constituted a controlling factor. What might have been the case 
and the court's attitude had Spain not signed such agreements remains 
open to speculation, and it is not clear from the opinion whether the 
court felt that the general rule regarding the existence of organised
tribes would have sufficed.
In any event, it does seem that the conclusion of treaties of 
protection constitutes a recognition of personality both of the ruler and 
of the people concerned and therefore eliminates the possibility of the 
area in question being considered a terra nullius. The suggestion by
*v,» Toi and of Palmas case that agreements with rulers of Judge Huber in tne .- -— -
(56)
(57)
(58)
Pleadings, CR.75/19, p.18 (Algeria).
P l e a d i n g s, CB.75/29, p.32 (Mauritania).
For examples of such State practice see Lindley op.cit pn 31 44 
and Alexandrowicz op.cit, footnote 17. See also the succeeding ’
section. .
(59) ICJ Reports , 1978, pp.12, 124.
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peoples "not recognised as members of the community of nations", while 
not amounting to titles in international law, "are nonetheless facts of 
which that law must in certain circumstances take account" , 60 can be seen
as too tentative, indeed, such agreements can be seen as constituting 
recognition ol membership of the community of nations. The, most 
certainly mark acceptance of the contracting party as representing an 
organised tribe or people by the relevant Europe«, po„ r and thus 
negating the possibility of a terra nulliua situation.
Occupation as a method of obtaining title to territory was thus only 
open as regards uninhabited territories or territories inhabited only by 
a number of individuals not constituting a social or political
aggregation. 61 Where, in Lindley's words, "the inhabitants exhibit
62collective political activity" the acquisition could only have been 
achieved by way of cession or conquest or prescription.
(2) Cession
It thus appears that the prime method of acquiring territory 
in Africa in the period of colonisation „as by way of cession. This 
raises questions as regards the status of both contracting parties and 
with respect to the legal quality of the agreement concerned. Slnce the
existence of sovereignty and of political organisation excluded the 
possibility of treating Africa a, terra a „ » lu„, tho Europ(!1M haa
(60)
(61)
2 RIAA pp.829, 858.
For example, Australia, see Evatt, 
Australia and New Zealand", Grotian "The Acquisition Society Papers, of Territory106 8 , pp.16, in18,
(62) Op.cit. p,45.
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resort to bilateral treaties as a means of
g 3
local sovereign.
acquiring territory from the
Tha General Act o£ the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 Itself recognised 
implicitly the existence of African sovereign entitles. Article 1 noted
that the principle of freedom of trade and navigation In“vibaxion in the "conventional
basin of the Congo" would only operate in the territories „tories of an independent
sovereign State if approved by such State.64 The core o-p „e core of the General Act
revolved around the principles enunciated m  Articles 34 and 3 5. The 
former declared that any power taking possession of land on the coasts of 
Africa, or establishing a protectorate there, must notify the other
signatory powers, while the latter provision stipulated that the signatory
powers "recognise the obligation to ensure the establishment of authority
in the regions occupied by them on the coast, of the African continent
sufficient to protect existing rights and, as the case may be, freedom of
trade and of transit under the conditions agreed unon" 65 t,B u upon • These provisions
were, It should be emphasised, concerned with the relations of the European 
powers inte_r_se and not with the direct acquisition of territory from the 
African sovereign. It denoted that In any territory acquired on the 
African coastline, the European powers agreed amongst themselves that 
effective occupation was to be the norm. O'Connell has written that this 
indicated also what was Involved In the notion of effective occupation, vis.
(63) Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 5, p.64. It should be noted that 
what was acquired was the title to the land of the entity, or 
territorial sovereignty, not private law rights over land in that 
territory« This was expressly proclaimed in a number of treaties, 
those with the Kafir Bulloms, 1827, and the King of Combo, 1840. 
Se© Hertslet op*cit# vol*I# pp*34, 12t 125, 137 et sscj. Th©
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared that "a mere change 
in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of 
rivate owners" Amodu Tliani v Secretary of the Southern Provinces 
^1921) 2 AC 299.” See also Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 5, p.52.
See Bindley op.cit. pp.32-3. This proviso was inserted in view of 
the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar, ibid. A report presented to 
the Conference by the Commission noted that "with regard to the 
native princes, the majority have already alienated their rights of 
sovereignty and with the others it will be right and possible to 
arrive at equitable arrangements", ibid p.33.
(65) Ibid, p.144 and Hertslet op.cit. vol,II p.468.
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the display of suffioient authority to protect acquired rights. 66 while
this would be of use lu cases of occupation of terra nullius, it cannot he
taken to specify the declaration of Africa as terra nullius. The BerIln
Conference67 can he seen as a turning point in European-African 
68
relations. Although the conference did not itself partition Africa, hut
rather was intended to »Unit the effects of the scrawling on European
relationships»69 it did involve an institutionalisation of the process of
acquiring territory in the African continent. And this process, as
Alexandrowicz has correctly stated, »was l„ the first instance not a race
for the occupation of land by original title but a race for obtaining
derivative title deeds which the European powers had to acquire
according to the rules of international law relating to negotiation and
70
conclusion of treaties". In the case of the Cameroon« territory, for
example, Britain had intended to acquire the region but before 
acted Germany signed a treaty with the local chief placing the
it had 
territory
under its protection. The title acquired by Germany, in late 1883, was 
not disputed by Britain. Had the area been regarded as terra nullius, 
the mere signing of a document would not have been sufficient and there 
would therefore have been scope for Britain to recoup the situation. 71 
Similar races took place between Britain, France and Germany on the Niger 
and in each case the aim was to obtain treaties with local chiefs, which
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
Op.cit. p.417.
See generally f-™w«V The Berlin West Africa Conference 1884-5. 
and Ward, The Great International Share-out, 1958. 1942,
Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 17, p.6 ,
Hargreaves, "Towards a History of the Partition of Afr^u« 
of African History, 1960, pp.97, 99. a 1 Journal
Op.cit. footnote 17, p.7.
Lindley, op.cit. pp.34-5.
would give t i t le .  None of this vast area of West-Central Africa was
72acquired by occupation alone. Lindley declares that "the territorial 
rights of the European powers in Africa were in general those which they 
had obtained by cession from the native chiefs" . 72 3
Since in the case of a cession the cessionary State receives such
title as is possessed by the ceding party, the nature and status of the
latter is of great importance to the former. No serious problem will in
general arise where the cessionary party is accepted as a subject of
international law or, in Lindley’s words, is "an advanced sovereign" . 74
An example of such a transaction affecting colonised territory would be
the sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States in 1916.75 76 in
addition, in 1907 and 1908 treaties, King Leopold as the "Hoi-Souverain
du Congo" ceded to Belgium "la souveraineté des territoires composant
l’Etat Indépendant du Congo avec tous les droits et obligations qui y
76sont attaches". However, where the chiefs or leaders of indigenous
communities are involved, issues as to capacity may arise. In a number
of treaties, African rulers specifically declared the powers they
possessed. For example, in a 1840 treaty with Britain, it was stipulated
that "all sovereignty of the before specified territory is now vested in
the said King of Combo and has descended to him from his ancestors" . 77 78
In a treaty of 1861, the ruler of Lagos was deemed to be "King in the
78usual African signification". In the general form of treaties used by
(72) Ibid pp.35-6. Further examples provided by Lindley as to the 
acceptance of the acquisition of title by means of treaties of 
cession signed with tribal chief include Bechuanaland, South-West 
Africa, East African territories and the Congo, ibid pp.36-9.
(73) Ibid p.34.
(74) Ibid p.166.
(75) 110 BFSP p.843
(76) Lindley op.cit. P.167.
(77) Hertslet op.cit. vol.I, p.12.
(78) Ibid pp.92-3. See also Alexandrowicz op.cit, footnotes, 
pp.38-43.
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African companies in dealing with local rulers, cessions were to be "with
79all sovereign rights". Problems arose in certain cases because of
uncertainty as to the precise status of the ruler with whom the European
State (or company) was making the particular agreement. In the Bulama
arbitration, Britain claimed that certain territories in West Africa
had been ceded to it in 1792, but the arbitrator held that those
purporting to cede were in fact under Portuguese sovereignty and that
80therefore the cession was invalid. A similar situation occurred in the 
Delagoa Bay award of 1875, as certain chiefs had purported to cede land 
on the eastern coast of southern Africa to Britain in 1823. The cession
was declared to be invalid, since the chiefs were under Portuguese 
 ^ 81sovereignty.
An attempt to analyse the various types of rulers or chiefs from the 
point of view of external sovereignty was attempted in the Barotae arbitral 
award of 1905 concerning the western boundary of the Barotse Kingdom. It 
was noted that "a Paramount Ruler is he who exercises governmental
authority according to (customary law), that is, by appointing the
subordinate chiefs or by granting them investiture, by deciding disputes
/  « bv deposing them when circumstances call for it andbetween these cnieis, uy b
82
by obliging ‘hem t0 « coS"lse W B  as thelr Parai”0,mt Ruler"- Tha
arbitrator examined tha tact, regarding the payment o£ tribute, the
a # trihai disputes and the exercise of authority in general, butsubmission oi tx^ wo-j. r
eventually decided to stipulate an arbitrary boundary in view of the
of tribes making it impossible to establish a;onstant intermingling
... ■ The auestion of capacity was also at issue regardingirecise delimitation. ** h ___:___________________________________ _
(79) Ibid, pp.137 et eeq.
(80) Bertslet op.cit. vol.III, p.988.
(81) Ibid, p.996.
(82) Ibid, p.1074.
a treaty made by Britain with the ruler of Bousaa over territory to be 
ceded on the Niger. France established that that chief was in fact
71
subordinate to another at Nikki, and a race ensued to gain the superior
83chief’s signature on a treaty of cession. Similar situations arose
respecting the cession of land at Assab Bay to Italy in 1880-1 and the
84following year in Madagascar over the cession of land to France.
In a number of treaties, the ceding party expressly stated that he 
was in no way dependent upon an external power. In a treaty of 1888 
between the UK and the Kingdom of Igbessa, it was proclaimed that the
85latter was "perfectly independent and pays tribute to no other power".
In the same year, the chiefs of Keta stated that their kingdom was also
86perfectly independent and paid tribute to no other power. In a treaty
of 1880 between France and the country of Kita, the chiefs, notables and
inhabitants of Kita expressly declared that they were independent of any
foreign power and this was repeated with respect to the chiefs of Benito 
87in 1883.
In order to transfer title in strict accordance with the international 
rules of cession, the treaty has to be entered into with such persons or 
institutions as, according to the law of the community, possessed the 
capacity to make the cession. In the Delagoa Bay case, Portugal objected 
to one of the treaties relied upon by Britain on the grounds that the
88hi f concerned lacked capacity according to the law and custom of Tembe.
(83) Lindley, op.cit. p.170.
(84) Ibid, pp.170-1.
(85) Hertslet op.cit. vol.I, p.105.
. 106 See also similar statements with regard to the Ibu
(86) Ibi , P ^  ¿ingdom of Jbaro and the Kingdom of Ondo, also in
southern Nigeria, ibid, pp*107-8.
„ op.cit. footnote 17, pp,34-5, Further examples
<87) ^  are .ls° cited, ibid pp.35-6 .
(88) footnote 80. S*e also Lindley op.cit. p . m .
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In certain cases, the agreement itself specified that the necessary
constitutional requirements of the community with regard to the cession
89of land had been complied with. In legal form at least, the cessionary
power had to be able to demonstrate that the person making the cession
had the capacity so to act. The greater the rivalry between the European
powers in the particular region concerned, the greater this need appeared.
One may note that in the Report on the Insurrection in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate, it was stated that "in (all] treaties from the foundation of
the Colony....to the latest treaty made in 1895, the character of the
chiefs as the owners and sovereigns and as independent contracting powers
90
is unequivocally and universally recognised".
Since such agreements were intended to constitute binding obligations 
on the parties, it was generally necessary to show that the local ruler 
appreciated the nature of the transaction, otherwise the treaty might be 
invalid. This was clearly demonstrated in the Lamu arbitration of 1889. 
The arbitrator rejected a German claim to the territory on the ground 
that the agreement purporting to cede the island of Lamu was not in 
writing and was therefore inadequate. He declared that "the adoption of
the written form is particularly necessary in dealings with the
governments of, but little-civilised, nations, which often only attach
91binding force to promises made in a solemn form or in writing".
This would appear to be going a little too far and it is suggested that
Lindley's rider that "any solemn form which is recognised by the laws and
92traditions of the native society should be equally effective", is
(89) See the treaty between France and the King of Comendo 1687- thagreement by the King and Chiefs of Sierra Leone to the cesain V  
land to King George III of Britain in 1788; the treaty between °f 
Britain and the King of North Bulloms in 1821 and the treaty betwe*« 
Britain and the King of Brekama in 1827, Alexandrowica on Mi-
footnote 17, pp.39-40.
(90) UK Parliamentary Papers, 1899, voi.60, p.15 (C.9388),
(91) Hertslet op.cit, vol.XII» p.894.
(92) Op.cit. p.172.
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preferable. That African communities were capable of understanding the
binding nature of agreements with other communities is quite clear.
Lugard for example, believed he had found the equivalent of the European
concept of a treaty as a binding arrangement in the ceremony of blood
brotherhood. 93 The more significant question that followed was whether
in practice such communities had consented to the particular treaties
involving the cession of territory or the creation of a protectorate, or
whether indeed such consent was seen as necessary. To take the latter
point first, it does seem as if it was established that the contracting
African party had clearly to comprehend the nature of the transaction.
Lord Salisbury in 1889 discussing the distribution of Portuguese flags
to chiefs who appeared in ignorance of the possible interpretation of
vassalage involved in the acceptance of such gifts, stated that "Her
Majesty's Government cannot recognise any claims which may be hereafter
advanced on the part of Portugal to sovereignty over territories in the
Nyassa districts, based upon the distribution of flags to the j^nnrarvt
native chiefs" . 94 The 1893 Convention between the UK and the South
African Republic stated that the UK would not recognise any agreement
between the latter and the Swazis relating to South African protection
unless it could be shown that the Swazi Queen Regent and Council understood
95the nature, terms and conditions of such an agreement. In fact, a large 
number of treaties expressly stipulated that the particular African rulers 
had understood the terms and effects of the agreement in question. In the 
treaty between Britain and the Chiefs and headmen of the Congo River of 
1834 the latter stated that they understood the agreement and considered 
it binding 96 The many agreements entered into by the Royal Niger Company
(93) The Rise of an East African Empire, 1893, voi.II, pp.33. 579 ef seq
(94) 81 BFSP pp.995-7. Emphasis added.
(95) 85 BFSP p.680,
(96) 47 BFSP p.540.
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contained a stipulation, one iorm of which declared that, "We, the
undersigned, are witnesses to the marks of the [chiefs] and also vouch
for their understanding what they have signed.... £and^] do hereby declare
that the foregoing agreement was duly and correctly explained to ¡[them]
97and that they fully understood it". Some of the agreements made by
this company also included a declaration that the Chiefs had entered into
98the particular arrangements "of their own free will and consent".
However, knowledge does not automatically or always indicate free consent,
and one interesting indication of the true situation is provided by the
declaration of the US delegate to the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 which
was sought to be added to the protocol of the final Act. It was stated
that "modern international law steadily follows the road which leads to
the recognition of the right of native races to dispose freely of
themselves and of their hereditary soil. Conformably to this principle,
my Government would willingly support the more extended rule one which
should apply to the said occupation [of territor£J in Africa, a principle
looking to the voluntary consent of the natives of whose country
possession is taken Jj>y treaty] in all cases where they may not have
99provoked the act of aggression". The fact that this view did not receive 
support at the Conference, and bearing in mind that the US did not 
ultimately ratify the final Act of the Conference, would seem to point to 
an ambiguous approach to the question of consent by the various African 
Chiefs. In a number of cases, it is probable that what appeared to be free 
consent would, upon examination, turn out to be something rather less. 
Alexandrowicz, perhaps a little optimistically, concluded that "it must be 
assumed that the principle of voluntary consent was at least tacitly 
accepted by the Conference". 97810
(97) Hertslet op.cit. vol.I, pp.137 et seq.
(98) Ibid p.142.
(99) Ibid p.VI.
(100) Op.cit, footnote 17, p,47. The practical question of the extent to 
which consent was actually forthcoming in particular situations is 
beyond the scope of this work.
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While duress would 1» modern International law vitiate a treaty, 101 102
the issue was less certain with regard to nineteenth century practice
regarding the colonisation of Africa + 0 + *a ftirxca. m  fact, State practice tends to
show that treaties imposed bv force .pusea oy force upon indigenous communities were still
regarded as valid. In 1681, lor example, a French army Invaded Tunisia
and a French general with an armed escort surrounded the palace el the Bey,
giving hi. lour hours to sign a treat, placing Tunisia „»der Fr0„ch
protection. The Bey signed under protest and In the presence ol French 
102power. Lindley notes that there seemed to be no case in which a treaty 
made by »a member of the International Family** with -*a backward people- 
was objected to on the ground that its conclusion was obtained by force. 103 *
The approach that the treaties of cession with local rulers were
purely private arrangements having regard to the status, or rather lack of
it, of those rulers under international law, cannot really be maintained
in view of the large amount of practice on this point. To emphasise this,
one may refer to the situation regarding colonial protectorates. Lindley
has pointed out that "it is difficult to see how, having regard to the
universality of the practice grounding a colonial protectorate upon an
agreement with the local authority, and of the importance attached by the
European powers to these agreements in their relations inter se, the
requirement for such an agreement can be regarded otherwise than as a 
104rule of law". It can be argued that such instances took place upon a 
background of greater legal personality, but it is submitted that treaties 
of cession made with local rulers were the main method whereby the
(101) See Articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969.
(102) Lindley op.cit, pp.189-90.
U03) Ibid p.175.
U04) Ibid p.176.
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European powers acquired territory in Africa. 105 Thus, the question of 
the status in international la. of African communities in the nineteenth 
century is clearly raised. Nineteenth century views of the universality 
of international law .ere distinctly United . 106 Westlake, for example, 
stated that the international society which developed International la. 
was composed of all the States of European blood plus, as a late addition,
Japan. International la. also applied to the three Christian States of 
Africa, viz. Abyssinia (Ethiopia,, Liberia and the Congo State (regarded 
as Christian since its sovereign was the King of the Belgians), although 
it could hardly be said that such States contributed to the development 
of international law. In addition to this, international society could 
admit States to parts of its law only and examples of this would include 
Turkey, Morocco, Muscat, Siam, Persia and China. 107 One may draw from 
this two conclusions. Firstly, that basically only States within the 
European circle were or could be members of the "International Family 
and full subjects of International law, and secondly, that only states 
were involved in any event.
As for the first contention, the nineteenth century test was that of
"civilisation". Smith noted that one important requirement of Statehood
was that a State should be "under a system of law which gives strangers
and natives a reasonable approach to equality of treatment. The
assimilation of European ideas, the growth of humane habits, the frank
attempt to break down the barriers of exclusion, all these will insensibly 
108prepare the way". Oppenheim wrote that "the Law of Nations, as a law
<1051 O ’Connell points out that the cessions made by Indian and South- 
■ 1 East Asian protectorates to the British Crown were the bases of
title and that it would be profitless to speculate on the degree 
, civilisation which would qualify a ruler for international 
personality, op.cit. p.440.
<1061 See Jenks, The Common Law^Jjankind, 1958, pp.62-89, and Jennings,
(106) 34 BYIL, 1958, pp.334, 350-4.
(107) International Law, part I, Peace, 1904, pp.49-1.
nnsi international Law, 5th ed, 1918, p.53. See also Westlake,
<l * I ^ ^ J ^ ^ T o n  Pub 1 1914» PP.143-5.
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between States based on the common consent of the members of the Family
of Nations naturally does not contain any rules concerning intercourse
with and treatment of such States as are outside the circle. That this
intercourse and treatment ought to be regulated by the principles of
Christian morality la obvious".^ Kivi.r excluded from international
law, "a horde or nomadic tribe, the negro tribes Africa and the native
races of Australia, the North American Indians, and chance communities,
organiaed temporarily such as bands of brigands and associations of
pirates" . 109 10 However, such statements were never an accurate reflection
of the evolution o, international law. European powers had treaty
relations with the Ottoman empire, and with Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and
Morocco for a number of centuries. 111 12 Scott noted in 1801 in The Helen.
that although African States such as Algiers had once been considered as
pirates, "they have long acquired the character of established governments,
with whom we have regular treaties, acknowledging and confirming to them
112the relations of legal States". However, in another case, he emphasised 
that with regard to African (ie. north African) States, the "European law 
of nations is not to be applied in its full vigour to the transactions of 
persons..,.residing in that part of the world" . 113 14
International law was thus the law governing civilised States. The 
British law officers wrote of it i n 1859, "as it has been hitherto
114recognised and now subsists by the common consent of Christian nations". 
However, this requirement of "civilisation" is perhaps best seen as
(109) Op.cit. p.50.
(110) Principes do Droit des Gens, vol.l, 1896, pp.45-51.
n .n  »the Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory
U  J in the Nineteenth Century", 94 LQR PP.408, 413, For examples of 
such pre-nineteenth century relations see Alexandrowicz op.cit. 
footnote 17, pp.9-28,
(112) 165 ER, p.515.
(113) 165 ER, p-480.
(114) "nub, 'tr— + Britain and th g j a g w ^  1932, p.12,
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referrable to entry into the European Family oi Nations, rather than as
a condition oi Statehood itself. I„ the Western Sahara case, the
International Court emphasised that "no rule of international la.....
requires the structure of a State to foilo. any particular pattern, as
is evident from the diversity of the forms of state found in the .orld 
115
today". Thus, Morocco was at the time of the Spanish colonisation of 
»estern Sahara a State, although of a special character as being founded 
upon the common religious bond of Islam and personal allegiance to the 
Sultan rather than upon the notion of territory. 116
From this.it may be deduced that international 1.. th. nlneteenth 
century and as transformed by positivism and European colonisation 
operated a dual system of States, those within and those without the 
European Family of Nations. This also affected the applicability of 
international law. However, .here non-State entities were concerned a 
further level of the international society .a. involved. It ha, been 
seen that practice demonstrates that the European colonisation of Africa 
.as achieved in la. not by virtue of the occupation of terra nullius but 
by cession from local rulers. This mean, that such rulers were accepted 
as being capable in international la. not only of holding title to
territory, but of transferring it to other parties, Accordingly, one may 
postulate a three-level structure of international law during this period 
as it related to the issue of international personality. States within 
the European defined ’’Family of Nations” were full and complete subjects 
of international law, States outside this "Family" had only a limited 
impact upon the development of the law and not all of it applied to them, 
while certain non-State entities or communities possessed only a limited 
personality in international law, although this certainly included the 
capacity to hold title to territory and territorial sovereignty.
(115) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 43-4.
(116) Ibid p.44.
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(3) Conquest
This involves the taking ol possession oi enemy territory 
through military force in time of mar . 117 Of dubious legality today, 118 
it »as historically Important and certainly operative in the nineteenth 
century as a method of acquiring territory. 119 12034 It noted in the case
i n A
of In Re Southern Rhodesia that _____ a. __------------------  --- 2. *n conquest as a way of obtaining title
to territory assumed the absence of an, formal transfer on the part of
the previous sovereign and required the taking possession of the
territory by force, together with the intention and ability to hold the
121territory as its sovereign. The title by conquest »as completed »hen
the intention to annex »as signalled and the territory involved »as
122effectively occupied. It »as not necessary apparently for all of the 
territory and all opposition to be totally subjugated, as the British 
proclamations of May and September 1900 annexing the Orange Tree state 
and the Transvaal »hile some Boer forces »ere still fighting, demonstrates. 
The Italian annexation of Libya in 1911 ».a clearly premature. Serious if 
sporadic fighting continued until and during the First World War and it 
«as only in 1923 that Turkey recognised Italy's sovereignty over the 
Libyan provinces. It is therefore doubtful whether title by conquest 
was involved in this case.
(117) Oppenheim op.cit. p.566,
(118) Infra, Chapter 7, p.525,
(119) Liadley op.cit, p.160.
(120) (1919) AC 211,
(121) Ibid p.221.
(122) Lindley op.cit. p.160,
(123) Westlake op.cit. p.65. But see Oppenheim op.cit » 571 
regards this as an example of premature annexation!’ ’
(124) Lindley op.cit, pp.161-4.
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Title by conquest »as rare in Airica in the nineteenth century. The 
Judicial Committee ol the Privy Council noted that the territory oi 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland had been acquired by conquest. 125 » h u e  
Britain claimed that upon the defeat of the Khalifa's army at Omdurman 
in 1818, "all the territories »hich »ere subject to the Khalifa passed 
by right of conquest to the Brltiah and Egyptian governments" . 126 By a 
French la* of 6 August 1896, Madagascar »ith the dependent islands »as
declared to be a French colony, »ith title being based upon conquest. 127
Conquest involves, it would seem, an implicit recognition of the
international personality of the opposing party. In the case of Southern
Rhodesia, the British had concluded a treaty with Lobengula in 1888 and a
year later had informed the Portuguese that Lobengula was the independent
128ruler of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, while in the case of Madagascar,
the other main example of title by conquest in Africa, the conquest was
129preceded by treaties of protection. In Africa, however, title by 
conquest was the exception. 130
II - Colonial Protectorates
The establishment of protectorates was so widespread during the 
period of colonisation in Africa that O'Connell has stated that it became 
in the nineteenth century almost a mode of acquisition. 131 However, the 
assumption by a comparatively powerful State of the duty of protecting a 
weaker State was an institution of some antiquity. One example of such a
(128) In He South.» Bhodeala (1919) AC 2 1 1. See alao Alex.mdro.tcn 
op.cit. footnote 17, pp.76-7.
(129) Lindley op.cit. pp.190-1.
(130) It appears that there were no cases of territory being acquired 
by prescription in Africa during the period of colonisation.
(131) Op.cit. p.342.
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relationship was to be found in the protectorate exercised by Britain over
the Ionian Islands between 1815 and 1864. This was set up by treaties
with Russia, Austria and Prussia, which stipulated that the Islands were
to be a free and independent State under the immediate and exclusive
protection of the King of Great Britain. In 1864, they were ceded to
Greece at the request of the islanders and with the consent of the
132guaranteeing powers. In the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees case,
the Permanent Court declared that protectorates had "individual legal
characteristics resulting from the special conditions under which they
133were created, and the stage of their development". As regards the
creation of the French protectorate over Morocco by the Treaty of Fez in
1912, the International Court noted that Morocco remained a sovereign
134State, and had granted certain sovereign powers to France. Thus, much
depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. In this classic
conception of the institution of the protectorate, should the protecting
power exceed its authority as derived from the relevant agreement, the
135protected party could treat this agreement as broken. In R v Crewe,
it was stated that the concept of a protectorate excludes, in contra­
distinction to the idea of annexation, "that absolute ownership which was 
signified by the word dominion in Roman Law and which though perhaps not 
quite satisfactory is sometimes described as territorial sovereignty. The 
protected country remains in regard to the protecting State a foreign 
country" . 132 4536 The concept of the protectorate was founded, initially at
(132) See Lindley op.cit, pp.181-2.
(133) PCIJ Series B no.4, p.27.
(134) US Nationals in Morocco, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp.176, 188.
(135) See Vattel, The Law of Nations, 1758, vol.I, para.16. This view 
was cited by Lord Salisbury with regard to the dispute with the 
French over the latter's declaration of a protectorate of Madagascar, 
see Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 17, p.62.
(136) [191(0 2 KB 576 at 620.
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least, upon a division made between external and internal sovereignty, 
with the former being delegated to the protecting power. But the concept 
was developed in the case of the colonial protectorate so that the 
institution became one more method of acquiring territory rather than the 
model of the classic approach.
Lindley observed that "an essential feature of the colonial
protectorate is that it is recognised by the other members of the
international family as giving to the protecting power the right as
against themselves to take steps in the direction of annexing the protected
137territory as its dominions". The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 appears
to have marked the turning point. Prior to that date, a number of treaties
of protection were signed consistent with traditional practice, ie.
granting the protecting State powers in the external field and quite often
determining that the local ruler was restricted in his external relations
138by the consent of the protecting power. After 1885, "State practice...,
revealed a tendency to deform the original classic concept of the
139protectorate and to convert it into an instrument of colonialism".
This can be seen with regard to Bechuanaland, where internal as well as
external sovereignty gradually passed to the protecting power. In 1884,
a number of treaties were signed with local rulers and the following year
a British protectorate was established. Not long afterwards, the southern
part of the protectorate was made a Crown Colony and its governor
exercised jurisdiction over the protectorate as well. In effect, Britain
140acquired both internal and external sovereignty over the territory. 1378940
(137) Op.cit. p.183.
(138) For example the 1827 treaty between Britain and the King of 
Brekoma, Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 5, p.55; the 1837 treaty 
between France and Adb-el Kader, Hertslet op.cit. vol.I, p.ll; 
and the 1884 treaty between Britain and the ruler of Opobo, 89 
BFSP 1089. See also Lindley op.cit. pp.183-4.
(139) Alexandrowicz op.cit. footnote 5, p.55.
(140) See Lindley op.cit. p.187.
83
Kennedy LJ emphasised in R. v Crewe that in the protectorate "every 
branch of such government as exists in administrative, executive and 
judicial, has been created and is maintained by Great Britain",141 
Nevertheless, the theoretical distinction was maintained. Vaughan- 
Williams LJ noted that "the Bechuanaland protectorate is under His 
Majesty'8 dominion in the sense of power and jurisdiction, but is not 
under his dominion in the sense of territorial dominion".142
This revisionist approach to the nature of protectorates in essence
treated them as hardly distinguishable from colonial possessions.143 14
Other examples of protectorates established in Africa by the European
144powers included Tunisia in 1881, Madagascar in 1885, Zanzibar in 1890, 
Uganda in 1895, Egypt in 1889 and Morocco in 1912. Basutoland and 
Swaziland also became protectorates, but Italian efforts to enforce a 
protectorate over Ethiopia rapidly collapsed.145 146 Under the Act of the 
Berlin Conference, only Article 34 relating to notification applied to 
protectorates and not the requirement under Article 35 relating to 
effective occupation. However, in subsequent interpretations, it was 
declared that protectorates had also to be effectively occupied by the 
European State concerned. This meant in effect that little practical
(141) fl910l 2 KB 576* 619>
(142) Ibid, 603-4.
(143) A distinction may be drawn here between the "traditional" 
protectorates of North Africa i.e, Tunis and Morocco and the 
"revisionist" protectorates of black Africa, see Okoye, Inter­
national Law and the New African States, 1972, p,8. The difference 
lies in the acceptance of the objects of the former protectorates 
as States (if not within the European Family of Nations) but not in 
the case of the latter.
(144) Supra
(145) See Lindley op.cit, pp.189-93, Treaties of protection were also 
signed with rulers in the Gambia, Gold Coast and in Nigeria by the 
British and in West Africa generally and in the Congo by France, 
see Hertslet op.cit. vol.I, pp.19-20, 64-120 and 137, See also 
McNair, International Law Opinions. vol.I, 1956, pp.41-55 and 
Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, 1965, pp.40-62.
(146) See Lindley op.cit, pp.148-9.
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distinction was made between «.^4..between ordinary coloniee and protectorates and it
marked the development of the colnmn1
colonial protectorate with its snbstantial
differences from the traditional protectorate.147
111 - Sgheres_of I„flnence_gnd_the Hinterland ........
in a large number of cases, before the European powers established
colonial protectorates, they agreed amend themselves as to the division
of areas of the African continent into spheres of in-pi148 spneres of influence, or spheres
of action. Such agreements merely amounted to an acceptance by the 
parties that certain territories would be subject to the attentions of ' 
one of their number and that the others were to abstain.
sees the reason for their development in the baste for the provision!
appropriation of territories in advance of anything resembling
occupation that characterised the latter part of the nineteenth century.
This "more shadowy form of earmarking" .,3 especially needed since
colonial protectorates differed so little in practice from annexations.150
A sphere of influence could arise as a result of a unii.t , ,o n  ot a unilateral declaration
of one power, which would become a reality if uncontented, or. more
usually, from an agreement between two or more powers not to Interfere in
the "spheres" of the other. By distinguishing between exercising
"influence" and exercising "sovereign rights" in Articles 6 and s, ,he
Final Act of the Berlin Conference formally inaugurated the prolific er.
(147) Westlake defined a colonial protectorate «a t,„ '
is no state of international law to be protected*8^ ?  *** Which there 
power that has assumed it does not yet claim h b^t .which the 
its territory, although that power claims to e x c l u d e ^ r ^ 0118117 
States from any action within it». Op cit „„ U  other
Oppenheim declared that the protectorates ¿vJr’AfrioIn ^  that 
acquired through treaty possessed no international ®S
op.cit, P* 196, This would emphasise the distin^i 8t5tus whatsoever, 
protectorates over States and over other anti«! " betWMn
r entities, see footnote *43.(148) The term "sphere of interest" was also used but
significance than the other expressions n * W&s oi less 1907, p.42. Pressions, see Curzon, Frontiers.
(149) Holdich declared that it was a wav of . ..
(150) Op.cit. p.128,
of spheres of influence in the partition of Africa.
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151.
The first such
arrangement w.a the Anglo-Germa„ agreement of May 1883, which th#
spheres of Interest of the parties and provided for non-interference by 
each party in the sphere of interest of the other.152 other such 
agreements followed rapidly between France and Germany, Britain and
Germany, France and Portugal and Germany and Portugal.153 i„ effect 
these agreements, binding upon the parties, marked a transitional stage 
on the road to colonial acquisition. Agreements .1th the local chiefs 
invariably followed to be succeeded by the establishment of protectorates 
Thus, while the spheres of Interest agreements were of no legal effect as 
regards the African populations,154 they tended to inaugurate the 
acquisition of title to the territories concerned. In any event the 
process re-emphasises the predominant inter-European aspect of the 
partition of Africa.
The principles established by the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference relating to the creation of European colonies and protectorates 
in Africa were solely related to territories on the African coasts and 
were not applicable in the interior of the continent. This was due not 
only to the fact that such interiors had not by then been seriously 
explored by Europeans to any great extent, but also to the difficulty of 
establishing effective occupation in such areas. Accordingly, various 
doctrines were utilised aiming at the acquisition of title and its
<151) See Uzoigwe, "Spheres of Influence and the Doctrine of the
Hinterland in the Partition of Africa", 3 Journal of African 
Studies, 1976, pp.183, 186.
(152) 76 BFSP 772.
(153) See Bindley op.cit. p.210 and Uzoigwe op.eit, pp.186-7.
(154) When the Sultan of Zanzibar protested that
belonging to him was allotted under a German-PortugieseCtreitvd T  
1886 to the latter State, Germany pointed out that the treatv^fl 
not affect tha Sultan'. righto but merely provided that Germany 
would not interfere with any arrangements that Portugal y,.
to make regarding the territory whether with the S u n ^  
others, 78 BFSP 1254-5. or with
recognition by all the European powers in a way which would obviate the 
need to establish effective occupation* Prominent among these were the 
notions of contiguity and hinterland.
Such expansive geographical doctrines, originally formulated it seems 
with regard to the occupation of the American continent,155 156789were trans­
ferred to Africa, with the idea that possession of a coastal strip in some 
way placed the occupier in a privileged position (at least) with regard to 
the interior of the country bounded by that coastal strip. France used
the argument with regard to Senegal and the British with regard to 
156Nigeria. Britain, however, objected to Portuguese claims to a belt
running across Africa from Angola to Mozambique on the grounds that no
doctrine of constructive acquisition existed in the absence of bona fide
157occupation and de facto jurisdiction. The hinterland doctrine, 
according to the arbitrator in the Walfisch Bay award, required for its 
application "the existence or assertion of political influence over
UQcertain territory or a treaty in which is concretely formulated".
However, the doctrine, replete with geographical uncertainty, ambiguity
and possibilities for confusion, was never really accepted. Britain, for
example, abandoned its claim of 1883 to large areas of land outside its
acquired territory of Walfisch (or Walvis) Bay in south-west Africa on
the grounds of contiguity or hinterland, once Germany had made territoria l
159acquisitions in that region. Lord Salisbury declared in 1896 that 
"the modem doctrine of hinterland with its inevitable contradictions, 
indicates the unformed and unstable condition of international law as 
applied to territorial claims resting on constructive occupation or
(155) Uzoigwe op.cit. pp.194-5. See also Westlake op,cit. pp.114-6,
(156) Ibid, pp.195.
(157) McEwan. International Boundaries of East Africa. 1971, p.172.
(158) Cmnd, 5857 (1911), p.32 cited in Lindley op.cit, p.235.
(159) Lindley op.cit. pp.229-30.
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control", while the US Secretary of State declared in the same year 
that "spheres of influence and the theory or practice of the 'hinterland' 
idea are things unknown to international law and do not as yet rest upon 
any recognised principles of either international or municipal law".1®1 
These notions were political expressions of the colonising spirit, not 
legal concepts. They soon gave way to cessions and effective occupation 
as the guiding juridical principles.
160
IV - Consideration of Geographical and Ethnic Factors during Colonisation
In the process of the European colonisation of Africa, ethnic
considerations were, in general, ignored and the colonies and protectorates
included within their borders, with few exceptions, large numbers of
different, often antagonistic tribes, while dividing others between
162different jurisdictions. However, this should not be taken to mean 
that no account was taken of local conditions in the delimitation of 
colonial frontiers in Africa. While some 30 per cent of the total length 
of African borders follow geometrical lines and thus would appear to have 
been established irrespective of local conditions, the majority of the 
borders were delimited, partly at least, in the light of some indigenous
„ „ 163factors.
Geographical factors were sometimes relevant, as in the delimitation 
164of Gabon's frontiers, while on a number of occasions ethnic consider­
ations were taken into account as well as the structure of African
(160) Ibid p.235.
(161) Ibid p.212.
n  ßo\ en Droit International, 1971, pp.70-3.
(163) Touval, op.cit. P.291. 
1940, pp.156-8.
See also Boggs, International Boundaries.
(164) . », »4« » to Delimitation des Frontières du Mangongo-Nzambie, L B . u e u n a ^ v  o Q(1885-1911)", 9 Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 1969, p.
Gabon
5.
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political entities. By the mandate agreements of 1922, the former
German East Africa was divided into Belgian and British mandated
territories. Soon after the mandates came into force, the Permanent
Mandates Commission was petitioned to rectify the border delimitation,
since the district of Kissaka had been separated from Buanda and placed 
165
in Tanganyika. The Commission deplored the territorial transfer and 
referred to the protests of the local population, and after Belgian- 
British talks, the boundary was altered and the district returned to 
Ruanda. On similar grounds, the Council of the League of Nations 
suggested in 1924 that certain readjustments be made to the frontier 
between the French and British mandated areas in the Cameroons.165 67 168970
In a series of treaties, provisions were incorporated stipulating
that account be taken of tribal groupings and African entities in the
drawing of boundaries. In the Anglo-French treaty of 1890, for example,
article 2 declared that the northern border of what was later to become
Nigeria shquld be drawn "in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of
action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of
Sokoto". The frontier between Nigeria and Dahomey as delimited by the
Anglo-French agreement of 1898 contained alterations to take account of
169treaties made by Britain with local rulers, while a treaty between
Britain and Portugal in 1891 provided that part of the border between
their central African territories would follow the western boundary of
■ 170the Barotse Kingdom. A comprehensive agreement regarding colonial
(165) Apparently in order to ease the construction of British railway 
communications, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 
2nd Session, 9 August 1922, p.72.
(166) Cmnd. 1974, See also McEwan op.cit. pp.154-5 and Touval, The 
Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, 1972, p ,10.
(167) Lindley op.cit. p.282. See also Murty, "Evidence on Traditional 
Boundaries and some Problems in its Interpretation", 8 IJIL, 1968, 
pp.487-8, footnote 14.
(168) Hertslet op.cit. vol.II, p.229. See also Anene op.cit, p.13.
(169) Touval op.cit. footnote 7, p.289,
(170) Ibid.
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delimitations was made between the UK and France in 1904 and this 
provided that the line separating Niger from Nigeria (as they are now) 
should be changed to place three particular sultanates with whom France 
had made treaties within the French sphere and that in determining the
frontier regard should be had to the political divisions of the
^  . 171territories.
The treaties between France and Liberia in 1907, and Italy and
Ethiopia in 1908 also provided that close regard was to be had to existing
172tribal divisions so as to avoid splitting tribes. In a number of
instances, treaties provided for the problem of tribes divided by borders,
not by amending the borders, but by some other form of recognition of the
situation. For example, the Anglo-French treaty of 1904 provided for the
transfer of the lies de Los and a part of Gambia to France and stipulated
that the populations of the areas concerned could opt for British
173citizenship if they wished. The Anglo-Belgian treaty of 1915 regarding
the Uganda-Congo border and the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1927 regarding
174the Kenyan-Italian Somaliland border also included similar provisions.
However, such considerations must be seen against the background of 
European power politics, which had much to do with the siting of borders 
and the influence of administrative convenience. In 1910, for instance, 
an area known as the Lado enclave was transferred from the Congo to Sudan 
and for ease of administration its southern part became a part of 
Uganda,175 while the inclusion within German south-west Africa of the
(171) Ibid.
(172) Lindley op.cit. pp.282-3, and Murty op.cit. pp.487-8, footnote 18.
(173) Ibid pp.289-90. See also Touval op.cit. footnote 166, p.10.
(174) Ibid p.290. See also Jones, Boundary Making, 1945, p.42,
(175) McEwan op.cit. p.129.
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Caprlvi Strip .as due to poor geographical knowledge, since the Intention
had been to secnre access to the Zambesi for the German colony. In the
belief that an important communications route was involved.176 As an
example of the vagaries of colonial boundary making, one may cite the
instance of a part of French West Africa. In 1890. the Soudan .as
created as an administrative entity, but nine years later was dismembered
and distributed amongst its neighbours. In 1002, the territory of
Senegamble and Niger was established. Two years later, the western part
was renamed the French Soudan. In 1935, Upper Volta was abolished and
parts of It were incorporated into the French Soudan, but fifteen years
later It was reconstituted, while In 1944 parts of the Soudan were given 
177to Mauritania.
V - Legal Ties
The second question put to the International Court In the Western 
Sahara case, asked "what were the legal ties between this territory and 
the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?"178 and in the 
discussion of this point, a number of Interesting matters were raised,
that highlighted the relationship between people, territory and sovereignty 
so crucial in the law of territory.
Morocco argued that it possessed sovereignty over Western Sahara by 
virtue of immemorial possession founded upon "the public display of 
sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncontested for centuries"179 as "evidenced 
by the general acquiescence of the international community which it was 
accorded for several hundred years". These internal and international
(176) Hertslet op.cit. vol.III, pp.899-906,
(177) Touval op.cit. footnote 166, p,14.
(178) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 14.
(179) Pleadings, CB.75/12, p.29.
(180) Ibid, p.6.
91
aspects had to be understood, however, ln tho light ot the sp8clal natur8
of the Moroccan State based upon personal allegiance to and the religious 
significance of the Sultan.181 Moroccan sovereignty extended also, it 
was claimed, to the Bled Siha, the area not in fact submissive under the 
complete power of the Sultan, since it acknowledged the spiritual
l o o
authority of the Sultan. Morocco pleaded that a number of religious 
and tax documents demonstrated political allegiance, to which could b. 
added various military activities,183 while a series of international 
agreements were invoked which purportedly constituted International
recognition of its title to Western Sahara. 184
Mauritania was in a different position, since 1, clearly had not
existed as a State during the colonisation period. It therefore
emphasised that the problem centred around the re-unificatl„„ „t lts
people.183 in order to substantiate this, reference was made to the
•'Mauritanian entity, or Blind Shinguitti. This .as a distinct, cultural
entity inhabiting a certain area.188 This entity, with it. own language
and social structure, was not a State, nor even a federation or
confederation. The concept of a league as it had existed in ancient
Greece was the nearest analogy presented to the p«,,-* 187ouri* and this entity,
consisting of a number of different, even warrin* triho ----- ---------- -------------------  warring, tribes was reinforced
(181) Pleadings, CR.75/11, pp.18-19,
(182) Ibid, p.6. The court, in fact, accepted this analvsi*
ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 44-5, analysis,
(183) Pleadings, CR.75/12, pp.36-7.
(184) Ibid, pp.6-29.
(185) Ibid, p.38. See also A/C.4/SR.2004.
(186) Allegedly from the river Senegal to the Wadi S a k w  n  „
with the proviso that to the south of the latt«.. +1 Hamra’ 
zone of overlap with the Tekna nomads of the ®Pleadings, CR.75/17, p.24. the Moroccan Bled Siba,
(187) Ibid, p.28.
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by a m i n e d  S a h a ™  law.188 Although it „as actno„ ledge(1 t„ >t the
constituent parts ol the entity »ere sovereign and independent.189 the
entity lived as a distinct unit in jit in complete independence from neighbouring
States. The concept oi nomadism »as used to express this method ol
linking people and territory in a legal relationship.191 The nature ei
the relationship bet».en the individual parts and the entity »a. described
as co-sovereignty. This » a n t  that despite its political diversity, the
entity could be regarded as an independent nation, in »hich all the people
jointly exercised sovereignty over the Mauritanian entity.192 included m
this entity were the Inhabitants of Western Sahara, »ho therefore partook
of the co-sovereignty.
Both Moroccan and Mauritanian contentions were rejected by Spain,
who emphasised that Morocco had never exercised State functions over 
193Western Sahara while the Mauritanian entity was simply a sociological
Phenomenon with no legal implications whatsoever.194 On the contrary the
population of the Western Sahara itself constituted a distinct people with
u  195its own characteristics.
(188) Dealing inter alia with agricultural and water issues, rules 
relating to area and methods for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, ibid p.29.
(189) Ibid p.28.
(190) Ibid p.25.
(191) Ibid pp.32, 33 and 37.
(192) Ibid p.41. See also Pleadings, CR.75/30, pp.38-40.
(193) See Pleadings, CR.75/22, pp.12-25 and 42-51, and Pleadings 
CR.75/23, pp.2-33 and 44.
(194) Pleadings, CR.75/24, pp.9-43, The term "Mauritanian entity" was 
first used during the General Assembly debates of 1974 ICJ 
Reports, 1975, pp.12, 57,
(195) Ibid pp.44-9. Spain emphasised that this approach was adopted by 
the Saharan political movements including Polisario, ibid pp.49-5j. 
The Algerian approach to the issue of legal ties as of the date of’ 
colonisation was to assert the primacy of the principle of self- 
determination and the will of the people, Pleadings, CR.75/31,
; p .121. ; '
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In its analysis of the Moroccan claim, the International Court laid
emphasis upon the actual manifestation of sovereignty by Morocco with
regard to Western Sahara during the time of Spanish colonisation. What
was of decisive importance was not indirect inferences drawn from history,
but "evidence directly relating to effective display of authority in 
_ „ 196Western Sahara . The court firmly resisted the temptation to accord
historical and geographical factors other than peripheral value.196 97 198 This
meant that Morocco's claim was to be analysed in the light both of "the
intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or
198display of such authority". While the court accepted that the
Moroccan State of this period was based on personal and religious bonds
rather than territorial ones, such allegiance had to be manifested
clearly in acts evidencing acceptance of the ruler’s political authority.199
The court, thus, was not willing to project the internal characteristics
of Morocco on to the international scene so as to obviate the need to
comply with recognised rules of international law.200 201 The court concluded
201that the material submitted did not show that Morocco had displayed 
"effective and exclusive State activity in Western Sahara" and that, 
therefore, there was no tie of territorial sovereignty between the two.202
(196) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 43.
(197) The court regarded the historical material presented to it as 
ambiguous, while the factor of geographical contiguity (even if it 
could be considered, which was doubtful) only emphasised the 
paucity of evidence of unambiguous display of Moroccan authority 
regarding Western Sahara, ibid, pp.42-4.
(198) PCIJ Series A/B no.53, p.45.
(199) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 43-4.
(200) But see Judges Ammoun and Forster who declared that the court had 
erred in not recognising that in the circumstances ties of 
allegiance amounted to ties of sovereignty, ibid, pp.102 and 103 
But cf. Judge De Castro ibid, p.136.
(201) In essence the court adopted the Spanish interpretation of the 
facts regarding the internal aspects of Morocco's claim to 
immemorial possession, ibid, pp.47-8 and supra footnote 193.
(202) Ibid, p.49.
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The court, however, went further to state that lega! ties of
allegiance had existed between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the
monadic tribes of the territn™ 203e territory. However, there is a qualitative
difference between personal infinonco * , .p rsonai influence exercised by the Sultan over tribes
inhabiting areas adjacent to the frm ti0wa ^«•o ™ e  frontiers of his State and legal ties of
allegiance between the two parties. Quite why the court recognised legal
ties of allegiance here is difficult to appreciate. It may be that the
special local conditions required such an unusual conclusion, but it must
be regarded as misguided, especially since,unlike ties of sovereign,, which
might influence the process of decolonisation of the territory, legal ties
of allegiance with part of the population did no,. It is also doubtful
whether the material available could support the existence of such ties of
allegiance and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the court was
trying to present Morocco with a consolation prize.204 in the event>
Morocco later misinterpreted and misused this part of the court's
. g 2 0 5opinion.
In discussing the nature of the Mauritanian entity, the court took 
into account that subjects of 1.» varied in their nature and the exercise 
of their rights, and gave full weight to the apeclal characteristics of the
(203) Evidence was adduced showing a certain .1
tribes by the Sultan, ibid! PP.48» d 56 ** ^  Tek"»
(204)
(205)
The court also appeared to give a broader i n t e r n r ^  + d 
question of legal ties than was justified in the c L e  th®
was centred on legal ties between the territorv c T l  i Th® quesUon 
claimants, it did not go further and c a i F f F r 1- if Sahara the 
with sections of the population of the t e r r i t o r v ^ ^ 88*011 °f ties 
opinion, therefore, fell between the Moroccan no«d+fhe Court's 
ties of allegiance amounted to ties of sovereiP !i U o n  that Personal 
and the terms of resolution 3292(XXIX) whirh fnty °Ver the territor; 
territorial ties in Morocco's case. As far as ®arly concernei only 
national acts invoked by Morocco were concerns ®. Varlous *nter- 
although they did not show that the international^ C°Uft ,elt that 
recognise Moroccan territorial sovereign tv in c w conunUility did 
time, they did provide indications of t h e ^ u l t » ^ « ™  i ^ the r6l®vant 
influence over some nomads in the territory, ibid^8 authority or
Morocco declared that the court's opinion F
was part of Moroccan territory and that "Moroccan of feSt®rn Sahara 
recognised by the legal advisory organ of the been
S/PV. 1849 p.ll (16 October 1975). United Nations".
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Sahara region, but the essential test of legal personality was that such
an entity be in "such a position that it possesses in regard to its
members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect" and be
"an entity capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its 
206members". As a matter of fact, the Mauritanian entity did not
constitute such an entity and could therefore have exercised no
207sovereignty in Western Sahara. However, certain legal ties could
still have existed, based on the facts of nomadism. Such rights included
those relating to the lands comprised on the nomadic routes. This appears
correct, for nomadic tribes should be regarded as possessing legal rights
respecting the land over which they have customarily migrated. The
special nature of Saharan life at the time demanded a more flexible view
208of the manifestation and creation of legal ties. However, the court
went beyond the assertion of legal rights between the nomadic peoples
c o n c e r n e d  and the lands which they traversed, to declare that such
rights "constituted legal ties between the territory of Western Sahara
209and the 'Mauritanian entity'." It is felt that this conclusion is far
too generalised. What the correct analysis would have led to was that
there were some legal ties between some of the tribes of the alleged
entity relating to some of the territory of the Sahara. To transmute
nomadic rights over part of a territory to rights possessed by the
"Mauritanian entity" over the whole of the territory in question must be 
- 209aseen as mistaken. ____ - ■ ____________
(206) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 43 and 63. See also the Reparations 
case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.174, 178.
(207) Ibid, p.63. Thus, no ties of sovereignty or allegiance existed, 
ibid p.64. See also Judges Petren, ibid p,115; De Castro, 
ibid*, p.165 and Ruda, ibid, p.175. 2089
(208) Ibid, pp.64-5. See also the analysis by Judge Dillard, ibid, 
pp.155-6.
(209) Ibid, p.64. Cf. Judge de Castro, ibid, p.165.
(209a) Note, however, that the court accepted that there existed a 
1 certain overlapping of Moroccan and Mauritanian ties, ibid,
pp.65-7.
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The court's acceptance of such non-territorial legal ties provides 
a legal loophole through which States with irredentist claims may seek 
recognition of pre-colonial legal tie, and then declare that auch ties 
Should he accepted aa having an influence upon the decolonisation process 
and after. The question la then raised of the effects of the legal ties 
discussed in the Sahara case. As far as ties of territorial sovereignty 
are concerned, it seems clear that their existence would have been of 
relevance not in superseding the principle of self-determination,210 but 
in providing guidelines for its application,211 such as with regard to 
the framing of questions for a plebiscite in the territory.212 As regards 
the other legal ties recognised by the court, they could not affect the 
application of resolution 1514UV) and the principle of self-determination
to the inhabitanta of the territory, but some uncertainty now exists as to 
their function in other such situations.
It may be concluded, therefore, that while International law will 
take into account any special characteristics there may be in attempting 
to identify legal personality, particularly Statehood, with regard to non- 
European entities, the ultimate teat of sovereignty is the classic one 
of objectively determined exercise of authority coupled with the intention
to act as sovereign. As far a, non-sovereign legal tles aro
these may be demonstrated in the light of the special characteristics I t  
the region and people in question and may be founded on religious or 
tribal practices. While such ties will not be reievant 1» the fi.id of 
sovereignty, it seems, the, may be of relevance to the various procedure. 
Involved in the decolonisation process, although in what for. and to what 
extent is open to question.
(210)
(211)
( 212)
See infra, Chapters 3 and 4.
Legal ties were defined in terms of their impact upon the
decolonisation of the territory, ICJ Reports, m ^  PP^E, 68
See ibid, PP.36 and 37. Cf. Judge Petren ibid, p.112
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IV " ^Le-^ ° bl-em of Legal Particularism
Th. circumstances of th, Sahara caa, which retired an analysis 
the legal aita.tioa fa that are. during th. IBBCs, raised the i.aue of 
particularism and the validity of competing international legal order..
A number of different approaches were propounded during the case.
Algeria declared that on. of the ways in which one could get around 
the conclusion that European international law regarded colonies as 
terra nulliu«, was to reject colonialist law and recognise that there 
existed an Arab-Islamic civilisation at that time and place, with a 
developed public law dimension. Thus, it could be argued that Western
Sahara was not terra nulliua since it belonged to the Par El Islam or
213 *
Moslem civitas. Mauritania claimed on rather similar lines that the
entity or Bilad Shingultti had since the seventeenth century „  extremely
precise meaning throughout the Moslem world and was within the Arab-
Isiamlc community a clearly individualised entity. It was argued that
there had been nothing in the nineteenth century to prevent international
law co-existing with various special legal orders such as Latin American
law, or the Internal relations of the British Commonwealth or indeed the
law of the Bar El Islam.213 14 Spain adopted a different approach and
stressed instead the unity of international law. To accept that different
legal frameworks were to apply on the one hand to the establishment of
Moroccan sovereignty and on the other to the establishment of Spanish
sovereignty, would mean the annhilation of international i '* international law. In addition,
the parties concerned had not supplied proof of the existence and
applicability of such rules,215 Spain stressed that departure from the
(213) Pleadings, CR.75/19, pp.43-5. Algeria actually relecteH 
approach since it was argued that one had to /resuL thf ® h 60 
dominance of European international law in th« m  6 the pre" 
nineteenth century, ibid. Cf. P ! . ^ "
(214) Pleadings, CR.75/30, pp.38-9.
(215) Pleadings, CR.75/25, p.13.
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idea that there is only one legal order, a general International la, 
governing relationships bet.ee» Independent States .„„id have grave 
consequences, the „oat serious ol »hlch being that legal reasoning would 
be incapable of producing a 1.1— of agreement since different basic 
categories would be used.^ *®
Morocco adopted a median position. It pleaded the special character
of Its State structure In the nineteenth century, .bile declaring that its
ties of territorial sovereignty with Western Sahara were valid under
general International law. In the nineteenth century, Morocco could only
be understood as an Islamic State with Its mixture of temporal and
217spiritual elements. To judge the nature of its tie. with Sahara, "It
was essential to abandon the constitutional pattern of the European state
218of the nineteenth century". But Morocco claimed that international law 
did recognise such a diversity of State systems and that, therefore, its 
approach was within the framework of general international law.219
Faced with such contentions, the court was prepared to move some way 
towards the acceptance of legal particularism, but not with regard to the 
question of terra nulllus, which was treated purely 1„ the light of the 
(European) State practice of the period. This sidestepped the possibility 
raised by Algeria of Sahara not being terra nullius because it was part of 
the Dar El-Islam. The court declared that "the legal regime „f Western 
Sahara, including Its legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot 
properly be appreciated without reference to (the territory’s) special
220characteristics", via, the desert nature of the land and the nomadism
(216) Pleadings, CR.75/22, p.ie. See also Pleadings CB.75/2 3 , p.67.
(217) Pleadings, CR.75/11, pp.15 and 18,
(218) Ibid, p.H.
(219) Pleadings, CR.75/27, pp.9-11. See also Pleadings CR.75/26, p .52.
(220) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 41.
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of its population. The question of legal ties had to be examined "in the
context of such a territory and such a social and political organisation
221of the population". In discussing the nature of the Moroccan State and
the Mauritanian entity at the relevant time, the court was prepared to
reach its conclusion in the light of the local particularism. However,
the general framework was firmly established as that of the general
international law of the period. The court recognised the special nature
of the Moroccan State and noted that "the particular structure of a State
may be a relevant element in appreciating the reality or otherwise of a
222display of State activity adduced as evidence of that sovereignty".
Nevertheless, the key factor was whether Morocco had effectively exercised
sovereignty in Sahara at the relevant time. Religious ties had existed
in other parts of the world and did not necessarily amount to legal ties
of sovereignty, while ties of allegiance had to be "real and manifested in
223acts evidencing acceptance of....political authority" for one to talk
of the display of State sovereignty. The real analysis had to be
224concerned with proof of effective sovereignty". As far as Mauritania
was concerned, the court noted that it had given full weight to the
225"special characteristics of the Saharan region and peoples". However,
whether the entity did enjoy sovereignty in the area was to be determined
in the light of the general international law test revolving around the
existence of an identity separate from its constituent parts and involving 
- ' , ' 226
the sense of obligation. 213456
(221) Ibid, p.42.
(222) Ibid, p.44, See also Judges Ammoun ibid, p.83, and Forster ibid, 
p,103.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Ibid, p.49.
(225) Ibid, p.63.
(226) Ibid. See also the Reparations case, ICJ Reports, 1949, 
pp.174, 178.
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The court, however, accepted the existence of legal ties of 
allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the people of Sahara, 
based on the exercise of the former’s influence over certain tribes and, 
therefore, upon the specific nature of the Sherifian State. In the case 
of Mauritania, the court recognised that the nomadism of the people of the 
area at the time of colonisation "gave rise to certain ties of a legal 
character....(and)....those ties neither had nor could have any other 
source than the usages of the tribes themselves or Koranic law".227 in 
other words, the court emphasised the existence of valid rights under
international 1.» at the time ol colonisation founded upon the 
particularism of the region, even though these had no effect upon the 
decolonisation process. However, the tact that the court concluded that 
certain rights over nomadic routes amounted to legal tie. between Western 
Sahara and the tribes o, the entity in question can only raise „uestlons 
as to the parameters of particular Juridical systems within international 
law. The court's overall treatment of the function particularism and
the problems of coinciding legal orders, therefore, does leave something 
to be desired.
Morocco also raised the attendant problem of the validity of the
pre-colonial legal system, Since that had been replaced by the colonial
' 228order consistent with intertemporal law, could it be revived upon the 
demise of colonisation by virtue of intertemporal law? It was declared 
that "logic would require that the new law which reopens the question of 
the title acquired by Spain at the time of colonisation should also reopen
(227) Ibid, P .64.
228) island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829,
Minquiers and Ecrehos case, vol.II, p.375. 
op.cit. pp.28-31.
845, and ICJ Pleadings, 
See also Jennings
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the question of Morocco's loss of title at the same period".229 n.is 
was, however, based upon a two-fold misconception. The new law did not 
reopen the question of the title acquired at the date of colonisation, 
hut rather demanded its cessation. Secondly, the new law patently did 
not operate on the basis of re-examining old titles, bnt based Itself 
on the right of the Inhabitants of the colonlally defined territory to 
. self-determination. As Bedjaonl noted on behalf of Algeria, the function 
of intertemporal law was not "to confer fresh legal Ilf, ,» a title prior 
to the title which today has become obsolete or is obsolescent".230 The 
court did not discuss this problem, but Its attitude may be appreciated 
in view of its support of the right of self-determination as the vital
23i
operative principle. Judge de Castro noted that colonisation had
created rights and ties, just as General Assembly resolutions calling for
decolonisation had created new facts so that by the date of resolution
3293 (XXIX), it could be stated that the law then in force was based upon
232
self-determination. The continuation or re-emergence of historic
rights, thus, had to be judged in the light of the right to self- 
determination, which posited the supremacy of the will of the inhabitants 
of the colonially defined territory. It was unfortunate that the court 
itself did not discuss such issues. The question as to which legal ties 
of the 18 80's may be relevant to decolonisation in the 1970'g ralseg all 
sorts of problems that were only peripherally considered
(229) Pleadings, CR.75/26, p.54. The terra nullius question was to be 
interpreted, the court held, by reference to the law in force at 
the time of Spanish colonisation of the territory, ICJ Reports 
1975, pp.12, 38-9, but the legal ties question had to be 
interpreted in the light of the decolonisation process, ibid, 
pp.40-1. This posed some awkward problems as to time.
(230) Pleadings, CR.75/31, p.15.
(231) For example, see ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 36 and 68
(232) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 167-71.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION1 234
1 - Historical Introduction
Verzijl has remarked that "seldom has there been advanced as a legal
right a claim so obviously of a political nature and of such a slogan-
2like quality as the so-called 'right of self-determination' Despite
this phraseology self-determination has clearly proved to be a principle 
of the utmost importance in international relations since 1945.
The history of the principle can be traced to the French revolution
at the close of the 18th century with its twin proclamations of human
rights and popular sovereignty. Its peculiar blend of nationalism and
3democracy profoundly influenced the political development of Europe and 
ultimately produced the concept of self-determination. This was 
interpreted as the capacity of the nation to decide for itself its own 
political structure, for nationalism appeared as a framework for the
4operation of the new theory of sovereignty called democracy. Although 
this "principle of nationalities", as it was sometimes known, was not
(1) See in general, Umozurike, Self-determination in International Law, 
1972; Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-determination, 
1973; Shukri, The Concept of Self-determination in the United 
Nations, 1965; Calogeropoulis-Stratis, Le Droit des Peuples a 
Disposer d'Eux-m^mes, 1973; Cobban, The Nation-State and National 
Self-determination. 1969; Johnson, Self-determination Within the 
Community of Nations, 1967.
(2) International Law in Historical Perspective, 1968, vol.l, p.321.
(3) Cobban op.cit. pp.33-6. The word self-determination is derived from 
the German Selbstbestimmungsrecht, used by the radical philosophers 
of the mid-nineteenth century, see Umozurike op.cit. p.3.
(4) See Emerson, From Empire to Nation. 1960, p.297.
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recognised as an integral part of European law,5 i t  had a profound effect 
particularly upon the nations of central and eastern Europe.
However, the three constituent elements of this concept, ie. people, 
the nation and the State, did not always coalesce in the same fashion and 
the role of the democratic factor often fluctuated. In many instances in
central Europe it re-emargsd aa a forB of natlonal
the tact of birth alone determined the lasue and the idea ol subjectivity 
»as rejected as irrelevant. The individual could not operate in a manner 
inconsistent with the mystical concept of the nation.6 0n the other hand 
»estem European liberal thought emphasised the subjective element and the 
element of choice over the pul, of the nation.7 But self-determination
was in no sense thought of as legally binding.8
(6)
(5) Tunkin* P£Bj?-Jateraatlonal Public. 1965 D 43 „ + _
self-determination and the principle of nationalité! t h o u g h  
used synonymously, there is a theoretical Were often
of self-determination may well make a decision whi!! th&t the w i t  
the attraction of the nation and leads not +! hifh runs COunter to 
greater fragmentation of the nation s e e ^
Nationalités", 37 HR 1931, p.5. See also Carr ’th p  Clp® des Peace, 1942, p.60. Carr' H lg Conditions rw>
Cobban declared that "the individual did not d e t e ™ ^  J  
rather the nation determined the individual" on ®.™lne his Nation, 
McCartney, National States and National Se« also
It is suggested that t h e ^ T Æ ^ b ^ l h î ^ Î ^ ’é  ' ’ P ’100' 
individual not being able to choose his State of the
performed by the nation. Judge Dillard commuted being
restraint which the legal right of self-deternHn * the car<*tnal 
that tt is "for the peopie to d.termihe Z  Z u l l V ' T * ' * "  l’ 
and not the territory the destiny of the peonle- to! * ® terrffory,
pp.1 2, 122. • p 6 fCJ Reports, 1975,
Zimmern wrote that "English people when they invni™ 
nationality mean the principle of democracy" the Principle of
Government, 1918, p.50, quoted in Cobban od
De Visscher, Theory and Reality in PuhHp île ' p,U4, Se® also 
traue. 1968, pp.33-7. ", 3rd ad.
(8) The nationalist school of international lawyer« * ,,
did indeed propose that national self-determina+Î°U °WÎn8 Mazzinl 
but their position was an extrema one in the ■> °! WaB a le8al right, 
Mandates under the League of Nations 1930 P1fl°d ’ se® Wright,
(7)
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It was the events and views precipitated by the outbreak of the 
gFirst World War that thrust the principle on to the centre of the stage. 
President Wilson of the United States declared before Congress in 1916 
that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they 
shall live” ,10 and this idea was developed in the following years. In 
1918 he promised that "all well-defined national aspirations shall be 
accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without 
introducing new or perpetuating old demands of discord and antagonism".11
In spite of such protestations, it was clear that the 1919 Peace
Conference did not treat national self-determination as an overwhelmingly
important principle. It did not appear in the final draft of the
12Covenant of the League of Nations, and it was treated "as a purely
political factor and not as a legal principle applicable to all peoples
13whose fate has to be determined1'* *70
(9) Self-determination was included in a resolution in the London
International Socialist Congress in -I860, see Lenin, The Right of 
Nations to Self-determination, 1951, p.42.
flOl US Congressional Record, L.III part 9, 8854, June 27 1916, This 
principle was his "favourite panacea" according to Minogue, 
Nationalism, 1967, p.137.
m i n  The last of the four points put to Congress. US Congressional 
' ' Record, L.VI part 2, 1952, February 11 1918, The 1919 border
adlustments were to follow "clearly recognised lines of nationality" 
Secretary Lansing proclaimed "what misery it will cause" The Peace 
Negotiations: A PersonalNarrative, 1921, pp.97-8, Wambaugh,
Since the World War, yol.l 1933, p.4, Temperly wrote 
that Wilson's ideas "in themselves were few and simple but their 
consequences when developed by the war were such as to produce the 
most far-reaching results", A History of the Peace Conference of 
P is 1920-4, vol.I, p.173. See also Pomerance, "The United States 
and~Self-determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception"
70 AJIL 1976, p.l.
Wilson put forward a suggestion in the first and second drafts of 
K ' th Covenant that territorial adjustments between States should be 
tfte ant to the principle of self-determination, but this was not 
accepted, Miller, The Drattin£ _ ^ h ^ o y s » J ^ S >  vol-n  1928> PP• « - 3
/•-itv nimuis "Regies Generales du Droit de la Paix", 32 HR 1931, p.37. 
lij) uupu , ^ that the more the work of the peace conference was
COldi d the less it seemed to have been under the control of this 
studie op cit. p.32. Schuman wrote that self-determination was 
princ P e , ^bere wa9 a possibility of reducing the territory
8Pde ower of the ^»fAat.ed States. International Politics, 5th ed. 
1953P°p.492, See also Warabaugh, op.cit. p.42, and Calogeropoulis-
Stratis op.cit.pp.49-52,
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Nevertheless, Its Impact upon the legal constitution of the world 
community can be detected In the various provisions lor minority 
protection,14 which can he regarded as a restricted application ol sell- 
determination 1» Its creation ol protective norms ,„r certain cultural and 
language groups. It was even conceivable that minority rights could give 
rise to secession hut this was considered an "altogether exceptional 
situation, a last resort where the State lacks the will or the power to 
enact and apply just and effective guarantees".15 167
Self-determination also made its mark in the institution of the 
16
mandate system which replaced the annexation ol territories belonging to
the defeated States outside Europe and was founded on the proposition that
"the well-being and development of such non-independent peoples form a
17sacred trust of civilisation”,
(14) See eg. De Azcarate, The League_of Nations and »«4___a,.
An Experiment, 1945; Claude, NaUonaTMinrvPr+^^
Problem, 1955; Lador-Lederer,"! ^ ^ ! ^ ! ^ ^
Kunz writes that the intern at i o i i H T ^ T f ^ r t h T ^ i i ^  1968*
minorities was a substitute in cases where the principle o^self 
determination could not be applied and can be regarded L f  « l 7 
and logical corollary of the principle of self-determini/ !rlct
nations", "The Present Status of International Law p °f
of Minorities", 48 AJIL 1954, p.282. See also n Z i l Z n  ^
Protection of Minorities to Promotion of Human Rights"’ “ 
yearbook of International Law, 1949, p.1 1 5, 6 ’ Jewish
(15) The Aaland Islands Dispute, Council Doc. B7/21/68/106.
(16) Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Truste e d n .  tq^q . „
Haas, TiThe Reconciliation of ConflUu^Tcrfonial Polic! J ' 
Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System" 6 Into™ 7* ®Organisation 1952, p.521, International
(17) Art,22 of the Covenant of the League. The International < w *
emphasised that the mandate was created in the interest« 
territory's inhabitants and of humanity in general as an 
national institution with an international object ie ” inter~ 
trust of civilisation, ICJ Reports, 1950, p.132. ’i C j ' n o t e d ^ I f  
there was "little doubt that the ultimate objective of th *
trust was the self-determination and independence of the neoni«^concerned", ICJ Reports, 1971, p,31. peoples
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In the inter-.ar years there »as relatively little practice dealing
»ith the application of self-determination.18 1920 In the leadl„g dlscusston
of its juridical character that did take place it was emphasised the,
"the recognition of this principle in a certain number of international
treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same
footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations" and stated that
international law "does not recognise the right of national groups as
such to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the
19simple expression of a wish".
Verzijl regarded the decision in the Aaland Islands question as
based upon the acceptance by the Commission of Jurists that positive
international law did not know of the asserted 'right' of self-determin- 
20ation. Although the idea of self-determination probably helped 
encourage the growing nationalist movements in the Arab and Asian worlds 
Brownlie points out that this had "no immediate counterpart on the legal 
plane".
(18) It was however proclaimed by the USSR in her peace treaties with the 
Baltic States in 1920. See Martens,Recueil General de Traites.
3rd Series, XI pp.864, 877 and 888, Cobban op.cit. pp.187^218.’ The 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 imposed on Russia by Germany was 
declared to be founded on the cardinal principles of the 
renunciation of war and self-determination, see Shapiro ed. Soviet 
Treaty Series, 1950, vol.l, p.l. The Communist theory subordinated 
self-determination to the interests of the working class, see Lenin, 
Marx, Engels, Marxism, 1934, p,147. Stalin emphasised that the 
border territories of Russia and the nations therein "like all other 
nations have an inalienable right to secede from Russia .... but the 
interest of the popular masses tells us that the demand of 
secession .... is deeply counter-revolutionary at the present stage 
of the Revolution". See Whiteman, Digest of International Law 
vol.IV,1965, p.56.
(19) The Aaland Island« Question, LNOJ Sp, Suppl. no.3, Report of the 
Commission of Jurists, 1920, pp.5-6. See also Barros, The Aaland 
Islands Question; Its Settlement by the League of Nations. 19687
Verzijl op.cit. pp.328-32, and Modeen, "The International 
Protection of the National Identity of the Aaland Islands" 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1973, p.l77.
(20) Op.cit. p.329.
(21) "History of the Principle of Self-Determination", Grotian Society 
Papers, 1968, p.96.
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The Second World War stimulated further consideration of this
concept. The Atlantic Charter, 1941, declared "the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will live” and the
desire to see no "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely
22expressed wishes of the people concerned".
Self-determination was not mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals of 1944, but it came into prominence at the San Francisco
23Conference at the instigation of the Soviet Union and was incorporated 
into Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations. This noted that 
one of the purposes of the Organisation was the development of friendly 
relations among nations "based on respect for the principle of human 
rights and self-determination of peoples" and was echoed in Article 55.
Although widely accepted before 1945 as a political or moral
24principle entailing no legal obligation, its inclusion in the UN Charter
<22 23> Decade of American Foreign Policy. Docs. 1941.Q 1950 ,
and other principles were reaffirmed in the Declaration 
Nations in January 1942 ibid pp.2-3, and in the Declaration on ed 
Liberated Europe in February 1945 ibid pp.27, 29. Churchill ? * 
noted that the Atlantic Charter was only intended to Z T l v  tn 
conquered Europe, see Huber, "National Self-determination" ,Research X 1943, p.l. «unation , Social
(23) Docs, of the UN Conference on International Organisation Hi1945, p.622. ’
(24) Lachs, however, regarded self-determination as a-pre-existin* i
norm "Law In and Of th. OS" I J U  1060. p.432; B r Z a £ w f  leeal 
determination in Central Europe" 14 AJIL 1920 n o«,'
"Principle of National Self-determination" in'soviet Forefi»n^oÜi?’
1963, p.162, and Rousseau, Droit International"?:
cf. Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1953, p.65.~~^ — — * * p ‘82
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raised questions as to its juridical character.25 However, the Charter
only refers to self-determination as a 'principle- and not a -right’ and
this induced the Australian delegate to the Commission on Human Rights to
point out that "where the Charter laid down a principle, it did not
necessarily signify a right, and it must be left to the authority
responsible for the administration of a given dependent territory to
determine the extent to which the principle of self-determination could
26be applied to it".
This view is reinforced by a consideration of the context in which
the principle is proclaimed, that is, as a basis for friendly relations
among States. Article 1(2) comes within the section dealing with the
purposes of the UN and not the more important section concerned with the
principles of the Organisation and appears merely as a guidance framework
27for UN activities rather than prescribing legal norms.
A further factor is the absence of definition or clarification of the
concept in the Charter and this leaves one to question its legal validity
28as proclaimed in the Charter. This is reinforced by the coupling of
(25) Article 73 of the Charter proclaimed the paramountcy of the
interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories 
noted that the administering powers were pledged to develop self 
government. Article 76 emphasised the promotion of progressive ” 
development towards self-government or independence having reaard 
to the wishes of the people concerned as one of the basic * 
objectives of the trusteeship system.
(26) E/CN4/SR.505 p.5. See also the views of the British delegate that self-determination was purely a political principle, E/CN.4/SR.503, 
p 7. See also O ’Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. 1970,
vol.I, p.312.
Bentwich and Martin, Commentary on the Charter of the UN I9sn 
See also Giraud, "Le Droit International Pub 1 ilTeTTriPoiit1 *„P *7 *
110 HR 1966, p* 744, cf. Nincic, The Problem of '
Charter and in the Practice of States. 1970.':-jTa5T and^rTeh?"^"Recognition and Self-determination" PASIL 1954 pp23-7 ««rt*
™  i « a  Trr 0 .182. ««a iota
(28)
HR 1959 III p.182,
However^ Bokor-Sz.go regards thia not as detracting fron u . W a U t v
but as constituting it as a lex imperfecta which has been oertlfl* 
by later regulation and application, New States and Internal. ,
Law, 1970, pp. 16-27, but see S c h w a r z e n b e l ^ ---^
International Law, 1976, p.10. ' .
109
self-determination of peoples with equal rights. Not every expression 
of a political concept in the Charter can be taken as creating legal 
obligations, notwithstanding the character of the Charter as a multi­
lateral treaty, since the Charter is not only the constitution of the 
UN but a document of political faith.
The majority of writers have taken the view that the combined effect 
of Articles 1(2) and 55 is  not such as to create binding legal obligations 
upon States to grant self-determination to non-independent peoples. 
Bentwich and Martin regard Article 1(2) merely as "a declaration of 
goodwill towards peoples who have not yet achieved self-determination" 29 
while Fawcett considers self-determination as formulated in the Charter 
as a "directive principle" similar in essence to part IV, Article 37 of 
the Indian Constitution which lays down principles fundamental to the 
government of the country but nevertheless unenforcible by the courts.30 
In other words the Charter provisions could not provide the legal basis 
for claims to self-determination by non-independent peoples.31"41
Kelsen adopted a different approach and took self-determination as 
expressed in the Charter as simply emphasising the concept of the 
sovereignty of States. Since "self-determination of the people usually 
designated a principle of internal policy, the principle of democratic 
government" and Article 1(2) referred to relations among States, and since
"the term 'peoples’ too . . . .  in connection with 'equal rights' means
(29) Op.cit. p.7.
**Tha Role of the United Nations in Relation to Human Rights - Is 
it^Misconceived?", Kobe! Symposium 7, 1968, pp.93-101.
41V qee the Views of Ethiopia, Uberia and Egypt, African Original 
 ^ ' M hers of the UN, that the Charter provisions regarding self-
ination have given rise to international legal rights and 
nidations GAOR 6th Session, 3rd Committee, 36lst, 363rd,
Snih 371st meetings E/CN.4/SR. 252-9; GAOR 7th Session, 
^ C o m m i t t e e , 286th, 400-47th, 465th and 438th meetings, ibid 
9th S salon 3rd Committee 562-73rd, 575th and 580-2nd meetings,
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probably States since 
general International
only Stages have ’equal rights' according to 
law .... then the self-determination of peoples in
Article 1(2) can mean only sovereignty of the States".42
This conservative interpretation, strongly influe„Ced by traditional 
positivist philosophy, can no longer be accepted today in view of the 
wealth of State practice relating to the development of rights under 
international law for persons other than States. The view that the 
combination of equal rights and self-determination amounted only to a 
reinforcement of the sovereign equality of States can only be regarded as 
a misunderstanding of the basic trends in international law, while the 
idea that self-determination refers only to internal political situations 
has been contradicted by the evolution of the principle. However, there 
is a strong current of irony involved here, since Kelsen's conclusion that 
self-determination reinforces State sovereignty is not far off the mark in 
the light of the subsequent interpretation of the principle, although his 
reasoning is flawed. If one takes self-determination to be the right of 
non-independent peoples to sovereignty within accepted territorial limits 
(usually those defined by the administering power) and that alone, then 
the sanctity of the territorial sovereign is enhanced, the principle of 
territorial integrity underlined and the right of minorities to secede 
from independent States eliminated.
Quincy Wright, however, has argued that the Charter did introduce 
binding duties for member States with respect to self-determination. He 
bases this opinion upon the proviso in Article 56 whereby all members 
"pledge themselves to take...action for the purposes set forth in Article 55"
(42) Law of the United Nations, 1950, pp.51-3. See also pp.29-32. See 
generally Schwelb "the International Court of Justice and the Human 
Rights Clauses of the Charter" 66 AJIL, 1972, p.337. In his report 
to Commission I, the Rapporteur noted that it was understood that the 
"principle of equal rights of peoples and that of self-determination 
are two component elements of one norm". Summary Reports of 
Committee 1/1, Doc.1/1/1 of 16 May 1945, 6 UNCIO p.296.
Ill
By ratifying the Charter, states have, according to Wright, nndertaken
43
such legal obligations. But the point has to he made that the purposes 
in Article 55 are many and various, and it is by no means sure that the
principle of the self-determination of peoples could be Included as such 
a purpose.
In addition it is not certain that the expression ■■pledge" alone 
can convert the humanitarian aims set out into binding legal obligations. 
For example it would he difficult to say that the aim of "1011 employment" 
is a legal duty on the State or indeed that it could be merely by virtue 
of this provision in the UN Charter.
Although the discussion as to the legal status of the principle in 
the Charter has revolved around Articles 1(2) and 55, Bowett has noted 
that it is permissible "to regard the entirety of Chapters XI and XII of 
the ---  Charter as reflections of the basic idea of self-determination”.44 *20
(43) "Recognition and Self-determination” PASIL, 1954, pD 23-37 
"National Courts and Human Rights - the Fujii Case” 45 AJIL 
P*73. Lauterpacht stated that "there is a distinct element l®?1' 
duty in the undertaking expressed in Article 56 ... any c o n s ^ L c T 1 
of the Charter according to which members of the United L t i n  ° 
in law entitled to di.reg.rd - and violate - human right, and * "  
fundamental freedoms is destructive of both the leeal an* !!! , 
authority of the Charter as a whole". InternatiLal La^ and h L
Rights, 1950, pp. 147-9. Sloan noted t h l T t h i T l ^ ^ u ^  
rights, Articles 55 and 56, embodied a definite and p o s i t i v e , 
obligation, "Human Rights, the United Nations and I n t e r n ! ^ X?gal
20 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret, Acta ScanJin 
Gentium, 1950, pp.30-1. See Budge Tan^a? lefL p o r t T  «6« “r U  
pp,288-9. Cf. Hudson's view that the human riehts * j
Charter are purely a programme of action and no more - " A f r a m e d ®  
a picture must not be mistaken for the picture itself" - 
of International Instruments" 42 AJIL, 1948, pp 105-ft on,/v g^U y  
o, 1LC, 1949, p. 178. See aleo Akehuret. A 
International Law, 3rd ed, 1977, p,77. ”— -----
(44) "Problems of Self-determination and Political ~
Countries” PASIL, 1966, p ,134. Xltlcal R1Shts in Developing
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Chapter XI deal, with uou-self-governlug territories, whiie Chapter XII 
deals with the trusteeship system. la neither is the concept expressly 
referred to, hut those administering „on-self-Eov.rni»g territories have 
by Article 73(b) to '■develop self-government, to take due account of the 
political aspiration, the peoples and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free politlcai institutions”, and among the basic 
objectives of the trusteeship system 1» Article 76 is "progressive 
development towards self-government or independence". The freely
expressed wishes of the people concerned have to be taken into account 
In fulfilling these objectives.
Van Asbeck has written that Chapter XI being in the form of a
45declaration imposes international duties, but this was decidedly a
46minority viewpoint.
The question as to the establishment of a legal right to self- 
determination has to be answered rather in the light of developments 
subsequent to the UN Charter. Practice since 1945 reveals certain trends 
towards regarding self-determination as a rule of international law. 
Declarations and resolutions adopted by the UN relating to the concept 
both in general theoretical terms and in specific cases have been numerous 
and have manifested a definite approach to the problem. But the issue as 
to whether such expressions have been sufficient to establish self- 
determination as a legal right lies at the heart of the matter and must 
be disentangled from the political aspects of the question.
It is generally accepted that its inclusion in the Charter did not 
per se transform it into a binding obligation as distinct from a 46*
(46) See eg. Kaeckenbeek, "La Charte de San Franc. W r ,  e „
Avec le Droit International", 70 HR, RaPp0rts
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non-legal guideline, but the relevant provisions possessed considerable
48potential for development.
Th. point should also b. hade that the f.ot that a particuiar purposa
of the ON is not deemed to constitute a legaUy binding rule does not mean
that it is devoid of effect »ithin the sphere of iaw. it » i n  he relevant
as regards the interpretation of the Charter of t™e carter of the UN and may contribute
towards the development of customary law.
There are basically two methods by which self-determination may have 
subsequently attained the status of law.* 49
The first derives from the character o, the Charter as a multi-iateral 
treaty and the consequent capacity of the parties thereto to interpret 
its provisions. Could it be stated that subsequent practice has revealed 
the interpretation of the relevant Charter provisions in terms of self- 
determination as a legal right? The second manner in which State conduct 
could construe self-determination as a binding rule is by virtue of its 
development as a rule of customary law. Both methods utilise to some 
extent the s u e  material, namely, BN declarations and resolutions, but 
comprehend their role slightly differently.50
(47)
(48)
(50)
Schwarzenberger notes that "when the Charter of the United Nations 
came into existence, neither the principle of national self- 
determination nor that of the self-determination of peoples was a 
principle of customary international law, a general principle of law 
recognised by civilised nations or in the framework of the Charter ol 
the United Nations more than a constituent element of Purpose Two of 
the United Nations". International Constitutional Law, 1976, p.15 3,
See Robinson, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Chart«?» 
the United Nations - A Commentary. 1946, p,105. ~~ ~ “  ~~~ “
(49) Schwarzenberger op.cit. pp,158-67.
Judge Tanaka noted that "the accumulation of authoritative pronounce­
ments such as resolutions, declarations, decisions, etc. concerning 
tlje interpretation of the Charter by the component organs of the 
international community can be characterised as evidence of the 
international custom referred to in Article 38(l)b". ICJ Reports, 
I960, p.292. Emphasis added. Judge Nervo declared that "included 
among the international rules which are binding on the administration 
of the international territory of Namibia are declarations formally 
adopted by the principal organs of the United Nations which represent 
generally accepted interpretations and applications of the provisions 
in the United Nations Charter” ICJ Reports, 1971, p.119.
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II - Charter Interpretation
(a) General
The development of international legal rules through the medium
of the United Nations has been one of the most striking and controversial
aspects of post 1945 norm creation. The problem has already been
51considered at length, but what we need to note here is a difficulty 
that has arisen as regards the relevance and application of the 
traditional sources of law to this phenomenon. The international 
community has recognised as law-creating mechanisms conventions, custom 
and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations,51 2 but it 
is clear that many of the activities connected with the UN organisation 
may be implicitly or explicitly creative of law in a manner which 
straddles the traditional classifications, and this is particularly so 
with regard to the political organs of the United Nations.53 This has 
led Higgins to refer to the blurring in the UN of the historically 
separate sources of law and to emphasise the twilight zone between custom 
and treaty in the development of international law in the Charter and in
(51) See eg. Kelsen, op.cit; Schwarzenberger op.cit; Hieeins Th«
P g y J g g g gtjtf- International LawThrough the Politic! .
theJJN, 1963; Asamoah, TheJLegal S i g n i f i ^ ^ T T T ^ l ^ “™ 1" 
of the General Assembly of the U n i t e d ^ i l ^ r " ^  
y ^ J ^ ^ t e c t ^ ot Vnited . 19e9 I d otterworks cited. ^  ~ ~ ~ -- ’ ’ ana other
(52) Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.
(53) Kelsen emphasised that the act of choice by the d o U h ,«i k
of the UN h . a a  lew-o,e.ti„B c h a p t e r  w h t L ^ r e “  ‘ „ “e ^ L a *
a legal normby another norm of totally different content, op cit
ruil'of l a w V a  part W a r ' s e t  o i l a c ^ r i T i r f PrinCiple °r 
of a more specific character and "this is a l a w - c r e a t i n g ^ c t ^ o ^ 16 
that "once a decision is rendered by an authoritative body it h i  
entered into the stream of decisions that will normally b r o o k e d  
to as a source of law". * "The Quasi-Judirui -looKea
Council and General Assembly" 58 AJIL, 1964, p.964.° 8 Security
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the organisation as a whole 54
This arises Primarily because of the tremendous amount ol State 
practice generated through the UN organisation and produced by virtually 
all the independent States of the International community In an ever- 
increasing variety of situations ranging from debates on colonialism In 
plenary session to discussions In committees such as the Commission of 
Human Rights and the International Lam Commission. This vast array of 
State behaviour pattern has Inevitably led to an increased awareness and 
emphasis upon such practice as norm-creative In given circumstances.
One result of this has been the faster emergence of rules of customary 
law while another has been the enhanced potentialities of Charter 
interpretation by State practice.
However, since the Charter as a multilateral treaty may be amended 
or interpreted by treaty action (ie. by following the prescribed methods
of amendment stipulated in Chapter XVIII), by custom and (it is suggested) 
by State practice not amounting to custom, it is hardly surprising that 
the precise boundaries between the different processes are frequently 
difficult to clarify. Similarly, it is often hard to pinpoint the exact 
legal manner in which a rule has emerged in the United Nations, since it 
could conceivably arise by virtue of Charter interpretations or amendment 
or customary international law or even as a general principle of law. In 
addition an emerging proposition may be a legal norm or a principle by 
reference to which existing rules are to be interpreted. *
(54) •'The Development of International Law by the Political Oraans of th 
UN". PASIL, 1965, pp.116-8. Sch.elb note, that after t ! Ä o  
Colonial Declaration "there are International documente which, 
although not concluded or ratified ae treaties, are not 'non-Mndln
One can say that they comprise a third category” »Neu« :
Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts durch die H i n t e n  N a U o L n ” ** 
Archiv des Völkerrechts XIII, 1966, pp,25-6. He declared thaï the 
difference between treaties and resolutions of international 
organisations is disappearing, ibid p.44,
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This apparent flexibility in the methods of international la.
creation in the framework of the international organisation has
contributed to the relative decline of the consent theory of law and the
rise of the consensus approach, and this has some bearing upon the
issue of the emergence of self-determination as a legal right through
the process of General Assembly resolutions and declarations. The
blurring of the division between the sources of law has led to great
confusion as to whether or not a particular proposition is or is not
law and to greater difficulties in identifying the criteria of norm-
creation. It has also meant the comparative neglect of Charter
interpretation as a separate category distinct from customary law.
A number of writers, in fact, have discussed the role of UN resolutions
as interpretations of the Charter in terms of the development of 
56customary law, and this has led to insufficient attention being paid 
to this process in the development of legal rules.
The parties to a treaty may subsequently interpret its provisions and 
could possibly be legally bound by such interpretations.5 67 This proposition 
is illustrative of the principles of consent and good faith and reflects
(55) See D'Amato "On Consensus" 8 Canadian YBJL 1970, p.104; ibid
The Concept of Custom in International Law, 1971, pp.33-41, 187-99. 
r> Thirlway. International Customary Law and Codification. 1972, 
pp.76-9.
(56) Eg. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law. 1972, 
p.82. See also Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports, 1966, pp.292, 294.
Hevener writes, regarding the discussions of the ICJ in the South- 
West Africa case, 1966, and Namibia case, 1971, on the subject of 
human rights and international law that "the general obligation is 
based on convention; its interpreted definition has developed as 
custom. The custom aspect of the court's opinion derives from a 
combination of custom reflected in the Charter and subsequent United 
Nations resolutions and action which interprets the Charter and 
gives evidence of the practice of States and their recognition of 
the present binding nature of rules protective of human rights",
"The 1971 South-West Africa Opinion. A New International Juridical 
Philosophy" 24 ICLQ, 1975, pp.794-5. Emphasis in original.
(57) See Kelsen op.cit. p.xiii et seq., Oppenheim, International Law.
7th ed. vol.I, p.857.
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an old-established concept of international law. Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, notes that "a treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purposes", while "any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation” should be taken into account 
(Article 31(3)b).
It is this concept of subsequent practice interpreting the treaty 
which marks as it were the frontier between treaty and custom in the 
emergence of new international legal norms. It may be valid as a
straightforward act of treaty interpretation or it may constitute State 
practice evidencing or leading to a new customary rule.
By Article 5, the Vienna Convention is deemed applicable to any
treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
58
organisation. Such »unilateral treaties are clearly in a special 
category since they create international entities with deilned powers 
and purposes and go beyond the bounds oi ordinary treaties. They 
invariably operate on a higher level oi conpleait, as they specify 
only the right, and duties the signatories but also the functions and 
aspirations of the newly created organisation, and the Intended pattern 
of its relationships with the »ember States. Nevertheless, in form 58
(58) This is "without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organisation’ 
This may provide a way around the literal interpretation approach of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, since it could be argued that 
rules permitting a more teleological and practice oriented approach 
to Charter interpretation have been adopted. Such rules may be 
derived from practice as well as from the constituent documents of 
the organisation concerned, see UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, 
Official Records, First Session, p,147, para.15. But cf, Judge De 
Castro’s view that the Charter would not appear to fall within the 
framework of the Vienna Convention, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 184,
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such instruments are treaties and as such are subject mutatisjutandis
59 ~to the law of treaties.
Such treaty-Charters incorporate a dynamic element which increases 
the likelihood of interpretation by subsequent practice since the 
operations of the organisations of which they constitute the 
constitutional instruments invariably provide evidence and examples of 
the understanding of their Charters by the member States.59 60 Invariably 
the activities of international organisations emphasise the role and 
importance of interpretation by subsequent practice even if this is not 
always expressly recognised.
Higgins has pointed out that the notion of subsequent practice is 
ambiguous since it may refer either to treaty interpretation or 
developing custom, but she appears to adopt the prevalent attitude by 
stressing that "it seems to me that the repeated practice here of the 
organ interpreting the treaty establishes a practice and ultimately
The Charter of the United Nations is a multilateral treaty and has 
been subjected to over 30 years of discussion, Interpretation and judicial 
opinion. It is unique in its universality of membership and function, and 
the wide range of subsequent practice relating to its role and powers 
places it in a category of its own. The question of the interpretation of
(59) Tunkin refers to the Charters of international institution* ** 
treaties sal generis, Theory o, Internet!-,,!
Rosenne notes that by origin such
treaties but by operation they are of a different
practice governed by fundamentally different principles
Constitution of an International Organisation I t . ’ 1 the
Treaty?" Comuntcasionl e s t S t X n f m TICJ Reports, 1962, p.157, > PP.21, 86, 66, See also
(60) See El Erian, "The Legal Organisation of ,
Me:g al_ot_Pub.Uc I n t e n ^ t ^ ^  J." *«.
(61-62) Op.cit. footnote 54, p.11 9,
119
the UN Charter, therefore, must be prefaced with 
the general approach adopted.
a few words illustrating
It appears clear that in the lieht of the specie! pature of treaty- 
Charters, the ordinary rules of interpretation of treaties may not 
suffice. This is primarily because of the powers and purposes ascribed to
the organisation which have the effect of altering the emphasis of 
interpretation from the Intention of the original parties to the intention
of member States on the contemporary temporal plane as manifested by 
practice and in the light of a collective appreciation of the purposes of 
the organisation. This point was clearly put by Judge De vtsscher who 
noted that "one must bear in mind that in the interpretation of a great 
international constitutional Instrument like the United Nations Charter, 
the individualistic concepts which are generally adequate in the 
interpretation of ordinary treaties do not suffice".63
Thus, a shift in the time frame of reference from the past, ie. the 
date of the treaty, to the present coupled with an added emphasis upon a 
consensus perception of the purposes of the organisation constitute the 
main differentiating factors regarding the interpretation of treaty- 
Charters as distinct from ordinary treaties. 64
The intentions of the original contracting parties remain important
(64) But see Judge Gros' dissenting opinion in the Namibia case 
ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 341. ~~ ~ ~  "
(65) See eg. The Advisory Opinions on Admission to the United Nations,
ICJ Reports, 1948, p.63, and Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.178-9, See also 
nf the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to 
The United Nations, ICJ Reports, 1950, p .8. "Fitzmaurice notes that 
the~Tnternationai Court in the years succeeding 1945 favoured a 
general approach to treaty interpretation based primarily on an 
elucidation of the text, "The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice, 1951-4", 33 BYIL 1957, p.209.
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the need for a wider base for interpreting the Charter becomes more 
66apparent. This process inevitably emphasises the teleological approach
to treaty interpretation, by which the treaty is comprehended in the light
of its aims and objects6 7 68*as against the textual and 'founding fathers'
68methods. This approach has found favour with most of the representatives 
69in US debates, and been propounded by a number of Judges of the
70-75International Court. Such an approach means that "an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation". 7 6 -7 8 This 
phrase together with the statement that the concepts embodied in Article 22
(66) See the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Basdevant, Winiarski,
McNair and Reed, ICJ Reports, 1948, p.92.
(67) See Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice"28 BYIL 1951, pp.1-2.
(6 8) Ibid. They of course will be of greater importance regarding the
' } interpretation of ordinary treaties. See The Opinion of the Court
in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case (2nd Phase) to the effect 
tbat "the Principle of Interpretation expressed in the maxim: 
rfi9 maais valeat quam pereat often referred to as the rule of 
■^ffectiveness cannot justify the court in attributing to the provisions 
for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning ... 
contrary to their letter and spirit" ICJ Reports, 1950, p.221. See 
also The Iranian Oil case, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.105, and the Rights 
0£ us Nationals in Morocco case, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.196.
RQ g ee the delegates of Afganistan GAOR, 17th Session, 6th Committee,
1 7 142-4-A/C.6/SR.762, Algeria ibid 138-9 A/C.6/SR.761, Argentina ibid
n s  20 A/C 6/SR.758, Ceylon ibid 149-50-A/C.6/SR.762, Hungary ibid 
112-A/C.6/SR.756, Syria ibid 156-A/C.6/SR.764, UAR ibid 18th Session, 
6th Committee, 164-A/C.6/SR.811. See also McDougal, "International 
Law, Power and Policy" 82 HR, 1953, pp.143-57.
(70-75) See Judge Azevedo, ICJ Reports 1950, pp.23-4. See also Judge 
u  Alvarez who noted that "an instrument ... must develop not in
accordance with the views of those who created it, but in
accordance with the requirements of international life".
ICJ Reports, 1948, p.6 8. See also Schwarzenberger, op.cit. 
p.137.
(76-78) ICJ Reports 1971, pp.16, 31. Judge Alvarez went further than this 
 ^ ~ iQ j,fS dissenting opinion in the Competence case when he declared
that "a treaty or a text ... acquires a life of its own.
Consequently in interpreting it one must have regard to the 
exigencies of contemporary life rather than to the intentions of 
those who framed it". ICJ Reports, 1950, p.18.
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of the Covenant of the League of Nations »ere "by definition evolutionary"79 80
appeared to mark the demise of the school emphasieing the predominant role
to he played by the Intentions of the original parties In treaty-charter 
80interpretations.
Judge De Castro declared that "the teaching of the court is, in fact, 
that for the interpretation of the Charter, account must be taken of its 
fundamental purposes and it must be recognised that it has the powers 
which are necessary to achieve them 'by necessary implication’."81 This 
must be accepted as correct and the teleological approach to Charter 
interpretation as the most important by far of the various schools and the 
one most productive of viable development. As De Castro pointed out, "it 
should not be forgotten that the General Assembly and the Security Council 
have the responsibility for promoting the purposes laid down in the Charter, 
They cannot remain bound by the possible intentions of the draftsmen, not 
only because it is difficult to know what those intentions were ... but 
also because interpretation necessarily undergoes a process of development 
and as in municipal law must adapt itself to the circumstances of the time
(79) Ibid
(80) See Higgins who noted that "in interpreting the constitutions of
dynamic international organisations the primary canon should not be 
the intention of the original parties but rather the evidence which 
can be adduced of the obligations which the present members feel are 
incumbent upon them". - "The Development of International Law by the 
Political Organs of the United Nations" PASIL 1965, p.119. This 
approach is characterised by Fitzmaurice as the theory of 'emergent 
purpose*, whereby the teleological school is extended so that the 
objects become liable to change through time. He notes that 
"whatever the attractions of this idea, it is clear that the process 
in question is a legislative rather than an interpretative one and 
must involve the assumption of a quasi-legislative function". - 
"The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1951-4" 33 BYIL 1957, p.208.
(81) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 185. References were made here to ICJ 
Reports, 1949, p,182 and ICJ Reports, 1962, pp,208-15. See also the 
court’s view that "when the Organisation takes action which..*, is 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the
United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultravires the Organisation". ICJ Reports, 1962, p.168, Judge Spender 
noted that "the meaning of the text will be illuminated by the stated 
purposes to achieve which the terms of the Charter were drafted" 
ibid p,187. This last proposition is quoted by Judge De Castro as 
"an authoritative criterion", ICJ Reports, 1971, pp,16, 1 8 5,
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and to the requirements so far as they are foreseeable of the future. 
The text breaks away from its authors and lives a life of its own" . 82 83
The nature of the United Nations as an active political structure has
reinforced these tendencies, particularly since the balance of membership
83has moved drastically since 1945. International organisations are 
competent to interpret their own constitutions, but this is not an 
unrestricted capacity. They must have regard to the terms of the 
instrument and the aims and powers of the organisation. As far as the 
United Nations is concerned, the prima facie scope for interpretation by 
subsequent practice is extensive in view of the essential characteristics 
and purposes of the organisation. Committee IV/2 of the San Francisco 
Conference reported that "in the course of operations of the various organs 
of the organisation, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such
(82) ICJ Reports, 1971, p.184. See also Judge Alvarez i pt »
p.18 .nd ibid, and ICJ Reports. 1951, p853 SpendarTot^V1“ 0 -
"the Charter must accordingly be interpreted, whils/in no ! h&t 
deforming or dislocating its language, so t h «  the a u t h o r , ^  ,
upon the Organisation and its various organs may attach itself0^ " 6“* 
and unanticipated situations and events", ICJ Reports 1962 ^ it-,™'”
The court had already declared that "the rights and duties ¿f an 
entity such as the Organisation must depend upon its purposes 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents 
developed in practice", ICJ Reports, 1949, p.180. See also * d 
Fitzmaurice loc.cit. p.2U, Gros, "The International Court of 
and the United Nations", 120 HR, 1967, pp.370, 385, and Lautfroaci^ 6
The.,Dev^lo£ment_of.;nternatlonal_Law by the Internal™*,
p.280. See for other examples of a
court, the International Status of South-West Afr1*« rrr J  th 
1950, P P . 1 3 ^ 7  South-West Africa 'vStlST?
1955, pp.99, 104-ifj The^dmissiblTitF'ofTieaTTn^^^ 
the Committee on South-West Africa, ICJ Repo7 tT7S^^~--r-2^ ^  
South-West Africa Preliminary Objections. ICJ Reports! 1962 1  32q
and 326. *
(83) Higgins has made the point.that the treatment of treaties hv 
political organs of the UN has involved the prevalence of the tel* 
ological rather than the literal approach. She notes that V i l L
fact that the advent of the general multi-lateral convention wit£ 
large participation and provisions for subsequent accession makls it* 
hard to ascertain precisely the intention of the parties l t i U  
understandable that the mushrooming of such instruments inder United 
Nations auspices should encourage the view of interpretation whirh 
rests on the presumed objects of the treaty". The Develonm«n/*f
International Law Through the Political Organs
pp.308-9. This is of course a manifestation of th* * ,  ’
adopted with regard to the interpretation of the UN Charter itself011
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parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions.... 
Accordingly it is not necessary to Include in the Charter a provision 
authorising or approving the normal operation of this principle».84'97 98
One question which is of particular concern is whether any special 
Procedure is necessary to bring about a binding interpretation.
Vallat, for example, takes the view that authoritative interpretations 
can only be by way of amendment, while others consider that General 
Assembly resolutions on their own are quite sufficient.99 yet other 
jurists declare that where resolutions purporting to be interpretations 
are rejected by some member States amendments would then be required 100
In any event, it appears to be accepted by most writers that at the 
very least, as noted by Judge Nervo, ’’the General Assembly has competence 
in respect of the interpretation of the Charter".101
(84-97) U8CI0 Docs. vol.lS, pp.709-10. See also Higgins op.cit „ ana 
and Brugiero, Le8.Pouvoirs_de L ’Assemblge C e ^ . i A n a  '
Unies en Mature Poli
the doctrine of implied powers, see” the view of’th«*V* AS reeards 
Court, ICJ Reports, 1949? pp.XTB a n d 198 SeeV u Z e
ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.281-2, and Judge Gros ibid, p 33 SeI 
Bowett’ of International Institution« «h i a J  lS°
p.301; Seyersted, "International P e i ^ ^ I i t v  of t ’
Organisations" 4 i m ,  1964, and T ^ i i ,  ih'ory o T l n ^ r “ 1national Law, 1974, pp.334-5. »ory or inter-.
(98) "The General Assembly and the Security Council of the United „
29 BYIL 1952, pp.66-7. See also El Brian op.cit. p.92, * aUons
(99) See eg. Lachs, "Law In and Of the United Nations" 1 i ji l io«n , 
pp.429, 439. ' auii0“l.
(100) See Schachter, "The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the
United Nations" 109 HR, 1963, pp.169, 187, 8 W e
(101) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 111, See also Judge Ammoun, ICJ Renorta
1970, pp.302-4. However, Virally notes that the absence of an 
of final competence weakens the argument that Assembly resolution?311 
and declarations can be regarded as authoritative interpretation L  
the Charter, "Droit International et Decolonisation" AFDI 1963 *
p , 563. ’
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The teleological approach has permitted a certain amount of
flexibility within the basic structure of the UN Organisation and its
constitution and has been supported by judicial opinion. In the Expenses
case, the International Court discussed the meaning of the word "action"
102as it appeared in Article 11(2) of the Charter, and came to the
conclusion that it referred not to any kind of action, which would
effectively reduce the General Assembly's function to simple recommendation
103but to coercive or enforcement action alone. In other words "action”
meant only "such action as is solely within the province of the Security 
Council" 104 in deciding whether the actual expenses authorised were
105within the meaning of Article 17(2), one had to test them by their
relationship to the purposes of the United Nations. Such purposes,though
broad, are not unlimited, "but when the Organisation takes action which
warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one
of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such
106action was not ultra vires the Organisation". Thus the General 1023456
(102) "Any such question relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security on which action is necessary shall be referred 
to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or 
after discussion".
(103) ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.151, 164.
(104) Ibid, p.165.
(105) "The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the members as 
apportioned by the General Assembly".
(106) ICJ Reports, 1962, p.168. This case contrasts with the Competence 
case, ICJ Reports, 1950, p.4, where the court stressed that the 
Assembly could not decide upon an application for admission in the 
absence of a Security Council recommendation and that "it is in the 
nature of things that the recommendation should come before the 
decision", ibid p.7. The court rejected the argument that no 
recommendation was equivalent to an unfavourable recommendation on 
which the Assembly could then decide positively, ibid p.9. Greig 
differentiates the cases on the basis of the more generally framed 
provisions in the former which permitted a more dynamic approach by 
the court, International Law, 2nd ed, 1976, p.486. In addition one 
must point out that the purposes of the Organisation include the 
maintenance of international peace and security and that according 
to Article 24 the Council possesses only the primary responsibility 
for this, whereas universality of membership is not a stated purpose 
of the Organisation, though highly desirable.
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Assembly was able to establish peace-keeping forces. 107 108
Th„ recognition by the ICJ ol the competence of the General Assembly 
to make determinations as to the meaning and scope of Charter provisions, 
albeit not unlimited with regard to the stated purposes of the 
Organisation, is valuable, but a few guidelines are proposed. The issue 
basically relates to the political structure and inter-relationships of 
the United Nations and as the court pointed out "in the legal system of 
States there is often some procedure for determining the validity of even 
a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be 
found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made during the 
drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the 
Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted .... there­
fore each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own 
108jurisdiction.
Accordingly, therefore, one must examine the practice of the organ in 
question in order to see how it has tackled the problem of interpreting 
the various provisions of the Charter.
The problem is also raised that it is the UN's organa themselves that 
will usually constitute the fora for the determination of the
(107) A similar process of interpretation and application has taken place 
with respect to Article 2(7) which declares that nothing in the 
Charter is to authorise the UN to intervene in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Matters concerning 
colonial affairs have in practice been excluded from this provision. 
Higgins notes that a narrow interpretation of the Article has taken 
place in UN practice, and that "the actions of the Organisation have 
been in conformity with the principle that an area covered by 
international law changes and develops - not in an arbitrary manner, 
but in accordance with interpretations made in good faith and in the 
hope of making the Charter effective". Op.cit. p.130. El Erian 
stresses that "wherever possible a flexible interpretation has been 
maintained by the concept of domestic jurisdiction, the main criterion 
being the attainment of the aims and purposes of the Organisation", 
Loc.cit.p.95. See for examples of cases, UN Repertory of Practice 
1955, vol.l, pp.55-156. See also Judge Ammoun ICJ Reports, 1970,
pp.313-4.
(108) ICJ Reports, 1962, p,168. See also ICJ Reports, 1971, p.45.
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constitutionality of thoir o„n acts. 109 As the court Itself remarked in 
the statement quoted above, attempts to make the ICJ a final authority 
regarding the interpretation of the Charter were rejected. Recourse to 
the court will depend upon a positive decision by the particular organ, 
and the opinions of the International Court are only advisory ln this 
field, though in practice usually adopted by resolution. 110
This means that in practice a very high proportion of questions 
relating to the constitutionality of, for example, General Assembly 
resolutions will be considered only by the Assembly itself, and this has 
had a blurring effect on the subject of Charter interpretation and its 
limits. 111 There are indeed dangers inherent in the situation where organs 
are deemed to be the final authority as regards the constitutionality of 
their own acts since majority voting could validate as it were provisions 
manifestly contrary to the stipulations enshrined in the Charter. Some 
safeguards therefore are necessary to prevent the process from degenerating 
into license. These will take the form of determining the requirement of 
authoritativeness surrounding Charter interpretations in such a way as to
(109) The competence of the political organs of the UN may to a laree
extent depend upon commonly accepted practices. For example the 
right of the Assembly to determine which territories fell within 
the scope of Article 73 of the Charter has now been recognised Se 
Higgins op.cit. pp.110-3. Resolution 1747(XVI)j for example 
affirmed that Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territorv 
within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. Note also the 
statement of the Philippines delegate that if there was a lacuna in
Chapter XI, it "could be remedied by a reasonable interpretation in 
keeping with the principle that any restrictive construction of an 
international agreement which would nullify or circumvent its 
manifest purpose should be rejected". GAOR 1st Session part 2 
4th Committee, part 3, pp,34-55. ' v •
(110) Eg, Security Council resolution 301 (1971) accenting w 
opinion of the ICJ. accePtinS the
(111) The court has however noted that "the political character of an orEf 
cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions 
established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its 
powers or criteria for its Judgement". ICJ Reports, 1948, p.64 cf 
Judge Morelli, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.060-1. See also Judges ’ 
Fitzmaurice, ibid p.200, and Winiarski, ibid p.230. 5
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protect the interests of the minority as well as to preserve some
elements of continuity and stability in evolution of international legal
. . .  112 principles.
There have been varying views expressed as to the way in which the 
Charter may be amended, altered and interpreted, and such views range 
widely. At this point we shall take a brief look at some of them in order 
to clarify the role and potentialities of Charter interpretation 
particularly with regard to self-determination.
Chapter XVIII of the Charter prescribes two ways in which the Charter 
may be changed. The first (Article 108) is by way of amendments, which are 
to come into force for all UN members when adopted by a vote of two thirds 
of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by at least two thirds 
of UN members including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 
The second (Article 109) is by way of alteration, which is to follow upon 
a general conference for the review of the Charter and a recommendation by 
a two thirds vote of the conference ratified by two thirds of the members 
of the UN including all the permanent members of the Security Council.
These methods are the declared constitutional procedures enshrined in the 
constituent document of the UN Organisation and there is a minority view 
to the effect that they are the sole means available for the modification 
of the Charter. 12 13
(112) Asamoah, however, writes that the danger of arbitrariness has been 
overestimated and this is because when "protests of irregularity 
have been raised and overruled expressly or impliedly, and practice 
proceeds on the assumption that the interpretation is valid, the 
interpretation will become unimpeachable and the practice built upon 
it will attain the status of law". Op.cit, p.39. It is suggested 
nevertheless that one does not follow from the other.
(113) Verdross notes that "any authentic interpretation of a legal norm 
may proceed only from the authority which created it, or from a 
superior authority, or perhaps as a result of a procedure which has 
been determined by these authorities. We find such a procedure for 
the present case in Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations 
Charter". Kann Die Generalversammlung der Verienten Nationen das 
Völkerrecht Weiterbilden, p.695 quoted in Tunkin op.cit, p.171:
see generally Kelsen op.cit. p.816 et seq, Goodrich, Hambro and 
Simons, The Charter of the United Nations. Commentary and Documents, 
3rd ed. 1969, p.641 et seq.
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However, despite this view it is possible to achieve some measure of
change in the Charter. An instrument may be amended by the subsequent
practice of the States parties to it. It is clear that custom may modify
a previous treaty norm just as a treaty may alter a previous customary
rule, but practice not amounting to custom may accomplish the same
objective. As Fitzmaurice has written, -the way in which the parties have
actually conducted themselves in relation to the treaty affords legitimate
evidence as to its correct interpretation"14 15 and the International Court
has on a number of occasions had recourse to subsequent practice in order
to aid in the process of treaty interpretation.116 17 However, subsequent
practice may not only clear up doubts and ambiguities in the text of the
treaty, that is, act as an extraneous means of elucidation in the absence
of clarity in the ordinary meaning of the words, but may also result in
117actual revision of the treaty itself. This, as we have already noted,
(114) See Rousseau. Droit International Public, 1970, vol.I, para.283, and 
the Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, 38 ILR, pp,182,
249 et seq.
(115) "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,1951-4" 
33 BYIL 1957, pp.211, 223. See also ibid 28 BYIL 1951 pp.20-1.
(116) See the Competence of the ILO with Respect to Agricultural Labour. 
PCIJ Series B no.2, The Rights of US Nationals in Morocco. ICJ 
Reports, 1952, p.185, The Anglo-Iranian Oil case, ICJ Reports, 1952, 
p.92. In the latter case the court in interpreting an Iranian 
unilateral declaration accepting its compulsory Jurisdiction referred 
to an Iranian law passed after the date of the signature of the 
declaration, and before its ratification, and noted with respect to
a particular clause in the law that "this clause....is in the opinion 
of the court a decisive confirmation of the intention of the govern­
ment of Iran at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the court" ibid p.107. See also Waldock's 3rd Report to the ILC, 
Yearbook of the ILC, 1964, vol.II, p.198.
(117) Article 38 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties provided that "a treaty may be modified by 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the 
agreement of the parties to modify its provisions", see Yearbook of 
the ILC, 1966, vol.II, p.236. This provision was deleted at the 
Vienna Conference by 53 votes to 15, with 26 abstentions, UN 
Conference on the Law of Treatiesi Official Records, first Session, 
pp.207-15. After a consideration of the views expressed by States 
voting in favour of the proposal to delete, Akehurst concludes that 
"it is thus difficult to interpret the deletion of Article 38 as a 
clear rejection of the view that existing law allowed a treaty to be 
amended by subsequent practice", "The Hierarchy of the Sources of 
International Law" 47 BYIL, 1974-5, pp.273, 277.
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is particularly evident in the case of the international organisations 
where changing conditions and a wealth of day to day practice cannot but 
result in some modification of the original constituent documents.118
The question then arises as to the conditions under which this
procedure might operate. It is generally accepted that the conduct
involved will have to encompass a large number of the parties to the
treaty119 though conduct by one party might be relevant as regarda the
doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel. One cannot go so far, however,
as to insist upon universal compliance since this could result in one
State out of about 150 frustrating an agreement reached by all the 
120others.
Tunkin emphasises that a further element must be that the practice
in question is evidence of an agreement by the relevant parties to the
121intended modification. This follows from his well-known views of
custom as a form of tacit agreement and his emphasis upon the importance
of the concordance of States’ wills in the formation of rules of
122international law. To the extent that the subsequent practice must 
clearly relate to a particular provision or set of provisions in the 
relevant treaty and that the States involved in the practice clearly wish 
to amend the treaty, Tunkin\a opinion is valid, However, it is felt that 
the requirement that the practice evidences the existence among the parties
(118) Akehurst notes that "subsequent practice often modifies the 
constituent treaties of international organisations", ibid.
(119) Fitzmaurice emphasises that "it is, of course, axiomatic that the 
conduct in question must have been....in the case of general multi­
lateral conventions, of the great majority of the parties" loc.cit. 
p.223. Rajan writes that a majority is sufficient, United Nations 
and Domestic Jurisdiction, 2nd ed. 1961, p.405. 120
(120) But cf. Tunkin, op.cit..p.339. See also Judge Spender, ÎCJ Reports 
1962, pp.151, 191. There is much to commend Akehurst's view that 
one ought to apply by analogy any amendment clause that exists in tl 
constituent treaty so that,in the case of the UN, the Charter may b< 
amended by a practice supported by two-thirds of the member States, 
including the permanent members of the Security Council, loc.cit *
■ p.278. ' . ■ ■ . . ......‘ ■ ■
(121) Ibid p.339.
(122) Ibid pp.124, 146.
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of an agreement respecting the attempted amendments is going too far and
fails to recognise the point that the conduct need not amount to a custom
123before achieving a modification in the terms of the treaty. Of course,
a customary norm may alter a previous treaty provision if the necessary 
conditions apply, but conduct not amounting to custom may operate to alter 
treaty norms so long as it is clearly aimed at modifying such norms.123 24 1256
General Assembly resolutions are in this instance particularly suited 
in form for this purpose. They constitute State practice and they are 
inherently linked to the UN Organisation and its Charter. This does not 
mean that other practice is irrelevant but by the very nature of things 
Charter modification, by way of amendment or interpretation, may be more 
readily accomplished by General Assembly resolutions than by other 
methods.12£*
Judge Spender declared that although members of international
organisations have the right to interpret the constituent instruments in
126good faith, "their right to interpret.... gives them no power to alter".
(123) Ibid pp.171-2, 339. See Schachter op.cit. p.186. See also ibid 
"Interpretation of the Charter in the Political Organs of the 
United Nations" in Law, State and International Order, Essays in 
Honour of Hans Kelsen, 1964, p.269.
(124) Fitzmaurice notes that "it is difficult to deny that the meaning of 
a treaty, or some part of it (particularly in the case of certain 
kinds of treaties and conventions) may undergo a process of change 
or development in the course of time. Where this occurs it is the 
practice of the parties in relation to the treaty that effects and 
indeed i£ that change or development", loc.cit. p.225.
(125) Judge Spender has argued that one cannot equate a principle of 
subsequent practice of parties to a treaty with the practice of 
international organisations themselves, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.192, 
195. However, the subsequent conduct of international organisations 
is based upon the practice of States, for example, voting and state­
ments and the actions of the former are predicated upon the 
practice of the latter. See also Tunkin op.cit. p.339.
(126) ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.196-7. Judge Spender notes that changes in 
treaty-charters may be accomplished only in accordance with the 
revision clauses in such instruments; they "cannot be altered at the 
will of the majority of the member States no matter how often that 
will is expressed...and no matter how large be the majority of 
member States which asserts its will in this matter", ibid. See 
also Vallat, "The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly" 
97 HR; 1959, p.211, and Bokor-Szego op.eit. pp,29-30.
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This strict positivist viewpoint is predicated upon the need to preserve
the consensual aspect of international law creation and lays excessive
emphasis upon the actual wording of the text of the particular instruments.
It ignores the fact that to interpret is to create and that the line to
be drawn between interpretation stricto sensu and actual alteration is
127hazy and incapable of precise definition.
Fitzmaurice appears to be moving towards this, and tentatively 
suggests that where subsequent practice has brought about a change or 
development in the meaning of a treaty through a revision of its terms 
by conduct, "it is permissible to give effect to this change or develop­
ment as an agreed revision but not as an interpretation of its original 
terms".127 28 12930 Although this may seem confusing in introducing a concept of 
agreed revision and treating interpretation as equivalent (it would appear) 
to amendment, it is a recognition that subsequent conduct may re-interpret 
a treaty, particularly the UN Charter within certain limits. But the 
problem still remains, that is, where to draw the line between inter­
pretation and alteration (or,in Fitzmaurice's phrase, agreed revision) if 
indeed a line has to be drawn,
Tunkin takes the view that custom may amend treaties but not change
129the basic provisions of the treaty and he gives as an example the
130modification of Article 27 of the UN Charter but he criticises the
(127) See generally Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 1976, and Dias, 
Jurisprudence, 4th ed. 1976, Chapter 7.
(128) Loc.cit. p.212.
(129) Op.cit. p.339. He notes that to allow custom to modify any treaty 
provisions would be inadvisable and dangerous for the stability of 
international treaties, ibid. p,146, Lachs suggests that there 
may be no need to amend the Charter where the interpretation 
confirms a general principle defined in the Charter, "Law In and Of 
the United Nations", 1IJIL, 1960-1, pp.429, 440,
(130) See ICJ Reports, 1971, p.22, and pp.117 (Judge Nervo) and 186 
(Judge De Castro).
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Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950 as a violation of the Charter since
it purported to amend basic provisions of the Charter.131 132 In practice
this distinction could prove elusive since perceptions as to such basic
provisions may well alter with the passage of time and lead to complex
problems of determination, while in theory it creates difficulties since
it is arguable that even rules of jus cogens may be changed by virtue of
the tacit consent of the vast majority of the members of a universal 
132organisation.
However, one distinction does remain and that is between amendments 
by subsequent practice and interpretations. It is a distinction that is 
in practice extremely difficult to define precisely, since the mechanics 
of change will be the same and States will rarely specify whether they 
feel that by a series of, for example, resolutions, they are amending or 
interpreting the Charter. Nevertheless, it is possible for a Charter 
provision to be interpreted by a majority of UN members in circumstances 
that might not amount to an amendment, for example, with respect to the 
numbers voting for it. In such cases, the persuasiveness of the inter­
pretation would depend upon the number and identity of the States voting
for it. Schachter, however, regards virtual unanimity as the true test
133of interpretation, and this demonstrates again the process of merging
(131) Ibid pp.339-43. Cf. Goodrich who treats resolution 377(V) as a 
"liberal interpretation" of the UN Charter, The United Nations.
1959, p.168. ' ”
(132) See Tunkin op.cit. p,160, and Akehurst loc.cit. pp,277-8, note 7,
(133) Op.cit. pp,186-7. See also Lachs loc.cit. p.439 and Judge 
Winiarski, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp,227-34. Asamoah adopts this 
approach as well, op.cit. p,35. Schachter also appears to suggest 
that only recommendations associated with the assertion of legal 
rights and obligations may constitute authoritative precepts 
derived from the Charter, "Interpretation of the Charter in the 
Political Organs of the UN", Law, State and International Order. 
Essays in Honour of Hans Kelsen. 1964, pp,269, 271,
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amendment and interpretation in Charter modification. This raises the
question of the authoritativeness of such interpretations. Whereas an 
amendment by subsequent practice will be binding, whether a particular 
interpretation of a Charter provision contained in one or more resolutions 
of the General Assembly possesses a persuasive quality and to what extent 
will be determined on the basis of the number and identity of States 
voting for the proposed interpretation. Thus, Charter interpretation in 
this narrow sense constitutes one element of Charter modification by 
practice and is subsumed under the generally recognised heading of 
Charter Interpretation. The advantage of this latter process is that it 
enables the majority of States to modify the Charter to accord with 
contemporary conditions, while imposing certain limitations as to the 
quantity of States proposing the change, and thus providing some 
protection to minorities. It is also necessary for the proposed 
modification to be directly referrable to a particular provision of the
Charter.
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Such changes may be, and generally will be, accomplished by Assembly 
resolutions, which may be either related to a specific situation or be 
more generally framed. Thus, Charter interpretations may occur other 
than as responses to particular disputes. Not all such resolutions will 
be of the same persuasive nature and a series of resolutions over a 
period of time will usually be required. 134
(134) Schachter makes the point that such an authoritative interpretation 
can just as easily be contained in actions and statements made 
within or outside the UN as in General Assembly Resolutions, "The 
Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations", 109 HR, 
1963, pp. 169, 186. Schwarzenberger writes that UN practice in the
field of colonialism has departed from the text of the Charter and 
indeed "amounts to a de facto revision of the Charter which on the 
basis of acquiescence or ineffective opposition on the part of a 
diminishing number of colonial powers tends to harden into a 
de jure revision of the constitution of the United Nations,"
A Manual of International Law. 6th eri. 1976, pp.226-7.
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(b) Self-Determination
(1) General Approach
At this point we shall turn to examine the question of whether
the right of self-determination can be regarded as established through
the medium of Charter interpretation as a result of practice subsequent
to the creation of the UN Organisation. As an introduction, one should
note the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This was adopted on
December 10, 1948, in the form of an Assembly resolution by 48 votes to 0
with 8 abstentions. It built upon Charter provisions regarding human
rights (for example, Articles 1, 55, 56, 62 and 76) and enumerated a list
of human rights and fundamental freedoms "as a common standard of
135achievement for all peoples and all nations". Although the principle
of self-determination was not referred to in this Declaration, which
concentrated upon the elucidation of individual rights, its path forward
was cleared in the same way in that democratic rights seemed to lead
inevitably in international society to consideration of the rights of
136peoples to define their own cultural and national status.
The Declaration was not legally binding as such in view of the terms
137in which it is expressed and the circumstances surrounding its adoption, 
but has come to have a significant effect within the international 
community. Some of its provisions might be taken as reflecting general 
principles of law, others as relatively new international stipulations.
(135) A/811, resolution 217(111).
(136) Note here, that resolution 637(XVII) in 1952 declared that the 
right to self-determination was a pre-requisite to the enjoyment 
of other human rights, and the inclusion of the right to self- 
determination in the international Covenants on Human Rights.
(137) See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 1950,
pp,397-408, and Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights,
1962, p.161.
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However, it can be regarded in essence as an influential interpretation
by the General Assembly of the relevant Charter provisions upon human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and as such of legal value as part of
138the law of the UN.
There have been a number of resolutions dealing with self-determination
both generally and with regard to particular situations, and it is possible
to point here to what appears to be a significant distinction.
Resolutions and declarations that posit principles of law may be regarded
as valid interpretations of the Charter if the necessary requirements of
unanimity (or near unanimity) and referral have been met. However,
resolutions and other UN and State practice referrable to the specific
situations are often limited by two factors. Firstly, such practice in
concentrating upon a particular situation is of restrictive value since
it deals only with one aspect of the principle under discussion which may
be modified or even distorted by virtue of ©ther principles deemed relevant
139in that particular situation, and secondly by the greater likelihood of 1389
(138) This view is taken by Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, 2nd ed. 1973, p.554 and ibid Basic Documents in Inter^ntin^T 
Law, 2nd ed. 1972, p.144 and Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports’^ 96?7~pT293'. 
See Waldock, 106 HR, 1962, pp,198-9 but cf. Oppenheim op.cit, p.745, 
See also 9 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, 1968 
pp.94-5. The International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran in 
1968 declared that the Universal Declaration "states a common under­
standing of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and 
inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes 
an obligation for the members of the international community",
A/CONF.32/41. The Teheran Declaration was proclaimed by the General 
Assembly to be an important and timely reaffirmation of the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 
see res.2442 XXIII. See also with regard to the Teheran approach’ 
the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organisation, Sept.1968, A/7201/ Add.l at 13, see Sohn and Buergen— 
thal, International Protection of Human Rights, 1973, p,519, ln a 
confusing phrase, Asamoah writes that the Universal Declaration is
"of quasi-legal significance as distinct from being the fonsetorigoof legal rights and duties" op.cit. p.190, Waldock noted that "the 
Declaration has acquired a status inside and outside the United 
Nations which gives it high authority as the accepted formulation of 
the common standard of human rights", Human Rights in Contemporary 
international Law and the Significance of the European Convention
1963, p. 15. “  ■’
(139) Eg. the need to maintain peace and security as in Palestine in 
1947-8 and Ruanda-Urundi in 1961.
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opposing votes and behaviour that »111 rob the praotlce of Its claim to
X 40universality. However, 1, Is possible for such defects to be remedied 
by a consideration of the temporal element. In other worlls a serles of 
resolutions, for example, calling for self-determination In different 
colonial territories, may be regarded as subseguent practice relevant to 
the interpretation of the particular Charter provisions in guestlon. 
Examples of such practice will be noted In the following section,141 but 
It will be useful In this context to recall the views of the ICJ regarding 
Article 27 of the Charter. The court declared that "the proceedings of 
the Security Council extending over a long period supply abundant evidence 
that presidential rulings and the position taken by members of the 
Council.... have consistently and uniformly Interpreted the practice of 
voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar to
the adoption of resolution.... This procedure followed by the Security
Council....has been generally accepted by members of the United Nations 
and evidences a general practice of that Organisation".142
A similar process can be seen with regard to Article 2(7) 0f the
Charter concerning domestic jurisdiction which has over the years been
143Increasingly restrlctlvely Interpreted »bile the Ceneral Assembly has 
progressively widened the scope of Its jurisdiction under Chapter XI of 
the Charter by asserting its competence both to request political 
information on non-self-governing territories under Article 73(e) and t
(140) Eg. the Tunisian and A lgeria n  cases before the Genera! Assembly
see Higgins op.cit. pp.94-7.
(141) Infra, p.152 et seq.
(142) ICJ Reports 1971, p.22, the case here also reinforces the view 4. 
a practice to constitute interpretation does not necessarily have 
to amount to a custom. The court referred to a n m c H n n  „ y ?ve 
en.ly and uniformly" followed, thus recalling thedi'cSsa r ? 1“ ' 
Asylum case, ICJ heports, 1050, p.266, but omitting ^ y  mention T,° 
opinio juris. Nevertheless the practice became a general
of the Organisation and thus an authoritative interpretation 
relevant Charter provisions. « o f  the
(143) See Judge Ammoun, ICJ Reports, 1970, pp.313-4 and Hieeins on *pp,58-130. bb °P;Cit.
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144 Thedecide which territories may be regarded as non-self-governing.
Assembly has also proclaimed its authority to decide between competing
aspirations of the right to self-determination and to declare whether
territories have exercised or should exercise the right to self- 
145determination.
In all of these Instances State practice over a period of time has 
been consolidated into Charter interpretation. Whether such practice 
can be treated as a valid interpretation »ill depend on all the 
circumstances of the case, but the presumption „ould be that the larger 
the number of resolutions, for instance, applying the principle of self- 
determination to different territories and the longer the period during 
which such practice has been operating the greater would be the likelihood 
that a persuasive or even binding view of the Charter term has been 
expressed.
Resolution 421<v) of December 4, 1950, embodied the request of the 
General Assembly for a study of the ways and means "which would ensure the 
right of peoples and nations to self-determination", and this was taken 
further by resolution 545(VI) which stated that the proposed article on 
self-determination in the International Covenants on Human Rights should be 
expressed in the terms that all peoples have the right to self-determlnatlo, 
It also noted that the article should stipulate that all States should 
promote the realisation of the right In conformity with the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations. Resolution 637(VII) proclaimed that self 145
(144) Higgins op.cit. pp.113-6 and Schwarzenberger op.cit. p.1 6 7 .
(145) See Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of
1973, pp.48-53 and ICJ Reports ’ 1975 , pp. 12 , 367” -
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determination was a fundamental human right. This resolution also
declared that UN member States "shall recognise and promote the
realisation of the right" with regard to the peoples of trust and non-
self-governing territories under their administration "according to the
principles and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations".146 47 1489 The
Commission on Human Rights considered the concept of self-determination
148over a number of sessions and submitted recommendations to the UN
Economic and Social Council, including a suggestion for the establishment
of a Special Commission to examine situations resulting from alleged
denials or inadequate realisation of the right to self-determination in
149certain circumstances. This was, however, opposed and the matter was 
referred back to the Commission on Human Rights for reconsideration.150 
During the reconsideration a number of representatives pointed out that 
self-determination was only a principle and not a right. It was declared 
that the Charter had not granted the General Assembly competence to 
implement self-determination, although by way of contrast, implementation 
of Article 1(1) was provided for by Article 11 and that of Article 1(3) by 
Article 13.
146
(146) The voting on the part of the resolution concerning ,
“  * >■” “  ’ ‘*»* » »  38 to 13 with 9 abotention. (with
USA oPP°si"g) seeA/C.3/SR.642. See also Calogeropoulos-siratis 
op.cit. p,139. The proclamation of self-determination as a hl l L  
right tended to confuse the issue since it was really onlv i n ^  . 
to stress decolonisation as a fundamental norm in international 
relations. The conclusion that self-determination as a human ri.ht 
was therefore applicable beyond the colonial situation and with 
reference to minority situations in particular was strongly rele.t^ 
see eg. A/C.3/SR.671, A/C.3/SR.888 and A/C.3/SR.642 Thi r i w i i + '  
self-determination was also stressed in resolution 742(VIIl 
set out a list of factors to be considered regarding the readiness 
of a people for self-government. See also resolution 648(Vn) /
(147) See the preceding discussions in the 8th session of the Commission 
on Human Rights, ECOSOC OR, 14th session, supple.4 paras i f  
B/2256 and E/2256 annex 1 . See also ECOSOC resolution 472(XV),
(148) See eg. E/1371, E/1681, E/1992, E/2256, E/2447. See in generalthe Commission on Human Rights, A/CONF.36/6 at pp,33-47, on
(149) E/2573.
(150) ECOSOC resolution 545 G(XVIII).
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Such objections were overridden as was the view that the realisation
of self-determination fell essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
States, and the Commission reaffirmed its previous recommendations which
151was sent to the General Assembly. The General Assembly at its eighth
session asked the Commission to give priority to recommendations regarding
international respect for the right of self-determination,15 52 1534 and by the
next session the Assembly already had before it the draft International
Covenants on Human Rights prepared by the Commission and transmitted by
153the Economic and Social Council.
The Commission suggested that both International Covenants should
154have an identical first article and this article, according to the
draft of the Third Committee of the Assembly, read as follows:
" 1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of the right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.
... 3. All States parties to the Covenant including those
having responsibilities for the administration of non-
self-governing and trust territories shall promote the
realisation of the right of self-determination and shall
respect that right in conformity with the provisions of 
155the UN Charter."
(151) By ECOSOC resolution 586 D(XX). See for the text of the recommend­
ation E/2731 and Corr.l. See also for the discussion, E/CN.4/ 
SB.500 p,15, E/CN.4/SR.503 p.8 and E/CN.4/SR.505 p.5 .’
(152) Resolution 738(VIII).
(153) ECOSOC OR 18th session supple,7, annexes I, II, III, and ECOSOC 
resolution 545 B(XVIII). By resolution 833(IX), the Assembly 
recommended that the 3rd Committee should give priority to an 
article by article consideration of the draft Covenants.
(154) Commission on Human Rights, report of 10th session, ECOSOC OR 18th 
session, supple.7, pp.62, 65, 66.
(155) A/3077, Para.2 referred to the right to dispose freely of natural
wealth and resources. Certain members of the third committee felt 
that the inclusion of an article on the right to self-determination 
would be incompatible with article 2(7) of the Charter, A/2910/Add 2 
The text which was to appear in both International Covenants was 
adopted by 33 votes to 12 with 13 abstentions.
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At the twelfth session, the Assembly declared in resolution 1188 (XII) 
that member States were to give due respect to the right of self- 
determination. From this point, the proposed Covenants became enmeshed 
in UN discussions from which they were only to emerge nine years later.
At this point we shall turn to two General Assembly declarations 
that might be treated as binding interpretations of the Charter.156 157
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (the Colonial Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly
of December 14, 1960, in resolution 1514 (XV) by 89 votes to 0 with nine
abstentions. This has had a profound impact upon international affairs
and has been treated with particular reverence by the States of the third
world. It has been regarded by many as the "second Charter" of the UN
157drawn up for the subjugated peoples of Africa and Asia. Indeed, Parry 
has written that the Declaration by itself has had the effect of modifying 
that part of international law that deals with territorial sovereignty.158 15960
The Declaration emerged after a debate in the Assembly initiated by 
159 160the Soviet premier and was drafted by 43 States. The preamble noted
that "all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the 
exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory"
(156) The fact that a resolution is adopted as a declaration rather than 
a recommendation is not significant as far as straight legal 
principle is concerned, although it is more formal and the level of 
expectation regarding its implementation is higher. See the reply 
of the UN Secretariat, E/CN.4/L.610 quoted in Asamoah op.cit. p.24, 
and Sohn and Buergenthal op.cit. pp.519-20,
(157) GAOR 18th Session, 1169th meeting para.5 (Nov.1962). Rosenstock 
described it as "a document only slightly less sacred than the 
Charter" for the Afro-Asian States, "The Declaration of Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations; A Survey",
65 AJIL, 1071, pp.713, 730.
(158) The Sources and Evidences of International Law, 1965, p,22,
(159) A/4501, A/BUR/SR.130, A/L.312/Rev.1 and GAOR 15th Session, 902nd, 
on.7rd. 925-39th, 944-7th meetings. See UN Repertory of Practice. 
1972,*vol.Ill Suppl. no,3, pp.44-52.
(160) See UN Yearbook 1960 pp.44-50.
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and proclaimed the necessity of "bringing to a speedy and unconditional 
end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". The Declaration 
laid down seven principles, stressing that "all peoples have the right to 
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development". Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness was not to serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 
Immediate steps were to be taken to transfer power to the peoples of 
non-independent countries, but attempts aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country 
were deemed incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter
The Declaration has been treated by a number of countries as 
constituting a binding interpretation of the Charter, or a restatement of
x&xprinciples enshrined in the Charter and it has been similarly regarded
by some writers.* 162 * However, there are others who dispute this. One view
already discussed is that any action by the General Assembly could only be
recommendatory in such circumstances and that therefore the Declaration
X6 3could be nothing more than a general statement of objectives.
But the most significant criticism of the Declaration as an 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter is concerned with the 
Inconsistencies that are noticeable between the two instruments.
. . Ee Liberia, GAOR 15th Session 931st meeting, Madagascar ibid
o44th meeting, Peru ibid 930th meeting, Tunisia ibid 929th meeting, 
Yugoslavia ibid 928th meeting and UAR ibid 18th Session, 6th 
Committee 164,
E«r Brownlie op.cit, p.576- Lachs op.cit. p.439; Asamoah op.cit.
' * ’177_85. Cf, Arangio-Ruiz "The Normative Role of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
Friendly Relations" 137 HR, 1972, p,517.
„„ the Swedish delegate GAOR 15th Session 946th meeting. See also 
<163> the Australian delegate ibid 18th Session, 6th Committee 205, 
A/C.6/SR.817.
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Paragraph 1 oi the Declaration proclaimed that "the subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental human rights (and) is contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations". However, this is not too clear in the Charter itself, for
Chapter XI and XII legitimise certain relationships of dependence
164regarding non-self-governing and trust territories, subject to defined 
conditions.
The Declaration in paragraph 3 notes that "inadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence", while Article 73(b) declares that 
States administering non-self-governing territories must "assist them in 
the progressive development of their free political institutions, according 
to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and 
their varying stages of advancement" and Article 76(b) underlines that 
among the basic objectives of the trusteeship system is the "progressive 
development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate 
to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples".
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration emphasises that "immediate steps" 
should be taken in all non-independent territories to transfer power to the 
people and this seems inconsistent with Articles 73 and 76. However, the 
call by the USSR, in particular, for immediate independence or the 
proclamation of a date at the end of 1961 for this to be achieved was not 
accepted164 65 and this provision should perhaps be regarded rather as a
(164) It has also been possible for the mandate relationship to contin 
unconverted to the trusteeship system. Article 77(1) of the W  
Charter noted this, see also International Status nf
Africa, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 128. — — — J U U ! * * !
(165) A/4502 and Corr.l, GAOR 15th Session, 947th meeting. See also 
UN Yearbook 1960 pp,44-50,
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change of pace rather than as a change of essence. The Declaration also
blurs the distinction between trust and non-self-governing territories
by positing the same provisions for all territories that have not yet
attained independence. In addition, the Declaration in paragraph 5
appears to regard independence as the only legitimate goal of the whole
process. This latter provision runs counter to a number of UN
resolutions, for example, recognising the exercise of self-determination
involved in the relationship of dependence between the USA and the Common
wealth of Puerto Rico,166 ^ and between New Zealand and the Cook 
168 169Islands and Niue after elections had been held in the respective
dependent territories. In fact, the UN Secretary-General noted in 1963
that ’’the emergence of dependent territories by a process of self-
determination to the status of self-government either as independent
sovereign States or as autonomous components of larger units, has always
been one of the purposes of the Charter and one of the objectives of the 
170United Nations". *168970
(166-7) Resolution 748 (VIII). The changed status of the island was 
later declared to be "a new political formula which respected 
the right of peoples to self-determination", A/C.4/SR.1007 p,32,
(168) Resolution 2064 (XX).
(169) Resolution 3155 (XXVIII), resolution 3285 (XXIX). See UNMC Oct.
1974 pp.50-1 and ibid Jan. 1975 pp.56-7. See also resolution 849 
(IX) regarding Greenland's association with Denmark, resolution 
945 (X) regarding Netherlands and Antilles and Surinam, and 
resolution 1469 (XIV) regarding the integration of Alaska and 
Hawaii with the USA. However, by resolution 742 (VII) a non-self- 
governing territory choosing self-government only must be free to 
change its status in the future if so desired. See Rigo Sureda 
op.cit. p,6 3 , Whiteman’s Digest op.cit. vol.V pp.61-6, vol.VI 
pp,392 et seq. In the case of Puerto Rico an attempt in the Special 
Committee on Decolonisation to re-open the question of its status 
in 1967 was adjourned sine die, UN Yearbook 1967 pp,622-3, However, 
in 1972, a resolution was adopted by the Special Committee recog­
nising the "inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self- 
determination and independence". See "The Applicability of the
Principle of Self-determination to Unintegrated Territories of the
United States - The Cases of Puerto Rico and the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands" PASID 1973, p.l. In 1974 and 1975.the 
question was adjourned, but in Oct.1976 the Special Committee re­
affirmed the right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determin­
ation and independence, and agreed to resume consideration of the 
question at its next session in Sept,1977, UNMC Oct,1976, p.17.
(170) Report of the UN Secretary-General, UN Special Release SPL/84, See 
Pfinarallv resolution 742(VII) and 2625(XXV) which accept statuses 
other than independence as legitimate exercises of self-determination,
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171 172Such inconsistencies have led Bokor-Szego and Martine for 
example, to deny that the Colonial Declaration is an authoritative inter­
pretation since it appears actually to amend the Charter, the argument 
turning on where the line between interpretation and amendment should be 
drawn. Fifteen years of State practice in the process of decolonisation 
formed the background to the Colonial Declaration and enabled it to bring 
up to date the relevant Charter provisions in a way marking contemporary 
consensus views as to, for example, the effect of inadequacy of political, 
social, economic or educational preparedness. All interpretations refine 
and develop the concept under consideration, in a manner acceptable to 
those concerned, and may be no less influential or binding because of
^  * 173 that.
However, it does not follow that everything contained in the 
Declaration (or in similar resolutions for that matter) constitutes a 
binding obligation. Some elements would remain upon a purely hortatory 
level, for example, the solemn proclamation in the preamble to the 1723
(171) Op.cit. pp.29-30.
(172) "Le Comité de Decolonisation et le Droit International" Revue 
Generale de Droit International Public 1970, p.402. See also 
Virally, "Droit International et Decolonisation" AFDI 1963, 
p.536.
(173) Castaneda refers to the Declaration as the "modern interpretation 
of the principle of self-determination rendered by the most 
representative organ of the international community, on the basis 
of political trends and events since the Charter was signed", 
op.cit. p.175, He stresses that the Declaration "not only reflects 
the change that has been wrought; it also symbolises and 
concretises a new politico-juridical conception: the definite 
repudiation and end of colonialism", ibid. Lachs stresses that the 
Declaration bridges the gap regarding self-determination between 
the state of affairs at the time of the adoption of the Charter, 
and the situation at the time of the Declaration, quoted in 
Bokor-Szego op.cit. p.29, Tunkin notes that the principle of 
self-determination in the Charter found "authoritative confirmation 
and concrétisation... in the Declaration of the General Assembly
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples" op.cit. p.65.
Declaration stressing "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and 
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". On 
the other hand, there may be statements which are inconsistent with 
instruments interpreting the Charter - for instance, the apparent 
acceptance in the Declaration of independence as the sole object of self- 
determination. This contrasts with UN practice, as noted above, 
recognising other relationships and with the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (Resolution 2625(XXV) ) which noted that "the establishment of a 
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with 
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right
174of self-determination by that people .
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It would therefore seem that where one is faced by conflicting inter­
pretations of equal standing, resort must be had to the intentions of the 
members of the UN, as revealed in their practice and upon this basis it 
would seem the stipulation in the 1960 Declaration restricting self- 
determination to the attainment of independence must be regarded as only a 
suggestion and not an authoritative interpretation of the Charter,
Nevertheless the core of the Declaration does constitute an interpretation
175of the Charter and one that has underpinned the end of colonialism. 1745
(174) See also resolution 1541 (XV). The ICJ referred to self-rt«^ ,as "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed w i n
(175) The International Court has stressed that the Declaration *the basis for the process of decolonisation" without exnlaini°Vlded 
whether this is to be understood as a legal or ^ ning
ICJ Reports 1975, pp.19, 32, See also ICJ Reports1 9 7 ^ 0 ^ « ’ V  
Sukovic regarded the Declaration as "an intermediate b e t w e e n ^  ■ 
Charter which is an international treaty.,, .and,,,. r e s o l u t i o n ^  
the General Assembly which have no binding force". "The C i °* 
Question in the Charter and in the Practice of the UN"Problems of the Institute of Political Economy, 1966 n 73t6rJ ational Declaration was cited by no fewer than 95 subsequent'reaoluti'6
in the 6 sessions following its passage, Anand New 0nsInternational Law, 1972, p,82. ‘ ----- I * ™ * . * *
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Higgins has noted that it "must be taken to represent the wishes and
beliefs of the full membership of the United Nations".176 17890 As to the
juridical character of the Declaration, Higgins stresses that in it the
right of self-determination is regarded "as a legal right enforceable 
177here and now".
This approach is underlined by the action taken by the UN to
implement the Declaration. On November 27, 1961, the General Assembly
created a subsidiary organ entitled the Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
178Independence, which was enlarged from 17 to 24 member States the 
179following year. It has gradually widened its sphere of activity so
that apart from the Trusteeship Council (which is only concerned now with
the trust territory of the Pacific Islands), it is the only organ
responsible for issues dealing with dependent territories. The Committee
has been very active and has done much to pressure the colonial powers
180and the administering powers. It has also stressed the position that 
the United Nations intended the Colonial Declaration to act as a juridical 
signpost to complete decolonisation and not merely as a solely hortatory
pronouncement.
(176) Op.cit. p.101.
(177) Ibid p.lOO, See also Feinberg, The Arab-Israel Conflict in 
international Law, 1970, p.47.
(178) Assembly resolution 1654(XVI) adopted by 97 votes to none with 4 
abstentions. States administering trust and non-self-governing 
territories were called upon to "take action without further delay 
with a view to the faithful application and implementation of the 
Declaration". Higgins wrote that in the light of the lack of 
opposition to the Declaration and resolution 1654(XVI) "it seems 
academic to argue that as Assembly resolutions are not binding 
nothing has changed and that 'self-determination’ remains a mere 
'principle' " op.cit. p.101.
(179) Resolution 1890(XVII). See also resolutions 1810(XVII) and 2105
. (XX). ■
(180) See eg. Contemporary Practice of the UK (ed. Lauterpacht), 1962,
II. pp,280-2, and Martine op.cit. p.357, and Mittelman, "Collective 
Decolonisation and the UN Committee of 24" 14 JMAS 1976, pp.41-64,
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Virtually all UN resolutions proclaiming the right to self-
determination of particular peoples expressly refer to the 1960 
181Declaration. Judge De Castro particularly noted in the Wester^Jlahara
case how the African group at the UN that prepared a draft 1 1 7 7 7 7
the Sahara problems for discussion in the fourth Committee was a, p.lns to
refer four times to resolution 1514UV) in reaffirming the right of the
people of Western Sahara to self-determination.1“  The International Court
has specifically referred to the Colonial Declaration as an "important
stage" in the development of international law regarding non-self-
183governing territories, and as -'the basis for the process of 
decolonisation".
On December 16, 1966, the General Assembly adopted the International 
Covenants on Human Sights, which consisted of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Eights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Eights and the Options! Protocol to the latter. Both 
Covenants have an identical first Article which declares inter alia that 
"all peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development" and that "the States parties to 
the present Convention including those having responsibility for the 
administration of non-self-governing and trust territories shall promote 
the realisation Of the right of self-determination and shall respect that 
right in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" 18234
(181) For example, resolutions 1064(XI). I568ixv^
106S/XV) , 1626«VI), 1650OCVI) , f  ’• “ 9? <XV)-
1747 (XVI), 1807(XVII), l819(Xvil) 1897rYVTT^2 (^ J) ’ 1746 (XVI) * 
1949(XVlII),19S4(XVlh), 2063 n)2185(XXI>, 2226(XXI), 23S4(XXII>, ¿379(XXU ) 2 3 8 3 « ^ n 83<m> ’
2428(XXIII), 2983(XXVII), 3162(XXVI1I) and 3M2(XX?X) ’
(182) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 136, footnote
(183) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31.
(184) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 32.
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The inclusion o, the night to selt-detennlnation in the Intennatlonai
Covenants occurred because the General Assembly i„ resoiution 545(VII)
recommended that the proposed Covenants should incorporate such a provision
and in resolution 637<V1I) declared that the right to aelt-determination
was a "fundamental human right". It is to he noted that the preambles to
both the Covenants refer to the "obligation of States under the Charter
of the United Nations to promote universal respect for and observance of
185human rights and freedom".
The International Covenants came into force in 1976185 86 and are thus 
binding as between the parties, but it would seem that they are of legal 
value over and above that, not only as practice leading to or reflecting 
a customary rule, hut also as a persuasive interpretation of the notion of 
human rights as embodied in the Charter.187
This appears so in view of the drafting history of the Covenants 
through the various organs of the UN, culminating in the adoption of 
resolution 2200CXXI), and the emphasis in the many discussions and 
resolutions and in the Covenants themselves upon the actual provisions
(185) The International Covenants had been under consideration since the 
6th session of the UN, and a draft prepared by the Commission on 
Human Rights was transmitted to the General Assembly by the 
Economic and Social Council on July 29, 1954, by resolution 545 B 
(XVIII)- See Ganji op.cit. pp.167-227, British Practice ed. 
Lauterpacht, 1963, II, p.223, Sohn and Buergenthal op.cit. pp.535-9. 
The movement to include self-determination in human rights was led 
by the USSR and the Afro-Asian States, see eg. A/C.3/SR.671.
(186) See UNMC April 1976, pp.50-2.
(187) Rao declared that once the Covenants came into force, self- 
determination would become "a legal right beyond doubt, but its 
contours can only become clear through the medium of State 
practice". "Right of Self-Determinations Its Status and Role in 
International Law" Internationales Rechtund Diplomatie, 1968, p.28, 
cf- Nincic's view that the Covenants "reaffirm the legally binding 
nature of self-determination as a norm of international law for all 
States, whilst at the same time defining the concept and the 
contents of self-determination with considerable precision",
Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of States. 
1970, p.22li
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of the Charter. The preambles to the Covenants specifically recall 
various Charter provisions (particularly Articles 1. 55 and 56) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
The Declaration on Principles of International Da. Concerning Friendly 
Halations and Cooperation among States In accordance ,1th the Charter of 
the Onlted Hâtions «as unanimously adopted without a vote on October 24, 
1970, and Is contained In the annum to General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV). It proclaims seven principles Including the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples. And the question that Is 
raised at this stage is whether this Declaration may be regarded as 
a binding interpretation of the Charter. The Declaration was 
specifically stated to deal with certain international legal principles 
•'in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations- and the preamble 
includes the phrase •■considering the provisions of the Charter as a »hole 
and taking Into account the role of relevant resolutions adopted by the 
competent organs of the United Nations relating to the content of the 
principles". This suggests not only that such resolutions are relevant 
in a Declaration of principles "In accordance with the Charter", thus 
Impliedly reinforcing the Importance of the Interpretative role of such 
resolutions, but also that the Declaration itself constitutes an 18
188
(188) See eg, A/7326 (1968) p,58 for a general view of the value of the 
Covenants. Mustafa has referred to the apparent anomaly of 
inserting an identical article on self-determination into two 
differing Covenants, since the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights recognises certain rights as already in existence, while the 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights may be defined as 
a promotional instrument binding its signatories to take steps to 
achieve progressively the specified rights. This incompatibility, 
argues Mustafa, makes self-determination ambiguous, especially since 
the parties are called upon to "promote and respect" self- 
determination only, while they must "respect and ensure" other civil 
and political rights: "The Principle of Self-determination in 
International Law" 5 International Lawyer 1971, p.482. Schwelb 
argues that the implementation rules of the Covenants are not 
applicable to self-determination; "Some Aspects of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966", International 
Protection of Human Rights, Proceedings of the 7th Nobel Symposium , 
1967, p.lll.
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interpretation of the Charter provisiona. The reason for the interpret­
ation in emphasised in the preamble which notes that "the great politic.!, 
economic and social changes and scientific progress which have taken place 
in the world since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations give 
increased importance to these principles and to the need for their more 
effective application in the conduct of States wherever carried on". The 
Declaration stresses that "nothing in this Declaration shall he construed 
as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the Charter or the rights 
and duties of member States under the Charter or the right, of peoples
under the Charter, taking into account the elaboration of these
189 *------this Declaration.
The Declaration states that "by virtue of the principle of e„ual 
rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine.... their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development" while "every State has the duty to respect this right i„ 
accordance with the provisiona of the Charter". Arangio-Ruls strongly 
asserts the non-leg.l status of the Declaration since it was effected at 
the merely organic or institutional level rather than on a formal, 
legally binding inter-Stat. level190 19and concludes that "there can hardly 
be any doubt.... that the Declaration embodied in Resolution 2625(XXV>...
is to be considered fro. a legal point of view .s an instrument of a
191
purely hortatory value". This approach, however, cannot be supported.
(189) Emphasis added. See also Judge Nervo, 
and ICJ Reports, 1975, p.33. ICJ Reports, 1971, p,ii7,
(190) Loc.cit, p.522.
(191) Ibid p.523. Arangio-Ruiz stresses later that the Declaration per 
is neither part of customary international law nor an 
authoritative determination or interpretation of custom or treaty: ibid p.525.
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The Declaration was intended to act as an elucidation of certain
important Charter provisions, although not as a« a„+, ,' iuugn not as an actual amendment of the
Charter, and was adopted by member States on that basis 192
State practice within and outside the UN also supports the view that 
the right to self-determination exists in international law. State 
practice, other than resolutions and declarations purporting to express 
principles of law, can be important in the process of Charter inter­
pretation provided it is linked to particular Charter stipulations and 
provided over a period of time sufficient practice has accumulated for it 
to be treated as a valid and general interpretation rather than as strictl, 
limited conduct specifically related to a particular situation.
It is realised that this formulation may fail to provide an adequate 
guide as to whether a proposition can be accepted as an authoritative 
Charter interpretation in a number of instances, but it is clearly 
impossible to lay down firm conditions as to the time that should be 
encompassed or the number of relevant resolutions that must be adopted.
In each case much will depend upon acceptance and acquiescence by an 
increasing number of States regarding the propositions involved in 
particular situations constituting general principles interpreting the 
Charter.
One must be careful not to deny the members of an organisation the 
capacity to harmonise its constitution with contemporary needs by means of 
their subsequent practice. After all, the aim of interpretation is to
enable the overwhelming majority to determine the nature and extent of the
(192) See UN Juridical Yearbook 1966 pp.124-5, ibid 1967 pp,198-201, 
ibid 1968 pp.123-6 and ibid 1969 pp.96-8. See also the various 
reports of the 6th Committee eg. A/6547, A/6955, A/7429, A/7809 
discussing the reports of the Special Committee on Principles of 
International Law - A/6230, A/6799, A/7326, A/7619. See also 
Wittens, "The Friendly Relations Declaration", 12 Harvard 
International Law Journal, 1971, pp.517-9, and Judge Nervo 
ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 111, 115.
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obligations and rights they have agreed to in clrcumatancea minimising 
adverse effects upon dissentient members. 193
State practice that does not fall within the categories mentioned
may nevertheless he relevant in the process of Charter interpretation as
evidence of recognised interpretations, and thus may be of value in
emphasising the form and content of a particular interpretation. It may
also play a vital role in pointing out which Interpretation, are to he
regarded as valid binding 0Bes, much as state practice may also
constitute evidence of particular rules of customary law. State practice
of course, may also lead to a new customary law. One should note that
those member States that abstain with regard to such interpreting
resolutions as the 1960 and 1970 Declarations discussed above may well
194still be bound by them.
(2) Specific Approach
State practice, particularly as manifested in the United Nations 
concerning the status and application of self-determination in specific
situations exceeds the abstract, general expression of self-determination
as a right, in terms of both frequency and diversity and accordingly must 1 
considered as a significant factor.
General Assembly resolutions proclaiming that specific territories 
should be entitled to the exercise of the right of self-determination are 
ultimately founded upon the established competence of the Assembly to
(193) Judge Nerve has said that "among the international rules
binding on the administration of the internati™«! ♦ b* h ar®
Namibia are declarations and resolutions forman ^errit°ry of 
principal organa of the Unltad Nation,whichrllL T  by the 
accepted interpratationa and a p p l i c a t i o n «  S ^ ^ E T S 1;,. 
United Nation, Charter and which either are of general Innlf 
or are stated to have specific reference to the situation nJ Namibia". ICJ Reports, 1971, pp,16, 119, tuation of
(194) See Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International Law 
pp.l, 7 and Schwarzenberger op.cit, pp.28-9 , 156, 2 9 9,
III 47 BYIL,
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determine which territories are non-self-governing. This is partly 
because self-determination has been deemed non-applicable to independent 
territories and partly to sidestep the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction
Article 2(7) of the Charter declares that "nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State" and the history of the first decade and a half of the UN 
Organisation largely centres around attempts to establish a balance
between this provision and the perceived need to end colonialism. This 
latter aim was achieved at least as far as the UN was concerned through 
establishing a clear division between the administering State and its 
administered territories, contrary to the wishes of a number of colonial 
powers particularly France with regard to Algeria and Portugal with
regard to its African possessions. Having instituted this division and
provided an exception to Article 2(7), the Assembly proceeded to make
recommendations regarding the future of these non-self-governing 
195
territories. Based upon its recognised competence to decide which
territories were non-self-governing territories, the General Assembly
successfully asserted its competence to determine whether or not a non-
self-governing territory had attained a full measure of self-government
as referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter, and to this end a series of
resolutions were adopted expressing the Assembly's views as regards 
196
specific cases. Despite the objections of the colonial powers, the
(195) See Rigo Sureda op.cit. pp.54-67; Higgins op.cit. pn 110-6.
Raj an, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdi^L» •.»;?' . 6 * , 
of how the Assembly's competence was estabJT^hT^ * V'  An analyst 
of this wort, hut see iu p a r t i c u l l r ^  ‘e t ^ o V L * ! £ L i h* SC° 
General inviting the vie.s of member States on the S e n n l ^ o r ^  
self-governing territories, A/74 under resolution^(l) " » o n ™ e w  " 
governing territories; Summaries of Information transmitted ! f2 
Secretary-General during 1946", 1947, pp.132-7, and resolutions 
222(111), 334(IV),567(VI), 648(VII), 7 4 2 ( V i m  H 6 7 ^
1542(XV), 1747(XVI). See also Higgins op.cit.pp.113-6 ’ * 196
(196) See eg. resolutions 748(VIII), 849(IX), 945«), 1469(XIV), 1747(xV]
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doctrine of domestic jurisdiction as declared in Article 2(7) has been 
interpreted by the subsequent practice of the UN Organisation and its
discussed within the Organisation and rendered subject to UN resolutions 
and declarations as to their political status.
The competence of the Assembly mas Initially fonnded upon Chapter XI
concentrated instead on the concept of self-determination as the basic 
relevant principle.
The large number of Assembly resolutions calling for self-determination 
in specific cases represents international practice regarding the existence 
and scope of a rule of self-determination in customary law. . They also 
constitute subsequent practice relevant to the interpretation of particular 
Charter provisions. For example, resolutions proclaiming that an 
obligation exists under Article 73(e) of the Charter to transmit information 
in a particular case may be regarded as a binding interpretation of the 
Charter provision in that specific instance since the competence of the 
General Assembly to determine such matters has been clearly recognised. 197 
The change from Chapter XI to self-determination with the Colonial 
Declaration as the juridical basis for the process marks the stronger 
line taken by the Assembly as a whole but the effect remains broadly 
similar - that is, the determination by the General Assembly of a 
factual situation within which the declared norm will be deemed to operate.
By such method, of course, the outlines of the norm itself will be 
elucidated and to that extent factual determinations by the Assembly will 
be juridically relevant.
(197) Similarly with regard to the determination of a territ«« -
members so that the affairs of non-self-governing territori es may be
of the Charter, but later resolutions disregarded this Chapter and
IPV6 y  *Awu*
However, unlike Assembly resolutions of a general nature, they cannot 
themselves authoritatively interpret a principle as a legally binding norm 
their function in this sphere rests rather upon delimitation, 198 though 
such determinations may also provide for the application of non-legal 
principles to a particular situation.
199The Algerian problem was first included on the agenda of the
Assembly in 1955, and it was claimed that France had broken the
provisions of the Charter on self-determination. 200 The Assembly, however
201decided not to pursue the matter and the Security Council did not place
202
it upon its agenda. In succeeding sessions, resolutions proclaiming 
the right of the Algerian people to self-determination failed to be 
adopted although support for the proposition was growing. 203 ïn fact lt 
was only in 1960 that a resolution was adopted which referred to the right 
of the Algerian people to self-determination. 204 Despite this hesitant 
start, and in view of the changed climate of opinion in France itself the
(198) Cf. Castaneda op.cit. pp.127-8, and Sloan op.cit, p.29.
(199) Earlier draft resolutions proclaiming the right of the Moroccan 
and Tunisian peoples to self-determination narrowly failed to 
obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, see A/2526 and A/2530,
(200) A/2924 and Add. 1.
(201) GA resolution 909(X).
(202) S/3609.
(203) See the resolution before the 1st Committee in the 11th c.oo-,
A/C.1/L.167, and the two moderate resolutions which went w  ’.v
Assembfy VC.I/L 166 an* VC.I/L.WT. R e s o l u U o ^ o S  * ^
was adopted after the two resolutions were defeated, merely called 
for a peaceful, democratic and just solution to the problem }n 1  
12th Session there was no agreement in the 1st Committee as'to a
resolution to be presented to the Assembly, A/C.1/L.194 
1184(XII) merely stresses the need for a solution to th^ problem 
In 1958, a draft resolution was adopted by the 1st C o «  f . '
for the right of the Algerian people to independence, but it failed^ 
by one vote to be adopted by the Assembly, A/C.1/L.232 In loin 
similar resolution was similarly defeated, A/C 1/L 276* Hi 7 &
remarks that despite such failures support for’the*concent o f « ! ,  
right to self-determination in such situations was growing, op cit** 
P « 9 0 •  * * *
(204) Resolution 1573(XV).
Assembly passed without opposition in the following session resolution 
1724(XVI) which called for the implementation of "the right of the 
Algerian people to self-determination and independence respecting the 
unity and territorial integrity of Algeria".
This resolution, which significantly referred to the Colonial 
Declaration of 1960, also asserted that the UN had a part to play in the 
fulfillment of this right.
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A large role has been performed in this process by the Special 
Committee established after the adoption of the Colonial Declaration. 205 20678
For example, the Special Committee was requested to study the situation 
in Southern Rhodesia by General Assembly resolution 1745(XVI) and its 
report formed the basis of an Assembly resolution criticising the failure 
of the United Kingdom to carry out the Colonial Declaration, and affirming
OAflthat Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory. The
Assembly adopted resolution 1755(XVII) proclaiming the right of the people
of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination, and the problem has been
207discussed at the UN at great length. The claim of the UK that the 
problem was an internal matter and therefore the UN could not consider it, 
was clearly rejected, and resolution 1747(XVI) affirmed that "the territory 
of Southern Rhodesia is a non-self-governing territory within the meaning
O Q O
of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. This situation was 
altered, at least as far as the United Kingdom was concerned, by the
(205) Supra, p.
(206) See A/AC.109/L.9, A/5124 and GA resolution 1747(XVI) (opnosed nni 
by South Africa), The Special Committee had establisheda * 1 *
committee on Southern Rhodesia, comprising India. Mali S v J ?Tanganyika, Tunisia, and Venezuela. ' yria»
(207) See Higgins op.cit, pp.102-3 and Hiesrins
and the UN" The World Today, March 1967, P P ^ A - l O s J ^ M c D o S ^ i ^ d 6816  
Reisman, "Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of lúternatiín«T d 
Concern" 62 AJIL, 1968, p.i and Fawcett "Security C m ^ i í  
Resolutions on Rhodesia" 41 BYIL, 1965-6, p,l03. X
(208) See also A/5127 and Add.l and 2, A/5124 and SCOR 18th W
meeting, para.51 and ibid, 20th year 1202nd meeting, para.90/6 *
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unilateral declaration of independence by the government of Southern 
Rhodesia, but the General Assembly vigorously attacked "any agreement 
reached between the administering power and the illegal racist minority 
regime which will not recognise the inalienable rights of the people of 
Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with 
General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)".2i59
In its first six years, the Special Committee considered some 70 
210territories and in 1974, for example, it discussed 39 territories, the 
majority being Pacific or Atlantic islands.209 111 m  virtually all cas6s 
the Special Committee has recommended that the territory become 
independent in the light of its right to self-determination, although in 
some instances association with another State was accepted, for example,
Niue and the Cook Islands.
Throughout the years of the existence of the UN Organisation a great 
number of resolutions have been adopted calling for self-determination in 
particular situations and these constitute State practice and international 
practice of overwhelming importance. The majority of such resolutions have 
referred specifically to the 1960 Colonial Declaration, thus strengthening 
its claim to be the fount of legality as far as the right to self-determin­
ation is concerned. It has been noted that "if this right (of self- 
determination) is still not recognised as a juridical norm in the practice 
of a few rare States or the writings of certain even rarer theoreticians 
the attitude of the former is explained by their concern for their 
traditional interests, and that of the latter by a kind of extreme respect 
for certain long-entrenched postulates of classical international law” 212
(209) Resolution 2138(XXI), See also resolutions 2151(XXI), 2379<XXIII)
and 2383 (XXIII). f
(210) Kay op.cit. p.54.
(211) Mittelman op.eit. pp.41-2.
(212) Per Judge Ammoun, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 7 5 ,
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It is submitted in conclusion that the right to self-determination
has been accepted by the United Nations by virtue of the process of
Charter interpretation as a basic principle in the law of the United
Nations, and that from this proposition certain legal effects flow with
regard to, for example, the definition of the determining unit, the
capacity of the people of the territory in question to decide its
political, economic and social status, the role of force in the process
213and the locus standi of the colonial power. Some of these notions
214will be examined in later chapters.
Ill - Customary International Law
The practice supporting the right of self-determination as emanating 
from Charter interpretation may also be of relevance in establishing the 
existence of a right to self-determination as a rule of customary law. 
Custom differs from treaty interpretation in a number of vital ways, it 
is founded on State practice, whereas treaty interpretation relates to 
practice construed with reference to a treaty provision, and it is 
dependent upon the opinio juris, the belief or expression of an accepted 
legal obligation. This, as we have seen, is not necessarily the case 
with respect to the interpretation of treaty-Charters, for practice not 
amounting to custom may have the effect of interpreting a particular
stipulation. 2134
(213) Schwarzenberger has listed a number of ways in which the purposes 
of the UN may be enlarged or transformed into legal duties of 
member States. Of these,three may be attained under the Charter 
itself, viz. treaty, practice accepted as law by the preponderant 
number of UN members and general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations op.cit. pp.156-7. These rules are based upon 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and it is suggested that this 
categorisation is unduly restricting in requiring a practice to 
be accepted as law before it can operate within the framework of 
binding Charter interpretation,
(214) One should note also Skubiszewski's view that "law made by 
international organisations" is to be placed alongside treaty, 
custom and general principles as sources of law, "Enactment of 
Law by International Organisations", 41BYIL 1965-6, p.198. See 
also Friedmann "General Course in Public International Law" 127 h r  
1969, pp.142-6.
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The International Court of Justice is directed by Article 38(1) of 
its statute to apply "international custom as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law" and Brierly emphasised this in terms of a 
"usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one" . 215 
Oppenheim notes that "whenever and as soon as a line of international 
conduct frequently adopted by States is considered legally obligatory 
or legally right, the rule which may be abstracted from such conduct is
o ]g
a rule of customary international law".
Precisely how one is to interpret and balance the two factors of 
State practice and opinio juris is subject to conflicting analyses, 217  
but it is commonly recognised that both elements are required. Usage is 
needed as the source material delineating the content and scope of the 
proposed rule, while the opinio juris is essential in differentiating 
norms of customary international law from State behaviour embarked upon 
for reasons of courtesy, morality or expediency alone, since the latter 
forms of conduct are clearly intended to have no legal effect at all
(216) Op.cit. p.27. See also ICJ Reports 1950, pp,276 277
(217) deny reg a r d ^  usage as the "material and detectable element" In 
cuatom and opinio juris as the "Immaterial and psychologic, 1
element" » _d 'Interpret at ion et Sources en L n O -  S J !*
Positif, 1899, para. llli!^ Di f feTe-ntTsciio^  ^ . 4
one or other of these elements, eg. Strupp, "Les R|giea GS  i °g du Droit de la Paix" 47 HR 1934, pp,263 304> Timvf« ,,„Genera1®8
' 2 #rJ?fidlCil CUSt°mary Norms'of i^ternational^w" 8 ^49 California Law Review, 1961, pp.419,420-21, and op cit ’ 
pp.113-33; Bin Cheng "UN Resolutions on Outer Space V,
International Customary Law?" 5 IJIL, 1965, pp.23 35 ™
stress the need for opinio juris while Kelsen/ "Th^orie du
International Coutumier", Revue International de la ThenrLDI i1:
Droit (new series) 1939, pp.253, 264-6, and Guggenheim T r h t l  ^ 
Droit International Public, 1953, pp.46-8, to di8d £ ~ ~ -
See also D ’Amato, T h e ^ C o n c e g t ^ ^
Thirlway, International Customary Law — p--* 1B71*
Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of InternationaFl^"~~ir7 nvrr ^  
1974-5, p.l. *
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As far as self-determination is concerned, practice is extensive 
both within and outside the UN. Tied to the issue of colonialism as it 
has been virtually since the adoption of the Charter, it has constituted 
one of the major concerns of the organisation as any analysis of debates, 
resolutions and declarations will attest. Kay notes that between 1960 and 
1967 the number of speeches by representatives of the new nations devoted 
to decolonisation outweighed those relating to any other topic in plenary 
and main committee meetings, with the exception of the Assembly’s 20th session 
when the issue of economic aid received marginally more attention. 218
If one includes the topic of South Africa which has been treated by 
many nations as an aspect of the general problem of decolonisation the 
emphasis becomes even more evident. It is clear that the interest of the 
third world nations of Africa and Asia has focused primarily upon the 
decolonisation issue, with the problems of economic aid and development 
coming more to the fore as the number of countries still under colonial 
rule rapidly declines. This issue has been broadly defined and extended 
so that it has assumed the status of a general category incorporating a 
number of specific questions. The Ghanaian representative to the 16th 
session of the General Assembly declared that "in our view, colonialism 
is the greatest evil of the modern world, the source of all the troubles 
which presently afflict mankind. It is the root—cause of the arms race 
and the problem of disarmament. Colonialism and neo-colonialism are a 
perpetual threat to the peace and sovereignty of the world. Colonialism 
is the cause of war and conflict among nations and is, therefore, the
(218) The New Nations in the United Nations, 1970, p.4S. Kay notes that 
there were 511 speeches devoted to decolonisation (in plenary and 
main committee meeting) in the 15th session, 928 in the 16th 
session, 661 in the 17th session, 554 in the 18th session, 153 in 
the 19th session, 624 in the 20th session and 896 in the 21st 
session, ibid pp.46-8.
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greatest danger to world peace". 219-220
The number of resolutions directly concerned with self-determination 
is high and forms a vital part of the UN attitude to the decolonisation 
process. Of necessity, therefore, one must consider whether such 
resolutions can be regarded as constituting State practice for the 
purposes of customary law formation.
Resolutions may be relevant in the context of norm creation or
determination in a number of differing ways. They may constitute binding
or persuasive interpretations of the UN Charter. They may evidence
and reflect recognised rules of international law whether created through
the medium of treaty, custom or as general principles of law recognised
221by civilised nations. In this case, resolutions merely underline the
accepted position and have no norm-creating functions to fulfil. More
crucial is the role played by resolutions within the process of customary
law formation. This may take the form either of a stimulus to State 
222practice or of actual State practice or indeed of manifesting the 
opinio juris. *21
(219-220) GOAR 16th session, 1015th meeting, para.54. Henkin has written 
that "the struggle to end colonialism also swallowed up the 
original purpose of cooperation for promotion of human rights" 
"The United Nations and Human Rights" 19 International 
Organisation 1965, p.512, Self-determination, he declared, was 
"added to the roster of human rights as an additional weapon 
against colonialism", ibid p.513.
(221) Resolutions could constitute statements of general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations. Precisely what amounts to such 
general principles of law is a matter of controversy, see Asamoah 
op.cit. pp.61-2. O'Connell notes that there are three approaches
to this problem: one, that it incorporates natural law into positive
international law- two, that the general principles are only 
sources of positive international law and must be embodied in 
treaty or custom before they become legally operative and three,
that the court may utilise general principles embodied in the
municipal laws of States, op.cit. p.9. As far as self-determination 
is concerned, it is clear that points two and three are not relevant 
while if point one is to be of use it has to be shown that the right 
is part of natural law and that would be difficult.
(222) See Thirlway op.cit. pp,63-4.
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In the first case, that of a resolution encouraging the growth of
usage, what is involved is clearly an extra-legal factor and one which
does not need to be considered further, since many activities may perform
such an encouraging role ranging from resolutions of private bodies to
opinions of legal writers. But the second and third possibilities must
be considered briefly. Whether a usage is solely a practice or also
incorporates within itself the expression of opinio juris is often
difficult to decide. A State which makes a claim asserted as a legal
right is not only exhibiting a practice but is also evidencing the
opinio juris, thus the border line between the material and psychological
requirements of customary law created is blurred. This is particularly
true with respect to Assembly resolutions, since- they are often
assertions of rights under international law. An example of this would
be the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted unanimously on 13 
223December, 1963. It was regarded as a declaration of existing law by
224many States, including the most important in the field, as well as by
225a number of writers.
The expression of State support for a particular declaration or 
resolution, however, whether by statement or voting, constitutes State 2345
(223) General Assembly resolution 1962(XVIII), Resolution 1721(XVI) 
also unanimously adopted by the Assembly, proclaimed certain 
principles of law relating to outer space. The US representative 
in the Legal*Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space noted that "when a General Assembly resolutionproclaimed principles of international law - as resolution 1721 
(XVI) had done - and was adopted unanimously, it represents the 
law as generally accepted in the international community".
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, pp.10-11. See also A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, p.7.
(224) Eg. by the US and USSR,the only space powers at that time
A/C.1/PV.1342 at pages 6-27 and ibid pp.27-46. These statements 
are reproduced in 58 AJTL 1964 pp.720—1.
(225) Eg. Schwelb, "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law" 
58 AJIL, 1964, pp.645-6, Jenks wrote that the Declaration, while
somewhat less than a treaty, must be regarded as rather more than 
a statement of custom, Space Law, 1965, p.185. But cf. Thirlway 
op.cit. pp.70-71, Darwin, "The Outer Space Treaty" 42 BYIL 1967
p.2 8 0, and Cheng, loc.cit.
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practice, while the assertion of the legality of the principles outlined
227therein is clear evidence of the opinio juris. Thirlway has emphasised
the need to maintain a clear distinction between usage and opinio juris in
order to prevent alleged rules lacking both components from becoming part 
228of customary law, but the fact remains that the two are closely
intertwined particularly with regard to United Nations practice. The
difficulty of unravelling the two with respect to Assembly resolutions is
one more aspect of the changes brought about by the institution and
operations of the UN within the sphere of international law. 229"260
Self-determination was clearly not a rule of customary law prior to the
Charter261 and the overwhelming bulk of practice regarding the concept
262has clearly occurred in connection with the United Nations. Thus one 
must focus on this aspect. 2678*
226
(226) Akehurst proposes that one should accept as State practice, "any 
act or statement by a State from which views about customary law 
can be inferred" op.cit. p.53. This would include physical acts, 
claims, declaration in abstract© (eg. General Assembly resolutions) 
national laws and judgements, and omissions, ibid. But cf. D'Amato 
op.cit. p . 88 and Thirlway op.cit. pp.58-9.
(227) The necessity for opinio juris is accepted by virtually all writers 
in one form or another and by the International Court, see eg.
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp,3, 4 4j 
"the Asylum case, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.266, 277, and Akehurst
op.cit. pp.31-42.
(228) Op.cit. p.6 8. He notes that it is doubtful to regard the 1963
Delcaration as an expression of existing law because it appears to
lack sufficient State practice, ibid p.71.
(229-260) The acceptance of UN resolutions as reflecting and strengthening
customary rules is widespread, see eg. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.Ltd.
v. Supor, 22 ILR, 1955, pp,23, 40-41 Assembl^7"T^olliHw^~~
96(1) on genocide. Akehurst argues that to constitute authority
for the content of customary law, such resolutions must actually
claim to be declaratory of existing law, "Custom as a Source of
International Law", 47 BYIL, 1974-5, pp.l, 6 . Judge Ammoun has
suggested that a number of similar Assembly resolutions might
per se constitute a custom, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 99.
(261) See Briggs, The Law of Nations,p.65, and Nussbaum, Concise History
of International Law, 1954, p , 186• .
(262) Higgins writes "The practice of the United Nations in this complex
area of international affairs is very revealing and its importancecan hardly be exaggerated". Op.cit. p.91.
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The concern of the United nations with regard to self.determination
has been two-pronged. On the one hand the Organisation has affirmed the
right to self-determination of ali peoples in general terms and
consistently since 1952. This has been Included not only m  a number
of Assembly resolutions and declarations but also in the International
Covenants on Human Rights adopted in 1966. On the other hand, the right
has been declared in a number of specificp C1I1C situations and disputes. This
has tended to increase the plausibility of the entry of self-determination
into the panoply of international customary rules, since the greater
the practice relating to a particular proposition, the greater the
likelihood that it has been accepted as a custom. This also applies to
the length of time during which the principle has been affirmed as a
right. The longer the process has taken the greater the chances that it
has hardened into a rule. In any event, it is clear that more practice
affords more opportunity from which to extrapolate the opinio juris, it
is interesting to note that Judge Dillard has stated that "even if a
particular resolution of the General Assembly is not binding, the
accumulative impact of many resolutions when similar in content, voted
for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period of
time, may give rise to a general opinio juris and thus constitute a norm
263of customary international law".
IV - Conclusions
It is thus concluded that the right to self-determination is a legal 
right as a result of Charter interpretation and that the possibility, 
additionally, is raised of the right constituting also a customary right, 
although UN practice appears to have strongly favoured the former approach
Recent judicial pronouncements on self-determination are surprisingly 
rare and centre around the Nag.ibla case of 1971 and the Western Sahara 263
(263) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 121,
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case of 1975. The court, in the former case, noted that "the 
subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing 
territories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations made the 
principle of self-determination applicable to all of them’’265 without
264
really specifying how this has occurred or what possibly is involved,266
and proceeded to refer to the Colonial Declaration as "a further important
267stage in this development without further clarification. In inter­
preting the mandate, therefore, the court had to consider "the changes 
which have occurred in the supervening half-century....by the subsequent 
development of law, through the Charter of the UN and by way of customary
OCQ
law". However, the court failed to confirm whether or not self- 
determination was a binding legal principle in its own right.
The court's observations of self-determination in the Namibia case 
were quoted extensively in the Western Sahara case, where the court 
similarly refrained from a clear declaration. The Colonial Declaration 
was referred to as "the basis for the process of decolonisation",269 an<
(264) See also the Aaland Islands question, supra, p.106, in the Rights 
of Passage case, India referred to the principle of self-determin­
ation as regards the population of the Portuguese enclaves. 
Portugal replied by asking the court to dismiss this line of 
argument, but the court held that it was no part of its judicial 
function to declare in the operative part of its judgement that 
such arguments were or were not well-founded, ICJ Reports 1960 
pp.16-9, 32. Judge Nervo rhetorically declared that concepts of 
equality and freedom "will inspire the vision and conduct of 
peoples the world over until the goal of self-determination and 
independence is reached". ICJ Reports 1966, p,457,
(265) ICJ Reports 1971, pp.16, 31.
(266) Judge Ammoun picked this up by declaring that "although the 
Opinion does not lack persuasive force, it would be more persuasive 
if it traced the path by which this right of peoples has made its 
entry into positive international law", ibid p,74.
(267) Ibid, p.31,
(268) Ibid. The court stressed that "these developments leave little 
doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the 
self-determination and Independence of the peoples concerned",
. Ibid. ■ ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
(269) ICJ Reports 1975, pp.12, 32.
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the essence of self-determination was discussed in relation to resolution
1.541 (XV) and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.270
Such instruments constituted the "basic principles governing the
decolonisation policy of the General Assembly" 271 .
* • Judge Dillard regarded
the opinion ee forthright In proclaiming the erietence of the rights as
far as the proceedings were concerned, but he went further and declared
that "the pronouncements of the Organisation thus Indicate. .. .that a norm
of international law has emerged applicable to the decolonisation of those
non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United 
272
Nations". Although he does not expressly bring out the process by which 
this has occurred, Judge Dillard draws attention to the long list of 
resolutions dealing with self-determination following in the wake of the
273
Colonial Declaration. The result, therefore, appears to be that the 
opinion recognises that self-determination is a legal right27 374 but is 
unclear as to how that has arisen exactly.274®
A norm created as a result of Charter interpretation, it should be 
noted, will bind all members of the UN, while a customary rule will bind 
all States save those objecting ab initio, Thus, the former method would 
appear the more advantageous particularly as regards, for example, South 
Africa. Indeed, the fact that self-determination applies virtually 
(270) Ibid p.33.
(271) Ibid p.34. Judge Petren emphasised that the law of decolonisation 
does not yet constitute a complete body of doctrine and practice 
although its guiding principles have emerged inspired by a series 
of General Assembly resolutions and in particular the Colonial Declaration, ibid p.110,
(272) Ibid p.121. He makes it clear that the court is thereby statingthe law not creating it, ibid p,122.
(273) Ibid p.121. See further on this case, infra, Chapter 4, p.174 et se<
(274) But cf. Verzijl op.cit. pp.557-8; Kaur, "Self-determination in 
International Law" IJIL 1970, p,479; Gross "The Right of Self- 
Determination in International Law" in New States in the Modern 
World (ed. Kitson), quoted by Emerson, "Self-determination"65 AJIL 
1971, p,461; Jennings op.cit, p.78; Emerson "Self-determination
Revisited in the Era of Decolonisation" 1964, pp.63-4.
(274a) However, the discussions by the court, as distinct from individual
judges, would appear to suggest that the binding quality of the rule 
lies in its character as an interpretation of the Charter.
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exclusively within the colonial sphere (although with some potential 
for development) is a further argument favouring the Charter interpret­
ation approach, since the distinction between colonies and metropolitan 
territories is one made by the Charter.
One further point remains and that is the possibility that self-
determination constitutes a rule of jus cogens, and thus a peremptory
norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted. The
question of the existence and nature of jus cogens is one that has
received much attention in recent years, being partly stimulated by
discussions and debates leading up to the Vienna Convention on the Law
275of Treaties in 1969. The basis of such rules, which cannot be changed
save by contradictory rules of the same status, has been variously
276ascribed to natural law, and to international public policy.277"8
However, despite differences as to the origin of jus cogens, its
279essence is generally accepted. The International Law Commission
(275) See eg. Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law. 1067.
pp.17-77; Riesenfield, "Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in Inter-’ 
national Law: In the light of a Recent Decision of the German 
Supreme Constitutional Court", 60 AJIL 1966, p,511; Schwarzenberger 
"International Jus Cogens" 43 Texas Law Review 1965, p,455. '
(276) See Verdross, "Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International 
Law” 60 AJIL 1966, pp.55, 56; Bokor-Szego op.cit. p.66; Tunkin 
op.cit, p.147.
(277-8) Quadri, "Coura General de Droit International Public" 113 HR
1964 p.335, Lauterpacht,^ Yearbook of ILC 1953 vol.II, p.155, Cf.
Rousseau, Principes Generaux de Droit International Public.*voiIt 
pp.340-1, Note, the International Court has distinguished 
between obligations of a State vis-a-vis another State and 
obligations towards "the international community as a whole"
ICJ Reports 1970, p.32. Tunkin speaks of the growing inter-’ 
nationalisation of aspects of the life of society as the reason 
for jus cogens, op.cit. p,157. See also Thirlway op.cit. p.29,
(279) See GAOR 20th session 6th Committee p.4Q, Suy writes that "the 
most surprising feature of the Commission’s (ie. ILC) debates is 
the unanimity with which members of the Commission approved the 
idea of jus cogens" op.cit. p.50. Schwarzenberger writes that 
since jus cogens presupposes the existence of an effective de jure 
order, with legislative, judicial and enforcement machinery, no 
such rules exist in customary law, op.cit. p.24, although they do 
exist in relation to the Charter and organisation of the UN
ibid p.206.
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discussed the concept and incorporated it into the final draft on the
281law of treaties in 1966. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention specifies 
that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is 
a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character".
O'Connell has written that "the inclusion of the concept of jus cogens 
in the Vienna Convention constitutes an important recognition of the fact 
that contemporary society is bound together by the acceptance of 
fundamental principles constituting the rule of law".280 182 283
If the concept of jus cogens is generally accepted, no such agreement
is manifested with regard to the creation of rules of jus cogens or their
scope or, indeed, which rules can be included as rules of jus cogens.
However, there is a body of juristic opinion which declares that the rules
of jus cogens are formed in the same way as other norms of international
law, that is primarily by way of custom and treaty, and can be modified 
283by such means, thereby placing the concept firmly within the ambit of 
positive law and away from any variant of natural law thinking.284
(280) Yearbook of ILC, 1963, vol.II, p,187, at pp.198, 211, 216.
(281) Ibid 1966, vol.II, pp.247-9, as Article 50.
(282) Op.cit. p.244.
(283) See Tunkin op.cit. pp.158-9. See also Bokor-Szego op.cit. pp.69-70; 
Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective. vol.I, 1968
p,85, and Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International 
Law" 47 BYIL, 1974-5, pp.273, 282-5 and the sources therein cited.
(284) See Tunkin op.cit. p.158. He denies the automatic binding force of 
jus cogens upon new States, ibid p.159, footnote, cf, Bokor-Szego 
op.cit. p.70. See also Akehurst, loc.cit, p.283.
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The problem of the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens is centred
upon the conduct of States as a whole and a new principle might arise by
2 85way of inference from State practice. How one might decide whether a 
new rule appertains to jus dispositivum or to jus cogens is open to 
question and would depend to a large extent upon the intentions of the 
international community and the universality of the rule involved.
One may illustrate this point by noting some examples of jus cogens.286
The most recognisable relate to the proscription of aggression287 and the
288prohibition of crimes against humanity and peace, while other
possibilities include the banning of slavery, piracy and genocide.289
Some jurists regard the rule against racial discrimination as an aspect 
290of jus cogens.
(285) The ILC left the full content of juS cozens «'to h» . , .
State Practice and in the jurisprudence of international'Vit 
Report of the ILC A/6309/Rev. 1, pp.76-7. D ' A m ^ o f lbmala” 
the two stools of the existence or not of j u ^ g e n f ll notr®* 
that it could be argued that a rule of jus cogens meant °U "e
"a .yerj_BtroM  rule of customary international law” th 
be changed by a number of treaties with contr.™ might
is unlikely to be changed, op.cit. T
It is submitted that this is a poor compromise si no« *\original- 
the disadvantages of the concept without the advLtagtt.
(286) The ILC refrained from providing such examples in its ,
the inclusion of some examples might lead lo m i s t e r s t Z l i T T  
to the position of other cases not specifically ^  g S
since any attempt to draw up examples of jus cogens w o ^ d  w i  
it in a prolonged study of matters falling outside t h * l* 1 lve 
the draft articles, ibid, but see for « ! . % £ £  £  ^ 1 1 °!! °* 
Yearbook of ILC, 1963, vol.H, p.199, members,
(287) See McNair, Law of Treaties, 1961, pp.214-5,
(288) Brownlie op.cit. p.500, and Tunkin op.cit. p.160 Not« 
resolution 2074(XX) condemned apartheid and r a c m  <uLrimin*^ 
as crimes against humanity. This was reaffirmed in resolution
2145(XXI) and Security Council resolution 276 (1970)”  1
(289) Brownlie op.cit. p.500.
(290) See ICJ Reports 1970, p.32, and Judge Ammoun ibid n 304 c
J S T  l l T - s u "  ReP°rtS 196G' I>-298- Aramoun * IC^Reports
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It is arguable that the principle of self-determination also falls
291within the category of jus cogens and a number of members of the
292International Law Commission appeared to be of this opinion. It
would indeed be difficult to conceive of a treaty providing for the 
continuation of a colonial relationship against the wishes of the 
inhabitants of the territory being upheld as valid. Self-determination 
is a basic principle of international law of universal application, 
while the weight of international opinion appears to suggest that the 
right may be part of jus cogens. 291
(291) See Judge Ammoun ICJ Reports 1970, p.304, and Brownlie op.cit 
pp.500-1.
(292) See Yearbook of ILC 1963, vol.II, p.199.
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CHAPTER 4 - SELF-DETERMINATION. DECOLONISATION AND TERRITORY
One of the major factors in any consideration of international 
relations since 1945 has been the advent of decolonisation, whereby 
scores of entities administered by European powers have emerged upon 
the world scene as sovereign and independent nations. This process 
has been of tremendous significance within international law 
However, although decolonisation has been extensively discussed in 
the United Nations, it has only really been considered by the judicial 
organs of the international community in the Namibia1 and Western 
Sahara2 3cases, and then not in any great detail. Until these cases 
and to some extent after them, the status in law of the principles 
relating to decolonisation has been the subject of much debate in 
particular, the definition of the entity seeking independence and the 
precise extent of its territorial and temporal delimitation remain open 
to conflicting interpretations. Clearly much hinges upon an apprecia­
tion of the principle of self-determination and the definition of the 
"self", but that notion as comprehended in moral or political terms is 
more extensive than is apparently the case with the legal concept 
since it would permit any set of persons linked together by a sense of 
group-consciousness to determine its political status.2 To permit 
such a wide proposition within the framework of international legal
Cl) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31 and 73-5.
(2) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 29-36.
(3) See Peutsch, Nationalism and Social C o m m u n ! i952 _ vn
Scelle, Precis de Droit des Gens, Principes A ~ * tri1ir,1V.P, 8; 
Pt.2, Chapter 1, p.259 cited by the
Commission on Human Rights, A/C3/SR443 para.34 and Cobba 
The Nation State and National Self-Determine ^  196g
See also the Greco-Bulgarian Communities caaa, onrr 
no.17, p.21, ' es
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regulations, with consequent obligations, would be hazardous to the 
dominant State system in international relations. It would threaten 
the territorial basis of international law as It has developed, and 
it would pose particular dangers to the precarious stability of third 
world States, the vast majority of which are not nation-states in the 
nineteenth century European sense, but State-nations in that diverse 
ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural groupings have to be 
reconciled within the framework of one State. In other words, the 
State precedes the development of the territorial nation, but is faced 
with powerful loyalties generated by sub-State community ties. This 
creates a crisis of legitimacy, since the State is founded not upon 
a genuine sense of community, but upon the vagaries and power ranking 
of nineteenth century European colonial empires. Thus, the emphasis 
upon the necessity of maintaining colonial frontiers clearly demon­
strated by the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian and South American 
States4 5 can be understood in terms of the necessity of establishing 
stable legitimacy factors. But this has meant a general freezing of 
territorial entities as at the eve of decolonisation and a consequent 
disregard for ethnic and historical ties, which cross the old colonial 
border, or at the least a minimisation of their Importance in territorial 
terms. Accordingly, the principle of self-determination has operated 
in practice to safeguard the colonial delimitations and overrule purely 
ethnic definitions of the "self", so that the "self" must be determined
(4) Rejai and Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations", 13 International 
Studies Quarterly, 1969, p.143. Hoffman refers to "governments 
still in search of their nation", in "International Systems and 
International Law" 14 World Politics, 1961, p,230.
(5) See further infra, Chapter 5, p.268.
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within the colonial territorial context. Despite some controversy, 
it is clear that the concept of self-determination has played a 
crucial role in the replacement of the colonial African (and Asian) 
empires by individual, sovereign States. The reference of the Western 
Sahara problem to the International Court of Justice was particularly 
advantageous, in that an opportunity was thus presented for clear 
judicial pronouncements on the relevance and hierarchy of the various 
principles involved.
I Self-Determination and Decolonisation; The Western Sahara Analysis 
The principle of self-determination has been defined in very wide 
terms in international agreements. It has been propounded as the 
right of all peoples to determine their political status and pursue 
their own economic, social and cultural development. This broad 
approach incorporates a series of propositions. Firstly, that all 
"peoples", however defined, have the right to establish their own 
sovereign, independent State. Secondly, that every people has the 
right freely to choose its own political system internally. Thirdly, 
that upon the achievement of independence via self-determination as 
formulated in the first proposition, the people (in the sense of the 
State) attains sovereignty free from the claims of other peoples (in
g
the sense of resident minorities). Fourthly, the right of the people
(6) Article 1 of the International Covenant on Human Rights, 1968.
See also the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law,
(7) See Luard, "The Origins of International Concern Over Human
Rights" in The International Protection of Human Rights, (ed. 
Luard), 1967, p .10, See also Thomas and Thomas, Nonintervention. 1956 p.369 and Umozurike, Self-determination in International
Law,*1972, p.192. Note alBO A/C.3/SR,447, par 4-10.
(8) Calogeropoulos-Stratis called this the principle of total 
sovereignty. Espoused particularly by third world States, it 
treats self-determination as protecting the independence and 
integrity of the newly independent State, Le Droit des Peuples h nfripnser d'eux-m&mes, 1973, pp,162-4,
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(l.e. the State and maybe Its inhabitants) to develop Ita own patterns 
oi social, economic and cultural behaviour and fifthly, the right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources.9 The second, fourth and fifth propositions are beyond 
the scope of this work, hut are mentioned to illustrate the range of 
this principle.
The nature of self-determination and Its relationship with the 
process of decolonisation was extensively discussed during the course 
Of the a-.tgH_gft.rm case.10 The questions posed by Assembly resolution 
3292 (XXIX)11 were firmly placed within the context of self-determination 
and decolonisation. The resolution reaffirmed the right of the people 
of the territory to self-determination In accordance with resolution 
1514 (XV) , noted that the request to the court was made without preju­
dice to the principles embodied 1» that resolution and specified that 
the court's opinion would he of value In the process of decolonisation 
of western Sahara. The court recogniaed that the principles of
decolonisation were an essential part of the framework of the questions
12contained in the request and that the right of the people of the
territory to self-determination constituted a basic assumption of the
13questions. In the Coe of Western Sahara, both Morocco and Mauritania,
(9) See General Assembly resolutions 523 (VI) 6 2R m nand 1803 (XVII). See also the Declaration It J *l}' 1514 (XV)
of a New International Economic Order, OSMC » . M 9 H  T
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Du+-r«o ^ f 74’ p p ,6 6 ~84  (resolution 3881 (XXIX)). «>“ Duties of States, 1974,
(10) In the Namibia case, the court declared »*1.
development of international law in regard to non ®U^ e<lueilt territories ... made the principle of non~8elf~8°verning
able to all of them" pp.li, 3 1 -eli-determlnatlon appUc.
(11) See supra Chapter 2, p,57 and infra, p.227.
(12) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 30, The ,, , .
would provide the UN General Assembly ltS °pinlon
vent to the decolonisation of the temiSyi iMd p ^ r  P6l°'
(13) Ibid, p ,36.
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the claimant States, had voted in favour of Assembly resolutions 
proclaiming the right of self-determination for the population of the 
territory,14 as had Spain15 and Algeria.16 These States had also 
supported the right in express terms.17 18 The problem was that the 
parties had different views both of the role of self-determination 
within the context of decolonisation and the framework of international 
law in general, and of the actual content of the principle.
Morocco declared that the tundameatal relevant rule was that of 
decolonisation, characterised a. a rule of Jus cogens and an '•end-norm-,
towards the attainment of which a variety of techniques and principles
18were available as "means-norms". As examples of such principles, 
one could cite self-determination and territorial Integrity. There­
fore, a wide range of possibilities lay before the Assembly i„ lta 
task of decolonlsing territories, in the light of the UN Charter and 
various resolutions, such as resolutions 1514 (sv>, 1541 (XV) and 2625 
(XXV). The right of self-determination was certainly relevant, but it 
had to co-exist with other principles, such as that of territorial
Morocco had voted in favour of all such resolutions except 
' * resolution 2983 (XXVII), while Mauritania had voted in favour
of all of them, see resolutions 2229 (XXI), 2354 (XXII), 2591 
(XXIV), 2711 (XXV), 2983 (XXVII), 3162 (XXVIII) and 3292 (XXIX).
(15) Spain had voted for resolution 2354 (XXII), against resolutions
* 2072 (XX) and 2229 (XXI), and abstained in the rest.
(16) Algeria had voted in favour of all such resolutions.
il7) See A/10023/Add.5, Annex, paras. 269 (Spain), 305 (Morocco),
' ’ 348 (Algeria) and 104 (Mauritania). See also the Agadir meeting 
of July 1973 at which the latter three reaffirmed the right as 
regards Sahara, A/9623/Add.4, pt.ll at p.23 and A/10023/Add.5, 
Annex. Appendix III D.
(18) Pleadings# CR.75/26, p,60.
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integrity and in certain case., it was deemed subordinate to the 
latter concept. The Moroccan representative, Professor Dupuy, 
put forward a typology by which to reconcile the various factors in 
the light of State practice. It was accepted that the right of self- 
determination existed with regard to non-..lf-go,ernlng te„ ltorl6s 
in areas where no State had been recognised by the international 
community in the nineteenth century. It was agreed that the right did 
not exist respecting independent States so as to destroy the unity of 
such countries. However, in the case of States which had enjoyed 
international recognition prior to colonisation and had then been dis­
membered, such as Morocco, it was suggested that self-determination 
gave way to re-unification and the re-establishment of the former 
State's territorial integrity. Thus, the pre-colonial State came bach 
into existence with all of its dismembered parts recovered.19
Mauritania characterised the issue as -quite simply that of our 
territorial integrity, the unity of our people.»20 Although the 
principle of self-determination was accepted, it was emphasised that 
the Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania and that the latter had 
.right of re-unification.21 Th. principle of self-determination wss 
connected with the principle of national unity and territorial integrity 
referred to inter all,, in resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2625 (XXV), and in 
practice the General Assembly often gave priority to the latte, principle,
(19) Pleadings, CR.75/8, pp.11-16,
(20) Pleadings, CR,75/12, p.38,
(21) Ibid p.44, See also Pleadings CR.75/17, p.27.
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It »as claimed, particularly »here colonialism had taken land, from 
an existing State and artificially created a ne» territory.22
The attitude taken hy Algeria and Spain »as completely different. 
Algeria recognised the right of self-determination as "one of the 
great principle, of contemporary International la» and decolonisation 
only one of it. manife.tatlon.. "23 It »a. an essential and primary 
legal principle from »hich the other principles governing the interna­
tional community flowed, and therefore »as a rule of J„. Cogens. a  
operated as a direct opposite to the concept of terra nullius24 25f„
reaffirming the rule of people, and «as a higher principle than those •
25underlying territorial claims. The territorial integrity of a 
non-self-governing territory »a. guaranteed under international la» 
and its incorporation into a neighbouring State could only be Justified 
hy the wishes of the former's population, and not upon the basis of 
any alleged territorial Integrity of the latter. Moroccan reliance 
upon paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV)26 *»as based upon a misinter­
pretation, since it did not aim at giving territorial claims priority 
over self-determination. The paragraph referred only to future attempts
(22) Pleadings CR.75/13, pp.9-13. The return of French and
1 Portuguese territories to India was referred to, as was the 
Gibraltar situation, ibid. See also resolution 2429 (XXII).
(23) Pleadings CR.75/31, p.34. It was declared that decolonisation
1 ' was clearly only a species of a larger genus, viz. self-
determination, which was the right of peoples to independence, 
to set up their own political and economic system and non­
interference in the internal affairs of States, ibid.
(24) See supra Chapter 2, p.54.
(25) Pleadings, CR.75/20, pp.10-12 and 26,
. This stated that any attempt to disrupt the "national unity and 
* ' the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with
the ... principles of the Charter."
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and not to disputes of the nast 27past. Therefore, Algeria supported the
right of the population of Western Sahara to  ^ *oanara to self-determination as
the fundamental principle to which all other factor, were .„„ordinate.
A division of the territory would only he acceptable, if the people
freely expressed itself in favour of that solution.28 The point was
also made that the General Assembly had recognised the right of the
people of Sahara to self-determination as had resolutions of the
Organisation of African Unity and conferences of non - a l i « ^non-axigned countries
and various meetings of Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria.29 *
Spain took a similar lino in emphasising self-determination as the 
fundamental relevant principle. But whereas Algeria wished for a 
re-statement by the court of the supremacy of that principle, Spain 
declared that the reddest to the court was without object since the 
General Assembly had already decided that the right of self-determinatio, 
should apply and that a plebiscite should be held. Just as the title of 
the administering power has to cease on decolonisation so the claim, 
of third parties become legally without effect, for otherwise the right.
of the Saharan people as recognised by the Assembly would be disregard 
and imperilled.
Since the court emphasised that the request lay within the frame­
work of the consideration by the Assembly of the decolonisation of 
Western Sahara, it decided to review the basic principles governing the 
decolonisation policy of the Assembly. Article 1 <2) of the UN Charter
(27) Pleadings, CR.75/31, pp.36-38.
(28) A/10023/Add, 5. Annex, para. 351.
(29) Pleadings CR.75/20, pp.18-23.
(30) Pleadings CR,75/21, pp.14-19. 
self-determination as a rule of 
Statement, para. 344.
Spain also regarded the right of 
jus cogens, Spanish Written
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reinforced by Articles 55 and 56, referred to the development of
friendly relations among States based upon respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination. The principle was discussed
in resolution 1514 (XV), which the court regarded as "the basis for
31the process of decolonisation" without specifying whether a legal
or political basis was meant. This called for immediate steps to be
taken in non-independent territories for the transfer of power in the
light of the principle that all peoples had the right to self-determination.
Resolution 1541 (XV) noted that self-determination could take the form of
independence, free association with an independent State or integration
32with an independent State. In each case the essential feature was
33the free choice of the people. Resolution 2625 (XXV), the Declaration
on Principles of International Law, was noted, as was the court’s
view in the Namibia case that the principle of self-determination applied
34to all non-self-governing territories. The court also pointed out
that the General Assembly had reaffirmed the right of the inhabitants
35of Western Sahara to self-determination.
The court emphasised that the right of the Saharan population to 
self-determination constituted "a basic assumption of the questions put 
to the court".31 2456 Judge Dillard declared that the opinion of the court
(31) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 32. See also ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 3 1.
(32) See also Pleadings CR.75/8 p.17 et.seq. (Morocco); Pleadings 
CR.75/13 pp.7-9 (Mauritania) and Pleadings CR.75/20, pp.38-9 
(Algeria).
(33) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 32-3. See also resolution 2625 (XXV) 
the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.
(34) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31.
(35) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 34-36.
(36) Ibid p.36.
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had been forthright in proclaimiug the «ximt.no. of the right in the 
instant proceedings and presented his view that the pronouncement of 
the court indicated "that a norm of internationai la. has emerged 
applicable to the decolonisation of those non-self-governing territories
„hich are under the aegis of the United Nations...”  The court dl<J 
enter directly into the Moroccan-Algerian debate as to decolonisation 
and self-determination. However, its attitude appeared to be to regard 
decolonisation as the basic framework and self-determination as the 
most important relevant principle. i„ that lt sought
to reconcile the competing assertions. Judge Petren made the point 
that "although its guiding principles have emerged, the law of
decolonisation does not yet constitute a complete body of doctrine and
38
practice." The court, unfortunately, did not take this opportunity 
of further analysing the subject, but certain factors may be discerned.
The court concluded that no ties of territorial sovereignty 
be established, thus "the court has not found legal ties of such 
nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in
could
a
the
decolonisation of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle
39
of self-determination.” In other words, the implication is that only 
ties of territorial sovereignty could affect the application of the
relevant decolonisation principles. But if self-determination is one 
of the guiding principles of the decolonisation of non-self-governing 
territories, may this be overridden by ties of sovereignty in the past 
and if so, on which basis? The court here declared that the validity of
C37) Ibid, p.121.
(38) Ibid, p.110.
(39) Ibid, p.68.
181.
the principle of self-determination had not been affected by the
failure in certain cases to consult the population of a territory,
since these were based either on the grounds that such a population
"did not constitute a ’people' entitled to self-determination or on
the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view
40of special circumstances." Therefore, two avenues are open in the 
event of the recognition of past ties of sovereignty, it appears.
Either the people involved are not a "people" for the General Assembly, 
or special circumstances are involved. Precisely what "special cir­
cumstances" might amount to for this purpose was not made clear. The 
ambiguity inherent in the conclusion of the court in this respect could 
well open the door to other claims of pre-colonial sovereignty rendering
the application of self-determination redundent.40 1 423 A far better approach
40would have been to state, as did Judge Boni, that even a finding of
ties of sovereignty would have entailed the obligatory consultation of
the inhabitants of the territory, thus affirming the right of self-
determination as the primary principle involved. The uncertainty in
the court's opinion in this respect is to be regretted. In the light
43of the Sahara case and State practice, the centrality and legal character 
of the principle of self-determination can hardly be denied, but one 
vital question which was raised by Morocco concerned the role of the 
principle of territorial integrity. Could this principle be employed to 
bring back into being the pre-colonial frontiers of a State recognised
(40) Ibid, p.37.
(41) One should note in this context the claim« ,
Argentina to the Falkland Islands and G u a t ^ SPfia *° Glbral*ar,Guatemala to Belize,
(42) Ibid, p,174,
(43) Infra, p.191. See also Chapter 5, p.268
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at that time? Morocco argued that it could, but wag strenuously
44opposed by Algeria. The court, however, did not discuss the issue
at all, since by declaring that no ties of territorial sovereignty
45had existed, it avoided the necessity. On the other hand, the tenor
of the court's opinion appeared to favour the supremacy of self-
determination and therefore the rejection of the Moroccan thesis con-
46
cerning territorial integrity.
The principle of self-determination itself was defined by the
court as "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of
peoples"4 5*7 489and this was clearly accepted as the crucial point, although
48consultation could be dispensed with in limited instances. Judge
Negendra Singh regarded consultation on the decolonisation process as
49
"an inescapable imperative", while Judge Dillard referred to the
"cardinal restraint which the legal right of self-determination imposes ..
it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not
50the territory the destiny of the people."
(44) See Pleadings, CR.75/31, pp.25-32 and 36-39,
(45) see Judge Dillard, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 120.
Judge Nagendra Singh declared that "even if integration of ter- 
) ritory was demanded by an interested State, as in this case, it 
could not be had without ascertaining the freely expressed will 
of the people - the very sine qua non of all decolonisation", 
ibid p,81. See also Judge Boni, ibid, pp.173-4. Note in 
articular, the court’s approach, ibid, pp.34-7. See further infra, 
P ’ p.285,
(47) Ibid, p.33. S e e  also ibid, p.68.
(48) But ef. Judge Ammoun ibid, pp.99-100.
(49) Ibid, p.81.
ibid P.122, The same phrase was in fact used by Ambassador 
Bedlaoui, Pleadings, CR.75/31, p.15, However, since the people 
. non„self-governing territory must make the determination 
° to its future political status within the confines of the 
ritory as colonially defined, there is an argument for say- 
e that in a sense it is the territory which determines the 
destiny of the people.
183.
II The Nature of the "Self” and Territory
The relevant Instruments of the UN have consistently referred to 
the application of self-determination to "all peoples". Accordingly,
some discussion of a "people" is merited 
of the nature of a people centre around
. Sociological discussions 
certain common characteristics
which «re reinforced by an «warenese of a diatinct conaclouaneaa. 
Deutach writ« that by "peoples" one means groups of individuals bound
9
together by certain complementary habita and characteristics, Including 
language, custom, and history.51 goalie noted that the term indicated”8 
that legal rights ■■„ay be exercl.ed collectively by any group of national, 
of a State without further prerequisites as regards auoh group than 
that of the common wish of the individual. whlch lt „  CMq)OMd„ M
while Cobban held that "any territorial community, the members which 
are conscious of themselves as members of . community and wish to main­
tain the identity of their community, is a nation."53 Although this 
may be acceptable as a guideline in socio-political theory, it does 
not necessarily follow that the same concepts should govern the legal
definition of a people, since the additional perspective of an inter­
national community founded upon the basis of a finite number of ter­
ritorially based entities called States is involved. This extra factor 
argues for certainty and stability in the process of State formation as 
in the protection of the integrity of existing States.
(51) Op.cit. p.78.
(52) Op.cit. p.259.
(53) Op.cit. p.107.
"nationality is
PP -9.
Emphasis in original. Clauds writes thatin aasnnra a suh * a. j - . HJBC
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Part of the problem lies in the confusion of terminology apparent 
in Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter. This called for "friendly rela­
tions among nations based on ... self-determination of peoples", 
and the question arose as to whether these terms were interchangeable. 
Certain delegates to the Commission on Human Rights replied in the 
affirmative, but others emphasised that "peoples" was wider than
"nations" since it could comprise all or part of the population of a
55State or indeed the inhabitants of several States. However, by 
referring to "nations" in Article 1 (2), the Charter in essence con­
cerned with States, since this would provide the only likely explanation 
of Article 1 (4), whereby the UN was to be "a centre for harmonising 
the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends.
A trend emerged in later discussions in favour of restricting
the notion of "peoples" to the inhabitants of a particular State or
56colony that is to clearly defined political units. Johnson regarded
the use of the term as signifying the desire to ensure that a narrow
application of "nations" would not prevent the extension of the principle
57of self-determination to peoples who might not yet qualify as nations.
H wever such discussions failed to reach a clear conclusion and one 
st turn to State practice to determine the juridical definition of
a people. 54
(54) See eg. the Haiti delegate, A/C.3/SR.444 para,40.
(55) Eg. the UK delegate, ibid, paras. 24 and 25.
(56)
(57)
See A/7326, p.61.
Self-determination Within the Comm,,»«*.. .
The Indian delegate to the C o n S t ^ ^ H ^  1987> p,55.
that if an ethnic group claiming to be a mi .Rlehts de«lared 
a people, it would succeed in obtaining it»afrity WBS actu* U y  
or not its right to do so was recognised, A/C Whethe**
Emerson noted that all too frequently the a + /&R,651> Para,4,
whether a people was involved was made aft et®'minati°n as to 
Empire to Nation, 1960, p .90. er fact, From
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In Europe, the principle of self-determination centred around 
recognised nations such as the Magyars, Germans, Poles and Italians, 
the aim being to create a sophisticated political structure upon the 
basis of the nation and thus to ensure the emergence of the nation­
state and the demise of the multi-national empires. As Cobban noted,
"the history of self-determination is a history of the making of
58nations and the breaking of States". In actual fact, very few of the
colonial borders in Africa coincided with ethnic lines. Each territory
tended to contain a multitude of different tribal groupings and each
border to split tribes amongst different administrative authorities.
For example, the frontiers of Ghana cut through the areas of seventeen
major tribes.58 9 60 The Bakongo Kingdom was partitioned between the Belgian
Congo the French Congo and Portuguese Angola, while the Ewes were
to be found in the British Gold Coast, British Togoland and French
Togoland. On the other hand, Kenya included over 200 tribes and
60Nigeria comprised hundreds of separate groups. All this has meant 
that in Africa, with few exceptions, one could not establish a newly 
independent State emerging from within colonially drawn frontiers upon
the basis of a unified ethnic self.
Mazrui has attempted to get around this problem by stressing the 
notion of "pigmentational self-determination" as the basis for sovereignty 
in Africa He has written that "the right to sovereignty was not merely
(58) Op.cit. pp.42-3.
(59) Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa. 1966,
p.108.
(60) vpitemtchouk, 'L*Afrique en Droit International. 1971. pp.70-72.
186.
for nation-States recognisable as such in a Western sense, but for
’peoples' recognisable as such in a racial sense, particularly where
61differences of colour were manifest." This approach leads to the
notion of "racial sovereignty" rather than national sovereignty in
discussions of self-determination problems in the States of Africa
and Asia. However, it confuses more than it elucidates, for it appears
to ignore questions of domination by one people over another of the
same race and the dilemma of secession. It has also been contradicted
in State practice, in cases of the alleged denial of self-determination
to a minority racial group within an independent State, as for example 
62
in Southern Sudan. Mazrui thesis can also lead to severe definitional 
problems with respect to "pigment" and "race". In any event, it is far 
too simplistic as a legal tool for analysing the nature of self- 
determination in Africa.
Umozurike defines the concept of "people" for the purposes of 
self-determination in very wide terms indeed. He notes that "the legi­
timate ’self' ... is a collection of individuals having a legitimate
interest which is primarily political, but may also be economic, cultural
63
or of any other kind" and continues by stating that "individuals, as 
peoples, are entitled to exercise rights and enjoy a commensurate share 
in determining their political, cultural and economic future" . * 6234 To 
reconcile this broad approach with reality, he is impelled on the one
.... Towards a Pax Africans: A Study of Ideology and Ambition 
-— — 3 3 :4 and '"Consent, Colonialism and Sovereignty" 11 
o p t i c a l  Studies, 1963, p.48. Cf. Kamanu, "Secession and the 
Right of Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma" 12 JMAS, 1974, 
p .355.
(62) See infra, Chapter 5, p,322.
(63) Self-determination in International Law. 1972, p .195
(64) Ibid.
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hand to extend the concept of self-determination to include self-
government, local autonomy, merger, association and other forms of
65participation in government and on the other to declare that the mere 
assertion of a right to self-determination does not ipso facto make 
the claim a question of self-determination in international law.66 
It is a matter of degree depending upon all the circumstances of the 
case particularly the seriousness of the "abuse of sovereign power, 
to the detriment of a section of the population".67 In other words, 
whether the claim is one of international law appears to be dependent 
upon a prior contravention of the principle by the government complained 
of, ie. the legal right of self-determination arises upon the abuse of 
the political principle of self-determination. It is clear that this 
approach confuses the political and legal principles and appears also 
to misunderstand the nature of self-determination as developed through 
international practice. Part of the problem may have occurred because 
of the linking of self-determination of peoples with individual human 
rights in the world community, something which tended to downgrade the 
importance of human rights by the focus upon self-determination as a 
fundamental human right.
In determining the nature of the "self" in self-determination, it 
must be realised that the relevant definition of "peoples" is not the 
sociological one but the legal one. There is a difference and upon that 
difference the legal concept of self-determination is predicated. The
(65) Ibid, pp.3, 192.
(66) Ibid, p .196.
(67) Ibid.
Suppl.
The quotation is from the Aaland Islands case, LNOJ 
no.3, 1920, p,5.
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International Court has pointed to this by noting that the fact that 
the General Assembly has not consulted the inhabitants of a particular 
territory in relation to self-determination may be due to the considera­
tion that "a certain population did not constitute a ’people’ entitled
68to self-determination", International instruments have consistently
maintained that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
69with the UN Charter and this would appear to rule out the right of
secession from an independent State. In addition, practice reveals
that not every "people" is deemed to have the right in law of self-
determination. The legal concept of self-determination is founded upon
a particular definition of the "self" that has emerged in doctrine and
in practice and this definition is centred upon the non-self-governing
territories (and the mandated and trust territories as well). Whether
or not the political concept has been Infringed may be relevant in a
broad political sense, but it has no bearing upon the legal issue. The
concept of self-determination has been the legal instrument in the process
70of ending colonialism.
An early attempt to extend the doctrine of self-determination in 
international law to all countries occurred in the so-called "Belgian 
thesis". This was a move spearheaded by the Belgians to widen the 
obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter to include "colonial situations" 
within independent States. As was noted, many States oppress groups within 68*70
(68) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 33. See also Judge Dillard, ibid,
p.121.
<?ee ee para.6 of resolution 1514 XVt the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles (res. 2625 (XXV)) and Article III (3) of the OAU 
Charter.
(70) Judge Quintana characterised the mood of the present period as 
"the age of national independence", ICJ Reports, I960, p.95,
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their own frontiers by a variety of discriminatory measures and there
seemed to be no reason, it was argued, why such groups could not count
as "peoples /whoj have not yet attained a full measure of self- 
71government." However, this proposition was strongly rejected by the 
non-colonial powers, who argued that the term "non-self-governing
territories" clearly referred to entities distinct from the metropolitan 
72State.
The terms in which UN resolutions have been expressed have also 
manifested the rejection of the Belgian thesis. Resolution 1514 (XV), 
the Colonial Declaration, emphasised the necessity to end colonialism 
and called for immediate steps to be taken in non-independent territories 
to transfer power to the people, while resolution 1541 (XV) noted that 
"the authors of the Charter ... had in mind that Chapter XI should be 
applicable to territories which were then known to be of colonial type" 
and declared that "prima facie there is an obligation to transmit 
information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate 
and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administer­
ing it." To make the point even clearer, the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law (resolution 2625 (XXV)) stipulated that 
"the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has, 
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of 712
(71) UN Charter, Article 73. See The Sacred Mission of Civilisation:
The Belgian Thesis, 1953; Toussaint, "The^ColonraTControversy“ ’ 
in the United Nations" 10 YBWA, 1956, pp.177-9; Kunz, "Chapter 
XI of the United Nations Charter in Action" 48 AJIL, 1954, p.109 
and Nawaz, "Colonies, Self-government and the United Nations" l 
Indian Yearbook of World Affairs, 1962, p.3. See also A/AC.58/1 
pp,3-14 and A/AC.67/2 pp.3-31.
(72) See eg. GAOR, 7th Session, 4th Committee, 254th meeting, paras
5 ,  7 and 8; ibid, 258th meeting paras, 24, 40 and 41; ibid, 255th 
meeting paras, 31, 39 and 40; ibid, 257th meeting, paras. 5 and 58* 
ibid plenary, 402nd meeting, para. 134 and ibid 8th session, 4th ’ 
committee, 327th meeting, para. 2, Note that Article 74 of the 
Charter distinguishes between "the territories to which this 
Charter applies" and "their metropolitan areas". See also Yearbook 
of ILC, 1949, p.73.
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the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under
the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non—self-
governing territory have exercised their right of self-determination in
73accordance with the Charter." in practice, the call for self-
determination and independence has been limited to the colonial situation
encompassing mandate, trust and non-self-governing, territories,7*^
Accordingly, the problem of defining a "people" which so engrossed UN
75delegates in 1950's in particular resolved Itself for legal purposes
76in a territorial sense. A people in a sociological sense would only 
be accepted as a people in legal terms for the purposes of self- 
determination if it inhabited a particular type of territory.* 74567 The 
distinction between trust and non-self-governing territories was funda­
mental in the UN Charter, with differing provisions for each and emphasis 
upon the former, but it has been of decreasing importance in practice.
The call for self-determination has been made regarding both types of
territory and the right has been accepted as being equally applicable to 
78both. State practice reveals that the clarification of the "self" has
f73i The USA argued unsuccessfully in 1961 for the Colonial Declaration 
to be used in non-colonial situations, see GAOR, 16th Session,
4th Committee, 1175th meeting, para. 35.
(74) But see eg. resolutions 2535B (XXIV) and 2627C (XXV) as regards
 ^ Palestine and infra p.257 with respect to South Africa.
(75) See eg. GAOR, 6th Session, 3rd Committee, 364th, 366th and 371st 
 ^ meetings and ibid 447th, 449th, 451st and 452nd meetings; and
ibid, 7th Session, 3rd Committee, 444th, 445th and 446th meetings.
(76) See the Indonesian delegate, GAOR, 7th Session, 3rd Committee, 
451st meeting, para. 11.
(77) Whether or not a territory was non-self-governing depended in 
the last resort upon the UN, In the cases of Algeria and Oman, 
the General Assembly upheld the right of self-determination even 
though these territories were not officially non-self-governing.
See ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31,(78)
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been made in clear territorial terms and within a particular temporal 
framework, ie. in terms of pre-independent territories. The former 
proposition will be examined in the light of practice relating to 
Africa in the following section, and the latter in the following 
Chapter.
Ill The Spatial Factor - State Practice
The determination of the self in terms of a defined territorial 
framework raises the question also as to the inviolability of the ter­
ritorial unit as colonially determined prior to independence, since the 
date at which the territorial "self’* crystallises is of crucial impor­
tance.
79(a) Namibia (South-West Africa) - South-West Africa was awarded to
the Union of South Africa as a mandated territory after the First World
80War under the League of Nations system. In 1946, the League adopted 
a resolution recommending the termination of its functions as regards 
mandated territories and noting that Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the 
United Nations Charter corresponded to Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League, which had dealt with the creation of the mandate system. 81 
Following this recommendation and the dissolution of the League, the UN
(79)
(80)
(81)
See in particular Dugard, The South-W««t A#.,.- ... ...
1873; siont»,. south-we»t
Mandate in. Dispute , 1973. and Wai i
Its Human Issues, 1967. gt°°’ ^ ^ £ £ 1  Africa and
For details of the mandate agreement see
See also Alexandrowicz, "The Juridical Expression^Ì Ìh P? ’72"4 * 
Trust of Civilisation" 65 AJIL, 1971 n SSlon °f the Sacred 
to incorporate South-West Africa as th« South Africa tried
Union with the support of the. all-white'Sout^S” ?1?**'®*'the 
see League of Nations Doc. C.489M.214 (l934\h*!!eSt Africa As»©mbl 
declared contrary to the principles of tv, * 50> but tliis waa 
by the Permanent Mandates Commission and ejected
60 and 61. ’ 866 PMC Mi™tes 1025, pp .59
21st Ordinary Session, Report of tha 1.+-«
also Umozurike, "International Law and Sal pp,5~6 - See
Namibia” 8 JMAS, 1970, pp.585-603» .■»«! Self-Oetemination in
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requested that South-West Africa be placed under the trusteeship system82 834
and rejected South African proposals to Incorporate the territory into
83the Union of South Africa. The issue was eventually referred to the
84International Court which held that South Africa alone was not com­
petent to modify the international status of the territory. That compet­
ence rested with South Africa acting with the consent of the UN . 85 
Liberia and Ethiopia as the two black African member-States of the 
League sought a declaration from the court that South Africa had broken 
the terms of the mandate and was thus in breach of international law. 86 87
The court decided in 1962 that it had jurisdiction to decide the case 
87on its merits, but in 1966 it held that individual League members had 
no locus standi to sue the mandatory power in respect of its treatment 
of the inhabitants of the mandated territory and dismissed the case. 88 
The problem then reverted to the political organs of the United Nations.
One of the primary objectives of the UN in this situation has been 
to preserve the territorial integrity of South-West Africa and prevent
(82) Resolution 61 (I). See also resolutions 141 f i n449B (V). (iI)> 227 (III> and
(83) Resolution 65 (I).
(84) Resolution 338 (IV).
(85) ICJ Reports, 1950, p.128.
(86) See resolutions 1143A (XII) and 1361 (XIV) in which th« r 
Assembly pointed out the legal action provided for in ! Ì T ' * 1
A « “ 1'’ 7 the »»date a g r e e l ! « , 
the ICJ Statute. The action to take leg.! proceeding! ™  
commended in resolution 1565 (XV) . See Falk, «’The South L  * 
Africa caaea: An Appraisal" 21 international « « w
p,7; Higgins, -The International Court of Justice and SouÌh w967’ 
Africa", 42 International Affaire, 1966. p . s n  and £ e f !  ^ St 
United Nations, South-West Africa and the World Court" 7 iJiu 
1967, p,491. t
(87) ICJ Reports, 1962, p.318.
(88) ICJ Reports, 1966, p.6.
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South Africa annexing or partitioning it. Assembly resolution 65 (I)
firmly rejected any attempt at annexation and this was reinforced by
the stand of the International Court in 1950, when the principle of
non-annexation was declared to be of paramount importance. However,
over the years, South Africa has sought to divide the territory on
racial and tribal grounds on a number of occasions. ln 1958 the Good
Offices Committee, established by the Assembly the previous year 89 90
issued its report in which it suggested that some form of partition of
the territory involving annexation of part by South Africa and the
establishment of a trusteeship over the remainder might provide the
90basis for an agreement with South Africa.
This was quickly rejected by the General Assembly,91 923which called 
for full discussion for an agreement "which would continue to accord to
the mandated territory of South-West Africa as a whole an international 
92status." In 1961, the Assembly proclaimed "the inalienable right of 
the people of South-West Africa to independence and national sovereignty" 
and established a UN Special Committee for South-West Africa.98 However 
the government of South Africa proceeded with preparations to divide 
the territory. The report of the Odendaal Commission was tabled early 
in 1964 and advocated a series of ten separate homelands for the Africans
(89) Resolution 1143 (XII).
(90) A/3900.
(91) Resolution 1243 (XIII).
(92) Ibid, para.2. Emphasis added. Since South Africa was not 
pared to consider UN supervision of the territory nor the xm**" 
to accept partition, there was no basis for an agreement W  
Report of the Gord Offices Committee, 1959, A/4224, para.’le
(93) Resolution 1702 (XVI), See also resolution 1596 (XV)
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three coloured townships and a white area. However, the bulk of the
industrial and mineral wealth would be situated within the European
areas.^ In discussions before the UN Special Committee against
Apartheid, it was reported that the objective of the plan "was seen to
be to divide the territory on tribal lines, create bantustans with
small populations and integrate the territory more closely with the
96Republic (of South Africa)." The South Africa government in a White
Paper of April 1964 accepted the report and endorsed the view that "it
should be the aim as far as practicable to develop for each population
group its own homeland in which it can attain self-determination and
97
self-realisation *"
This view was not accepted by the UN, which strove to emphasise 
the territorial integrity of South-West Africa. The Odendaal report
was criticised by the Special Committee on Decolonisation as a device
, 98
to prolong the control of the South African authorities and condemned
99by the General Assembly in 1965. In 1966, following the decision of 945678
94
(94) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South-West African 
Affairs, 1962-3, 1964, Pretoria. See D*Amato. "The 
Proposals for South-West Africa" 4 JMAS, 1966, p.177. See 
also A/AC.109/L.108.
(95) The allocations were as follows.*- 312,433 sq. kilometres for 
424,047 Black Africans, 14,785 sq. kilometres for 23,965 coloureds 
and 495,927 sq. kilometres for 73,464 whites .(including government 
lands). I960 population figures. See Odendaal Report, tables
A, B and C, pp.109, 111, tables XI, XVIII and XIX at pp.29, 39 
and 41. See also D*Amato loc.cit. p.'181 and Africa Research 
Bulletin, February, 1964, p.27.
(96) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1964, p.42.
(97) See Kahn, Annual Survey of South African Law. 1964, pp.41-3.
(98) UNMC June, 1964, pp,33 et.seq.
(99) Resolution 2074 (XX).
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the International Court, the Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming 
the inalienable right of the people of South-West Africa to self- 
determination, freedom and independence and proclaiming that the terri­
tory had an international status which it would retain until independ- 
100
ence. The resolution reaffirmed the applicability of resolution 1514 
(XV) and terminated the mandate. The intention was that thenceforth 
South-West Africa would come under the direct responsibility of the UN 
and to this end an ad hoc Committee for South-West Africa was established 101 102
I- resolution 2248 (XXII,. the Assembly ve-emph.sised the •■territorl.l
integrity of South-West Africa" M d the right of its people to freedom
and independence in accordance with the UN Charter, resolution 1514 «v,
and all other resolutions concerning the territory. A u n Council for
South-West Africa of 11 members was establiahed to exercise various
102
powers and functions. The Assembly declared in resolution 2325 (XXII) 
that South Africa's continued presence in the territory was a "flagrant 
violation of its territorial integrity and international status as 
determined by General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) " 103 104 Howev i 
1968, the South African parliament adopted the Development of Self-
Government for Native Nation, in South-West Africa Act, which was intended
104to implement the Odendaal report and accordingly the Act established
(100)
(101)
Resolution 2145 (XXI). Adopted by 114 votes to 2 (South Africa 
and Portugal), with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi and UK),
See as to the legality of the resolution and the question of 
the Assembly’s competence eg. Crawford, ’’South-West Africa:
Mandate Termination in Historical Perspective" 6 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 1967, p.91-Higgins, »The
International Court and South-West Africa: The Implications of 
the Judgement" 8 Journal of the International Commission of 
Jurists, 1967, p.3 and Dugard, "The Revocation of the Mandate 
f o r  South-West Africa" 62 AJIL, 1968, p.78.
(102) UNMC July 1967, p.87; ibid, August-September 1967, pp.39-40 and 
ibid November 1967 pp.28-30. See A/6640. See also Herman, "The 
Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia" 13 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1975, p,306.
(103) UNMC January 1968, pp.62-7.
(104) See Dugard op.cit. pp.431-3,
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certain areas for the different nations and provided for various
administrative machinery in each homeland. In pursuance of this policy,
legislative and executive councila were created between 1968 and 1972
for the Ovambos, Kavangos and the inhabitants of the Eastern Caprivi.105 106
In April 1968, the Assembly resolved to change the name of the territory
to Namibia and condemned the Pretoria government for consolidating its
illegal control and destroying the unity of the people and the terri-
106torial integrity of the country. Following the Development of
Self-Government Act, the Assembly adopted a resolution attacking South
Africa for destroying the territorial integrity of Namibia.107 At
this point, the Security Council by resolution 264 (1969) recognised
the termination of the mandate by the General Assembly and declared
that the actions of the South African government "designed to destroy
the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia through the
establishment of bantustans are contrary to the provisions of the
United Nations Charter." By resolution 269 (1969), the Council declared
that the continued occupation of Namibia by South African authorities
constituted an "aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United
Nations, a violation of the territorial integrity and a denial of the
political sovereignty of the people of Namibia." It also called upon
South Africa to withdraw its administration from the territory immediately,108
tea
(105) Ovamboland Legislative Council Proclamation no. R291, GGE no. 2177 
(Beg. Gaz. no. 1025); Kavango Legislative Council Proclamation R196 
GG 2770 (Reg. Gaz. no. 1313) and Eastern Caprivi Legislative Council 
Proclamation R6 GG 3373 (Reg. Gaz. no, 1566). See Dugard op.cit. 
pp.434-5. See also the Caprivi Constitution Proclamation, Afri< 
Research Bulletin March 1976, p.3975.
(106) Resolution 2372 (XXII).
(107) Resolution 2403 (XXIII).
(108) See also resolution 276 (1970).
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By resolution 284 (1970), the Council requested an advisory opinion 
from the International Court on the legal consequences for States of 
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. In its opinion,109 10
the court emphasised that the principle of self-determination was
110applicable to all non-self-governing territories by virtue of the 
"subsequent development of international law", in particular resolution 
1514 (XV) and the subsequent independence of all but two of the trust 
territories.111 12* The opinion of the court was that the continued 
presence of South Africa in the territory was illegal and should be 
terminated. UN members were obliged to recognise this illegality and
refrain from actions and declarations implying recognition or lending
112support to such presence and administration. The opinion was 
approved by the Security Council in resolution 301 (1971), which also 
reaffirmed the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia 
and condemned all measures by the government of South Africa to destroy 
that unity and integrity, including the establishment of bantustans.
South Africa, however, continued to maintain its policy of separate
development with the proposed partition of the territory into separate
113black and white States. In 1973, the South African Foreign Minister
(109) ICJ Reports, 1971, p,16.
(110) Ibid p.31. See also ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 31-3.
(111) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31. Papua-New Guinea became independent 
in 1976.
(112) Ibid p.58. The court declared that the decisions of the 
Security Council declaring South Africa’s presence in Namibia 
illegal (ie. resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 276 (1970)) 
were in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter and 
"consequently binding on all States members of the United 
Nations." ibid, p.53. See Higgins, "The Advisory Opinion on 
Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of 
the Charter?" 21 ICLQ, 1972, p,27.
(113) See the proposals of the Commissioner-General for t„„V 
Peoples of South-West Africa, Africa R e s e a t  B u i w f  
1974, p.3406. The possibility was also suggested^of 
of Angola and Namibia uniting to form a State ihi* °vambos 
Africa Research Bulletin January 1975, p.35u '  See also
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appeared to suggest that Namibia might become independent in about ten 
114years, while the UN continued to adopt resolutions proclaiming 
the right of the people of the territory to self-determination and 
independence and reaffirming the national unity and territorial integrity 
of Namibia, as well as criticising the bantustan proposals.14 15
In 1975, a Constitutional Conference opened in Windhoek in 
Namibia with delegates from 11 ethnic groups, but without the parti­
cipation of SWAPO, the UN-recognised national liberation movement.116 178
The aim was to establish a multi-racial government to run the territory
until independence, which was intended to be the end of 1978, accord-
117ing to a committee of the conference. The conference ended in the
spring of 1977, with proposals for a draft constitution with a three-
tier system based on ethnicity, not on separate bantustans. The
principle of the territorial integrity of Namibia was thus accepted by
118the South African supported conference. However, the ethnically 
based proposals were rejected by the UN Council for Namibia, which 
reiterated its support for the struggle of the people under SWAPO's 
leadership to achieve self-determination and independence and called upon
(114) See UNMC May 1973, pp,39-40 and 59-60,
(115) See eg. Security Council resolutions 323 (1972) and ass m o *«* 
and Assembly resolutions 3031 (XXVII) and 3111 (XXVIII) U876>
(116) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1975 D 37R0 eibid, March 1876, pp. 3973-4. P-3769. Saaalao
(117) Ibid, August 1976, p.4136. This was rejected bv th<* ttm r>
for Namibia and by SWAPO, ibid, pp.4136-7° COUnCl1
(118) Ibid, January 1977, p.4301 and ibid March 1977 PD 4370 ,
the 60 seat proposed Assembly, 12 would go to ¿yambos 6 to 
whites and 4 or 5 proportionately to 9 other groups ibid 
February 1977, p.4336. See also S/12180. ’ ’
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the Security Council to take action. In resolution 31/146, the
General Assembly criticised the convening of the conference as an
attempt by South Africa to "perpetuate its colonial exploitation of the
people" and impose upon the people a "bogus constitutional structure
aimed at subverting the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia."
This resolution also expressed support for the armed struggle of the
people, led by SWAPO, to achieve self-determination, freedom and
independence in a united Namibia. The International Conference in
Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia held in Maputo,
Mozambique, in May 1977 rejected all attempts by South Africa to
120dismember the territory of Namibia. The plan for an interim admin­
istration on multi-ethnic lines as envisaged by the Windhoek conference 
was, however, abandoned by South Africa and Judge Steyn appointed 
instead as Administrator-General for Namibia during the transition 
period. Assembly resolution 32/9D reaffirmed the terms of resolution
31/146, in particular as regards the need for maintaining the territorial
122integrity of Namibia.
In the spring of 1978, South Africa announced its acceptance of 
123western proposals for a settlement in Namibia involving a UN peace- 19203
119
(119) UNMC August-September 1976, pp.26-7. See also S/121RS
EEC stated that these Turnhalle talks held at W i L w i , '  Th® 
representative without the participation of SWAPO Afrie!*6 n0t 
Research Bulletin, February 1977, pp.4336-7. SWAPO was«**« *
ively barred by the ban on non-white political parties UNMr August-September 1976, p.27. parties, UNMC
(120) Ibid June 1977, pp.41-8. See also Africa Research BulletinMay 1977, pp.4418-21. cn Bulletin,
(121) Ibid June 1977, pp.4471-2 and ibid July 1977, p.4516.
(122) See also resolution 32/42, and the Declaration of Lusaka k . V
UN Council for Namibia, A/S-9/2-S/12631. ska by the
(123) The western proposals may be seen in ILM, May 197a no 762 o 
They involved a reduction in the number of South Afri™„ t ’ 
in the territory, the entry of SWAPO p e r s o n n e l * a
vised election for a constituent assembly. "“per-
200.
keeping force.'*" However, concern for the territorial integrity of
Namibia was evident in the Ninth special session of the General 
125Assembly, and in resolution S-9/2 containing the Declaration on 
Namibia and a Programme of Action, South Africa was urged to respect 
the integrity of the territory. Namibia was declared to be the direct 
responsibility of the UN until genuine self-determination and independ­
ence and the mandate given to the Council for Namibia as the legal 
Administering Authority until independence was reaffirmed, in 
September 1978, however, South Africa rejected key parts of the Western 
proposals regarding the number of UN troops to be stationed in Namibia 
and stated its intention to conduct its own elections in the territory 124 526 1278
It was ultimately accepted by all parties that the territorial 
integrity of Namibia prior to independence was to be maintained and 
that the appropriate "self" for the exercise of self-determination was 
to be defined in terms of a united territory of Namibia. It could be 
argued that Namibia as a mandated territory was a special case in this 
respect, but practice seems to show that the same principle operates 
with respect to other non-self-governing territories.'*'27
(b> Pre-Independent Kenya and Somali Claims for Self-Det6rmi„n*4^ * 2 8  _ 
Any examination of the Kenya colony and protectorate in relation to its
(124) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1978, p.4829. SWAPO accents
the proposals on July 12th, ibid July I9 7 8f p ,4935t Pt d
(125) See the report of the debates in UNMC June 1978, pp.49-.j06
(126) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1978, pp.4999-5002
(127) The question of Walvis Bay, although linked to the issue of th«
territorial integrity of Namibia by UN resolution« „ * th
one and will be examined infra, p,250. ’ lfl a ^ i a l
(128) See generally, McEwan, International Boundaries of vaa+ a
1971; Drysdale, The_ Somali Dilute, >
Nationalism, 1963; Castagno, "The Somali-Kenyan C o S t ^ r a v "  2 
JMAS, 1964, p.165 and Lewis, "The Problem of the Norther^ 2
Frontier District of Kenya" 5 Race, 1963, p.48
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minority Somali population must centre on the strong desire to main­
tain the territorial integrity of the colony that was clearly mani­
fested both by the British administration and by the colony's
129emerging African rulers.
The Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya consisted in 1962
of some 102,000 sq. miles in six adminstrative areas and a population
130of 388,000, including approximately 240,000 Somalis. These people
had gradually migrated southwards over the years and displaced the
majority of the Galla tribes, themselves representatives of an earlier 
131Hamitic invasion. In the years preceding 1939 there were many dis­
putes between those of Somali origin and the non-Moslem Gallas which 
necessitated much stricter military control than was exercised in 
southern Kenya. After the Second World War, there were increasing 
signs of Somali nationalism and with the creation of the Somali republic
in July 1960, the Somalis of the NFD began demanding the right to
132secede from the Kenyan colony and join their brethren, The British 
Prime Minister, however, declared in April 1960 that "Her Majesty’s 
Government does not and will not encourage or support any claim affecting 
the territorial integrity of French Somaliland, Kenya or Ethiopia.
This is a matter which could only be considered if that were the will 12930
(129) This was mitigated to some extent by the cession of the Jubaland 
province to Italy from Kenya by the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 
1924 as a reward for Italian participation in the First World 
War in accordance with the 1912 Treaty of London, see McEwan, 
op.cit., pp,117-9, However, it is argued that the critical 
period is the period prior to independence, thus excluding 
territorial changes made decades before independence from our 
thesis.
(130) See the Report of the NFD Commission, cmnd, 1900. 1962, Appendix 
D.
(131) See Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa" 1 Journal 
of African History, 1960, p.213.
(132) Castagno, loc.cit., pp.173-6,
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of the Governments and peoples concerned."133 This clearly appeared 
to define such "governments and peoples" in terms of the whole of the 
territories involved and not parts of them.
Nevertheless, a delegation from the NFD consisting of pro­
secessionist members was invited to the Kenyan Constitutional Conference 
in London in 1962. They requested autonomous status for the area so 
that upon Kenya's independence it could join the Somali Republic.134 
A United Nations plebiscite in the area was suggested, but the idea 
was rejected. However, a commission was appointed to discover the 
views of the area's population to various constitutional proposals.135 136
This Commission reported that the majority of the population supported
136the secessionist approach. But at the same time, the Regional 
Boundaries Commission visited the area and a new system of regions was 
proposed for Kenya, which would split the NFD into three regions; the 
north-eastern region and parts of the eastern and coast regions. The 
Commission declared that they would have preferred to see a separate 
Somali district, but had been precluded from suggesting this. This
(133) 621 House of Commons Debates 55, Written Answers, cols. 104-5,
(134) Report of the Kenyan Constitutional Conference, cmnd. 1700 
p.ll. It was claimed that as well as being historically, 
ethnically and culturally distinct, the NFD had always been 
governed as a separate entity, with its own laws and courts 
and with special passes needed to enter the rest of Kenya
see The Issue of the NDF, White Paper issued by the Government 
of Somalia, 1963, pp.15-16.
(135) Castagno, loc.cit., p.176.
(136) Report of the NFD Commission, cmnd. 1900, The split was 
basically on Moslem/non-Moslem lines. The Commission consisted 
of a Nigerian lawyer and a Canadian major.
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impelled Somalia to break ofi diplomatic relations with the UK in 
137March 1963, and ultimately to pledge non-co-operation by Somali
138leaders in the NFD with Kenyan authorities. It was also dis­
closed that the British Prime Minister's statement of April 1960 had 
been interpreted by the British authorities as "precluding any cession 
of Kenyan territories so long as Her Majesty’s Government are responsible 
for Kenya."139 This approach appeared to allow for secession upon 
independence, but that, of course, depended on the attitude of the 
Kenyan leaders who were strongly opposed to any re-adjustment of its 
frontiers. In a memorandum on the Somali question submitted by the 
Kenyan delegation to the Addis Ababa summit conference of 1963 (prior 
to Kenyan independence), it was emphasised that "the principle of 
self-determination has relevance where foreign domination is the issue.
It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by
„14°dissident citizens.
This case demonstrates the supremacy of the principle of the unity 
of the colon!ally defined territories, even when faced with an accepted 
majority preference by a distinct group in a defined area for secession 
as the logical expression of self-determination. Ethnic identity was
(137) Drysdale op .cit. p,145.
(138) Ibid pp.157-8 and Castagno loc.cit. p.180,
(139) In a Somali press communique of August 29, 1963, after the
abortive Borne conference with Britain, quoted in Drysdale 
op.cit. p,133,
(140) Pan-African Unity and the NFD Question in Kenya. May 1963, 
quoted in Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited In the Era of 
Decolonisation, 1964, pp.35-6,Note also the Report of the 
Commission on the Problem of the Kenya Coastal Strip, which 
recommended integration with Kenya because inter alia it 
would provide no precedent for the disintegration of Kenya and 
would avoid the creation of boundary problems, Keesings 
Contemporary Archives, pp.19403 and 19741.
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not to disturb the integrity of the colonially established territory 
Kenya became independent on 12 December 1963 and in October 1964, it
141abolished the regions and became a unitary State.
142
(cj Bxdtigh ^ ogoland - The situation in this case revolved around 
the division of the Ewe people amongst the British administered Gold 
Coast and the British Togoland and French Togoland trust territories.14 243 
By the early 1950's, the Ewe problem had become linked with the 
proposed unification of the two Togolands. The General Assembly
unequivocally recognised this as an ethnic issue and declared that,
"the unification of the two Togolands is the manifest aspiration of the 
majority of the population of both trust territories."144 The compli­
cating factor was that British Togoland was administered together with 
the Gold Coast and this impelled the British authorities to regard an 
all-Ewe solution with some disfavour. The General Assembly sent a 
Special Mission145 to British Togoland which recommended146 the division 
of the area into four units for the purpose of a plebiscite. The UK
(141) Note that prior to the independence of Kenya and Tanganyika, 
a delegation from the Masai tribe split between the two 
territories requested the UK to remain in Masailand after 
Kenyan independence. The petitioners were also seeking the 
unification and Independence of the Masai lands, see McEwan 
op.cit. p.149.
(142) See Coleman, Togoland, International Conciliation, 1956, no.509
and Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Tv»tA,.nn«o+4 
1973, pp,151-63. . .. • : ~  — ----_>
By resolution 441 (V), the General Assembly stressed the 
importance of the problem and requested a solution by the 
administering authorities in accordance with the wishes of the 
people concerned. The All-Ewe Conference had petitioned the 
UN Trusteeship Council in 1947 over the division of the Ewe 
people, see Rigo Sureda, op.cit., p,15.
(144) Resolution 652 (VII).
(145) Resolution 860 (IX).
(146) T/1218, p,16, essentially dividing the territory into Ewe and 
non-Ewe areas.
(143)
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opposed this as failing to accord with democratic practice which had
to be manifested in terms of majority opinion throughout the country 
147
as a whole, and declared that if this were to be followed elsewhere 
the result could be "none other than the break-up of viable political 
and economic units and the frustration of true constitutional progress 
The argument was put that in view of the diversity of the people in
the territory the only fair assessment would be by plebiscites by
149 150area but this was overwhelmingly rejected.
The Assembly decided in favour of treating British Togoland as
a unit and by resolution 944 (X) called for a UN sponsored plebiscite
to ascertain the wishes of the majority of the population. The results
of the plebiscite held in May 1956 showed a majority in favour of
union with the Gold Coast, although over half the votes in the southern
part of the territory were against such a union. The result was
endorsed by the Assembly, which subsequently approved of the union of
151British Togoland with the Gold Coast. Subsequent elections held in 
July 1956 in the Gold Coast and Togoland revealed a large majority in 
favour of integration and this was clearly of importance as regards the 
correctness of the plebiscite decision. The UN Plebiscite Commissioner 
declared that "the fate of the plebiscite was bound up with the results 
of the general election" and stressed the point in his r e p o r t . T h e
(147) Ibid p.62.
(148) Ibid. See also Rigo Sureda op.cit. , p,i57.
(149) GAOR 10th Session, 4th Committee, 539th meeting, para.71 
(Venezuela) and ibid 544th meeting, para.46 (Togoland Congress).
(150) Ibid 536th meeting, para.39; ibid 537th meeting para,18; ibid 
538th meeting para.16; ibid 537th meeting paras.49 and 82 and 
ibid 540th meeting para.54,
(151) Resolution 1044 (XI). See also Yearbook of the UN, 1956, pp.368-70,
(152) GAOR 9th Session, 4th Committee, 562nd meeting, para.l,
(153) A/3173.
148
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importance of these elections was underlined by the fact that when the 
General Assembly discussed the outcome of the plebiscite, the results 
of the elections were already known. The Gold Coast and British 
Togoland became independent in 1957 as the State of Ghana.154 1567 Thus 
the concept of pre-independent territorial integrity was emphasised 
and the relevant determination made by the majority of the inhabitants
of the territory as a whole.
155
(d) British Cameroons - This trust territory was administered by the
UK in two parts, the northern part together with the northern region 
156
of Nigeria and the southern part as a separate unit. This de facto 
partition was upheld as valid by a Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission,15 
which noted that the inhabitants of the northern sector were closer to 
their northern Nigerian neighbours than to the population of the 
southern part of British Camerrons who resembled the inhabitants of the
French Cameroons.158 15960 Accordingly, separate determinations of the
159wishes of the population were recommended. The General Assembly
160accepted this and requested separate plebiscites. There was also a
(154) Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, 1966. p.14.
(155) See generally Ardener, ’’The Nature of the Reunification of 
Cameroon” , African integration and Disintegration, (ed. Haslewood) 
1967, p.285. Note that Cameroun is the correct spelling of the ’ 
independent French speaking republic of 1960-1, while the 
Cameroons applies to the pre-independent divisions of the terri­
tory, and either Cameroun or Cameroon to the unified, independent State, ibid.
(156) T/1440, para.10.
(157) Asked to visit the territory by Trusteeship Council resolution 1907 (XXII).
(158) Report of the Visiting Mission, 1958, T/1446 and Add.l, para.16.
(159) Ibid para.170. The problem had arisen because of the British 
announcement that Nigeria was to become independent on October 1 
1960, see GAOR 12th Session, 4th Committee, 803rd meeting,
(160) Resolution 1350 (XIII). However, some countries had argued, 
unsuccessfully, that the differences between north and south 
Cameroons were no greater than those existing in Nigeria,
Togoland and the Gold Coast and that therefore one plebiscite unit 
was sufficient. See GAOR 13th Session, 4th Committee, 860th meet­
ing, pars.31 and ibid 862nd meeting, paras.13-15. See also ibid 
865th meeting, para.2 and ibid 878th meeting, para.5.
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different choice to be made in each case. The north was to choose
between joining Nigeria or deciding its political future at a later 
161date, while the south was to choose between joining Nigeria or
162the independent republic of Cameroun.
The result of the plebiscite in the north revealed a majority in
163favour of postponing the decision, an outcome which was attributed
by the UN Plebiscite Commissioner to protests against inadequate local
164administration policies. In the south a large majority voted for
16 5joining the republic of Cameroun. The General Assembly decided to
hold a second plebiscite in the north, the choice being restricted to
166joining Nigeria or Cameroun and the result this time favoured join- 
167ing Nigeria.
However, taking British Cameroons as a single unit, a majority had
_ 168voted in favour of joining Cameroun and this emphasises the importance 16234*
(161) Resolution 1350 (XIII).
(162) Resolution 1352 (XIV). See also Keesings Contemporary Archives,
1 16821. The French Cameroons was proclaimed independent on
January 1, i960, ibid, p.17226.
(163) The actual votes were 70,546 favouring a later decision, 42,788
* in favour of joining Nigeria and 526 rejected votes. Voting
was by universal male suffrage, see Umozurike, Self-Determination 
in International Law, 1972, p.106 and Rigo-Sureda, op.cit., 
pp. 166-7.
(164) A/4314 and Add.l. See also GAOR, 14th Session, 4th Committee,
989th meeting, para.13.
<■1651 By 233,571 votes to 97,751, see Umozurike, op.cit,, p,106 and 
Rigo-Sureda op.cit. pp.166-7.
(166) Resolution 1473 (XIV),
MR7V BV 146 296 votes to 97,659, see Umozurike, op.cit. , p.106 and 
Rico Sureda op,cit. pp. 106-7, See also Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, pp.17179 and 17484.
Cameroun was dissatisfied with the preparations and conduct of the 
lebiscite in the northern part of British Cameroons and instituted 
nroceedings before the International Court, which, however, dis­
missed the case, ICJ Reports, 1963, p,15.
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of ascertaining the necessary "self" for the exercise of self- 
determination, as well as the importance of the questions asked in 
any plebiscite. The only valid factor differentiating the Cameroons 
from Togoland would appear to be the Visiting Mission's ethnic obser­
vations, coupled with the influence of the views of the administering 
169
power. It is also to be noted that the British Cameroons was 
administered as two separate units. But in any event, this case does 
mark an exception to the general rule.
(e) Ruanda-Urundi - In 1959, the General Assembly _ ^
authorities of this trust territory to put forward a timetable for its 
170
independence. This followed a series of disturbances between the
171rival Tutsi and Hutu tribes. Within a couple of months, a UN
172Visiting Mission had arrived in the territory. The question of 
independence for Ruanda-Urundi was discussed at the twenty-sixth 
session of the Trusteeship Council, which recommended, in view of the 
essential community of interest and the facts of history and geography,
the evolution of a single, united and composite State.169 70273 174 This approach 
was endorsed by the General Assembly, which established a UN Commission 
for Ruanda-Urundi consisting of delegates from Haiti, Togo and Iran and 
proposed the introduction of such arrangements regarding internal auto­
nomy for Ruanda and Urundi as would be agreed by the representatives of 
174the area.
(169) But see Rlgo Sureda op.cit. pp.167-8.
(170) Resolution 1413 (XIV).
(171) See generally Lemarchand, Rwanda and 1970 <3
Lemarchand and Martin, S e l ^ i i ^ r G ^ T ^  al®°
Rights Group, 1974, p . 3 ~ — . Wnority
(172) T/1551 and T/1538.
(173) T/L.985 and Add.l, and T/L.1004 and T/L.1005.
(174) Resolution 1579 (XV).
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In early 1960, there was an upheaval In Ruanda which resulted
in the establishment of a republic, but this did not affect the view
175of the General Assembly. A further resolution was adopted, which
emphasised the conviction of the Assembly that "the best future for
Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that territory to independence
176as a single, united and composite State." More disturbances
occurred in the area and in December 1961, Belgium signed Protocols
separately with Rwanda and Burundi granting them a large measure of 
177self-government. The issue was discussed in the UN Fourth
Committee and the delegates were overwhelmingly in favour of the
178creation of a single State. Belgium was severely criticised for
179fomenting distrust in the area. As recommended by the Fourth 
Committee, 175 68980 the General Assembly reaffirmed the single State idea , 181 
A five-member Commission for Ruanda Urundi was established to reconcile 
the rival factions, and the return of refugees, help in the guarantee 
of human rights in the territory and generally assist in the maintenance 
of law and order. In addition, the Commission was to convene a 
conference at Addis Ababa to find an acceptable formula for the closest
(175) See the Report of the UN Commission for Ruanda-Urtmd*
A/4706 and Add.l. '
(176) Resolution 1605 (XV).
(177) A/C.4/518.
(178) GAOR 15th Session 4th Committee, eg. 1080th meeting oar« tn
(Ghana), ibid. 1086th meeting para . 12 (Ivory Coast) and ibid 
1091st meeting paras.4 (Somalia) and 53 (Pakistan) ’
(179) Ibid 1093rd meeting para.19 (Guinea).
(180) A/4929 and Add.l.
(181) Resolution 1743 (XVI).
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possible political, economic and administrative union between the two
areas. However, the conference was not a success and the commission
was forced to admit "the regrettable fact that the territory was 
182divided." Its report referred to the "psychosis of mutual distrust 
which has prevented the two sides from taking a clearer view of their 
long term prospects." This report convinced the delegates of the UN
5 Q OFourth Committee of the need to partition the territory.
Accordingly, the Assembly adopted a resolution noting that the
efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda-Urundi had not succeeded and
taking account of the desires of Rwanda and Burundi to become separate,
independent States on July 1, 1962.182 384 185 This decision by the UN reflected
acceptance of the fact that the interests of peace and security were
paramount and that this overrode the desirability of retaining the
185pre-independence territorial structure. The wishes of the two units 
must also be accepted as an important element here, It is also to be 
presumed that the UN was concerned with the possibility of a repetition 
of events that had occurred in the neighbouring Belgian Congo and that 
this influenced the ultimate decision.
(182) A/5126 and Add.1,
(183) See GAOR, 16th Session, 4th Committee, 1305th neeHn»
“ « i m  1307th-27th meetings. Note el.o thet tte u Z l t H V * 1*
been separate kingdoms and continued this way under both r and Belgian rule. y under both Cerman
(184) Resolution 1746 (XV).
(185) Note also Assembly resolution 181 (H) on Palestine whioh 
emphasised that "the present situation ... ig likely t* 
the general welfare and friendly relations among nations "
Two other points need to be noted with regard to the p .!' */■ 
issue. Firstly, that the Mandate for Palestine incorporated116 
the Balfour Declaration with regard to the establishme^ ^ I t  
Jewish national home in Palestine and there is nothin* ^imfi* 
in any other mandate and secondly that the principle of J*r 
determination was not a legal right as of 1947-3 s eAI"
The Arab-Israel Conflict (ed. Moore), 1074, 3 voja 66 e®ne:rally,
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<f) £ablnda186 - This enclave formed part of Portuguese Angola, although
physically separated from it by the Zaire river and some forty miles of
Zaire territory. The General Assembly in resolution 1542 (XV), which
listed nine Portuguese territories deemed to fall within Chapter XI of
the UN Charter, recognised its status as an enclave and as part of 
187
Angola. In 1975, members of the Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) declared the area independent188 and attempted 
to invade it from their bases in Zaire and take control from the 
Angolan MPLA organisation. They did not succeed, although the movement 
was recognised by Gabon and the Congo Republic. 189 No State, however, 
recognised the independence of Cabinda. Indeed, one of the few 
factors on which the three rival Angolan movements (MPLA, FNLA and Units) 
did agree was the territorial integrity of Angola including Cabinda. 190 
Cabinda was the only instance of a former Portuguese territory where 
the threat of a break-up of the colonially defined unit was acute. 191
(186) See "Notes sur Cabinda, Partie Intégrante de l'Angola" an 
anonymous text sent by anti-separatist Cabindese to African 
States and published in 121 Revue Française d’Etudes Politiaues Africaines, 1976, pp.58-69.
(187) Article 1 (e) of the resolution referred to "Angolathe enclave of Cabinda". g°la, including
(188) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1975, p.3706.
(189) Ibid. The Congolese Foreign,wll|5Ui,00 *w*v*B» .»xiuaier declared that "Cabinda 
exists as a reality and is historically and geographically dif­
ferent from Angola." Ibid, But cf, "Notes sur Cabinda" op,eit, 
Zaire called for a referendum in the enclave, Africa May 1975, p,3632.
pp.59-63.
Research Bulletin
(190) See the terms of the Mombasa agreement of January 1975
Legum and Hodges. After Angola, 1976. p.67. ' ln
(191) The UN adopted a number of resolutions caliimr for x
and self-determination of such territories as w ind©pendence
their territorial integrity, see eg. r e s o l ^ t i o n s ^ ^ ™ ? * * 1*"11*8 
(XVII), 1819 (XVII), 1913 (XVIII), 2107 (XX) 2184 ' 1807
( x x m )  and 2918 (XXVII), By resolution 3294 ¿ S i x t  ' ■ ■ ■
welcomed Portugal's acceptance of self-determinati Assembly
the need for preserving the territorial inteerit,, 0 n .tod stressed 
unity of the territories. ■ national
212.
Despite the MPLA victory in the Angolan civil war,192 1934Unrest continued 
in Cabinda. 192
<e> Equatorial. Guinea - This territory was created by Spain in 1963
by merging the island of Fernando Po with mainland Rio Muni. The
General Assembly noted the merger ** in 1965 and the following year
requested Spain to ensure that "the territory accedes to independence
as a single political and territorial unit and that no step is taken
which would jeopardise the territorial integrity of Equatorial Guinea.**195 196
The territory became independent in 1968 despite the fact that in a
referendum in August of that year a majority in Fernando Po voted
196against independence. Accordingly, the integrity of the colonial 
unit as it existed just before independence was maintained at the express 
request of the United Nations.
(h> Comoros - The attitude of the international community in general 
and of African States in particular to the independence of the four 
Comoro islands ruled until 1975 by France clearly reveals the acceptance 
of the territory as a whole as the relevant unit for self-determination 
The General Assembly in January 1974 reaffirmed the right of the people
(192) See infra, Chapter 7, p.515.
(193) See Africa Research Bulletin, October 1977, p.4601 (regarding 
also a split in the separatist forces) and ibid. April 1978, 
p.4820. The separatist argument included not only geographic 
and ethnic factors, but also a claim based on the treaty of 
Simulambuco, 1895, between Portugal and the Cabinda princes, 
ibid.
(194) Resolution 2067 (XX).
(195) Resolutions 2230 (XXI) and 2355 (XXII), See Africa Research
Bulletin, December 1966, p.686.
(196) See Bigo Sureda, The Eyplutlgn__gf__the Right of Self-Determination. 
1973, p.200.
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of the archipelago to self-determination In accordance with resolution
1514 (XV) and stressed the unity and territorial Integrity of the 
197
territory. In December 1974 a referendum held by the French autho­
rities on the islands revealed a 95 per cent vote for independence, but
on Mayotte island a majority voted against independence and for eonti-
198nued ties with France. The consequence of this result was that the 
French Parliament passed a bill in June the following year which pro­
vided for Mayotte to remain linked with France after the independence 
199of the Comoros. This disturbed the representatives of the three 
other islands and on July 6 , the Comoros parliament unilaterally declared 
independence notwithstanding the absence of the Mayotte deputies. 200 in 
response to a plea for help from the latter, France, while recognising 
the independence of the Comoros, reserved its position regarding Mayotte. 201
Within a short time, eleven African States had recognised the independence
202of the four islands of the Comoros, including Mayotte. The African
group at the United Nations issued a statement supporting the Comoros'
membership of the organisation and calling on France to refrain from any
action likely to compromise the independence and territorial integrity 
203of the new State. The French, however, claimed that the principle of
(197) Resolution 3161 (XXVIII)* See siso UNMC J&nuAfy 1974f
(198) Africa Research Bulletin, December 1974, p.3466*
(199) Ibid, June 1975, p.3666.
(200) Ibid, July 1975, p.3707.
(201) Ibid, p.3708.
(202) Ibid.
(203) Ibid, October 1975, p.3802.
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self-determination was superior to the need to respect the territorial
integrity of the colonial territory, but this implied a version of the
"self" of self-determination not consistent with international practice. 204 2056
According to a bill later adopted by the French Council of Ministers in
May 1975, Mayotte was to become the 102nd French department, but in
December the National Assembly adopted a bill, later confirmed by the
Senate, declaring Mayotte to be a "territorial collectivity" in the 
206French Republic. This was attacked by the Organisation of African 
Unity, which reaffirmed the view that Mayotte was part of the Comoros. 207 
In resolution 31/4, the Assembly, by 102 votes to 1 (France), with 28 
abstentions, condemned the French referenda and declared them void.
The French occupation of Mayotte was a flagrant encroachment on the 
national unity of the Comoros and a violation of resolution 1514 (XV) . 208 
In resolution 32/7, the General Assembly called on the Comoros and 
France to settle the problem of Mayotte, respecting the political unity 
and territorial integrity of the Comoros, while the OAU Summit Conference 
of July 1978 at Khartoum condemned France's illegitimate occupation of 
Mayotte, which constituted a threat to the national unity and territorial
/oo4) See UNMC March 1976, p,6. The Comoros joined the UN on
November 12, 1975, see Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, 
p 3833. See also resolutions 3291 (XXIX) and 3385 (XXX), 
reaffirming the need to respect the unity and territorial inte­
grity of the new State, composed of the four islands including 
Mayotte.
(205) Africa Research Bulletin May 1976, P.4019.
(206) Ibid, December 1976, pp.4252-3.
, _ T M d  At the OAU Summit Conference in July 1976, a resolution
(207) lDI°* ._d -electing all French laws intended to legalise the French presence on Mayotte, ibid, July 1976, p.4080. See also ibid, September 1977, p.4554.
aonSv a Security Council resolution calling on France not to jeopar-
(208) A Se independence, unity and territorial integrity of the
» „  vetoed by France, see S/11967 and UNMC March 1976, 
“ 5 see also Assembly resolution 21/34.
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integrity ol the Comoros as well as an act of aggression. 209 Thus, 
following the Equatorial Guinea example, the claims of a territorially 
distinct part of the colonial unit were denied by the International 
community in the interests of the territory as a whole. 210 21
(i) Eritrea, 1941-1952 - The history of the colony of Eritrea from
the defeat of the Italian occupation forces in 1941 until its eventual 
incorporation within the Ethiopian empire in 1952 affords an interest­
ing example of the way in which the decolonisation of the territory 
failed to lead to independence, while the integrity of the territory 
was maintained. The case emphasised the relevance of a series of 
factors ranging from the wishes of the population to the requirements 
of peace and security and the nature of the claims of other States.
It is particularly instructive in that the decision was left in the 
hands of the UN,
Prior to the Italian conquest of Eritrea in the late nineteenth 
century, the territory had existed on the fringes of the Ethiopian 
empire, but not as any kind of distinct entity either in fact or in 
name , 212 The people in the colony were divided by race and religion. 
Eritrea was captured by British forces in 1941 and there were basically 
two interlinked objections to an ultimate grant of independence to the 
territory as a unit. The first was the claim maintained by neighbouring
(209) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1978, p.4914.
(210) See also the cases of Aden, Anguilla and the British Indian 
O c e a n  Territory, Rigo Sureda, op.cit. pp.199—202,
(211) See generally Trevaskis, Eritrea, A Colony in Transition: 1941-52 
I960- »°"^r«on. The Making of the. Modern_3udan, 1953; Longrigg,
a QhJU* History of Eritrea, 1945; Cumming, "The Disposal of 
Ern'rea'^T^Uddle East "journal, 1953, p.1 8, and Abuetan, "Eritrea; 
United Nations Problem and Solution", 2 Middle Eastern Affairs, 
1951, p.35.
(212) Trevaskis, op.cit., p.d.
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Ethiopia founded upon historical, ethnic and economic grounds and the 
second was the attitude adopted by the Eritrean Christians. The popu­
lation of the territory of just over one million was virtually equally
213divided between Christians and Moslems, with the former wishing to
214maintain ties with Ethiopia and the latter objecting to annexation 
by Ethiopia. This rivalry resulted in intermittent violence in the 
1940's. Ethiopia's claims were partly historical, although its 
sovereignty over the area prior to the Italian conquest had been 
tenuous, and partly ethnic and cultural in relation to the Eritrean 
Christians. There were also economic and strategic factors operating.
Impelled by these claims and by the communal friction, British
opinion in the 1940’s tended to support partition with the Moslem tribes
of the west being incorporated with Sudan and the Christians being
215merged into Ethiopia. Such a solution was also proposed at meetings
216of the Big Four between 1945 and 1947. In February 1947, the UK, 
France, USA and USSR agreed on an Italian Peace Treaty, which provided 
inter alia that the future of the former Italian possessions in Africa 
(Libya, Somalia and Eritrea) was to be decided by the Big Four in 
accordance with the wishes and welfare of the local populations and in 
the interests of peace and security. The opinions of other interested 
States were also to be taken into account. However, if the Big Four 213456
(213) The Christians were concentrated around Asmara on the plateau 
bordering Ethiopia and the Moslems on the coastal strip and 
in the western province, ibid, pp.132-3.
(214) Primarily through the medium of the Coptic Church, encouraged 
by Ethiopia, ibid, pp.59-60.
(215) See Henderson op.cit,, p.335 and Longrigg op.cit., p.174-5,
(216) Trevaskis op.cit., p.84.
217.
were unable to reach a decision within a year of the treaty entering 
into force, the problem was to be sent to the General Assembly for a 
recommendation, which the powers agreed to accept and implement.
Thus the Assembly was to be given the power to make a binding decision
217by virtue of the express agreement of the parties. The four powers 
sent a Commission of Enquiry to Eritrea, which confirmed that while 
the Christians were in favour of immediate union with Ethiopia, the 
Moslems favoured eventual independence after a period as a UN trust 
territory. 217 18 219 Both parties appeared to reject partition. In the 
event, the four powers failed to agree and the matter was referred to 
the General Assembly in September 1948.
In the First Committee, the UK proposed a partition of the
territory between Ethiopia and Sudan, and this was arran**.* 220 21»i-tepteo. However,
following anti-Italian riots in Tripolitania, the General Assembly
rejected the draft resolution dealing with the disposal of Italy's
221former possessions, and the issue was postponed until the following 
222session. During that session, a commission was established to 
ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. The Commission (comprising
(217) See Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions, 
1969, pp. 141-2.
(218) Report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, vol. 1, 
Eritrea, pp.88-9.
(219) Ibid, p.96,
„ „ „ ,a,q See GAOR 3rd Session, 1st Committee, annexes,(220) In May,
A/C,1/466.
_ 14 to 37 against, with 7 abstentions, even though the part
(221) By A Eritrea had in fact been approved by 37 votes to 
dealing ^  abstentions, see Trevaskis op.cit., p.93. See also 
i ; ' *  MThe Italian Colonies at the General Assembly” 3 
Internationa Organisation, 1949, p.469.
(222) Resolution 287 (IH)»
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representatives of Norway, Guatemala, South Africa, Pakistan and
Burma) was to take account of "(a) the wishes and welfare of
the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial,
religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and
the capacity of the people for self-government; (b) the interests of
peace and security in East Africa; (c) the rights and claims of
Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons,
including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access 
223to the sea."
This enquiry was less thorough than that of the four powers and 
two separate reports and three sets of proposals emerged. The Norwegian 
representative called for the territory's union with Ethiopia, except 
for the western province, which was to continue under British administra­
tion and be allowed to choose at a later date between union with 
Ethiopia or Sudan. The South African and Burmese representatives sug­
gested that Eritrea should become a self-governing unit federated with 
Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown, while the 
Pa istani and Guatemalan representatives called for a ten year trustee 
ship followed by independence. Both reports and all the representatives
apart from the Norwegian, emphasised the necessity of maintaining the
224unity of the territory. The General Assembly also took this line and 
on 2 December 1950 recommended that Eritrea was to become an "autonomous 
unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian 234
(223) Resolution 289 C (IV).
(224) Report of the VN Commission for Eritrea GAnn e
Soppl.no. 8, A/1285. I» it, subsequent comments T .  S ’
supported the partition of the territory between PfiîÎ Sudan, ibid. y Between Ethiopia and
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crown". The territory was to have its own legislative, executive
and judicial powers in domestic affairs, while the federal government
was to have control over defence, foreign affairs, finance and
interstate and international commerce and communications. An Imperial
Federal Council with equal representation was to be set up and a
single nationality established throughout the federation. 25 26 2789 This
solution was deemed by the UN Commissioner to constitute a middle of
the road answer to the conflicting aspirations of the inhabitants of 
227the territory. In reaching its decision, the UN General Assembly
considered the three points specified in resolution 289 C (IV) and
called for the fullest respect for the institutions and traditions of
228the Eritrean territory.
The importance of the choice of the unit for self-determination
is underlined in this case, since a separate consideration of the
Christian and Moslem areas would have led to the partitioning of the
territory. Both parties called for the unity of the territory and this
was a factor of some significance, no matter what the ultimate inten-
229tions of the parties were. In the event, the UN, given a determinative 
role by the Big Four Powers, decided to maintain the territorial integrity 
of the unit, partly because of the views of the parties involved and
225
(225) Resolution 390 A (V).
(226) Final Report of the UN Commissioner for Eritrea, aDDoint«d
draft the constitution, A/2188. PP 4 to
(227) A/1959.
(228) Resolution 390 (V).
(229) See A/2188, para.44.
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partly alp«, th. territory »as admialatered aa ouu unit. The ultimate 
solution ol a self-governing iederatlon »1th Ethiopia »as deemed to 
comprise sufficient safeguards for the preservation of the Moslem 
traditions of half the Inhabitants, It is also possible that the
Assembly »as influenoed by Its experiences over Libya, where proposals
230to divide the territory had been rejected,
<J) "** F!,ench Terrltorr the Afars and Issss2 31 . Thls territory
Of some 23,000 s„. kilometres ha. a population of around 200,000 roughly
232equally split between Afars and Issas. The territory was at one
time coveted both by Somalia on the grounds of the reunification of
the Somali people and by Ethiopia for historic, economic and ethnic
reasons. 230 133 234 France transmitted information on the territory to the UN
in accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter from 1946 until 1957. As
fro m  that year, France declared French Somaliland had become a self-
234
governing territory. In 1967, the French authorities held a referen­
dum to ascertain the views of the inhabitants as regards the future of 
the territory and a substantial majority voted in favour of continued 
French rule. However, there were objections that this had been achieved 
by d e p o r t i n g  large numbers of sympathisers with the Somali cause and
(230) See Yearbook of the UN, 1948-9, p,257,
(231) Formerly known as French Somaliland. The change in terminology 
was made in a law of 3 July 1967 and recognised by the UN on
15 April 1968, see Yearbook of the UN, 1970, pp,717-8,
(232) See Africa Research Bulletin June 1974, p.3272. An OAU fact­
finding mission estimated the population of the territory in 
1976 at 220,000, 120-150,000 inside the barbed-wire enclosed
area around the port of Djibouti and the rest nomads, The 
number of French troops was put at 6,000, ibid, May 1976, 
p.4031» The Afars are related to the Ethiopians, while the Issas are akin to the Somalis.
(233) Djibouti handled some 75% of Ethiopia's foreign trade, ibid
(234) GA0R 14th Session, annexes, agenda item 36, p.2,
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imprisoning thousands of others, as well as by altering electoral 
235
constituencies. The French view was that the population had 
expressed its wishes to remain French and that this was to be respected, 236
Neither Somalia nor Ethiopia.has openly called for the annexation
of the territory. They declared instead that France had to respect the
principle of self-determination and proclaim the territory independent. 235 637 2389
In 1966, the General Assembly affirmed the right of the people of
the territory to self-determination and independence in accordance
238with resolution 1514 (XV). Somalia proposed that France should 
grant immediate independence to the territory and that the UN should 
administer it for two years to enable the deportees to return and to per­
mit the inhabitants to decide for themselves whether they favoured an
OOQindependent status or some other solution to the problem The UN 
limited itself to a declaration of the right of the people to self- 
determination and independence. In resolution 2356 (XXII), the Assembly 
called on France to create the necessary political conditions for 
accelerating the implementation of the right, including the return of 
all refugees. Ethiopia's position seemed to be at one stage an acceptance 
of the status quo, but if the French were to leave its claim to the
(235) Lewis, "The Referendum in French Somaliland; Aftermath and 
Prospects in the Somali Dispute", The World Today, July 1967, p.308
(236) See eg. the statements of the French Minister of State for 
Overseas Territories and Departments, Africa Research Bulletin 
February 1972, p.2385 and by the French President, ibid,
November 1974, p.3437.
(237) A/6300/Rev.l, pp.637-42 and 647.
(238) Resolution 2228 (XXI).
(239) A/AC.109/121, paras.37-40. Somalia appeared to be hoping for 
a merger of the territory with the Somali republic.
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territory might be revived. In August 1975, however, the Ethiopian 
Head of State appeared to renounce Ethiopia’s historic claim to the 
territory in favour of allowing a free choice to the population.240 41 
Somalia at the same time demanded the unconditional independence of 
the territory and the return of all expellees.242 in January 1976, 
the General Assembly adopted resolution 3480 (XXX) calling on all States 
to refrain from any action that might alter the independence and terri­
torial integrity of the territory, which should be granted immediate 
independence, and urged all States to renounce claims to the territory.243 
Round-table discussions on the territory opened in Paris in February 1977 
and the following month a conference was held in Accra by the OAU.244 2456
A referendum took place in May of that year and 77.2 per cent of the
245votes were cast for independence and at midnight of the June 26-27,
the territory became independent. Military and other agreements were
signed with France and the new State of Djibouti was welcomed inter alia
246by Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan.
240
(240) Africa Research Bulletin January 1973, p.2726. See also 
Yearbook of the UN, 1966, pp.58 et.seq. and A/6300/Rev.1.
(241) Africa Research Bulletin August 1975, p.3720. Ethiopia had 
been backing the Djibouti Liberation Movement (MLD), while 
Somalia was supporting the Somali Coast Liberation Front 
(FLCS), ibid.
(242) These views were reaffirmed before a UN Special Mission on 
Djibouti that held talks with Somali officials in Mogodishu, 
ibid, April 1976, pp.4000-1,
(243) In a French-Somali communique in January 1977, the Somalis 
agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity 
of the territory, ibid, January 1977, p.4294,
(244) Ibid, March 1977, pp.4367-8.
(245) Ibid, May 1977, pp.4436-7.
(246) Ibid, June 1977, pp.4458-60.
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(Is) Mauritania - The issue of Mauritania was officially taken up by
the Moroccan government in early 1958 and the territory claimed as part 
247
of Morocco. The problem came before the General Assembly at its 
fifteenth session following a request from Morocco. This request was 
accompanied by a memorandum in which it was argued that the territory 
of Mauritania had always formed part of Morocco and that the dismember-
248ment of the latter's territory could not be accepted. The General
Committee recommended that the item be included on the agenda of the
249 250General Assembly, and this was accepted by the Assembly, which
251allocated it to the First Committee.
Morocco declared that prior to the French occupation, Mauritania 
had never constituted a distinct entity while "the frontiers of 
Morocco had at all times been the Mediterranean to the north, the
252Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Senegal river to the south." In 
other words, until the French takeover the territory of Mauritania had 
been an integral part of Morocco. It was argued that until 1912, the 
currency of Mauritania was Moroccan and that the Moroccan central
253authority was responsible for public order and national defence. Tl 247895013
(247) Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauritania" 
15 Western Political Quarterly, 1962, p.641. See also 
Gallagher, Morocco and Its Neighbours, Part III Morocco and 
Mauritania, 1967.
(248) GAOR 15th Session, 1st Committee, 1109th meeting cara 3
A/4445 and Add.l. p
(249) Ibid, General Committee, 128th meeting, para.16.
(250) Ibid, Plenary, 898th meeting, para.134.
(251) Ibid, 904th meeting, para.96.
(252) Ibid, 1st Committee, 1109th meeting, paras. 1, 3 and 4.
(253) Ibid, para.6 . Morocco noted that the "attributes of sovereignty 
were exercised in accordance with the conditions of the time 
but the whole population had recognised the authority of the* 
Sultan of Morocco unreservedly until 1912", Ibid.
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Moroccan government emphasised that France had pledged in the General
Act of the Algeciras Conference, 1906, to respect the sovereignty of
the Sultan and the integrity of his domains, but that this promise
had been broken by the occupation of increasingly large areas in the 
254
region by France. In addition, a French decree of 1904 was null
and void since it wrongly defined what was termed the "civil territory
of Mauritania" in the light of the actual occupation by France of under
255ten per cent of the area. French actions were also inconsistent
with an exchange of notes between France and Germany in November 1911,
wherein both parties argued that Morocco comprised all of North Africa
between Algeria, French West Africa and the Spanish territory of Rio
de Oro. It was not until 1920 that Mauritania was declared a colony
256and partly merged with French West Africa. This led Morocco to the 
view that Mauritania had formed part of Morocco at least until 1906 and
that France since its assumption of a protectorate over Morocco in 1912
257had broken its obligations to respect Moroccan territorial rights.
Morocco received some support from the 1958 Tangier Conference 
for the Unity of the Arab Maghreb, where the three North African dele­
gations acknowledged Moroccan interest in Mauritania within the framework
258of Morocco^ "historic and ethnic unity", while at Conakry in 1960 254678
(254) Ibid, para.7.
(255) Ibid. See also 97 BFSP, 1903-4, p.967.
(256) Ibid, para.8, See also 104 BFSP, 19H ,  pp .953 955>
(257) It was stated that France was seeking to "shatter a geo
graphic, political, ethnic, linguistic and religious entitv"ibid, para.16. y
(258) Ibid. See also Ashford, loe.cit., p.647.
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representatives of African and Asian peopies condemned the existence of
259
Mauritania. However, Morocco lost support on this issue and it
resulted in Morocco's absence from the important Addis Ababa Conference 
260in 1963.
France denied that Mauritania had constituted a single entity with
Morocco and emphasised that "no Moroccan suzerainty or authority had
261existed either in fact or in law." Any suggestion of historical 
rights by Morocco was totally devoid of substance, 259 60162 while ethnic, 
linguistic and religious claims were unconvincing. 263 2645 The Sultan's 
authority over Mauritania until the French occupation was of a "frag- 
mentary, uncertain and intermittent nature" only, while arguments regard­
ing international agreements were incorrect and ignored treaties signed
by Morocco, after it had become a protectorate, which showed that
265Mauritania was not part of its territory. It was also noted that in
the referendum of September 1958, 94 per cent of the electorate in
Mauritania had voted in favour of the French Community and thus 
A .. 266impliedly against Morocco.
The Moroccan argument centred on the significance of pre-colonial 
historical and religious ties and their continuing validity in terms 
of the definition of the subject of self-determination. It also involved 
minimising the relevance of the colonial territorial unit in the
(259) Ibid.
(260) See also Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa.
1966, pp.27 and 34.
(261) GAOR 15th Session, 1st Committee, 1109th meeting, para.21-3.
(262) Ibid, para.23.
(263) Ibid, para.24.
(264) Ibid, para.25.
(265) Ibid.
(266) Ibid,
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decolonisation process. The Moroccan view was criticised by many 
States, particularly African ones, both in the First Committee and 
later in the Security Council. Senegal declared that "the independence 
of the African countries had rightly been established on the basis of 
the existing frontiers; if old political entities had to be recon­
stituted, independence would not have been achieved in the conditions
267of peace and harmony." The right of self-determination was the
relevant principle and it was for the people of Mauritania to decide alone, 267 68 26970
Gabon referred to the "foolish course of revising frontiers" and emphasised
269the wisdom of retaining the status quo, while Niger declared that the
270frontiers of Africa should be left undisturbed. Ultimately no vote 
was taken in the First Committee.
Upon achieving independence in November 1960, Mauritania applied 
for United Nations membership. Its case received majority support, with 
only the USSR supporting Morocco’s claims in the Security Council.
Following the Soviet Union's veto in the Council, the issue came before 
the General Assembly and resolution 1602 (XV) was adopted. This noted 
that no recommendation had been made regarding membership because of the 
opposition of a permanent member and declared that "in its view the Islamic
(267) Ibid, llllth meeting, para.2. See also Thiam, La Politique 
Etrangère des Etats Africains, 1963, pp.101-2.
(268) GAOR 15th Session, 1st Committee, llllth meeting, para.3.
(269) Ibid, para.17.
(270) Ibid, 1113rd meeting, para.22. See also Central African 
Republic, ibid, para.12; Upper Volta, ibid, 1114th meeting, 
para.2 and Nigeria ibid, plenary, 893rd meeting, para,196.
Note also Senegal, SC0R, 16th Year, 971st meeting, para.163 
and Ivory Coast, ibid, para.183.
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Republic ot Mauritania la a peace-loving State vlthln the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Charter, that It 1. able and , 1m » ,  to carry out the 
obligation, of the Charter and that It ehould In consequence he admitted 
to membership in the United Nations. " 271
This case clearly demonstrated the supremacy of the territorial 
model of self-determination in the face of closely argued historical, 
cultural and religious affiliations with a neighbouring State. Ultimately, 
In June 1970, Morocco and Mauritania signed a treaty of co-operation and 
both agreed to respect each other*s territorial integrity. 272 273
273(1) S p a n ^ h J ^ a r a  - The question of Spanish Sahara first came before 
the UN at the end of 1963, while in 1963, the Special Committee on 
Decolonisation called on Spain to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and 
liberate Spanish Sahara (and the enclave of Ifni) from colonial rule. 274 
This was reaffirmed in Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), while in resolution 
2229 (XXI), Spain was called on to determine at the earliest possible 
date the procedures for holding a referendum under UN auspices to enable 
the indigenous population to exercise freely its right to self-determination.
(271) Mauritania was in fact admitted to the UN at the following 
session.
(272) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1970, p,1776.
(273) See generally, Rezette, The Western Sahara and the Frontiers of 
Morocco, 1975; Gretton, Western Sahara: The Fight for Self- *” 
Determination, 1976, and Mercer, "Confrontation in the Western 
Sahara" The World Today, June 1976, p.230.
(274) GAOR 19th Session, annexes no.8 , pt.l,, Chapter XI para.112. 
Spain maintained for a number of years that its African terri­
tories were Spanish provinces, but in November 1960 agreed to 
transmit information regarding them to the UN Secretary- 
General under Chapter XI of the Charter, GAOR 15th Session,
4th Committee, 1048th meeting. This was noted with satisfaction 
in Assembly resolution 1542 (XV).
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This call was repeated annually (save for 1971) until 1974.275
276Moroccan claims to the territory were pursued consistently 
since independence in 19S6. In 1958, King Mohammed V declared that
277Morocco would do everything possible to recover the Sahara.
Moroccan claims were based on a number of factors. Historically, the
continuity of the authority of the sovereigns of the dynasties which
278bad ruled over Morocco was noted. Morocco talked in terms of "a
permanent and peaceful Moroccan presence, an immemorial possession"
279extending over more than three centuries, which was based on two
280elements, internal display of Moroccan authority and "certain inter­
national acts said to constitute recognition by other States of its
281sovereignty over the whole or part of the territory." The religious
ties binding Western Sahara to Morocco, which Morocco contended also
demonstrated political allegiance, were evidenced by documents dealing
with the appointment of caids (or sheikhs), the allegiance of such
caids renewed upon the accession of every Sultan and the imposition of
282Koranic taxes and levies. To these could be added what were termed
(275) See, for example, 
(XXIV), 2711 (XXV)
resolution 2354 (XXII), 2428 (XXIII),
, 2983 (XXVII), 3162 (XXVIII) and 32922591 (XXIX).
(276) The Sahara has an area of some 266,000 sq. kilometres, with a 
population of about 95,000 according to a Spanish Census of
1974, see Report of the UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara,
1975, A/10023/Add.5, annex, pp.26-7. See also Gretton, op.cit., 
pp.9-14.
(277) A/10023/Add.5, annex, paras.89-90 and 93-100
(278) Ibid, para.91.
(279) Western Sahara case, Pleadings, CR,7 5/q n *>« *CR.75/12, p.2, «.75/9, p,26, See also Pleadings
(280) Ibid, pp.29-31 and ICJ Reports, 1975, pp,12 45
( 281 ) Ib id . See a ls o  P leadin gs C R .7 5 /1 2 ,  p p .6 - 2 9 .
(2S2) A/10023/Add.5, annex, para.91,
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"military decisions" or the dispatch of armed forces to drive out
foreigners landing on the Sahara coasts and the sending of arms
to various groups resisting foreign penetration, in particular
283Ma ul-'Aineen in the south. Morocco thus claimed sovereignty
over Western Sahara by virtue of immemorial possession founded
upon "the public display of sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncon-
284tested for centuries" as "evidenced by the general acquiescence
of the international community which it was accorded for several 
285hundred years." This will to act as sovereign could additionally 
be determined, it was suggested, by the series of travels under­
taken by Sultans in the territory, the commercial policy of the 
Sultans aimed at evicting foreign companies from the coasts and the 
diplomatic protests addressed to the representatives of the European 
powers against attempts to occupy territory in Western Sahara. 283 4586 287
Morocco laid great emphasis upon the geographical, historical,
287ethnological and cultural ties linking it with the territory,
"because international law attaches decisive importance to these 
288factors." These arguments had also to be understood in the light 
of the special nature of the Moroccan State at the time of the colon­
isation of the Sahara, based upon personal allegiance and the religious
(283) Pleadings, CR.75/12, pp.36-7.
(284) Ibid, p.29.
(285) Ibid, pp.34-5. It was also claimed that Sheikh Ma ul-’Aineen
who in the 1890's controlled Sakiet-El Hanra and neighbouring 
areas, was an agent of the Sultan, Pleadings CR.75/11, pp.58-68.
(287) See also Pleadings, CR.75/9, pp.5-12 and 26-54.
(288) Pleadings CR.75/12, p.31. See also as regards the importance 
of contiguity, ibid, p.32.
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significance of the Sultan. Accordingly, the territorial sovereignty 
of the Sultan extended as far as his religious authority reached. 289 
Morocco also asserted that it was not possible for international law 
to condone the dismemberment of an independent State by colonial powers 
in the nineteenth century and thus the territorial integrity of Western 
Sahara was not a necessary prerequisite of self-determination. 290 291 The 
principle of the intangibility of frontiers in Africa could not affect
2Q1changes made before independence.
Mauritania was in a different position to Morocco since it clearly
had not existed as a State during the time of colonisation of Western
Sahara and therefore it had to base its claim on something other than
a modified form of recognised European State requirements for the
acquisition of title to territory. Its claims to Western Sahara were
based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic and economic ties , 292 293 and the
293need to -reunify" its people. This involved the description of "the
Mauritanian entity" as a distinct unit , 294 295with a unified Saharan law
dealing inter alia with the use of water holes, grazing areas and
agricultural lands, rules relating to war and methods for the peaceful
295settlement of disputes. All the people, organised separately in 
tribes, confederations of tribes and emirates, jointly exercised
(289) At the time, Morocco was divided into the Bled Makhzen, the
area fully under the control of the Sultan, and the Bled Siba 
the area where the inhabitants possessed a great deal of power 
but nevertheless acknowledged the spiritual authority of the ’ 
Sultan, see Pleadings, CR.75/11, p .6 and ICJ Reports, 1975 
pp.12, 44-5. '
(290) Pleadings, CR.75/8, pp.3-4.
(291) Pleadings, CR.75/13, pp.47-9,
(292) A/10023/Add.5, annex, paras.378-9.
(293) Pleadings, CR.75/12, p.38.
(294) Pleadings, CR.75/17, p.24,
(295) Ibid, p.29.
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sovereignty over the "Mauritanian ent-it»" 296 297 u.,. ...M i a n  entity , and the Western Saharans
297were included in this.
Both these claims .ere bssed therefore or the proposltiou that 
ethnic, historical and other ties pre-datiog colonisation could 
operate to override the vishes of the people .ithin the colonlally 
established territorial framework, in other words, that the ■•self- 
in question was not necessarily territorially defined but could be 
determined in the light of ethnic, historical and other factors.
Morocco, for example, noted that the problem of decolonisation in this 
case was identical to the return of "territories and populations torn 
away by colonial usurpation" to the Moroccan State. 298 To put it 
another way, "the decolonisation of Western Sahara implied ipso facto 
its reintegration into the Moroccan State. " 299
The discussions that took place prior to the adoption of resolution 
3292 (XXIX), containing the reference to the International Court, 
revealed considerable emphasis upon the right to self-determination with 
regard to Western Sahara. Spain had agreed in 1966 to the application 
of the principle of self-determination while pointing out some of the
(296) Ibid, p,41.
(297) Both Spain and Algeria disagreed with the Moroccan and Mauri*» <
contentions, see eg. Pleadings CR.75/22, pp i2 ~25 4A f  an
Pleadings, CR.75/23, pp.2-33 and 44; Pleadings CR 75^ 4 ' «
sud Pleadings CR.75/31, p .m .  See also Supra I p 7 ' P P '9-43'
(298) A/10023/Add.5, annex, para,298.
(299) Ibid. The Moroccan king declared that he would accent the 11 
of the Saharan population only if it •»»» *a~ * , ,.  ^ 0 will
choice between continued Spanish rule or 1« 6 w ^ a referenduiB 
ibid, Appendix II, para.24. Mauritania noted that "bv 
Mauritania the people of that area wouin oou« re<J°inlfig
and independence", A/10023/Add.5, annex, para^S?!61* ' ^ * 6™ 111**101*
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difficulties involved because of the nature of the territory and its
people. But it was from 1973 that a new approach in Spanish policy
took place. Spain gave an assurance to the Yema’a, or general assembly
of the people of the territory, that the population of Sahara would
freely determine its future and it guaranteed the territorial integrity 
301of the territory. In July 1974, Spain announced a new political
302statute for Sahara“-  and In August declared that It would hold a
referendum under UN auspices during the first half of 1975.* 301203 3045 n , l8
precipitated vigorous political activity m  the area and Morocco
suggested to S p a m  that the International Court should arbitrate the 
304 305matter but Spain refused. At about this time the Idea arose of 
seeking an advisory opinion from the court on aspects of the status of 
Sahara at the date of Spanish colonisation. It seema that Morocco's 
intention was that a statement from the court accepting the existence 
of ties between the territory and the Moroccan State would support its 
claims upon the decolonisation of Western Sahara. 1» the discussion 
in the Fourth Committee, a large number of countries underlined the 
Importance of the principle of self-determination in the light of the 
terms of resolution 3292 (XXIX). These Included the Ivory Coast , 306 
Cameroon and Syria, 307 Cuba, Grenada, Equatorial Guinea. Colombia, Costa
<300) A/6300/Rev. 1.
(301) A/9176, annex. IV.
(302) A/9655. See also A/10023/Add,5, annex, paras,84, 143-50
(303) A/9714,
(304) A/9771, annex.
(305) Mauritania did not at this stag, associate itself with the 
Moroccan initiative, A/9715, annex.
(306) A/C.4/SR.2131.
(307) A/C.4/SR.2130.
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Rica, Malaysia, Venezuela, Portugal, Libya and Ecuador308 and Algeria.309 3102*
Such discussions clearly demonstrated the central role to be played
in the decolonisation of Spanish Sahara by the principle of self-
310determination. As noted above, the court emphasised the principle
of self-determination as the basic assumption of the questions put to 
311it and concluded that it had found no legal ties of such a nature 
as to affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonisa­
tion of Western Sahara and in particular the principle of self- 
312determination. Self-determination was defined as "the need to pay
313regard to the freely expressed will of peoples" and in terms of
"the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the 
314territory." The UN Visiting Mission to the territory, reporting 
within a few days of the court’s opinion, stated that "there was an 
overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the territory in favour of 
independence and opposing integration with any neighbouring country"315 
and concluded "after visiting the territory that the majority of the 
population within the Spanish Sahara was manifestly in favour of
(308) A/C.4/SR.2131.
(309) A/C.4/SR.2125. The proposed resolution was adopted by the 
Fourth Committee by 81 votes to 0, with 43 abstentions and 
resolution 3292 (XXIX) was adopted by the General Assembly by 
87 votes to 0, with 43 abstentions.
(310) Supra, p.174,
(311) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 36.
(312) Ibid, p .68.
(313) Ibid., p .33. See also Judge Nagendra Singh, ibid., p.81 and 
Judge Dillard ibid., pp.120-1.
(3141 Ibid. p.68. As regards the relationship between the Moroccan
1 and Mauritanian claims themselves, see A/10023/Add,5, annex,
paras.14, 15» 66-7, and 381. See also ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 
65 and 67 and Judge De Castro, ibid, p.131,
(315) A/10023/Add.l, annex, para.202. See also ibid., paras.201-64.
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independence." The sanctity of the colonially defined territorial 
unit as the framework for the operation of the principle of self- 
determination appeared to be decisively established.
However, Morocco asserted quite incorrectly that "the opinion of 
the court can only mean one thing: the so-called Western Sahara was 
part of Moroccan territory over which the sovereignty was exercised by 
the Kings of Morocco and that the population of this territory con­
sidered themselves and were considered to be Moroccans ... Today
Moroccan claims have been recognised by the legal advisory organ of the 
317United Nations." To underline its approach, the Moroccan authorities
announced their intention to organise a mass march of civilians into
the territory, "to gain recognition of /thqj right to national unity
and territorial integrity." The march took place on 6 November 1975316 7819 3201
despite requests by the Security Council to States to avoid any action
320which might further escalate tension in the area. Algeria remarked
that "not a single African country will fail to see consequences both
immediate and long term of the success of such a solution if applied to
the various boundaries and territorial problems which arise on the
321African continent." The Security Council in resolution 380 (1975)
316
(316) Ibid, para.229. The mission was itself set up pursuant to 
resolution 3292 (XXIX) by the Special Committee on Decolonisation.
(317) Press release of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN,
16 October 1975, quoted in S/PVt1849, p.ll,
(318) S/11852. This was the so-called Green March. See also S/11874,
(319) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, pp,3836-8,
(320) Security Council resolutions 377 (1975) and 379 (1975). See 
also the Reports of the UN Secretary-General, S/11863 and 
S/11874.
(321) S/PV,1852, p.76.
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deplored the march and called on Morocco to withdraw from the territory 
and resume negotiations under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General.
A few days later, Morocco ordered the marchers to leave322 32and entered 
into negotiations with Mauritania and Spain over a solution to the
problem. At the end of these talks a in<nt „„„ .K8' a Joint communique was issued
comprising a declaration of principles324 according to which a 
temporary tripartite administration over the territory was to be 
established, including Morocco, Mauritania and Spain, with the colla­
boration of the Saharan Yema-a, and Spain agreed to terminate its pre­
sence by 28 February 1976 at the latest.325 326 Additional terms in the 
agreement, which remained secret at the time, dealt with the partition 
of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania and various other issues 326
On 10 December 1975, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions 
dealing with the Sahara question. Resolution 3458A (XXX), adopted by 
88 votes to none, with 41 abstentions, reaffirmed the inalienable right 
of the people of the territory to self-determination in accordance with 
resolution 1514 (XV). It also emphasised "its concern to see that 
principle applied to the territory of Spanish Sahara within a framework
(322) S/11876.
(323) S/11880, para.2.
(324) Ibid., annex I and annex II.
(325) Algeria regarded the declaration as null and
recognise the right of Spain, Morocco and M a u r i refus4ng to 
of the territory, ibid., annex IV. uiritania to dispose
(326) See Franck, "The Stealing of the Sahara" 70 AJIL, 1976, pp.694, 
715-7. It was reported that by this agreement Spain retained 
a 35 percent interest in the Bou-Craa phosphate mines and 
secured both fishing rights for the Canary islanders and a 
period of Moroccan toleration for its enclaves on the southern 
Mediterranean shore, Mercer, "Confrontation in the Western 
Sahara", The World Today, June 1976, pp,230, 232-3.
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that guarantees and permits them the free and genuine expression of 
their will in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United 
Nations. Spain was called on to take all necessary measures ,fin 
consultation with all the parties concerned and interested so that 
all Saharans ... may exercise fully and freely, under United Nations 
supervision, their inalienable right to self-determination."
However, the effect of this resolution was confused somewhat by 
the adoption of resolution 3458B (XXX) by 56 votes to 42, with 34 
abstentions which "takes note of the tripartite agreement concluded at 
Madrid on 14 November 1975." This resolution also reaffirmed the 
Saharan people’s right to self-determination and called for its exer­
cise "through free consultations organised with the assistance of a 
representative of the United Nations appointed by the Secretary-General." 
Although both resolutions refer to self-determination, they are incon­
sistent on a number of points. The former resolution called for UN 
supervision of the free and genuine expression of the will of the people, 
for instance, while the latter resolution accepted the partition agree­
ment between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania and called only for "respect" 
for the aspirations of the population and merely "free consultations" 
organised by a UN representative rather than UN supervision of the act 
of self-determination. Of the African States voting on these resolutions, 
twenty-nine voted in favour of resolution 3458A (XXX) and eleven abstained, 
while twelve States (excluding Morocco and Mauritania) voted in favour of 
resolution 3458B (XXX), twenty-one opposed it and eight abstained. Fight- 
ing broke out in the territory during November 1975 leading to a clash 327
(327) Africa Research Bulletin, December 1 9 75, pp.3872-4
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between Algerian and Moroccan forces at Amghala.328 32901* In February 1976,
the Polisario independence movement declared the sovereign Saharan
329Arab Democratic Republic, In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania 
formally agreed the division of Sahara between them. The border was to 
pass from the point where the western coast meets the 24th parallel
near Dakhla (Villa Cisneros) eastwards to where the 23rd parallel cuts
330
the 13th western meridian. The UN Secretary-General announced that 
the UN would refuse to legitimate the actions of Morocco and Mauritania, 
which together with the fighting taking place rendered any genuine con-
Q O Isultation under resolution 3458B (XXX) impossible.
The partition solution, far from being accepted by the population
as a whole, was based only on the most cursory consultations with the
332
rump of the Verna'a. In the declaration of principles in the tripartite 
agreement, it was argued that "the views of the Saharan population 
expressed through the Yenta'a will be respected. In fact, the Verna'a 
dissolved itself by a majority vote in November 1975. Morocco claimed 
that eighty of its members were present at a special meeting which
(328) Ibid. , pp.3910-2.
(329) Ibid., February, 1976, pp.3942-2. See also infra Chant«, t 
p.478. In March, Morocco and Mauritania broke off diplomatic 
relations with Algeria, ibid., March 1976, p.3952! Pl°fflatlc
(330) Ibid., April 1976, p.3985. See also West Africa, 3 May 197g
p ,622,
(331) I D .  *°rld Bulletin no. 5, pp.1237 and i24a
(8 March 1976),
(332) The Yema'a consisted of 103 members, including 40 sheikhs elected 
by tribal councils, 40 representatives elected by male Saharans 
over 2 1  from the family units and 16 representatives of corporate 
groups, see A/10023+Add,5, annex, para,136. It was created by 
Spain in May 1967 as the highest representative body of the 
local administration with certain limited powers, ibid., para,127.
(333) S/11874, Annex III.
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unanimously accepted the partition, but this was contradicted by press
reports which put the figure at sixty, ie. less than the necessary two- 
334thirds. A number of the members of the Yema'a joined Polisario
335and defected to Algeria. In other words, not only did Morocco and
Mauritania refuse to hold a plebiscite in the territory, they also
failed to adequately consult the very organ they had declared would
express the will of the population. In March 1976, the UN Secretary-
General declared that he had been asked by Mauritania to send a UN
representative to observe the proceedings of the Yema’a and that he
had replied that he would not do this as the necessary steps to ensure
the exercise of the right to self-determination by the Saharan people
336had not been taken.
The meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in June 1976 adopted 
a resolution proposed by Benin with twenty-nine votes in favour uncon­
ditionally supporting the just struggle of the Sahara people and
calling for respect for the territorial integrity of Western Sahara and
337the withdrawal of foreign and occupation forces. As a result of
this Morocco boycotted the subsequent OAU summit meeting and hinted
that it and Mauritania might leave the OAU if the pro-Saharan resolution
338was supported. In the event, discussion was postponed and OAU plans 345678
(334) Africa Research Bulletin, February 1976, pp,3942-3» The figure 
of 60 was a UPI one, according to the New York Times of 28 
February 1976, p.6, the figure was 65.
(335) According to the Algerian representative at the UN, 57 members 
of the Yema’a left, A/PV.2435 at p«92,
(336) BNMC March 1976, pp.41-2. Zambia noted that ’’policies of 
annexation and expansion were being pursued in total disregard 
of the aspirations of the inhabitants of the territories con­
cerned and the United Nations was being asked to bless these 
unjust designs” , A/C.4/SR.2175, p.32.
(337) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1976, p,4Q47 and ibid,, July 1976, 
p.4081.
(338) Ibid., pp',4078 and 4081.
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to hold a special session on the Saharan problem put off on a number of 
339
occasions. At the July 1978 OAU Summit Conference a resolution was 
adopted which reaffirmed the intention to hold a special session on the 
Saharan issue and a committee was set up "to find a solution to this 
question compatible with the right of self-determination."39 40
IV The Spatial Factor - Conclusions
The application of the principle of self-determination to non-self- 
governing territories is indisputable, but the basis of the principle 
has been transformed from the personal concept implicit in the political 
definition of self-determination to the strict territorial concept of 
international practice. It is the territorial factor which is pres­
criptive and the personal element is secondary, usually being of 
little or no significance. The "self" of self-determination is there­
fore to be understood in strict spatial terms so that the right accrues 
to a colonial people within the framework of the existing territorial 
unit as established by the colonial power. Pre-colonial and/or subsisting 
ethnic, religious or cultural ties are not strictly relevant, for it is 
the people of the defined territory, who alone have the competence to 
exercise the right of self-determination. Indeed, practice relating to 
Rhodesia demonstrates further that self-determination is the right of 
the majority of the people and cannot be understood to mean simply freedom
(339) Ibid., July 1977, pp.4486-7; ibid. August 1977, p.4523; ibid
September 1977, p.4554; and ibid., March 1978, pp,4770-1. ’
(340) Ibid., July 1978, p.4914. See also ibid., September 1978,
pp.4979-80, The UN General Assembly in resolution 32/22 
reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of self-determination 
with regard to the Western Saharan case and expressed the hope 
that a just and lasting solution to the problem could be found 
in accordance with UN principles at the proposed OAU summit 
meeting devoted to the question.
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from the control of the colonial power in all cases.341 342 It can thus
be stated that self-determination is to be exercised within the colonial
territory treating that territory as a unit, and that therefore the
principle of territorial integrity operates prior to independence in
these situations as a guarantor of the territorial basis of self- 
342determination. This would appear to be overridden only where there 
are exceptional circumstances threatening peace and security, as in 
Ruanda-Urundi.
This interlinking of self-determination and territorial integrity 
in pre-independence situations is clearly demonstrated in State practice. 
Indeed the only exception to the rule (apart from the peace and security 
proviso and special cases below) in African practice relates to the 
Cameroons situation, which may be partly (but only partly) explained by 
the administrative division of the territory upon ethnic grounds as 
noted by a UN mission by the administering power. The basic proposition 
is upheld by the Saharan issue, although the inability of the inter­
national community to rectify the situation has tended to obscure this. 
One may also point in non-African practice to the Belize and Timor 
issues as reinforcing the accepted rules. In the case of Timor, the 
Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 384 (1975) which called
(341) See Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the
Political Organs of the United Nations, 1963. p.105. Note’---
particularly resolution 2012 (XX) which declared that the per­
petuation of minority rule in Southern Rhodesia would be incom­
patible with the principle of equal rights and self-determination.
(342) The UK Minister of State stated in the constitutional conference 
held in London in 1978 regarding the Gilbert Islands, that the 
key principle in leading colonial territories to independence, 
is "the importance now widely attached to the principle of 
territorial integrity” . Successive governments had always 
believed that "the wishes of the people as a whole within the 
existing boundaries should be the main guide". Quoted in a 
letter to The Guardian on 9 January 1979, p,8, by Sir Bernard 
Braine. See also "Report of the Gilbert Islands Constitutional 
Conference", cmnd.7445.
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for respect for the territorial integrity of the former Portuguese
colony and the right of its people to self-determination and this was
343 *repeated in resolution 389 (1976). Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX)
deplored Indonesia's intervention and called for its withdrawal to
enable the exercise of self-determination and this call was subsequently
344repeated a number of times. In the case of Belize, a British
colony subject to Guatemalan claims, the UN has reaffirmed the right of
its people to self-determination and stressed that the territorial
345integrity of the territory must be preserved.
The essence of self-determination is the free choice open to the
inhabitants of the particular territory as to their future political 
346status. By virtue of this, the application of the right of pre­
emption was overruled. This right was a device whereby one colonial
power declared that in the event of disposing of a particular territory,
347a second power would have first option over it. In the Franco- 
Spanish Convention of June 1860, for instance, it was provided that if 
the Spanish government decided to cede its possessions in West Africa in 
whole or in part in favour of any party, the French government would 34567
(343) In August 1975, a civil war broke out in the Portuguese colony 
which appeared to have ended in September. The following month 
clashes were, reported on the Indonesian-Timor border and^« 
December, Indonesia intervened and took over the territory
See "Issue on East Timor", 7 Decolonisation. 1976 nn in lo 
See also S/12011. ’ PP<ia-32.
(344) See resolution 31/53 and 32/34.
(345) See resolutions 3422 (XXX), 31/50 and 32/32.
(346) Se. re»olut4oa 1514 W )  , re.olu»o„ 2625 (XXV) an* 1CJ „eport8, 
1975, pp,12, 33, 66, 81 and 123. See also Article 76(b) of the 
UN Charter and Summary Report of Committee 1/1 doc iA /i
16 May 1945, 6 UNCIO Docs., p.296. ’ ‘ - ' ‘
(347) See Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter» t.Aw o«,
1973, p . 181. ~  — ----— — ' ■ eQ*
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have the right of pre-emption (or droit de préférence).348 34950 However,
when the Spanish colonies in West Africa became independent no mention
of the right was made. France had also a right of pre-emption over
the territory of the Congo Free State after Belgium. It was stated
that "le gouvernement Belge reconnaît à la France un droit de
préférence sur ses possessions congolaises en cas d'alienation de
349celles-ci a titre onéreux, en tout on en partie." In this case,
France did seek to enforce these rights. On 26 February 1960, the
French Foreign Minister informed the Belgian government that it regarded
the latter as bound by the agreements granting it a right of pre-emption
over the Congo, but Belgium rejected the claim and maintained that
territories and populations were no longer "goods which could be the
350subject of international trade."
The factor of free choice may be rendered precarious when other 
parties are given a special status with regard to the determination of 
the future of a territory by its population. However, this practice is 
highly unusual in the process of decolonisation. By resolution 2229 (XXI),
(348) Lindley, The Acquisiton Mid Government of Backward Territory 
in International Law, 1926, p. 168. See also the Anglo- 
Portuguese agreement of February 1884 by which the UK obtained
a right of pre-emption regarding the Portuguese fort of St. John 
the Baptist of Ajouda on the Gold Coast, see Yakemtchouk, L'Afriaue 
en Droit International, 1971, p.304. ~~ —
(349) Lindley, op.cit. ppl68-9.
(350) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p,17318. Belgium also noted 
that even if such a right existed it could not be exercised in 
the instant case since the transfer of power to the people of the 
Congo could not be regarded as an alienation of the territory by 
Belgium, ibid.
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Morocco, Mauritania and "any other interested party" le. Algeria 351 
were accorded a special status and although one explanation is based 
on the contention that Western Sahara was a colonial enclave, 352 the 
true reason is to be sought rather in the general geo-political situa­
tion in the area. The territorial claims by Morocco and Mauritania 
and the strong opposition to them by Algeria had created a delicate 
situation in that region and the Assembly clearly felt impelled to 
take account of this. Nevertheless, it is felt that the sole valid 
interpretation of such status is to be seen in the context of discussions 
and consultations rather than in the field of substantive solutions. 353 354
Once the principle of the free choice is accepted as the basis of
the exercise of self-determination, the question is then posed of the
method by which it may be demonstrated. This is important since a free
choice is invariably dependent upon its efficacious exercise. Such
exercise may be accomplished by a variety of methods, ranging from
plebiscites and elections to commissions of enquiry. It is in this
field that the UN has often had a practical role to play. However, an
examination of the cases in which such operations have occurred, reveals 
354no clear pattern. Commissions of Enquiry were sent to Eritrea 355
(351) The fact that Algeria was intended by this phrase is clear see 
Pleadings CR.75/3, pp.3-4. Note also that in one of the pre­
ambular paragraphs of resolution 3292 (XXIX), Algeria as well 
Spain, Morocco and Mauritania is specifically named.
(352) See Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of
1973, p.214. See further infra, p.249. --- — ---- -
(353) This may be assimilated with the view expressed by the International
Court that "the right of self-determination leaves the General * 
Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms and pro­
cedures by which that right is to be realised", ICJ Reports 1975 
pp.12, 36. ’ ’
(354) See Rigo Sureda, op.cit,, pp.294-323; Umozurike, Self-Determ4
in International Law, 1972, pp. 105-8 and Merle, "Plebiscites— —  
Organisés par les Nations Unies" AFOI, 1961, p.425.
(355) Resolution 289 (IV).
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British Cameroon,356 British Togolhnd,357 M d  Va.tara Sahara.358 359
Plebiscites were held In British Cameroon., British Togoland. Ruanda-
359
Drundi, and Papua-New Guinea, while ordinary elections sutficed In 
a number of cases. In the case of Eritrea360 the commission was not 
followed by a plebiscite and Its report was accepted, hut the report of 
the Visiting Mission to British Cameroons was not accepted and the 
General Assembly decided that plebiscites should be held m  the north
and south of the territory.361 The mission to British Togoland recommended 
that a plebiscite be held and this indeed took place.362 36
In a large number of colonies, neither plebiscites nor elections 
were held in a way directly related to the exercise of self-determination. 
This is because in the majority of cases no serious alternative to inde­
pendence was proposed regarding the future of the territory. In other
words, a deterministic view was taken of the territory - people 
363
nexus. However, in the case of the trust territories in the light of
(356) Trusteeship Council resolution 1907 (XXII).
(357) Resolution 860 (IX). commissions of Enquiry were also sent inter 
alia to Western Samoa in 1959 and Sabah and Sarawak in 1963."
(358) Resolution 3292 (XXIX).
(359) Regarding the question of the monarchy, or Mwami of Rwanda.
(360) A/1285 and resolution 390 (V).
(361) T/1440. GAOR 13th Session, 4th Committee, 844th-880th meetingand resolution 1350 (XIII). n meetings
(362) T/1218 and resolution 944 (X).
(363) Note that the French loi cadre of 23 June 1956 and subsequent
elections in French West Africa developed the territorial frame­
work of the eight States that subsequently became independent. 
Plebiscites were held in 1958 in French territories, offering 
the choice between autonomous status in the French community, 
retention of existing status with representation in the French 
Parliament or full integration with France. Only Guinea voted 
to reject the new constitution and thereby attain full independence 
at that time, see Keeslngs Contemporary Archives, pp,16544 and 
16529.
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the special responsibility of the United Nations364 365and especially
where a serious dispute existed as to the disposition of the territory
some method of determining the wishes of the population had to be
applied. Thus, although plebiscites have been comparatively rare in
non-self-governing territories, they occurred with some frequency in
365the case of trust territories.
V Special Cases
(i) Colonial Enclaves - One important exception to the proposition that 
the inhabitants of a non-self-governing or trust territory should have 
the right to determine their own political structure and future within 
the colonially defined borders is afforded by that category of small 
territories known as colonial enclaves. The normal definition of an 
enclave refers to an area totally surrounded by the territory of other 
States366 or the territory of one other State.367 However, in the case
(364) The case of Namibia is a special one. Following the termina­
tion of the Mandate by the General Assembly in 1966 in resolution 
2145 (XXI), a UN Council for South-West Africa (later Namibia) 
was established by resolution 2248 (S-V). This Council was 
empowered "to administer South-West Africa until independence" 
and "to promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regula­
tions as are necessary for the administration of the territory 
until a legislative assembly is established." In 1974, a Decree 
on the Natural Resources of Namibia was adopted by the Council 
requiring the Council’s consent for any exploration, mining or
extraction of natural resources found in Namibia, see A/C.131/33
(365) It must be noted, however, that the effectiveness of the response 
of the international community to the violation of self- 
determination in the Sahara and Timor leaves something to be 
desired and marks an unfortunate precedent for the resolution of 
such problems as those relating to the future of Belize, Gibraltar 
and the Falkland Islands, see generally Franck and Hoffman, "The 
Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places". 8 New York 
Journal of International Law and Politics, 1976, p,331,
(366) See eg. the Oxford Dictionary. See also Krenz, International 
w n M aves and Rights of Passage, 1961, pp. 19-22 and Raton, "Lea 
Enclaves" AFDI, 1958, p.186.
(367) R a t o n ,  loc.cit. p.186.
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of colonial enclaves, the framework for discussion relates to a
relatively small area totally surrounded on the landward side by the
territory of one other State, thus allowing for a stretch of coast.
This type of enclave is a territory detached by a colonial power from
the surrounding territory and placed under the administration of a
separate party from that governing the dismembered State. In such
cases, the United Nations has adopted the doctrine that the country from
which the enclave was originally taken should have the right to re-acquire
the territory. This approach, which is fundamentally a concession to
geographical and political reality, is strictly limited, for UN practice
demonstrates that smallness and paucity of resources are not to be
3Ô&regarded as a barrier to independence. It is clearly aimed at pre­
venting threats to international peace and security by the establishment 
of precariously independent small States or indeed the maintenance of 
colonial status of areas surrounded on the landward side by larger States 
with irredentist claims. It also amounts to a recognition of the 
validity of historical claims in restricted situations.
(368)
( 369)
See practice with regard to small ia2flMrfo ,
pp.64-70. Assembly resolutions 3427 (XXX) a ^ i Pril 1973» 
example, relating to Pacific and West Indi ^  3433 (XXx>» for 
ritories emphasised that the question of i”*11 island ter- 
geographical isolation and limited resources 8ize»
to delay the implementation of resolution 1 5 1 4 ? ™ ?  be USed
Claims to the maintenance of colonial enciav««
their ultimate absurdity in the case of the p ®PP6ared to reach
of Sao Joao Baptists de Ajude (St. John +h ortuSuese enclave
taken over by Dahoray (now Benin) on 31 julf °f
of one two-storey house on U j  acres of i J , , / * *  ** COna*sted
boundary pillars in the former slave port of o “8I? ated by 8
had two governors and no population. Porh.^i The ®nclave
claim to the enclave for a while after it« 5 « contlnued to lay
Environment and Policies in West Africa Zure* aee Harrison,
—- - — ■ i J-woa, p .77,
2 4 7 .
The concept was utilised with regard to the Spanish enclave of
Ifni, which was surrounded on its landward side by Moroccan territory.
It covered an area of some fifteen hundred square kilometres, with a
population estimated in 1966 of some 53,000 inhabitants, the majority of 
370
whom were nomads. The basis of Spanish title to Ifni was the treaty
of Tetuan, 1860, concluded with Morocco and this title was confirmed
in the Franco-Spanish conventions of 1904 and 1912. However, Spain did
not actually administer the area until 1934. in 1957, Morocco
sought to seize the enclave and succeeded in forcing a partial Spanish 
372
withdrawal. The issue was first examined by the UN in the discussions 
of the Special Committee on Decolonisation in 1963 and again in 1964.373 
In resolution 2072 (XX), the General Assembly called on Spain to enter 
into negotiations regarding the application of resolution 1514 (XV) 
to Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. The differences between Ifni and the 
Spanish Sahara were clearly recognised by the UN. In resolution 2229 
(XXI), the Assembly declared as far as Ifni was concerned that Spain 
was "to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonisa­
tion of Ifni and to determine with the government of Morocco, bearing in 
mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the 
transfer of powers" while as far as Spanish Sahara was concerned, reference 
was made to the need for a referendum to enable the population to "exercise *
f370) Mathy, "L’Autodétermination de Petits Territoires Revendiques
 ^ par Etats Tiers (Deuxième Partie)" Revue Belge de Droit International 
1975, p.129.
Ibid, p . 130 and Africa Research Bulletin, January 1969, pp.103-4.
*  ^ _ âiso Reyner, "Morocco’s International Boundaries: A Factual
Background", 1 1963, p.324.
(373) Mathy, loc.cit., p.131.
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freely its right to self-determination” . Resolution 2354 (XXII) was 
divided into distinct sections dealing separately with Ifni and 
Spanish Sahara, while resolution 2428 (XIII) noted in its preamble 
"the difference in nature of the legal status of these two territories”. 
This resolution stressed the intention of Spain as administering power 
to sign a treaty with Morocco on the transfer of Ifni, while reaffirm­
ing with regard to Sahara the inalienable right of its people to self- 
determination and calling for a referendum to enable the people to 
exercise freely its right to self-determination. On 4 January 1969, 
the Treaty of Fez was signed between Spain and Morocco and in it the 
term "retrocession" is used in transferring the enclave.374 * A number 
of points can thus be made with regard to the distinguishing character­
istics of colonial enclaves. The surrounding State, or former possessor, 
is entitled to a special status during the process of decolonisation, 
the choice open to the inhabitants of the enclave is strictly curtailed 
although their views are to be considered and no referendum is available 
it seems to ascertain such views. It appears therefore that once the 
status of colonial enclave is established, the surrounding State possesses 
prima facie the right to assimilate the territory in question. The right 
of self-determination, accordingly, is not exercisable by the population
(374) Mathy loc.cit. p.132. The transfer took piace on on T
and was duly noted by the General Assembly i hiT  30 June 1069
p.80. The International Court noted that "siní \ ^  A/7630«
having been decolonised by transfer to Morocco h 69’ Ifni* 
appeared in the resolutions of the Assemblv" i n f !  “° loneer 
1975, pp,12, 35. There are a number of * Report®.
surrounded by Morocco. These include Ceuta ^  Ff“*811 enclaves 
Velez, Penon de Alhucemas, Ishote del Mar and t i la’ Pencm de 
Islas Chafarinas, see Reyner loc.cit. pp 324 s*8** de Tierra and
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save in the sense of decolonisation simpliciter. Rigo Sureda has argued 
that the special status accorded in UN resolutions to Morocco, Mauritania 
and "any other interested party" ie. Algeria with regard to self-
determination for the territory of Western Sahara might be due to the
375status of Sahara as a colonial enclave, However, this is not a
satisfactory explanation for a number of reasons including the size of
the territory and the fact that it is bordered by three States not one.
UN practice has also clearly demonstrated that the Sahara was not to be
treated as a colonial enclave, sharply differentiating the territory from
376the enclave of Ifni.
The status of colonial enclave has also been suggested with respect 
377
to Gibraltar. Assembly resolution 2353 (XXII) noted that "any colonial 
situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and specifically with 
paragraph six of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),"37 78 This, however, 
seems to run contrary to the traditional interpretation of paragraph six 
of resolution 1514^(XV), which was Intended to protect the territorial 
integrity of independent States and not that of former entities.379 But 
if one interprets resolution 2353 (XXII) as referring to colonial enclaves 
alone, rather than all colonial situations, it is then possible to integrate
(375) Op.cit., p.214.
(376) Note that in the instance of the French Territory of +v,
Issas, no special standing was claimed or accordL Eth?I t * * ™  and 
Somalia in the decolonisation process. ed Ethiopia or
(377) Rigo Sureda op.cit. pp.7S-9, 183-99, and m o  d „
A/AC.109/SR.291. ’ * . '8' See also
(378) See also resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI)
(379) See A/AC.109/PV. p.284.
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the proposition within the framework of the law relating to decolonisa­
tion. A wider interpretation would be inconsistent with international 
practice regarding self-determination. The Assembly has recommended
negotiations aimed at the transfer of power from the UK to Spain in the 
380case of Gibraltar in similar terms as those used in the Ifni case 
and it does appear as if the doctrine may be applicable to Gibraltar.
The status of a territory as a colonial enclave would at the very 
least afford the surrounding State a locus standi in discussions cover­
ing the disposition of a territory and where this has not happened the 
presumption must be that a colonial enclave is not involved, as for 
example in the case of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. 
However the converse is not necessarily true and one may point to a 
number of territories where neighbouring States have been accepted as
having a incus standi without the territory in question being regarded
381as a colonial enclave.
In the context of Africa, the question has arisen as to the status
382
f the enclave of Walvis Bay. The enclave some eleven hundred square 
kil metres in area with a seasonal fluctuating population of 27,000 or 38012
(380) See resolutions 2353 (XXII) and 2429 (XXIII),
(381) For example the Western Sahara situation and the Falkland 
Islands case, see resolution 2065 (XX), Yearbook of UN, 1964 
p.432,- ibid., 1966 p.659, UNMC January 1970, p.124 and A/AC.109/ 
PET.1132. See as regards other enclave situations, Mathy 
loc.cit, and ibid,, "L'Autodétermination de Petits Territoires 
Revendiqués Par Des Etats Tiers (Première Partie)" Revue Beltre 
de Droit International, 1974, p.167.
(382) See Prinsloo, Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands; Backirrnnnrt 
and Status, South African Foreign Affaira Association Study 
Report, no. 8, 1977, and Brooks, "The Legal Status of Walvis 
Bay" 2 South African Yearbook of International Law, 1976,
p .187.
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so constitutes the fifth largest port of South Africa and the only 
deep water port of Namibia. It is situated halfway down the Namibian 
coastline. The Penguin Islands are a number of small islands, islets 
and rocks a few miles off the coast, stretching along the coast of 
Namibia.^33 in 1878, the British authorities decided to annex Walvis 
Bay38 84 3856and the surrounding area as part of the Cape Colony. In 1884, 
after the Cape Colony Legislature had passed the appropriate measures, 
the Cape Governor officially proclaimed the annexation of Walvis Bay
385and surrounding area as part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
Between 1884 and 1890, a German protectorate was established over
Namibia and its borders defined by agreements with Portugal and the UK.
A dispute over the southern boundary of Walvis Bay was ultimately
388settled by arbitration in 1911. Following the South African Act of
1909 the Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910. The
Union comprised the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the
T ansvaal and the Orange River by section two of the Act, with the same
b undaries as those of the colonies by section six. Since the Penguin
I 1 nds were formally annexed to the Cape Colony in 1866 and Walvis Bay
in 1884 these territories became in 1910 part of the territory of the
U i of South Africa. In 1931, the Union gained sovereign status and in
' ».omibiic 387 la 1915, South-West Africa was captured from 1961 became a repuDiic.
(383) Prinsloo op.cit. pp.5-6.
(384) Known also as Walfish and Walfisch Bay.
(385) See Prinsloo op.cit. pp.11-12. See also Marsh*ty ,Walvis Bay" 27 ICLQ, 1978, p.683. shall, Namibia and
(386) 104 BFSP p.50.
(387) Prinsloo op.cit. p.14, and Brooks loc.cit. p.188
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Germany and in 1920, "the territory which formerly constituted the
German protectorate of South-West Africa" was given to South Africa to
388administer as a "C" mandate. By section 1 of the South African
South-West Africa Affairs Act, Act no. 24 of 1922, Walvis Bay was to be
administered as part of the mandated territory. This was basically for
389reasons of administrative convenience.
With the moves towards a constitutional settlement in Namibia, the
issue of Walvis Bay began to assume some importance. In April 1976,
the South African Prime Minister stated that whatever happened with regard
to Namibia, Walvis Bay remained South African territory.38 990 391* This was
repeated in June 1977 in the context of the discussions with the five
power Western nations contact group and in the Walvis Bay Administration
Proclamation of 1977, it was provided that as from 1 September 1977
"Walvis Bay shall cease to be administered as if it were part of the
territory /of South-West Africa7 ... and shall again be administered as
part of the province /of the Cape of Good Hope7." A The International
Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, 1977,
recognised Walvis Bay as part of Namibia and rejected South Africa’s
attempts to separate it from the rest of Namibia. All governments were
called upon to ’’decisively reject all attempts to dismember the territory
392of Namibia and especially the design to annex Walvis Bay," In
(388) Article 1 of the Mandate Agreement, see Dueard o *
Africa/Nafflibla Dispute. 1973, pp,72-4. 6 '
(389) The Penguin Islands were not administered as *Africa, Prinsloo op.cit. p.20. P*rt of So«th-West
(390) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1976, p.4007,
(391) Prinsloo op.cit. p ,17,
UNMC, June 1977, pp.41, 43 and 46.(392)
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September 1977, the UN Council for Namibia issued a statement condemning 
"this unilateral attempt by South Africa to destroy the territorial 
integrity and unity of Namibia. Walvis Bay has always been an integral
part of Namibia and South Africa has no right to change its status or to
393appropriate it as a part of its own territory." The General Assembly 
adopted resolution 32/90 in which it declared that the South African
decision to "annex" Walvis Bay rr A O  C U i attempt to undermine the unity and----
territorial integrity ot Namibia and waa "an act oi eolenl.l expanalon 
in violation oi the purposed and principles oi the Charter oi the United
Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (xv\ » * ,' ouch annexation,
it «as stated «as Illegal, null and void.39 94 The OAU Ministerial 
Council also condemned South Africa'. "illegal annexation" „i walvis Bay 
.hlch «as an integral part oi Namibia.395 3967 South Afrlca,s ^  ^
condemned by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, »hich called on all 
States not to take any action «hich "might give any semblance oi legitimes
O Q f l  *to South Africa’s claim to Walvis Bay.”
The General Assembly discussed the Namibia issue at its ninth special
397session in Spring 1978, and in resolution S-9/2, adopted by 119 votes 
to none, with 21 abstentions, reiterated that Walvis Bay was an integral 
part of Namibia and strongly condemned South Africa's "annexation” of
(393) UNMC October 1977 p.23 and A/AC. 131/67. The W n ,  a* a
decision was termed illegal and an act of racist ¡ L * 1?811 expansion, ibid.  ^^ d  colonialist
(394) Walvis Bay was stated to be "an integral part of Wo»«*,
which it is inextricably linked by geographical f“fbla witheconomic, cultural and ethnic bonds." This 
adopted by 117 votes to none, with 24 abstentions.0 ^  W&S
(395) Africa Research Bulletin, February 1978, p.4736. SWAPO declared 
that Walvis Bay was an inviolable and non-negbtiable part of 
Namibia, see UNMC, March 1978, p.12. The UN Council for Namibia 
at its Lusaka session in 1978 repeated its earlier statements on Walvis Bay, ibid., April 1978, p.45.
(396) Ibid., May 1978, p.20.
(397) Declaration on Namibia and Programme of Action in Support m  e , 
Determination and National Independence for Namibia, 1 &elf'
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the territory which violated the principle of the territorial integrity
of Namibia, embodied in Assembly and Security Council resolutions.398
The South African action was held to be illegal, null and void and an
act of aggression against the Namibian people. All States were urged to
do their utmost to compel South Africa to renounce its "spurious claims"
to Walvis Bay and respect the territorial integrity of Namibia. In the
debates, a number of States emphasised that Walvis Bay was an integral
part of Namibia, the territorial integrity of which had to be preserved.399
400The western proposals submitted to the Security Council on 10 April 
1978401 deliberately ignored the issue of Walvis Bay, since no way of 
settling the question could be found in the context of the negotiations 
held. It was stated that this question should be the subject of discus­
sions between South Africa and the elected government of Namibia.402 
SWAPO accepted this while maintaining that Walvis Bay was part of Namibia,403
while South Africa emphasised that Walvis Bay was a separate and distinct
404issue and should be treated by the UN as such. The Security Council 
on 27 July 1978 adopted resolution 432 (1978) unanimously in which it 
declared that ’’the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be 
assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory" and
(398) Especially Security Council resolution 385 (1976) »ih„k *
tie need to maintain the territorial integrity oi Hamma “ '1
(399)
(400)
(401)
(402)
(403)
(404)
See UNMC June 1978, pp.49-106.
Drawn up by the representatives of UK, USA, CanadaWest Germany. * Canada, France and
S/12636. See also ILM, May 1978, p,762. 
UNMC June 1978, p.6.
Africa Research Bulletin July 1978, p,4936. This was supported 
by the five "front-line" States of Zambia, Tanzania, BotswJl 
Angola and Mozambique, ibid., June 1978 p.4900, '
id., July 1978 p.4936. The fear was that the Security Council 
ght impose sanctions on South Africa because of the Walvis Bay 
sue, ibid., p.4937, According to reports in Pretoria, the 
s t e m  powers gave an assurance to South Africa that they recoe- 
sed its legal right to Walvis Bay, ibid. B
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decided to remain seized of the matter until such reintegration. 405
On the same day, a statement on behalf of the western contact
group reiterated the stand that a discussion of the legal status of
Walvis Bay would not be useful, while its future should be determined
in negotiations between the parties concerned. It was recognised that
Walvis Bay was critical to the future of Namibia. It was further
stated that there were arguments of a geographic, political, social
culture and administrative nature which supported the union of Walvis
Bay with Namibia, and accordingly the Security Council resolution was
appropriate. The resolution, it was noted, did not prejudice the
„ 406
legal position of any party.
Since the UN has therefore quite clearly asserted that Walvis 
Bay is part of Namibia and that any attempt by South Africa to retain 
control of it is illegal and null and void, the question arises as to 
the legal justification for this approach. International law has 
cepted that titles to territory acquired in the colonial era retain 
their validity, subject only to a right of self-determination on the 
part of the people concerned. Therefore the acquisition of Walvis Bay 
by first the UK and then the Union of South Africa was perfectly legiti-
^  «articular African States, have repeatedly reaffirmedmate. States, v 407 Thus,the sanctity and legitimacy of the former colonial borders 
South Africa's title appears lawful. Neither the arguments of geographical
(405) Emphasis added.
(406) ILM, September 1978, pp.1307-8. See also the South'a * < ' 
restatement of its views on Walvis Bay, ibid., pp.isoilij“ *'
(407) See the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa
by the OAU which accepted the present boundariesJ^ J •»- ot ihe States
of Southern Africa, cited in Prinaloo op.cit. p.22.
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contiguity nor of historical continuity can be used to invalidate the 
primacy of the colonially established frontiers, while the fact of 
joint administration of Walvis Bay and Namibia is in itself insufficient 
to found title in the absence of South Africa's intention to dispose 
of it. There would, therefore, appear to be only one viable argument 
in the sphere of international law as distinct from political considera­
tions and factors upon which one might found the legality of a claim 
for Walvis Bay's incorporation into Namibia and that is based on the 
doctrine of colonial enclaves.
Walvis Bay fills the requirements of the doctrine in all but one 
respect. It is small, surrounded by one State from which it was 
originally taken and the special status of Namibia in relation to the 
enclave has been clearly recognised. However, the State administering 
the enclave while deriving its title through an act of colonisation is 
not itself a colonial power in the traditional sense, although it could 
be argued that South Africa's administration of Namibia renders it a 
colonial power in the broad sense. The question is whether the crucial 
economic importance of the enclave to Namibia plus the virtually unanimous 
view of the international community with respect to Walvis Bay's status 
as part of Namibia can overcome this problem. It is cautiously suggested 
that this question may be affirmatively answered. The terms of the 
unanimously adopted Security Council resolution to the effect that the 
unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay 
suggest a recognition of the enclave as part of the territory of 
Namibia. The ambiguous stand of the five western powers on the legal 
issue can hardly affect this. The critical importance of Walvis Bay to 
an independent Namibia coupled with the extreme difficulty of maintaining 
South African control in such circumstances once Namibia becomes a 
sovereign State, especially in the light of the enclave’s dependence on
257.
electricity and water supplies from Namibia, would appear to point to 
a colonial enclave status for Walvis Bay which would involve a right 
of reincorporation into Namibia proper.
(ii) Apartheid - The rule that the appropriate unit for decolonisation 
is the territorial entity as defined by the colonial power is now well 
established, as is the rule that the principle of self-determination in
international law is applicable only in pre-independent entities within
. 408 _  40Qthe colonial framework. The one accepted exception would appear
to be with regard to South Africa and its apartheid policies. It would 
seem that because of apartheid, a right of self-determination has been 
recognised with regard to the inhabitants of that State, even though 
one is not confronted with a traditional colonial situation. The UN 
began considering "the question of race conflict in South Africa result­
ing from the policies of apartheid of the government of the Union of 
South Africa" in 1952. Apartheid was alleged to be creating a situation 
which constituted both a threat to International peace and security and 
a violation of the basic principles of the UN Charter. In a number 
of resolutions, the Assembly declared that "it is in the higher interests
of humanity to put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial
411persecution and discrimination." A new phase in the relations of the 
UN and South Africa with respect to the apartheid issue opened in I960, 40891*
(408) See infra, Chapter 5, p.268.
(409) See infra, p.264, regarding the Palestine question.
(410) A/2183. For the issue of the treatment of Indians in South Africa 
see Sohn and Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights 
1973, pp.556-587. As regards apartheid see eg. ibid., p p ^ ^ 739^' 
Pierson-Mathy, "L'Action des Nations Unies Contre l'Apartheid"
6 Revue Beige de Droit International, 1970, p.203} Apartheid and 
United Nations Collective Measures (ed. Leiss) , , —
"Les Implications Internationales de la Politique d'Apartheid"*
69 Presence Africaine, 1969, p,164.
(411) For example resolutions 616 (VII) and 721 (VIII). See al«« , tions 820 (IX), 917 (X), 1016 (XI), 1178 (XII), 1278 (XII) a d U~ 
1375 (XIV). -
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as a result of the increasing number of African member-states of the UN
following decolonisation and a series of disturbances in South Africa
such as the Sharpeville shootings. The Security Council discussed the
412issue for the first time and called on South Africa to abandon its
apartheid policies. The situation in South Africa was termed one that
if continued might endanger international peace and security.412 13 415 in 1962
the General Assembly adopted resolution 1761 (XVIII) in which it criticised
South Africa for refusing to abandon its racial policies and called on
States to initiate a diplomatic, economic and arms boycott of South
Africa. A Special Committee on Apartheid was also established. In July
1963, the Security Council again discussed the situation in South Africa
414resulting from apartheid and declared that it was ’'seriously disturbing
international peace and security. South Africa was again called on to
abandon apartheid and all States were requested to cease the sale and
415shipment of arms and ammunition to it. in resolution 191 (1964), the 
Council in addition termed the policies of apartheid "contrary to the 
principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and inconsis­
tent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
well as South Africa's obligations under the Charter."416 The General 
Assembly began to adopt resolutions condemning apartheid in even stronger 
language from this point, stating that the situation constituted a threat
(412) S/4729.
(413) S/4300,
(414) A/5802.
(415) Resolution 181 (1963). See also resolutions 1R2 /iocox(1964). 8 2 (1063) and 190
(416) The Security Council did not discuss the aDartheirf 
,m t U  1970. For Africa» ,ie.e relating to ‘plrthfij
Anderoicael, The OAU and the UN. 1976 1 ... . _' eee
Unfinished Qu^t'; ^ 9 W ~ ^ l l 0 ^ 2 . * ** 3 9 ^  ^ v e n k a ,  The
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to international peace and security, calling for arms and economic boy­
cotts of South Africa and appealing for assistance to be granted to the
417opponents of apartheid. in resolution 2396 (XXIII), the Assembly 
referred to apartheid as a -crime against humanity- and reaffirmed -the 
urgent necessity of eliminating the policies of apartheid so that the 
people of South Africa as a whole can exercise their right to self- 
determination and attain majority rule based on universal suffrage."417 18 
In 1970, the Security Council resumed its discussions on apartheid419 and 
in resolution 282 (1970) recognised the -legitimacy of the struggle of 
the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their human and 
political rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The situation resulting 
from the continued application of apartheid and the South African arms 
build-up constituted a "potential threat to international peace and 
security" and the Council called on all States to strengthen the arms 
embargo against South Africa. In resolution 311 (1972), the Council 
reiterated its total opposition to apartheid, which was contrary to 
South Africa's obligations under the Charter. The Assembly termed apar­
theid a negation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity in resolu­
tion 2671 (XXV) and reaffirmed its recognition of "the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the people of South Africa to eliminate by all means at their 
disposal, apartheid and racial discrimination and to attain majority rule 
in the country as a whole based on universal suffrage." The establishment
(417) See for example resolutions 2054 (XX), 2202 (XXI) and 2307 (XXII),
(418) See also resolution 2506 (XXIV). In resolution 2636 (XXV), the 
Assembly refused to accept the credentials of the South African 
representatives on the grounds that they only represented the 
white minority. See also resolutions 2862 (XXVI) and 2948 
(XXVII) and A/9179.
(419) A/8402.
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by South Africa of bantustans was termed "a violation of the principle
of self-determination and prejudicial to the territorial integrity of
420the State and the unity of its people." In 1976, the General
Assembly took an additional step by declaring that "the racist regime of
South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the people
of South Africa." It reaffirmed that the authentic representatives of
the overwhelming majority of the South African people were the national
421liberation movements recognised by the OAU.
The World Conference for Action against Apartheid held in Lagos in 
1977 issued a declaration condemning apartheid as a flagrant violation
of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a
422crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind. In November 1977
the Security Council voted unanimously to impose a mandatory arms embargo
against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, having determined
that the policies and actions of South Africa made its acquisition of
arms and related material a threat to international peace and security.
Specifically cited in resolution 418 (1977) were South Africa's acts
of repression, its defiant continuance of the system of apartheid and its
423attacks against neighbouring independent States. Thus, the weight of 
the UN practice clearly demonstrates the unacceptability of apartheid 42013
(420) See also resolution 2775E (XXVI), 2923E (XXVII), 3151G (XXVIII) 
3324E (XXIX) and 3411G (XXX).
(421) Resolution 31/61. The legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed 
people of South Africa by all possible means for the seizure of 
power and the exercise of the right of self-determination was also 
stressed. It was recognised that the people had no alternative but 
to resort to armed struggle to achieve their legitimate rights.
See also resolutions 31/77 and 31/33.
(422) Apartheid was defined as the policy of institutionalised racist 
domination and exploitation, UNMC August-September 1977, pp 6-10 
at p.7. See also A/CONF.91/9.
(423) See also Council resolution 417 (1977), Further Assembly resolu­
tions include resolutions 32/10, 32/14, 32/35 and 32/42, In 
September 1978, the Special Committee against Apartheid called 
upon the Security Council to impose a petroleum embargo against 
South Africa, UNMC October 1978, p.39,
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as a lawful Ideology in international law. As the International Law
Commission noted in its report of 1976 »the international community now
appears to recognise that such acts as the forcible maintenance of
colonial domination or the forcible pursuit of a policy of apartheid
constitute internationally wrongful acts of a particularly serious 
424character.
The question arises therefore of the legal status of apartheid and 
the role of the principle of self-determination. The numerous resolu­
tions in the UN are clearly crucial here.42 25 426 The basic approach stressed 
in such resolutions is that apartheid is contrary to the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter and two provisions are particularly relevant 
here. Article 1(3) calls for "promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language or religion", while Article 1(2) stress that the 
purposes of the UN include the development of "friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
426determination." In other words, in view of the number and contents 
of the appropriate Assembly and Security Council resolutions, a rule of
(424) Yearbook of the ILC, 1976, vol.II, part two, p.108. This con­
clusion was reached in the light of "an objective examination of 
State practice in the United Nations", ibid.
(425) Judge Jessup noted that "the accumulation of expressions of con­
demnation of apartheid ... especially as recorded in the resolu­
tions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are proof of 
the pertinent contemporary international community standard";
ICJ Reports, 1966, pp.6, 441. McDougal, Lasswell and Chen stated 
that "the thrust of all these authoritative condemnations, 
repeated again and again with only minor variations is clearly 
towards the crystallisation of shared community expectations that 
apartheid as an aggregate set of practices is unlawful,", "The 
Protection of Respect and Human Rights" 24 American University 
Law Review, 1974, pp.919, 1010.
(426) Article 55 states that the UN shall promote universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, while 
Article 56 notes that all members "pledge themselves" to take 
action to achieve the purposes set out in Article 55, See supra, 
Chapter 3, p.
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United Nations law has emerged via a process of Charter interpretation 
prohibiting the practice of apartheid.427 4289 The International Court declared 
that "to establish ... and to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restric­
tions, and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, 
descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and
428principles of the Charter." The rule, based on the Charter, which
thus determines that the establishment and enforcement by governmental
authority of policies based on apartheid is unlawful is referable both
to the general provision relating to human rights and to the principle
429of self-determination. It is to be noted that in the section dealing 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in 
the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, it is provided 
that nothing in the section is to be understood as authorising or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair the territorial 
integrity or political unity of independent States "conducting themselves 
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples ♦.. and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour."
(427) Akehurst writes that while Article 56 does not appear to imply
a legal obligation to observe human rights now, a State which 
deliberately moved backwards as far as human rights are concerned 
would probably be regarded as having broken Article 56, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law. 3rd ed. 1977, p.77. "
(428) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 57. The court emphasised that in 
such circumstances the question of intent or governmental dis­
cretion was not relevant, nor was it necessary to investigate 
or determine the effects of these measures upon the welfare of 
the inhabitants in question, ibid. The specific reference to 
Namibia as a territory with "an international status" should not 
detract from the general conclusion, ibid.
(429) As regards apartheid and Namibia, see Assembly resolution 2145 
(XXI) and ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 57.
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Apartheid is also unlawful under conventional international law.
In the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 1965, (which entered into force in 1969), racial 
discrimination is defined as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin" and Article 3 provides that States parties "particularly condemn 
racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and 
eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their juris­
diction." The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973,429^  (which came into effect in 1976), 
provides in Article 1 that the States parties declare that apartheid is 
a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies 
and practices of apartheid are crimes violating the principles of 
international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter. A comprehensive definition of apartheid is contained in 
Article 2. It may also be argued that apartheid is contrary to customary 
international law, having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which was stated to be an obligation for members of the inter­
national community by the UN Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 
1968,430 and relevant State practice.
The applicability of the principle of self-determination to the 
apartheid situation as a result of the governmental establishment and 
institutionalisation of racial discrimination has a number of consequences 
as regards the use of force and third party involvement and with respect
(429a) South Africa is not a party to either of these conventions.
(430) A/CONF.32/41. For a list detailing South Africa's violations 
of the Universal Declaration see E/CN.4/949 and Add.1-5 and 
E/CN.4/979 and Add.1-8. See also Farah, "South Africa’s 
Apartheid Policy: An Assessment" in Africa and International 
Organisation (ed. El-Ayouty and Brooks), 1974, p.71. ~
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to the creation of the so-called independent bantustans. These issues
431will be considered later, but suffice it to say that the fact that it 
was sought to render the South African situation analogous to decolonisa 
tion in terms of international law demonstrates the significant role 
played in the international community by the principle of self- 
determination. Apart from the apartheid situation, it may be argued 
that South Africa can be equated with a colonial situation since it is 
governed by descendants of colonial settlers from Europe, who thus 
exercise control over the majority indigenous population.
The only other instance where the General Assembly has proclaimed 
the right of self-determination with respect to an independent State has 
been the post-1967 Palestine situation.
While the UN has considered the question of Palestinian refugees 
432regularly since 1948, it was only in resolution 2534B (XXXV) that
reference was made to the "inalienable rights of the people of Palestine"
The following year, a resolution was adopted condemning those governments
denying the right of self-determination of peoples recognised as being
en titled  to i t  "especially of the peoples of Southern Africa and 
433Palestine." Resolution 2672 (XXV) recognised that the "people of 
Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" and declared that 
"full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an 
indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in 4312
(431) See infra Chapter 6, p.355 and Chapter 7, p.477,
(432) See for example, Assembly resolutions 194 (III), 302 riVl
(XXVI) 2963D (XXVII) and 3089D (XXVJII) aod s^curlti
resolution 242 (1967). j v.uum.ii
(433) Resolution 2649 (XXV).
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the Middle East." In resolution 3210 (XXX), the Palestinian people 
were treated as a party to the "question ol Palestine" and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation was Invited to plenary deliberations. By 
resolution 3237 (XXX), the PLO was given observer status In the General 
Assembly and conferences and meetings held under UN auspices
A number of factors, however, differentiate the Palestine from the 
South African situation. While self-determination in the latter context 
would imply the democratic right of majority rule, in the Palestine 
case the geographical ambit is unclear. If one is referring to that part 
of mandatory Palestine not part of the independent State of Israel, ie. 
the West Bank and Gaza areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, the 
proposition is unexcept ion able, and may even be traced back to the General 
Assembly partition resolution of 1947. If, however, the reference is to 
Palestine as it was constituted in mandatory times, the majority of this 
unit is Jewish and Israeli. Two problems are thus posed with regard to 
the latter interpretation, the issue of the non-Arab majority and the 
question of the State of Israel. As far as the former is concerned, the 
Palestinian National Covenant of 1964 (as amended in 1968)43 536 proclaims 
that the Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to Palestine 
within its mandatory borders and when Palestine is liberated will 
exercise self-determination solely according to its own will and choice 437
434
(434) See also for example resolutions 2787 (XXVI), 2792D (XXVI),
2963E (XXVI), 3070 (XXVII) add 3089D (XXVIII). Resolutions 
3376 (XXX), 31/20 and 32/20 referred to the inalienable national 
rights of the Palestinians.
(435) See also resolutions 3236 (XXX) and 3247 (XXX),
(436) See Harkabi, "The Position of the Palestinians in the Israel- 
Arab Conflict and Their National Covenant (1968)*', 3 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1970, p.209.
(437) Articles 2 and 3.
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Only Jews living permanently in Palestine at the beginning of the 
"Zionist invasion" are deemed to be Palestinians.438 ttla> of necesslty> 
involves the free return or immigration of Palestinian Arabs into 
Palestine and possibly the forcible emigration of Israelis. It also 
involves the extinction of the State of Israel.439 However, in this 
case one is faced with the General Assembly partition resolution which 
called for the creation of a Jewish State in Israel as well as resolution 
273 (III) which called for the entry of Israel into the UN in 1949.
While the membership of Israel of the UN cannot be regarded as requiring 
non-recognising States to recognise it,440 it may very well be that the 
UN itself is thereby estopped from denying Israel’s Statehood. It is 
also to be noted that Security Council resolution 242 (1967), unanimously 
adopted, affirmed that the fulfillment of Charter principles required 
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which 
should include "respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the 
area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force." In addition, the neces­
sity for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political inde­
pendence of every State in the area was emphasised.441
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination as interpreted as involving the
(438) Article 6. This is dated at 1917, see Markabi, loc.cit. p.231.
(439) Articles 19,20,22 and 23 of the Palestine National Covenant.
(440) See Brownlie, Principles of Public International r.W 2nd erf
1.973, p .99. ------------ ’
(441) See also Security Council resolution 338 (1973).
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dismantling of Israel cannot be regarded in the light of UN practice 
as a legal right. However, it is just possible to interpret such 
resolutions as referring to the West Bank and Gaza situation, in other 
words not affecting the existence or integrity of Israel. It is, 
therefore, concluded that it is only the South African case that deviates 
from the general rule regarding the non-applicability of the legal right 
of self-determination to independent States.
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CHAPTER 5 - TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
I - The Concept of Territorial Integrity 
(a) Generally
In any system of international law founded upon sovereign and
independent States, the principle of the protection of the integrity of
the territorial expression of such States is bound to assume major
importance,* Together with the concept of non-intervention, territorial
integrity is crucial with respect to the evolution of the principles
associated with the maintenance of international peace and security.1 2 3
It also underlines the decentralised State-oriented character of the
international political system and reflects the sovereign equality of
States as a legal principle. It is, however, with regard to the rules
relating to the use of force in international law that the principle of
the territorial integrity of States has been most intensively examined.
3This is apparent both in the sphere of customary law and in relation to 
conventional formulations. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations declared that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial Integrity and 
existing political independence of all the Members of the League".4 
Article 11 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States,
(1) Oppenheim notes that "independence and territorial as well as personal 
supremacy are not rights but recognised and therefore protected 
qualities of States as International Persons", International Law. 
vol.I, 8th ed., 1955, p.286. Bowett regards this principle as 
fundamental in international law and an essential foundation of the 
legal relations between States, Self-Defence in International Law. 
1958, p.29,
(2) Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response 
to Territorial Separation", 16 Virginia Journal of International Law, 
1976, pp.779, 783.
(3) Bowett writes that "the most obvious substantive right for which the 
right of self-defence serves as a means of protection is the right
of territorial integrity" oji^clt. p.29.
(4) Tonpor Seizure of Territory, 1947, pp,40-45.
269
1933, provided that "the territory of a State is inviolate and may not be 
the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed 
by another State directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even 
temporary". Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter emphasised that 
"all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State". Such views have also been reflected in other 
documents. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organisation of American 
States in 1948 proclaimed that "the territory of a State is inviolate",5 6
while Article 9 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States 
noted that "every State has the duty to refrain from resorting to war as 
an instrument of national policy and to refrain from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State”. However, one must distinguish between the concepts of 
territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers. Although they are 
clearly connected in that a violation of a frontier, for example, could 
also involve a violation of the territorial integrity of a State, there 
is a basic conceptual difference in that not every border violation 
constitutes a violation of territorial integrity. The incursion across 
the frontiers of another State might occur as a result of the right of 
self-defence in which case the territorial integrity of the State is not 
offended in international law. There are fundamental differences between 
the notions of territory and frontier, since the former operates to 
express the physical basis of the State and manifests its identity within 
the international community, while the latter marks the extent of the 
physical expression of the State. The concept of territorial integrity is 
therefore broader and more fundamental than that of the inviolability of
(5) tfhUBman’a Digest of International Law. vol.V, 1965, p. 186.
(6) Yearbook of the ILC, 1949, pp.277, 288.
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frontiers. It may indeed be that the latter is but one aspect of the
former, since in many ways the inviolability of frontiers constitutes a
concretisation of the concept of territorial integrity. However, the
two principles have been on occasions separately treated. This was
particularly so in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
7operation in Europe, 1975. The seminal resolution 1514(XV) declared 
in paragraph 6 that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations" and this was echoed in the 1970 Declaration on Principles 
of International Law. It was noted in the section on the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples that every State "shall 
refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total destruction of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country". 
The point was also included under the principle of the sovereign equality 
of States, which was deemed to include the proposition that "the 
territorial integrity and political independence of the State are 
inviolable". The 1974 Consensus Definition of Aggression noted in the 
preamble that States were under a duty not to use armed force to deprive 
peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence or 7
(7) Cmnd.6198 Principle III on the inviolability of frontiers noted that
"the participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s 
frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and 
therefore they will refrain now or in the future from assaulting 
these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand 
for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the 
territory of any participating State". Principle IV on the 
territorial integrity of States provided that "the participating 
States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the 
participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action 
inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations against the territorial integrity, political 
independence or the unity of any participating State, and in part­
icular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force,
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each 
other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct 
or indirect measure of force in contravention of international law, 
or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat 
of them, No such occupation or acquisition will be recognised as 
legal". Ibid, pp.3-4.
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to disrupt territorial integrity and additionally that the territory of a 
State was not to be violated by being the object of military occupation 
or of other measures of force taken in contravention of the Charter.
In Article 1, aggression was defined as the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the concept of 
territorial integrity in international law protects the State from 
unlawful interference by other States with regard to its territory. It 
is not, however, an absolute concept since the doctrine of self-defence 
permits States in certain circumstances to resort to the use of force 
against the territorial integrity of other States. In addition, of 
course, a State may voluntarily alter its territorial composition by
O
acquiring territory or ceding or exchanging territory. What is not 
permissible in the light of the principle would be changes in territorial 
extent by force. The concept of territorial integrity, however, stretches 
beyond this. It constitutes an important element within the context of 
the legal right of self-determination, since it provides the rule for 
identifying the people or unit entitled under international law to exercise 
the right to self-determination, freedom and independence. As previously 
noted,8 9 this right accrues to the inhabitants of the colonially defined 
non-self-governing territory so that the people concerned have the right 
to choose their political status within the framework of the territorial 
integrity of the colonially established unit. Two questions arise at this 
stage. The first would concern the issue of the territorial integrity of 
pre-colonial entities and whether this may be projected forward to 
influence either the decolonisation process or post-independence dispositions
(8) See generally, Minh, "Remarques Sur Le Principe de l'Intangibillte 
des Frontières” , Peuples et Etats du Tiers Monde Face l'Ordre 
International (ed. Fenet), 1978, p.51.
(9) Supra, Chapter 4, p.171.
272
The second centres on the application of the concept of territorial 
integrity and its relationship with self-determination in post­
independence situations. In other words, can the notion of territorial 
integrity be extended from its involvement with the protection of the 
territorial composition of the States to cover the threat of territorial 
reduction from within, that is the menace of secessionism? It can indeed 
be contended that the newly sovereign States have laid great store by the 
principle of territorial integrity in order to protect themselves from the 
dangers of internal secessionist movements. Thus, the principle under 
consideration has undergone or is undergoing a subtle change in meaning 
in order to create a presumption against the claims of secessionists in 
already independent States. It could be argued that far from its 
traditional posture of neutrality in such situations, international law 
is now adopting an adverse position. These propositions will he 
examined in this Chapter.
(b) African Practice
Prior to independence, African attitudes with regard to the
territorial integrity of independent States were somewhat ambiguous and
reflected a general dissatisfaction with the colonial boundaries that had
created a variety of European delimited territories. It appeared that a
general campaign of frontier re-arrangement was under consideration.10 1
In 1945, the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester adopted a resolution
proclaiming that "the artificial divisions and territorial boundaries
created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the
11political unity of the West African peoples". This resolution did not, 
however, demand the revision of frontiers.
(10) See generally Yakemtchouk, I/Afrique en Droit International, 1971,
pp.63-97; Touval.-The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. 1972, 
and ibidj "African Frontiers" 42 International Affairs, 1966, p.641.
(11) See History of the Pan-African Congress (ed. Padmore), 1963, p.55.
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Many factors combined to produce African discontent with the
colonial territorial arrangements ranging from the artificial nature of
such entities in geographical, ethnic and economic terms to the
psychological effect of the European division of Africa. This encouraged
the pre-independence African political parties to think in terms of the
re-adjustment of borders once sovereignty had been achieved. The high
point of this approach occurred in the All-African Peoples' Conference
at Accra in 1958 which approved a resolution in four parts entitled
"Frontiers, Boundaries and Federations", The third part of the
resolution denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by the imperialist
powers, particularly those which cut across ethnic lines and divided
peoples of the same stock, and called for the abolition or adjustment of
such frontiers at an early date. The guiding principle by which this
12was to be effected was to be "the true wishes of the people".
President Nkrumah of Ghana was particularly active in seeking the re­
alignment of colonial borders. He called on the Sanniquellic Conference 
of 1959 to examine methods of "eradicating the artificial divisions and 
boundaries which are responsible for the balkanisation of our continent". 
This kind of approach was underlined by the resolutions adopted at the 
conferences of the radical parties and States which supported Somalia's 
attempts to unify all the areas containing Somali inhabitants under its
flag,12 34 15and mirrored the approach earlier adopted as to Morocco’s
"15irredentist claims.
(12) Legura, Pan-Africanism, 1962, pp.229-32 and Touval op.cit. pp.58-60.
(13) See Barden, Awakening Africa: The Conference of Independent African 
States, 1962, pp.149-50. See also the joint communique of the 
Presidents of Ghana and Somalia in October 1961 stressing "the 
imperative need to call upon the principle of self-determination as 
a means of removing the artificial colonial frontiers" quoted by 
Emerson, "Pan-Africanism" 16 International Organisation, 1962, p,278.
(14) For example, the resolution adopted at the All-Africa Peoples’ 
Conference, Tunis, I960, see Legum op.cit, p,246, and the resolution 
adopted by the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference,
1960, see Touval op.cit. p.63,
(15) For example, the First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at 
Cairo, 1957, see Touval op.cit. pp.51-3.
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However, within a few years the atmosphere changed and more and more
African States, upon obtaining independence, sanctioned the boundaries
imposed by the colonial powers. This was already evident at the debates
at the UN General Assembly concerning the Mauritanian question. Morocco
claimed that Mauritania was an artificial State and that its territory
rightly belonged to Morocco. While such claims received some backing
from the Arab and Communist States, the majority of African States
16rejected Morocco's demands. The territorial unit as determined by the
colonial powers began to be accepted as the framework for the newly
independent entity. This was reflected in resolution 1514 (XV), with its
expressed concern with the preservation of the national unity and
17territorial integrity of a country.
18The Congo crisis precipitated in 1960 marked an important landmark
as Katanga sought to secede. African States decided to uphold the
territorial integrity of the Congo. At the Leopoldville Conference in
19August 1960, the secession was condemned, and at the Monrovia Conference
in 1961, African States were called upon "to desist from such activities
20as the hasty recognition of breakaway regimes". At the Lagos Conference
in 1962 of the Monrovia bloc, the principle of respect for existing
21borders was proclaimed and the Conference adopted the Charter of the 
Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation, Article 3 of which stressed 
"respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State" and 
Article 5 of which underlined that "each State has the right of defence of 1678920
(16) See supra, Chapter 4, p.223.
(17) Supra, p.188, note 69.
(18) Infra, p.306.
(19) Legura, op.cit. p.48.
(20) This Conference involved a number of African States seeking to bridge 
the gap between the radical Casablanca bloc and the French-dominated 
Brazzaville grouping, see Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, 1966, pp.26-34. The conferences of the more radical States 
at Casablanca and Cairo in early 1961 gave strong support to the 
territorial integrity of the Congo, see Touval op.cit. p.72.
(21) Ibid, p.78,
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its territorial integrity". Although the majority of African States by
the early 1960's had accepted the validity of the colonial frontiers and
the preservation of the territorial status quo, expressed in terms of the
overwhelming adoption of the doctrine of the territorial integrity of
States, a few did dissent. Morocco pressed its claims to Mauritania and
Spanish Sahara as well as parts of Algeria and Mali on historical grounds,
while Somalia pursued its object of reuniting all Somali tribesmen. The
Somali president expressed the view that other principles of international
law could override the concept of the territorial integrity of States,
which was described as an "outmoded concept....[whichj must vanish from
our habitual thinking because its roots are embedded in colonialism and it
22is incompatible with Pan-Africanism". The vast majority of African 
States, however, disagreed with such an approach and endorsed the supremacy 
of the principle of territorial integrity when faced with territorial 
claims either from within by secessionist pressures or from without by 
irredentist forces. This has emerged clearly from the attitudes adopted in 
the Conference of the Organisation of African Unity during 1963 and 1964,
At the inaugural conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa in May 1963,
delegates stressed the necessity of working within the framework of the
territorial integrity of States and of respecting the colonial boundaries.
Ethiopia in particular pointed out that many African States would cease to
exist if boundaries were redrawn on religious, racial and linguistic 
o ogrounds. The Mali representative noted that "we must take Africa as it 
is and we must renounce any territorial claims if we do not wish to 
introduce what we might call black imperialism in Africa..African unity 23
(22) The Somali Republic and African Unity, 1962, p.7 (a Somali government
publication). See also Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the 
Era of Decolonisation, 1964, p.53. “
(23) Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, I,
Section 2, Documents, CIAS/GEN/INF/43. *
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demands of each one of us complete respect for the legacy that we have
received from the colonial system, that is to say, maintenance of the
present frontiers of our respective States",^ Other African States
25adopted the same approach.
Although the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity does not 
specifically refer to the sanctity of the colonial borders its provisions 
are unambiguous. The preamble refers to the determination to safeguard 
and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member-States. In Article 2(l)c, the Charter 
notes that one of the purposes of the organisation is to defend the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African States, 
while in Article 3(3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent
26existence is formulated as one of the principles of the OAU. Emerson
concluded that "the net effect of such pronouncements as of the relevant
sections of the 1960 UN Declaration is for all purposes to deny the
legitimacy of any further disintegration or reshaping which impairs the
27integrity of the colonially defined States". This view was over­
whelmingly supported by the discussions at the first Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation at Cairo 
in July 1964. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia declared that the 24567
(24) Ibid, CIAS/GEN/INF/33. This countered Ghana's view that only 
continental unity could solve border disputes, ibid, CIAS/GEN/INF/36.
(25) See for example the speeches of the delegates from the Malagasy 
Republic, ibid, CIAS/GEN/INF/14 and Nigeria, ibid, CIAS/GEN/INF/35. 
Morocco refused to attend the conference as it might have been 
interpreted as recognition of Mauritania, see Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, p.19463.
(26) In Article 6, member States pledged themselves to observe scrupulously 
the principles enumerated in Article 3. See also Maya Krishnan, 
"African State Practice Relating to Certain Issues of International 
Law" 14 Indian Journal of International Affairs, 1965, pp,196, 207-8 
and Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter. 1968.
(27) Op.cit. p.35.
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acceptance of imperialist borders was necessary for Africa’s safety and
that the provisions of the OAU Charter regarding the preservation of
28territorial integrity must be supported. The representative of the
Ivory Coast noted that the conference "should decide as one of the surest
means of achieving unity on absolute respect for the frontiers of member
29States of our Organisation". President Nkrumah of Ghana in a decidedly
minority stand emphasised that the artificial divisions of African States
were too numerous and irrational for permanent and harmonious settlement
30save within the framework of continental union. Kenya, however, called
for a Charter to be drawn up with the object of preserving the territorial
status quo and making impossible any frontier re-alignment except by 
31mutual consent. In the event, a specific resolution was adopted by the 
Assembly in the issue. The preamble of resolution AHG/Res.16(1) noted 
that the borders of African States on independence constituted a "tangible 
reality" and recalled Articles 3(3) and 4 of the Charter of the OAU. The 
essence of the resolution was contained in the second operative paragraph 
which "solemnly declares that all member States pledge themselves to 
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national 
independence".
The resolution was not, however, unanimously accepted, Both Somalia
32and Morocco refused to be bound by it. The question also arose as to 
the meaning of the phrase "achievement of national independence" since it 
could be construed as validating the pre-colonial borders of such 289301
(28) African Research Bulletin, July 1964, p.122,
(29) Ibid, p.123.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid, pp 123-4. See also the speech of the delegate from Sierra 
Leone, ibid, p.125.
(32) Ibid, p.108.
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independent entities as Morocco, Ethiopia and Liberia, and therefore used
33as a basis for reclaiming lost territories. In addition, the resolution
did not cover the problems caused by the different interpretations of
documents defining boundaries, a situation a number of African States
found themselves concerned with.^4 It is also interesting to note that
the principle of self-determination was not referred to, nor was the
difficulty of reconciling it with the acceptance of the territorial status
quo alluded to. Neverthless, the border resolution can be said to have
marked the acceptance by Africa as a whole of a new territorial regime,
one based on the legal validity of the colonial frontiers of independent 
35States. It is no longer possible to deny the impact of this rule as
36a binding practice of African States.
There are a number of reasons for this approach to the problem.
Apart from the fear of anarchy and chaos if the map were to be redrawn 
on ethnic lines, the need is felt for a source of legitimation of State­
hood. In European countries this is found in the identity of the nation­
state, but African territories with only a few exceptions contain 
considerable numbers of different tribal groups. The vast majority of 
African countries do not consist of a defined "nation" as such in the 
western sense, and accordingly have sought the root of their legitimacy 
in the territorial unit rather than in the ethnic characteristics of the 
State. As Zartman has pointed out (as regards West Africa, but it is true 3456
(33) See Touval, "The Organisation of African Unity and African Borders"
21 International Organisation, 1967, pp.102, 124-5, See also 
infra, p.286.
(34) See infra Chapter 8, p.534,
(35) See also the resolutions of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned 
Countries, 1964, which declared that "the established frontiers of 
States shall be inviolate" and pledged the States "to respect 
frontiers as they existed when ^they^ gained independence". See 
Africa Research Bulletin, October 1964, p.164.
(36) The Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU noted in 1967 that ideally 
the organisation should be an instrument of solidarity and defence of 
the territorial integrity of all African States", Africa Research 
Bulletin, September 1967, p.854. But note the attitudes adopted by 
Somalia and Morocco, infra, pp.
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for the continent as a whole), "it is not the boundary but the nation
37that is artificial".
If ethnic unity does not exist in any given country, the question of 
s^f-determination of peoples in its sociological meaning of identifiable 
cultural groups becomes highly controversial. This is especially so 
since the end result could well be the creation of large numbers of 
competing and often hostile States each based upon a different ethnic or 
cultural unit. Accordingly, the legal and political emphasis has been 
not upon the characteristics of the population of the State but upon the 
territorial definition of that State and not unnaturally the doctrine of 
territorial integrity has been elevated to a principle of prime importance 
for the African continent. Save for those States like Morocco or Somalia 
that have founded their raison d'etre upon historical or ethnic factors, 
the overwhelming majority of African countries see their existence in 
terms of their territorial integrity and identify their "nations" in 
strict territorial terms. In Africa, therefore, the notion of the nation- 
state has been replaced by the concept of the territorial-state, in so 
linking the principle of territorial integrity with the preservation of 
the inviolability of the colonial frontiers and thus establishing a legal 
basis for the rejection of both irredentist and secessionist demands, 38 
African States have laid down the basic thesis relating to questions 
regarding territory on the continent. This approach has been character­
ised as constituting the creation of an African Uti Possidetis. 39
(37) Op.cit. p,109, Yakemtchouk writes that "en Afrimie*• ■«“».11 »• « * * • . « “ 0nrded'existence....ce processus est diamétralement opposé à celui oui 
s\manifeste en Europe a partir du XVIe mais surtout au XIXe 
siecle", op.cit. p.8 8.
(38) See Petkovic, ‘’Intégrité Territoriale et Droit l  l'Autodétermination 
en Afrique", Revue de la Politique Internationale, 20 February 1969
P>20. *
(39) S.. Yake.tchou* op.cit pp.83-7. Sep generaUy Bogga, Internationa,
Boundaries, 1940, pp.79-80 and Cukwurah, The Settlemenr^f“'"'*“^ ^
Boundary Disputes in International L»w, 19677pp'.'112-6"---
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This concept, derived from Roman Law,*“ is related to State Succession 
and was an idea adopted by the newly independent States of Latin America 
whereby the administrative divisions of the Spanish empire as they 
existed in South America in 1820 and in Central America in 1821 were 
deemed to constitute the basis for the frontiers of the new States.
It was intended to end boundary conflicts in Southern America and fore­
stall any attempts at European colonisation by preventing any part of 
the sub-continent from being regarded as terra nullius. * 41 The transfer 
of the concept to Africa has been criticised, particularly in view of 
the different circumstances pertaining to the two continents. 42 43 Touval
preferred to see the process of the acceptance of the colonial frontier
43as a "common law of successor States". Whichever phrase is used, the 
essence of the proposition remains, namely that the doctrine of 
territorial integrity has been adopted specifically in Africa as a rule 
operating as a blocking mechanism to any post-independence territorial 
re-arrangement except where attained by mutual consent. 44
(c) The Temporal Definition of Territorial Integrity
The claim has been made that the critical date at which the 
unit of territory is to be defined should not be restricted to the post­
colonial stage. This argument has been used particularly by Morocco,
(4) Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman Law, 1954, p.273. See 
also Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol.I, 1957, p.289.
(41) See Columbia-Venezuela Arbitral Award. 1 RIAA, pp.223, 228. See 
also Cukwurah, op.cit. p.114 and De La Pradelle, La Frontiers.
1928, pp.86-7.
(42) McEwen. International Boundaries of East Africa. 1971, pp.30-1,
(43) "Africa’s Frontiers" 42 International Affairs, 1966, pp.642, 644. 
Touval described the concept as "the right of undisturbed possession 
of the inheritance; existing borders are not to be challenged, ibid.
(44) The concept was re-emphasised in a seminar on International Law and 
Africa organised in Ghana by UNITAR in 1971, Africa Research 
Bulletin, January 1971, p.1983. Note also the comment by the Upper 
Volta Minister of the Interior that there could be no place in 
Africa without scrupulous respect for the colonial borders, no matter 
how imperfect they may be, ibid, September 1974, p.3258.
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and to a lesser extent by Mauritania, to justify territorial claims. 
Morocco has declared that the territory which has to be considered as 
the relevant unit in international law today for the purposes of the 
rule of territorial integrity may also include the pre-colonial 
definition of the State. In Morocco's case the implication could well 
be that this might comprise all of Mauritania and Western Sahara as 
well as parts of Algeria, Mali and even arguably Senegal. This argument 
was used with respect to Morocco's claim to Mauritania in the period 
leading up to and immediately after the independence of the latter45 
and with regard to the Saharan question. In its assertions the Moroccan 
government emphasised that it was seeking the integrity of its territory, 
by which it meant all those areas, including Morocco as constituted in
the post-colonial era, which could be regarded as having been under
46Moroccan sovereignty prior to the colonial period. Morocco maintained
that the concept of territorial integrity proclaimed in paragraph 6 of
47resolution 1514 (XV) referred to the integrity of a country already in 
existence and already constituted as a State and that this had been re­
emphasised in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.48 
However, by that Morocco meant that the concept of territorial integrity 
was available to any independent State in order to recover all of its 
territory as defined according to pre-colonial history. As far as Sahara
was concerned, Morocco’s sole concern "was the liberation of Western
49Sahara and its reintegration into the Moroccan State''. Mauritania, 
during the course of the hearings before the International Court in the 
Sahara case, added the point that the principle of African Uti Possidetis
(45) A/4445 and Add.l.
(46) A/10023/Add.5, annex para.294. See also Western Sahara case, ICJ, 
Pleadings CB.75/8, pp.11-16.
(47) Supra, p .  270.
(48) A/10023/Add.5, annex para.295.
(49) Ibid, para.298. See also ibid, appendix II, para.16.
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only concerned States which had obtained independence and did not ban
50regroupings before accession to independence.
Algeria’s stated view was that a claim to territorial integrity was
51more than lawful, it was sacred. It distinguished three varieties of
territorial integrity. The territorial integrity of a colony with
respect to the territory of the administering power was now well
established and enshrined in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law. The territorial integrity of the non-self-governing
territory vis-à-vis a neighbouring State was an issue governed by the
principle of uti possidetis juris or respect for the frontiers bequeathed
by colonisation. It amounted to a general and valid rule and not a mere
de facto practice and it constituted the basis upon which African States
were achieving independence. More than that, Algeria emphasised that
the principle of the inviolability of frontiers was one of the pillars of
52international law. The third type of territorial integrity derived
from the concern to preserve the territorial integrity of the neighbouring
State in relation to the non-self-governing territory. It concerned the
question of decolonisation by integration and this, it was stressed,
could take place only on the basis of the free choice of the population
of the dependent territory and not by virtue of the territorial integrity
53of the neighbouring State. The view that paragraph 6 of resolution 
1514 (XV) could refer to territories formerly detached from a State and 
now the subject of a claim on the grounds of the principle of integrity 
was strongly rejected. Paragraph 6 related only to future attempts to 
impair the territorial integrity of a State and could not be used to give 
territorial claims priority over the principle of self-determination. 50 1234
(50) Western Sahara case, ICJ, Pleadings, CR.75/13, p.48.
(51) Pleadings, CR.75/31, p.25.
(52) Ibid, pp.25-31.
(53) Ibid, p .36.
(54) Ibid, pp.37-8.
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A variation in the temporal-shift approach to the concept of
territorial integrity is afforded by Alexandrowicz's views on "reversion 
55to sovereignty". This was based on the claim by Ceylon in the General
Assembly Sixth Committee discussions on the report of the International
Law Commission on Succession of States and Governments in respect of
Treaties that in view of its existence as an independent Kingdom prior
to the nineteenth century, it should be classified not as a new State
but as an original State in the Family of Nations. 5 6 5789 Judge Moreno
Quintana appeared to take the view that such reversion to sovereignty
was essentially of a procedural character and did not therefore affect
the acts of the colonial power resulting from the legitimate exercise of
57its right of sovereignty in the colonial period. Brownlie, however, 
has pointed to the dangers of accepting this theory as valid in 
international law. The logical consequence of such a doctrine of 
reversion may create a threat to the security of legal relations, it is 
noted, for "it would follow that the successor would not be bound by 
territorial grants or recognition of territorial changes by the previous 
holder". This, of course, would introduce a serious element of
instability in the international system as well as challenging the
59dominant interpretation of self-determination.
The court in the Western Sahara case did not directly discuss whether 
the concept of territorial integrity could refer to pre-colonial States, 
but it did emphasise that the right to self-determination, predicated upon
(55) See "New and Original States", 45 International Affairs, 1969, 
p.465 and "The New States and International Law", 3 Millenium 
Journal of International Studies, 1974-5, p.226.
(56) A/C.6/SR.1036. See also ICJ Reports, 1960, p.6 .
(57) Ibid, pp.93-6.
(58) Principles of Public International Law. 2nd ed, 1973, p.652.
(59) Alexandrowicz made the point that the doctrine would generally 
not apply in Africa, except for Algeria, see "New and Original 
States" 45 International Affairs, 1969, pp.465, 473 and 478.
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"the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples" was
one of the basic principles governing the decolonisation process. 60 612
The presumption was clearly against upsetting the wishes of the
inhabitants of the territory to be decolonised and should they be against
integration or re-integration with an independent State, their views 
61would prevail. The legal basis for any merger would thus be the freely 
expressed wishes of the people of the territory and not any principle of 
territorial integrity accruing to another State.
Judge Dillard unambiguously made the point that "any claim to what
has been called automatic retrocession is not applicable to the Western
Sahara and therefore it was unnecessary for the court to pronounce upon
the principle of territorial integrity embodied in paragraph 6 of
62resolution 1514(XV)". It was suggested that the court might have 
discussed the matter further had it decided that the Moroccan claim had 
been established, but in any event Dillard's own view of paragraph 6 
"makes it unlikely that H  could justifiably be applied to the 
decolonisation of Western Sahara as a principle of territorial integrity 
overriding the right of the people to self-determination" . 63 Judge 
Nagendra Singh was of a similar opinion with respect to Western Sahara.
He noted that there was no evidence of a single State comprising Morocco 
and Western Sahara or Mauritania and Western Sahara at the time of Spanish 
colonisation "which would have been dismembered by the coloniser and thus 
justified reunion on decolonisation at the present time" , 64 and therefore 
paragraph 6 of resolution 1514(XV) was not applicable. The legal ties
(60) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 33 and 34.
(61) Ibid, p.6 8. See also Judges Dillard, ibid, p.123 and Nagendra Sinah
ibid, p.81. b
(62) Ibid, p.120.
(63) Ibid, footnote
(64) Ibid, pp.79-80.
which did exist at the time of Spanish colonisation between the
claimants and Western Sahara "were not of such a character as to
justify today the reintegration or retrocession of the territory
65without consulting the people".
The Judge appeared to leave open the possibility that if legal
ties of territorial sovereignty were deemed to exist between the
territory in question and a claimant State prior to colonisation,
then the concept of territorial integrity might conceivably be
66utilised to justify a retrocession. In a sense, a gap exists in
the court's advisory opinion on Western Sahara. However, two things
ought to be noted. Firstly, that the principle of territorial
integrity in this sense is relevant in cases of colonial enclaves,
where in essence the right of self-determination exists only in an
extremely attenuated form, and secondly, in usual decolonisation
situations, the applicability of this principle may be of relevance
only in a procedural context. The court noted in the Western
Sahara case that "the right of self-determination leaves the
General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms
68and procedures by which that right is to be realised". 6578
(65) Ibid, p.79. The effect of recognition of legal ties by the 
court between the claimants and Sahara was to point out the 
possible options open to the inhabitants of the territory, 
ibid, p.80. But see resolution 1514 (XV) and the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law. Judge Petren 
noted that the question of the role of past legal ties in the 
decolonisation process fell within an, as yet, inadequately 
explored area of contemporary international law, ibid, p.112.
(6 6) Ibid, p.80. See also Judge Petren ibid, p,114.
(67) See supra, Chapter 4, p.245.
(6 8) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 36.
The court went on to say that as far as the future action of
the General Assembly was concerned, "various possibilities exist,
for instance with regard to consultations between the interested
States, and the procedures and guarantees required for ensuring
68aa full and genuine expression of the will of the people".
Accordingly the existence of ties might affect the form in which
any plebiscite questions may be phrased, the extent of any
consultations with interested parties and indeed the manner in
which the inhabitants of the particular territory may be consulted.
Such consultation may be, for instance, by plebiscite or by simple
consent of institutions deemed representative. There is thus some
scope for the expression in international practice of such ties,
although care would be needed to prevent the procedural aspects
from having a serious impact upon the fundamental substantive
provision. One may also note with interest how the court
discussed the issue of self-determination before turning to the
two questions asked of it, thus emphasising the crucial role of
the concept. The court stressed in particular that neither the
request for the advisory opinion nor the terms of resolution
3292 (XXIX) affected the right to self-determination of the 
68bpeople of Sahara.
(6 8a) Ibid, p.37. 
(68b) Ibid, p.36.
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If the temporal-shift interpretation of territorial integrity is not
to be applied as regards a pre-colonial State, the question arises as to
its applicability to pre-colonial non-State entities. The court, while
accepting the variation in forms of States, nevertheless identified
personality in terms of a legal entity in the light of the essential
test as to whether the entity was in such a position as to possess in
regard to its members rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect. 69 701
The "Mauritanian entity" at the date of colonisation was not such an 
70entity. Therefore, the notion of territory and territorial integrity 
in international law was of no direct relevance as far as it was 
concerned. It would also be logical to suggest that the concept of 
territorial integrity can have no applicability in the law as far as pre­
colonial non-State entities are concerned.
Accordingly, one may conclude that the correct temporal context
for the definition of territorial integrity is the period of decolonisation.
The territorial configuration of any given entity at an earlier historical
period would of itself have no legal importance, although when allied to
strong historical and cultural ties, for example, existing between the
successor State and the territory in question, it might at the discretion
71of the United Nations have some procedural relevance.
(d) Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination
The link between the two concepts in the period of decolonisation 
is, therefore, crucial, for the right of the people to self-determination 
takes place only within the framework of the colonially defined territory.
(69) Ibid, p.63. Note also the definition of State sovereignty in terms 
of genuine display or exercise of the State authority, ibid, p,44.
(70) Ibid, pp.63-4.
(71) See footnote 69.
In post-independence situations, the link is two-fold. Firstly, it
reinforces the norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any
State, for all States have the right to choose their own political,
economic and social systems. Secondly, the two principles together will
operate to render unlawful any territorial diminution of an independent
State which takes place in conditions where a legal right to self-
determination exists and where the effect of such action would be counter
to the right of the people concerned to self-determination. To date,
this proposition relates specifically and uniquely to South Africa and its 
72bantustan policy. In resolution 2775E(XXVI), the UN General Assembly
stated that the bantustan policy was in pursuance of apartheid and it
condemned the policy as violating the right to self-determination and as
prejudicial to territorial integrity. This was repeated in resolution
3411D(XXX), which also reaffirmed that the establishment of bantustans
was a measure "essentially designed to destroy the territorial integrity
of the country in violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations". In June 1976, the OAU Council of Ministers
reaffirmed "the OAU's sacred commitment to the principles of territorial
and national integrity of all territories under foreign domination and
fighting for liberation and self-determination" and called on all States
not to recognise any of the bantustans, in particular the Transkei,72 3 74
The Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid declared that the
agreements signed between South Africa and the proposed Transkei Chief 
74Minister were of no validity and were not agreements for the granting 
of self-determination or independence to the African people, but a fraud.
(72) See also supra, Chapter 4, p.257 and infra Chapter 6 , p .355 
and Chapter 7, p.477.
(73) CM/Res.493 XXVII.
(74) Such agreements were a prelude to independence, Africa Research 
Bulletin, September 1976, p.5153.
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An appeal was made to all governments and organisations for solidarity 
with the people of Namibia and South Africa in their struggle against the 
bantustan policy and for the territorial integrity of their nations. 75 76
On October 26, 1976, the Transkei was declared independent by 
76South Africa, and on the same day the General Assembly, in resolution 
7731/6a, condemned the change in status of the Transkei and referred to 
its "sham independence". The establishment of bantustans was strongly 
attacked as designed to consolidate apartheid and destroy the territorial 
integrity of the country. All governments were called upon to deny 
recognition to the Transkei or any other bantustan. 77 in June 1977, the 
Security Council unanimously endorsed Assembly resolution 31/6A.78 The 
principles behind these resolutions may be stated as follows. The right 
of self-determination applies to the people of South Africa as a single 
unit. An integral part of this right is the right to territorial 
integrity. Any activity involving territorial diminution not in 
accordance with the right of all the people to determine their political 
status contravenes not only the right to self-determination but also the 
inter-connected principle of territorial integrity. Thus, until the right
(75) UNMC October 1976, p.15.
(76) See the Status of the Transkei Act 1976, ILM, September 1976, 
p.1175. See also the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act,
1976, ILM, September 1976, p.1136.
(77) The resolution was sponsored by 67 States and adopted by 134 votes 
to none. The USA, the sole abstaining State, declared that it was 
prepared to support a resolution calling on all States not to 
recognise the Transkei and not to have official contacts with the 
Transkei government, but it had certain reservations about the 
clause prohibiting individuals from dealing with the bantustan, 
UNMC November 1976, p.14. See also the statement by the UN 
Secretary-General, ibid.
(78) Resolution 407 (1977). See also Assembly resolution 32/14. On 
6 December 1977, the independent State of Bophuthatswana was 
proclaimed amidst condemnation from the OAU and the EEC, Africa 
Research Bulletin, November 1977, p.4631 and ibid December 1977, 
pp.4666-8. See generally Richardson, "Self-Determination, 
International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy" 17 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1978, p.185.
of the people as a whole to exercise self-determination is granted in 
accordance with UN resolutions, there appears to be a duty not to reduce 
or adversely affect the territorial integrity of the nation. To this 
extent, paragraph 6 of resolution 1514(XV) is relevant.
II - The Nature of Claims Against Territorial Integrity
Once a State has become independent and thereby exercised the right 
to self-determination as spatially defined, the question of the temporal 
application of self-determination arises. In other words, does the right 
of self-determination in international law subsist beyond the achievement 
of independence to challenge the territorial integrity of the new State 
or is it temporally restricted to the period of decolonisation? If the 
latter is the case, as is contended although the potential for change 
exists as the South African situation demonstrates, one may posit a 
fundamental harmony between self-determination and territorial integrity 
on a number of planes. As we have seen, the colonial borders delimited 
the territories in Africa and gave them thereby a certain national, 
linguistic and cultural framework. Additionally, the territory so 
delimited became a unit both externally in relation to other such 
territories and the international community in general and internally as 
regards a particular self-image. However, a number of claims have been 
made against the territorial integrity of States, although one must 
distinguish between irredentist and secessionist claims since the 
situation in law is distinct. Such claims have revolved primarily around 
ethnic and historical factors, although economic and geographic 
contentions have also been pressed. In most situations a variety of 
assertions are made at the same time in order to demonstrate the strength 
of a particular claim, while it is interesting to note just how many are 
actually expressed in terras of the right of self-determination, although 
interpreting it in ways inconsistent with accepted formulations.
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This use of the concept is presumably an attempt to derive some benefit
79from the charisma of the principle itself. We shall note some of the 
types of claims made against the territorial integrity of States before 
proceeding in subsequent sections to an examination of practice.
80(a) Historic Claims
These are propounded upon the basis that what has been ought
now to be and that the existence (usually before colonisation) of a
sovereign State should entitle it in the post-colonial era to claim the
extent of its previous territorial limits. In the context of African
affairs, there has been only one major such claimant and that is Morocco,
Morocco has claimed all of Mauritania and Western Sahara and parts of
Mali, Algeria and possibly Senegal on the basis of historical connection,
since it was argued that from the eleventh century to the establishment
of the French protectorate in 1912, the Kingdom of Morocco had extended
81from the Mediterranean to the Senegal River. This historical
connection was expressed in terms of personal and religious allegiance to
the Sultan of Morocco rather than in the light of the European concept of
82territorial jurisdiction within a State. Although the International
Court accepted the specific character of the late nineteenth century
Moroccan State, the test of extent of sovereignty was still based upon
83evidence of actual exercise of authority. Using this test, it was 7980123
(79) This emphasises the point made by Hill that the "types of claims 
made by a State to territory reflect the doctrines and conditions 
dominant in international relations at the time", Claims to 
Territory in International Law and Relations. 1945. p.35.
(80) See Hill op.cit.pp.81-91, and Jennings, The Acquisition of 
Territory in International Law, 1963, pp,76-8.
(81) A/4445 and Add.1. See also Rezette, The Western Sahara and the 
Frontiers of Morocco, 1975, pp.35-50;" Wild, "The Organisation of 
African Unity and the Algeria-Morocco Border Conflict" 20 Inter­
national Organisation, 1966, p,l8 and Zartman, "The Politics of 
Boundaries in North and West Africa" 3 JMAS, 1965, p.155,
(82) Supra, p.90.
(83) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 43-4.
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concluded that although a legal tie of allegiance had existed between the
Sultan and some of the peoples of the territory at the time of
colonisation, Morocco's claim of immemorial possession based on the
public display of sovereignty uninterrupted and uncontested for centuries 
84was not accepted. Judge De Castro in particular emphasised that the 
doctrine of intertemporal law, expressed in the rule tempus regit factum 
was relevant in such cases. Whatever the ties between Morocco and Western 
Sahara in the 1880’s, the fact of colonisation had created a new 
situation with sociological and legal implications which had to be 
assessed in accordance with the law in force at that time. In addition 
the decolonisation process based on the UN Charter and resolutions had 
created a new legal context for the non-self-governing territories and, 
as the court had declared in the Namibia case,83 the principle of self- 
determination had become applicable to them all.84 56 Judge De Castro noted 
that whatever the existing ties with Western Sahara at the time of 
colonisation by Spain, "legally those ties remain subject to intertemporal 
law and that as a consequence they cannot stand in the way of the 
application of the principle of self-determination".87
Morocco's claims regarding Mauritania and Algeria,88 89similarly based
on historically oriented factors, failed to arouse much international
support and ultimately Morocco accepted the reality of the colonial 
89 'frontiers. In the Sahara, Morocco first compromised its claim by its
(84) Ibid, pp.48-9.
(85) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31.
(86) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 168-71.
(87) Ibid, p.171. Emphasis in original. See also Judge Dillard ibid
p.118. '
(88) In this case there was also uncertainty as to the precise location 
of the borders, see infra, p. 530.
(89) Algeria did note at one time that although it had no claims of its 
own, there were historical rights it could assert over territory 
Morocco claimed and occupied, see Africa Research Bulletin
March 1067, p.734.
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arrangement with Mauritania and then proceeded to enforce it in defiance
of the opinion of the International Court. A number of other historical
claims in Africa have also been made. Liberia claimed the Mount Nimba
region of Guinea and the land between the Cavally and Cess rivers in the
Ivory Coast on historical grounds, but renounced these claims upon the
90independence of the two States. In 1975, Lesotho asserted a claim 
before the UN for "conquered territory" in South Africa's Orange Free 
State and Cape, which had originally belonged to Basutoland before being
Q1added to the South African areas over one hundred years earlier.
Uganda claimed large areas of territory taken from it in colonial times
92and transferred to Sudan and Kenya, while Malawi in 1968 claimed
districts in Zambia and Tanzania which it asserted belonged to it on
historical and other grounds and which had been detached in colonial 
93times. None of these claims succeeded while historical claims in
general have not been accepted as valid legal claims to territory in 
, , 94international law.
95(b) Ethnic Claims
Since claims are closely linked with the political definition 
of self-determination and consist of the assertion that either a . 
particular ethnic group is entitled to secede from an existing State or 
that an existing State may extend its territorial limits to include all 9012345
(90) Zartman "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa"
3 JMAS, 1965, pp.155, 172.
(91) Africa Research Bulletin, January 1975, pp.3485-6 and ibid,
October 1975, pp.3783-4.
(92) Ibid, February 1976, pp.3919-20, Note also the historical claims 
by Ethiopia in 1945-8 to Eritrea and Somaliland, see A/C.l/8 and 
Marian, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute"
11 JMAS, 1964, pp.189 et seq.
(93) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1968, pp.ll, 78-9,
(94) See Hill op.cit. p.171 and Jennings op.cit. pp.76-8.
(95) See for example Hill op.cit. pp.115-30 and Yakemtchouk,
L'Afrique en Droit International. 1971. p p .88-90.
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members of a particular ethnic group. The ethnic secessionist claim
has manifested itself in a number of instances, the most prominent being
the Biafra case, while the ethnic irredentist claim is most clearly
instanced by the Somali case. In a number of cases the two claims have
merged, so that a secessionist claim will be subsumed under an irredentist
97assertion by a neighbouring State. The use of the ethnic argument to 
found title to territory has been singularly unsuccessful in this purist 
form, because once granted it could lead to widespread disruption and 
destroy the territorialist conception of the State maintained by African 
States.
98(c) Geographic Claims
Allied with strategic claims or demands for a natural frontier,"
the concept of geographic claims could have been used to a far larger
extent than has in fact occurred in a continent of such arbitrary borders
as Africa. The fact that it has not (apart from indirectly in the special
case of colonial enclaves) reinforces the acceptance of colonial borders.
Morocco attempted to use the geographic contiguity of Western Sahara as
an additional reason for the foundation of its title upon an analogy with
1 0 0  „  ^  ■ 'the Eastern Greenland case. However, the International Court, after 967810
(96) Not all ethnic groups always wish to live in the same State. See 
for example the case of Bugulfi, which was included in Tanganyika 
in the mandate agreements of 1922. In 1948, the ruler of Urundi 
petitioned the Trusteeship Council for the return of the area, A 
UN Visiting Mission in July of that year declared that Bugulfi was 
geographically clearly part of Urundi and its people were Barundi, 
T/217/Add.1, p.101. The matter was further discussed between the 
British and Belgian authorities, but a resolution of the Trusteeship 
Council in February 1950 recognised that the evidence showed that an 
overwhelming majority of the people of Bugulfi wished to retain the 
status quo and accordingly no action was taken, T/635 and 
resolution 116(VI).
(97) See infra, p.295.
(98) See for example Hill op.cit. pp.71-80 and Jennings op.cit. p.74.
(99) See Blum, Secure Boundaries and Middle East Peace, 1971.
(100) PCIJ Series A/B, no.53.
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noting that the geographic unity of Western Sahara with Morocco was in
any case debatable, declared that even if the "geographic contiguity of
Western Sahara with Morocco could be taken into account in the present
connection it would only make paucity of evidence of unambiguous display
of authority with respect to Western Sahara more difficult to reconcile
with Morocco’s claim to immemorial possession".101 On 1 November 1978,
Uganda announced that it was annexing a 710 sq. mile area of Tanzania up
to the Kagera river. Part of the reason for this was that Uganda saw the
river as its "natural frontier" with Tanzania rather than the arbitrary
land boundary fixed between Britain and Germany before the First World
War. A week later under OAU pressure, Uganda proclaimed its intention to
102evacuate the salient. It is clear that under international law
103geographic claims are insufficient to found title and African practice 
has underlined this.
104(d) Economic Claims
Although economic reasons have underlain a number of territorial 
claims, direct economic claims have been very rare. However, Tunisia did 
claim a "prolongation" of its territory into Algerian Sahara up to marker 
233 or an agreement that beyond a certain limit in the Sahara "the door 
opens on an area undivided and shared by all, where communications, water 
points, pasturage and underground wealth are at the disposal of all",105 
upon an analogy of the desert with the sea. Tunisia did seem to be seeking
(101) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 42-3.
(102) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1978, pp.5052-5.
(103) See for example the Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA p.829, and 
Waldock, "Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies",
25 BYIL, 1948, p.342.
(104) Hill op.cit. pp.92-113 and 172
(105) Speech by President Bourguiba of Tunisia on 5 February 1959 quoted 
in Zartman, loc.cit. p.113. See also Touval, The Boundary 
Politics of Independent Africa, 1972, pp.251-4.
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economic rights rather than actual territorial acquisition, in the event,
and this was expressed in the theory of depassement, according to which
border disputes would be left behind by a higher level of cooperation
agreements. Ultimately, Tunisia formally renounced any territorial
claims and recognised the territorial status quo in a series of agreements 
, 106with Algeria.
Ill - State Practice
In this section, African State practice regarding irredentist and 
secessionist claims against independent States will be examined. Such 
claims have been made in the light of primarily historical and ethnic 
factors, although cultural elements were necessarily involved.
(a) Irredentist Claims
(1) Moroccan Claims to Algerian Territory
In pursuit of its pre-colonial borders, Morocco has also
claimed areas of Algeria on the basis of respect for the territorial
integrity of its pre-colonial territorial extent. However, large parts
of the border were never demarcated in view of the nature of the 
107territory. Prior to its independence, the provisional Algerian
government recognised the existence of a "territorial problem" with
108Morocco in an agreement signed at Rabat on 6 July 1961, and 
negotiations were promised. However, upon the achievement of independence 
a year later, Algerian attitudes changed and when French troops were 10678
(106) See Africa Research Bulletin, January 1970, p.1633 and ibid,
May 1970, p.1748.
(107) See the Treaty of Lalla - Marnia, 1845, Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, p.19939 and infra, p.530.
(108) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.19940 and Africa Research 
Bulletin, October 1966, p.632. Algeria declared that any Franco- 
Algerian agreement regarding territorial delimitation between it 
and Morocco would not be binding on Morocco, Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, p.19940.
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withdrawn, both Morocco and Algeria sent in soldiers to occupy positions 
in the disputed areas. An agreement was signed in April 1963, but it 
proved a failure. In September, Morocco occupied border posts claimed 
by both sides, but they were captured the next month by Algeria. This 
precipitated a wider conflict and on October 15, King Hassan of Morocco 
declared that his country was determined "to impose respect for our
1QQnational territory and the integrity of its authentic frontiers".
After a series of unsuccessful mediation attempts,110 a meeting was held
at Bamako at the end of October with the president of Mali and the
emperor of Ethiopia as mediators. This resulted in an agreement which
comprised a cease-fire, a commission to determine a demilitarisation zone
composed of the parties and the mediators and a proposed meeting of OAU
Foreign Ministers at Addis Ababa to establish an arbitration commission.111
This arbitration commission was set up in November with representatives of
Ethiopia, Mali, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika, and
the following February an agreement regarding a demilitarised zone, troop
withdrawals, the establishment of a no-man’s-land and an exchange of
112prisoners was signed. In January 1969, Morocco and Algeria signed a
Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation valid for twenty years according to
113which all questions at issue were to go to joint commissions. On 
May 27, 1970, the two parties met at Tlemcen in Algeria and agreed upon 
a final settlement of the frontier dispute with a joint commission to map 
out the delimitation. The frontier was to be the same as during the 
colonial period, while Morocco was to have a share in mineral exploitation
■ n 4
in the Gara-Djebilat area. In June 1972, at the Rabat Conference of
(109) Ibid.
(110) By Ghana, Syria, Tunisia, Iraq and Egypt 
of the Arab League, ibid, p.19941.
and also by the Council
(111) Ibid, p.19942.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Ibid, p,24125.
(114) Ibid. See also Africa Research Bulletin, May 1970, p,1748,
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the OAU, the leaders of the two countries met again and declared that
the border issue was resolved. Two conventions were signed, a border
agreement declaring that the disputed area of Tindouf would remain part
of independent Algeria and an economic cooperation agreement regarding
115the mining of iron ore deposits south-east of Tindouf. King Hassan
declared that "frontiers have nowadays lost their former importance."15 16 17
Moroccan claims to Algerian territory were never recognised by any other
country and ultimately Morocco itself was compelled to accept the existing
frontier as colonially defined, with some delimitation of areas that had
been left undelimited. A major territorial dispute therefore resolved
itself into an exercise of delimitation. It is interesting to note that
when the issue was discussed at the Extraordinary Session of the OAU
Council of Ministers in November 1963, a resolution was adopted
proclaiming that African States must seek solutions to disputes "within
the framework of the principles and the institutions prescribed by the
117Charter of the Organisation of African Unity", and Article 3(3) of the 
OAU Charter emphasises the principle of "respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each State".
(2) Somali Claims toEthiopian and Kenyan Territory
Somalia is unique among African States in being a homogeneous 
nation-State on European lines. It therefore has had no need for the 
territorial principle of State legitimacy since it possesses its own 
ethnic raison d ’etre. However, there are a substantial number of Somali 
tribesmen inhabiting areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti and in its 
claims to extend its boundaries it has demonstrated the classic ethnic
(115) The signing of the conventions was witnessed by the representatives 
of the 40 States attending the conference, Keesings Contemporary
Archives, p.25372, and Africa Research Bulletin, June 1972, p.2502.
(116) Ibid.
(117) ECM/Res. 1(1).
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assertion. Somalia has consistently opposed the status quo approach
to African borders and has argued instead for the right of self-
determination, by which it means not the legal doctrine as defined in
international practice, but rather the political concept founded as it is
upon ethnic or national factors. Having no fear of secessionist movements
119Itself since it is ethnically united, Somalia has failed to perceive
African apprehensions of tribal conflict in the event of a rearrangement
of borders on ethnic lines. It itself is a merger of the former British
120and Italian Somalilands and its constitution and five star flag reflect 
its aim of promoting the political unification of the Somali nation.
Somalia opposed the important OAU resolution on respect for colonial 
borders, as did Morocco. In its wishes to unite all Somalis, Somalia 
received some initial sympathy from the more radical gatherings of African 
and other States, but support has since waned appreciably.
The First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Cairo in
December 1957 approved a resolution regarding the right to self-deterrain-
121ation of the people of Somaliland, while the All-Africa Peoples' 
Conference at Tunis in 1960 supported the struggle of the Somalis "for
122independence and unity in order to give birth to a bigger Somaliland".
The Conakry Conference of 1960 of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organisation adopted a resolution in favour of the "glorious struggle of
123the Somali people for their freedom, independence and unification". 189203
(118) See Hill, op.cit. p.115. This is what Zartman calls "national over­
hang", "The Foreign and Military Politics of African Boundary 
Problems", African Boundary Problems (ed. Widstrand), 1969, p,81.
See also Hoskyns, The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute 1960-7. 1969.
(119) Touval, Somali Nationalism, 1963, pp,16-25 and 29.
(120) Representing British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Djibouti and 
the Somali inhabited parts of Kenya and Ethiopia.
(121) Touval. The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. 1972, pp.51-3.
(122) Legum, Pan-Africanism, 1962, p.246.
(123) Touval, op.cit. p,63.
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The Somali case was discussed at a preparatory meeting of Foreign
Ministers at Addis Ababa dealing with the creation of the OAU in 1963.
Somalia requested an item on the agenda dealing with territorial disputes
between neighbouring African States and the establishment of machinery to 
124resolve them. It was included under item VII dealing with the creation
of a Permanent Conciliation Commission but never actually dealt with as
the establishment of a conciliation commission was subsumed under the
125discussion on the setting up of an organisation of African States.
At the first OAU Summit Conference, the Somali president put forward his 
case but was faced with arguments supporting the territorial integrity of 
States based upon colonial borders put forward by Ethiopia and the
X26representatives of the pre-independent Kenya-African National Union.
In July 1963, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defence agreement
and in January and February 1964 incidents in the Haud and Ogaden regions
of Ethiopia claimed by Somalia led to fighting between the Ethiopian and
127Somali regular armies. Somalia informed the OAU Secretariat of the
128fighting and requested a meeting of the Security Council. - On the same
day, Ethiopia asked the OAU to consider its complaint against Somalia.
The United Nations Secretary-General preferred an African framework to be
129used for the discussion of the problem and the issue was accordingly 
placed before an Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers at 12456789
(124) Procs.I, Sec.I, Doc. Agenda/Conf./5, May 15, 1963.
(125) ClAS/Plenary/3, May 22, 1963.
(126) C1AS/GEN/INF/25 and 43. See also Wolfers, Politics in the 
Organisation of African Unity, 1976, pp.132-3.
(127) A f r i c a  Research Bulletin, February 1964, pp.22-3.
(128) S/5536.
(129) See Wolfers op.cit. p.134.
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Dar-Es-Salaam. Somalia informed the UN Secretary-General that it
would not raise the matter with the Security Council while the problem
131was in the hands of the OAU. At the conference, Somalia restricted its 
demands to a cease-fire and disengagement of the armies, while Kenya and 
Ethiopia broadened out the discussion into matters of principle. Kenya 
suggested that a further Charter should be established which would 
prohibit territorial claims. Ultimately a resolution was adopted calling 
for a cease-fire, cessation of hostile propaganda and negotiations for a
1 ^ 9peaceful settlement of the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. A
resolution dealing with the Somali-Kenyan dispute was limited to calling
for steps to be taken to settle the dispute without actually requesting
133negotiations between the parties. The issue was further discussed at 
the Second Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers at Lagos. In 
spite of Somali objections that a territorial dispute was involved, the 
Ethiopian-Somali dispute was listed as a border one. Ethiopia and Kenya 
called on Somalia to renounce its territorial claims. A resolution was 
eventually adopted on the Ethiopian-Somali dispute which confirmed the 
Dar-Es-Salaam resolution and called on the parties to respect the cease­
fire. The resolution also requested Ethiopia and Somalia to open direct 
negotiations and significantly referred to Article 3(3) of the OAU Charter,
which specifically mentions respect for the sovereignty and territorial
134 ■ ■ ■ . . .integrity of States. The resolution on the Somali-Kenyan dispute 13024
(130) The Extraordinary Session had been called to discuss the army 
mutinies in East Africa, but the dangers of renewed fighting between 
Ethiopia and Somalia convinced the representatives to consider the 
issue, Kenya’s request that its dispute with Somalia be placed on 
the agenda was subsequently accepted by the Council, see Touval,
"The Organisation of African Unity and African Borders", 21 Inter­
national Organisation, 1967, pp,102, 112.
(131) S/5542. See also S/5557 and S/5558,
(132) ECM/Res.3 (II).
(133) ECM/Res.4 (II), and in accordance with Article 3(4) of the Charter 
of the OAU, See Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent 
Africa, 1972, pp.212-6, and Hoskyns, op.cit. 1969, pp.50-61.
(134) CM/Res.16 (II).
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1similarly called for negotiations and referred to Article 3(3), It
thus appeared that African States accepted the territorial positions of 
Ethiopia and Kenya and were prepared only to seek means to defuse the 
crisis. A cease-fire was in fact agreed through Sudanese mediation in 
March and the joint Ethiopian-Somali communique issued at the end of the 
meeting noted that the talks had taken place in accordance with the OAU's 
recommendations.
The Somali disputes were to be discussed at the first OAU Assembly
of Heads of State and Governments in Cairo in July 1964, but this was
137postponed in view of a Somali government crisis. However, at this
conference, the OAU resolution was adopted which called on member-States
138to respect the colonial borders. At the second OAU Assembly at Accra
in October 1965, an agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Somalia
139against using hostile propaganda, but the tension continued. During 
December 1965, President Nyerere of Tanzania arranged a Somali-Kenyan 
meeting at Arusha, but this had no positive results. Kenya refused to
negotiate about its territorial integrity, while Somalia demanded the
140right of self-determination for its kin in northern Kenya. The next 
year, Sudan attempted to mediate between the two, but it was not until 
after a change in government in Somalia in June 1967 that progress could 
be effected. During the fourth OAU Assembly in Kinshasa in September 1967,
(135) CM/Res.17 (II).
(136) OAU Review, May 1964, vol.I, no.I, pp.40-1,
(137) The Somali Republic and the Organisation of African Unity.
Mogadishu, 1964, pp.39-40, 138940
(138) AHG/Res.16 (I). At the conference, Somalia objected to the Ethiopia- 
Kenyan defence pact and requested the OAU to denounce such agreements 
but this item was dropped from the agenda following a note proposed 
by Tanzania, see Touval "The Organisation of African Unity and 
African Borders" 21 International Organisation, 1967, pp.102, 116-7,
(139) Africa Research Bulletin, October 1965, p.381,
(140) Hoskyns, op.cit. pp.73-4.
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the Zambian President encouraged Somalia and Kenya to meet and a joint
declaration emerged in which both parties agreed to negotiate in
accordance with the OAU Charter and this was endorsed by the Assembly.141 142
The Kinshasa Declaration noted that "both sides have expressed their
desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in
the spirit of paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the OAU Charter". Thus,
Somalia had appeared to accept the principle of territorial integrity in
practice although its hopes for eventual unification remained.143 145* In
October 1967, a conference was convened between the parties at Arusha
under Zambian mediation and an agreement was signed relating to the
144easing of tensions and the ending of the propaganda war.
The Ethiopian-Somali situation remained quiescent for a number of
years. However, in 1973 the issue was revived due to a number of factors
ranging from the growing tension between the two over the French Territory
of the Afars and Issas to the discovery of oil and gas in the Ogaden
region claimed by Somalia. At the OAU Council of Ministers in May 1973,
Somalia accused Ethiopia of massing troops in the area and insisted on
placing the issue on the agenda of the OAU Assembly in terms of a
territorial dispute. Ethiopia maintained that it was merely a border
dispute involving the demarcation of part of the boundary in accordance
with existing agreements. In the event, the Council decided upon a
' 145compromise and a five-man commission was appointed. The following
month, an OAU Good Offices Committee was established at the OAU Assembly
146with a Sudanese mediator. Both Ethiopia and Somalia maintained their
(141) AHG/St.l (IV).
(142) Brownlie, Basic Documents on African Affairs. 1971, pp.362-3,
(143) See the speech by the Somali Premier quoted in Hoskyns op.cit. p.80
(144) Ibid, pp.82-3. See also Africa Research Bulletin, October 1967,
pp.880-2.
(145) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1973, p.2845.
Ibid, June 1973, pp.2883-4 and 2850.(146)
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positions. At the OAU Assembly of June 1974, Ethiopia declared that the
Somali dispute was only a question of demarcating an unmarked border,
while Somalia pursued its territorial claim.147 1489 Throughout 1976 violence
increased in the Ogaden region as the Somali-backed Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) forces infiltrated into the area, and by summer
1977 it was clear that the WSLF effectively controlled the whole of the 
148Ogaden plain. On 2 August 1977, the Ethiopians failed to secure the
necessary two-thirds vote when they tried to convene an emergency session
of the OAU Council of Ministers to consider the alleged Somali aggression/
The eight nation OAU Committee established in 1973 attempted to mediate
but the WSLF was refused a hearing and Somalia boycotted the closing
session of the meetings. A resolution was adopted by the commission which
reaffirmed the inviolability of African frontiers as at the date of
independence and condemned political subversion.150 15 Somalia argued
against this that the principle of the respect for borders as at the grant
of independence did not apply in this case, since Somali territory had
been colonised by Ethiopia in the past. It was stated that Ethiopia was
a colonial State which had taken part in the partition of Africa at the
1884-5 Berlin Conference and this meant that the population of the Ogaden
151retained the right to self-determination. in other words, the WSLF 
were merely exercising the accepted right with regard to the decolonisation 
of a colonial territory. On February 11, 1978, Somalia officially
(147) Ibid, June 1974, p.3257.
(148) See Mayall, "The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentisra and
International Diplomacy", The World Today, September 1978 p.336.
See further infra, Chapter 7, p,511, ' ’ '
(149) Mayall loc.cit. p.337.
(150) Ibid. See infra, Chapter 7, p,513.
(151) See Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1978 pp 664-5
and UNMC November 1977, pp.52-3 and 108-9, ’
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announced that its regular army was being sent into the Ogaden, but the
Cuban and Russian aid to Ethiopia proved decisive and on March 9, Somalia
declared that its forces were being withdrawn. Somalia received no
152international support for its irredentist activities, and it was made
clear that military aid would only be sent to Somalia to defend its
153recognised borders. The degree of Somalia's isolation with regard to
its 1976-8 Ogaden adventure is compelling evidence as to the unaccept-
154ability of the active pursuit of irredentist aims.
(3) Ghana's Claims to the Ivory Coast
Before the independence of the Ivory Coast, a delegation
of Sanwi leaders went to France to request autonomy under the terms of
an 1834 treaty and after failing to receive a positive response a Sanwi
independence movement was established early in 1959. This was set up in
neighbouring Ghana, which supplied it with arms. In 1960, Ghana claimed
the south-east corner of the Ivory Coast, which was inhabited by the
Sanwis, on grounds of tribal unity, since the Sanwis were related to the
Nzima tribe of the President of Ghana. However, the claim was soon
155dropped and aid to the Sanwi movement ceased.
(4) Ghana, Togo and the Ewe Question
The problem of the Ewe people, split between Ghana and 
Togo, caused severe tensions between the two countries and stimulated 15234
(152) The majority of African States, western countries and the USSR 
condemned the Somali violations of its inherited borders, Revue 
Generale de Droit International Public, 1978, p.664.
(153) Mayall loc.cit. p.336 and infra, Chapter 7, p.514.
(154) A dispute between Gabon and Congo (Brazzaville) over the latter's 
claims to territory on ethnic grounds was apparently resolved by
an agreement on December 1, 1962, at Dorala, Cameroon, on the basis 
of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
State, see Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa,
1972, pp,196-7.
(155) Zartman. International Relations in the New Africa, 1966, 
pp,24 and 113 and Touval, "The Sources of Status Quo and 
Irredentist Policies", African Boundary Problems (ed. Widstrand), 
1969, p.lll. Personal and political antagonism between the Ghanaian 
and Ivory Coast Presidents exacerbated the problem, ibid.
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irredentist claims by both. The unification of British Togoland with
the Gold Coast following a plebiscite in May 1956 resulted in some one
hundred thousand Ewes being divided between Ghana and Togo. President
Nkrumah of Ghana called for the integration of Togo (then French Togoland)
into Ghana as its seventh region in order to unify the Ewes, while the
newly independent Togo favoured the reunification of the two Togos, ie.
156claiming the former British Togoland for the same reason. Personal
factors played a large role and the antagonism abated somewhat after the
assassination of the Togo President in January 1963, although it recurred
on a number of occasions in subsequent years. The Togo President in
April 1966 called for a reunion of ex-British Togoland with the Republic
of Togo, declaring that it was necessary to satisfy the legitimate
aspirations of the people. In that month, the Ghana-Togo border was
157formally reopened after a three year closure. The secessionist 
element which is often involved in irredentist situations came to 
prominence when in 1964 a call was made for the secession of Ghana's 
Volta region and its merger with Togo. The Ghana government declared 
that it had no intention of betraying the confidence reposed in it by 
the people of the former British Togoland in the UN plebiscite of 1956.156 758 
In February 1975, however, a delegation from the Volta region presented a 
letter together with resolutions, a petition and a memorandum to the 
Ghanaian ambassador in Togo calling for negotiations between Ghana and a 
national liberation movement committee to solve the reunification question 
concerning the two Togos. It was proclaimed that "Western Togo" could no
(156) Togo also claimed the territory on historical grounds in an attempt 
to reconstitute the borders of the former German colony, see Touval 
loc.cit. p.110 and Zartman op.cit. p.112. See also Austin, "The 
Uncertain Frontier : Ghana-Togo" 1 JMAS, 1963, p.139, Austin noted 
that there had never been an Ewe State, but rather a series of 
autonomous Ewe communities along the coast and in the Togo hills, 
ibid, p .141.
(157) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1966, pp.509-10,
(158) Ibid, March 1974, p.3162.
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longer be a region or a part of a region of Ghana. The Togo 
government for its part ceased to call publicly for the cession of the 
former British Togoland. In late 1977, however, Ghana charged that Togo
was planning subversion in the Volta region, although this was denied by
m 160 Togo.
(b) Secessionist Claims
(1) Katanga
At a round-table conference in Brussels in early 1960, it
was agreed that the Belgian colony of the Congo would become independent
on June 30, 1960. The Congo, comprising an area of some 2,345,525 sq.
kilometres and a population at the time of about fourteen million persons,
161possessed "one of the most complex tribal structures in Africa".
162Tribal fighting broke out in the spring of 1960, while upon independence
163separatist strains became evident. On 5 June, the Force Publique
164mutinied near Leopoldville and disorder spread. On July 10, Belgian 
troops, stationed in military bases in the country by virtue of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (which was never in fact ratified), 
intervened in Katanga and Kasai provinces and later throughout the 15960234
159
(159) Ibid, February 1975, p.3525.
(160) Ibid, September 1977, p.4555.
(161) Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 1965, pp.2-5. According to 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa, some 80% of commercialised 
production was in European hands in the private sector, while this 
proportion was even higher in Katanga, one of the provinces of the 
Congo, see UN Economic Bulletin for Africa, June 1961, p.72.
(162) Particularly between the Baluba and Lulua tribes, which spread from 
Kasai province to Leopoldville, the capital, see Keesings 
Contemporary Archives, pp.17594-5,
(163) The Abako party of the Bakongo tribe threatened to create a separate 
government for the Bakongo areas and hinted at a merger with the 
French Congo, while President Tshombe of Katanga was unhappy at the 
exclusion of his party from discussions as to the composition of the 
national government, ibid, pp,17595-6. See also Hoskyns op,cit. p,81
(164) Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.17639-40. See also Legura,
Congo Disaster, 1961.
307
country. The Belgian government represented its action as a form of 
humanitarian intervention designed to protect its nationals and the 
interests of the Congo and the international community.165 66
On July 11, Tshombe announced the independence of Katanga and its 
secession from the Congo. Belgian aid was requested and a Belgian officer 
appointed by Tshombe to command his forces.167 The Central Government 
immediately appealed to the United Nations, "not to restore the internal 
situation in the Congo but rather to protect the national territory 
against acts of aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops".168 
This request of July 12 followed upon a request for technical assistance 
to the Congo security forces made on July 10. Belgium was accused of 
engineering the secession and the urgency of the appeal was emphasised.169 
Ghana announced that a mission offering all aid including military aid 
was being sent to the Congo and stressed its recognition of Katanga as 
an integral part of the Congo and condemned any attempt to detach it as 
a "flagrant violation of the Congo’s territorial integrity".170 On July 
13, the UN Secretary-General, acting under Article 99 of the Charter 
called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council,171 and strongly
(165) Hoskyns op.cit. pp.96-9. Tshombe had reportedly made a request for 
Rhodesian troops to restore order, ibid, p.97. See also Abi-Saab,
The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-64. 1978, pp.7-8.
(1 6 6) Hoskyns, op.cit. p.96. See also SCOR, 15th Year, 873rd meeting, 
para.196. The action could not have been justified by the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Congo as Belgium was not 
granted any right of intervention without the express request of the 
Congo government, Abi-Saab op.cit. p.8.
(167) Hoskyns op.cit. p.99 and Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17641.
The UK, Central African Federation and Southern Rhodesia all refused 
to send police and military aid to Katanga, while Belgium adopted a 
sympathetic attitude, ibid, pp.17641—2.
(168) S/4382, The Central Government had requested 3,000 American troops, 
but the US had advised recourse to the UN, Keesings Contemporary
Archives, pp.17641-2.
(169) S/4382. See also A/4390 and Add.l, and Auma-Osolo "A Retrospective 
Analysis of United Nations Activity in the Congo and its Significance 
for Contemporary Africa", 8 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
1975, p.458.
(170) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17642.
(171) S/4381.
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recommended sending military aid to the Congo government. The UN force
would not include personnel from the permanent members of the Security
Council and would not be authorised to take action beyond self-defence
172or action which would make it a party to internal disputes. The
Council adopted a resolution by eight votes to none, with three
abstentions, on July 14 calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops from
the Congo and authorising the Secretary-General "to take the necessary
steps in consultation with the government of the Republic of the Congo
to provide the government with such military assistance as may be 
173necessary". The same day, the Congo broke off diplomatic relations
with Belgium and Katanga declared that it would not permit the entry of 
174UN troops. Offers of troops from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia
were accepted and as a first stage it was agreed that seven battalions
from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia would be sent to the 
175Congo.
African reaction to the Katanga secession was strongly hostile.
Guinea declared it was contrary to the interests of the Congo while Ghana 
noted that Katanga was "a natural, integral part of the Congo Republic"!'76 
The UN Secretary-General emphasised that the Security Council resolution
of July 14 applied to the whole of the territory of the Congo, although
177 ■ '■UN forces would not intervene in domestic conflicts. The Security 
Council adopted a resolution on July 22 recognising that it had itself 
called for the admission of the Congo to membership of the UN as a unit|78
(172) SCOR, 15th Year, 873rd meeting, pp.3-5. See also A/3943.
(173) S/4387. See Miller, "Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action
in the Congo", 55 AJIL, 1961, p.10.
(174) Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp,17644-5.
(175) Hoskyns op.cit. p.131. Ghanaian and Tunisian troops started arriving 
on July 15, while on that date Tshombe cabled UN members asking for 
recognition, Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17645.
(176) Ibid, p.17646,
(177) SCOR, 15th Year, 877th meeting, pp.1-4. See also A/4389 and Adds.1-6.
(178) By resolution S/4377 adopted unanimously on July 7, 1960.
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and calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops. All States were requested
to refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law and
order and undermine the territorial integrity and political independence
179of the Republic of the Congo. By the end of July, the UN force in the
180Congo numbered over 11,000 but had not yet entered Katanga in view of
Katangan hostility and the belief that violence would be involved.179 8081 18234
The Security Council adopted a resolution on August 8 calling on Belgium
to withdraw its troops from Katanga under speedy modalities determined
by the UN Secretary-General and declared that the entry of UN troops
into that province was necessary for the full implementation of the
resolution. It was reaffirmed that the UN force in the Congo would not
182be involved in any internal disputes. Ghana, Guinea and the United
Arab Republic offered to send troops to end the secession if the UN was
183not able or willing, while a number of other countries indicated
their support for the territorial integrity of the Congo, but preferred
184action to be taken through the UN. The Secretary-General of the UN 
was accused by the Congo Prime Minister of tacitly recognising Katanga's
(179) S/4405.
(180) Yearbook of the UN 1960, p.54,
(181) S/4414. This was the subject of criticism by Ghana, Guinea and 
the USSR, S/4415 and S/4416. See also S/4417 and Adds.1-10 and 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.17754-6. On August 7, the 
Prime Minister of the Congo demanded the entry of UN troops into 
Katanga without delay, S/4421,
(182) S/4426, The Secretary-General declared that the UN was concerned 
with the attitude of the Katangan authorities to the extent that 
it might be founded on the presence of Belgian troops; apart 
from this the dispute between the Congo and Katanga was one in 
which the UN was not a party and could not involve itself,
S/4417 Add.6. The Premier of the Congo contested this view, 
S/4417 Add.7.
(183) See Congo 1960 vol.II, p.630, published by the Belgian Centre de 
Recherche et d'information Socio-Politiques.
(184) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17758. These included Togo, 
Morocco and Tunisia.
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secession by refusing to supply military assistance to enable government
185forces to enter the province. The Secretary-General noted that he was 
primarily concerned with the international peace and security aspect of 
the problem, ie. the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and, although he 
criticised the Katangan secession and stressed the need to respect the 
territorial integrity of the Congo, he did not regard the ending of the 
secession as a function of the UN force. On the other hand, the Congo 
government and most African States were primarily concerned about 
reintegrating the province into the territory of the Congo. 185 86 187
A conference of African States with representatives from Cameroon,
Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Mali,
Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the UAH was held in the Congo capital
of Leopoldville at the end of August and i t  concluded with a declaration
of total support for the territorial integrity of the Congo and
187condemnation of the secession. During this period, the Central
Government's intentions to attack Katanga became known and there was
188some criticism of this at the conference. In the event, this operation 
foundered in Kasai province. A meeting of the Security Council in early
(185) S/4448. The situation in the Congo grew worse with the declaration 
of independence by Kalonji of the "Etat Minier" in South Kasai, see 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17759. The Central Government 
sent forces and by the end of August claimed to have ended the 
rebellion, ibid, pp.17781-3.
(186) SCOR 15th Year, 887-9th meetings. A Soviet draft resolution 
criticising UN actions was not put to the vote for lack of 
support, S/4453.
(187) Hoskyns, op.cit. pp.170-4. The Conference of African States at 
Monrovia in 1961 called on African States not to recognise break­
away regimes, while the Casablanca Conference and the Cairo Con­
ference of 1961 strongly supported the territorial integrity of 
the Congo, see Legum, Pan-Africanism, 1962, pp.192, 195 and 199.
(188) Hoskyns op.cit. pp.192-3.
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September resulted in deadlock and the suggestion of the US delegate
to remit the whole matter to the General Assembly under the Uniting for
190Peace machinery was accepted.
The fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly opened
on September 17 with a dispute between the USA and USSR over the supply
of Soviet technicians, transport planes and trucks to the Congo.
Despite differences over the interpretation and implementation of the
Security Council resolutions, delegates supported the territorial
integrity of the Congo and condemned the Katangan secession. Libya
proclaimed the need to maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo * 19091 192
while Ethiopia emphasised that at the start of the crisis African States
had tacitly agreed on a number of fundamental principles. These were
that the Congolese people were one and that the territory of the Congo
must be maintained as a unit and that collective action should be taken
through the United Nations in order to maintain the unity, integrity and
192complete independence of the Congo. On September 18, resolution 1474 
ES-IV was adopted, by seventy votes to none, with eleven abstentions.
This supported the Security Council resolutions of July 14 and 22 and 
August 9 and declared that it was essential for the UN to continue to 
assist the Central Government", with a view to preserving the unity 
territorial integrity and political independence" of the Congo. The 
Secretary-General was requested to continue to take vigorous action to 
safeguard the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of
<189) This was partly the result of an internal crisis in the Congo as 
the President and Prime Minister sought to dismiss each other*and 
sent rival delegations to the UN and partly the result of a more 
activist policy pursued by the USSR, see S/4531, S/4523 S/44R2
and Adds.1-4 and S/4519.
(190) S/4526.
(191) GAOR, 4th Emergency Special Session, A/PV. paras.16-18 and 23 
See also the delegates of Ghana, ibid, A/PV.8 6 8, paras.151-9• 
the UAR ibid, para.221 and Liberia, ibid, A/PV, 862, para.149,
(192) Ibid, A/PV.863, paras.103-7.
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the Congo in the interests of international peace and security and
appealed to all States to refrain from any action that might undermine
193that unity, territorial integrity and political independence.
In February 1961, the Security Council adopted a resolution by nine
votes to none, with two abstentions, expressing regret at the killing of
Lumumba and urging the UN to take all appropriate measures to prevent
civil war in the Congo, including, in the last resort, the use of force.
It expressed grave concern at the prevalence of conditions which
seriously imperilled peace and order and the unity and territorial
integrity of the Congo and called for the reconvening of the Parliament
194and the reorganisation of the Congolese armed units. In order to
implement this resolution, the UN Force was substantially increased. 193 495 1967
In April, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions, calling inter
1  A / Jalia for the withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign personnel, and
by the summer a government of national unity and political reconciliation
was established in the Congo, one of whose aims would be to annul the
197secession of Katanga. Since the February resolution of the Security 
Council had urged that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and 
evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military 
personnel and political advisers not under UN command, and mercenaries, 
and since Katanga depended to a large extent upon such personnel, 198
(193) The issue was further discussed during the 15th session of the 
General Assembly, centring on the constitutional crisis in Leopold­
ville, see GAOR, 15th Session, plenary, meetings 911-3 and 917-24, 
and A/4578. Further unrest took place in the Congo with Lumumba 
supporters taking power in Stanleyville, the capital of Orientale 
province, A/4557 and Add.1, and Keesings Contemporary Archives,
pp.18202-3. The Security Council discussed the situation in early 
December, particularly the more by Colonel Mobutu against 
Lumumba, see Hoskyns, op.cit, pp,266-74, but no resolution was 
adopted, S/4578 and Res.l. and S/4579. The Assembly resolved to 
keep the matter on its agenda, resolution 1592(XV).
(194) S/4741.
(195) S/4752 and Corr.l, and Add.1-4.
(196) Resolutions 1599(XV), 1600(XV) and 1601(XV), See also A/4711 and 
Corr.l and Add.1-2, and S/4721.
(197) Yearbook of the UN 1961, p.60.
(198) See Hoskyns op .c it. pp.384-9.
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It became apparent that a ready weapon was at hand for the UN to Involve
itself in the Katanga situation. On August 24, the Congo President
issued an ordinance for the immediate expulsion of all non-Congolese
officers and mercenaries in Katanga that had not entered into contractual
arrangements with the Central Government, and UN assistance to achieve
199this was requested. This was clearly designed to provide the UN with
the legal authority to act within the Congo to implement the February
Security Council resolution. The resulting operation by the UN in
Katanga had some initial success, but fighting broke out in September.19 200 20134
A truce was arranged and a number of agreements signed, but the UN soon
alleged that they were being broken by the Katangans who had retained
201the foreign mercenaries. It is clear that during this period the
Secretary-General felt that nothing in the UN Charter or resolutions
justified UN moves to end the Katangan secession and that action was to
be limited to removing foreign personnel in accordance with the Security
202Council resolution of February. The Security Council was reconvened 
203on November 13 and a resolution adopted on November 24 by nine votes
204to none, with two abstentions. This set out the policies and purposes 
of the UN with respect to the Congo. These included the maintenance of 
the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo and the 
prevention of civil war. The resolution completely rejected the claim
(199) S/4940, Annex 1.
(200) Hoskyns op.cit. pp.404-8. See also Abi-Saab op.cit. pp.129-33 and 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.19342.
(201) S/4940 and Add.1-12. Fighting broke out in October between 
Central Government and Katangan forces on the borders of Kasai 
and Katanga provinces, S/4940 and Add.13.
(202) See Abi-Saab op.cit. pp.129-48. Dr. Hammerskjold, the Secretary- 
General, was killed in an aircraft in September on his way to meet 
Tshombe to arrange a cease-fire, Yearbook of the UN 1961, p.63
(203) Following a request by Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan, S/4973.
(204) S/5002.
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that Katanga was a sovereign, independent nation and strongly deprecated
the secessionist activities carried out by the provincial administration
of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries.
It also declared that all secessionist activities were contrary to the
Loi Fondamentale of the Congo and Security Council decisions, and it
demanded that such activities in Katanga should cease forthwith. It
underlined UN support for the national unity and territorial integrity
of the Congo and requested all member-states to refrain from any action
which might directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of
the UN in the Congo. This resolution clearly changed the basis of the
UN actions in the Congo. On November 24, the acting Secretary-General
declared that action was necessary to avert civil war and this action
implied not neutrality but a sympathetic attitude to the efforts of the
Central Government to suppress all secessionist activities. 205 206 After 
. 206
more fighting, the position of the Katangan authorities became 
untenable. On December 19, Tshombe entered into negotiations with the 
Central Government at Kitona and two days later he made a declaration 
accepting the application of the Loi Fondamentale of the Congo, the 
indissoluble unity of the Republic and the authority of the Central 
Government over all parts of the country. President Kasavubu was also 
recognised as Head of State and Tshombe agreed to carry out all UN
resolutions and place the Katangan gendarmerie under the President's 
authority.207 208 The end of the secession was formally accepted in a
declaration by Tshombe on January 14, 1963, from Kolwezi,
(205) S/PV. 982. See also Auma-Osolo. "A
United Nations Activity in the Congo and ita Siraiffly8U 04 
Contemporary «pica", 8 Vanderhiit J o u ™ . “ «  i!!” 10“ 0*
1975, pp.458 . 468-79. tor a ^ ■ £ £ £  ° " ‘ 1 LSW'
I Z I T Z "  Z n ™ ° a T * 4 by »««ersnold and'hi.
(206) S/4940, Add.14-19.
(207) S/5038, The "Etat Minier"
1962 with Kalonji's arrest, 
pp.l9349-50.
of South Kasai was ended in autumn 
see Keesings Contemporary Archives,
(208) S/5053, Add.15, Annex V and S/5240.
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It would be inaccurate to regard the Katangan issue as demonstrating
the intention of the UN to maintain the status quo and become involved
against all secessionist attempts. Although Tshombe claimed the right of
209self-determination, this was clearly not accepted by the international 
community. But to assert from this the validity of UN actions to 
suppress such activities would be incorrect. There was present in the 
Katanga situation one factor which clearly distinguished it from other 
secessionist attempts and that was the extent to which the secession was 
seen by the international community as a foreign inspired move . 209 10 The 
Belgian intervention against the Congolese mutiny of the Force Publique 
was the original cause of recourse to the United Nations, while the 
crucial Belgian presence in Katanga deemed indispensable to the survival 
of the secessionist regime was considered to be the single most important 
factor governing the relations between the UN and Katanga. The 
representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in the Congo in 1960 
submitted a report stating that "in Katanga, Belgian influence is omni­
present. Virtually all key civilian and security posts are either held 
directly by officials of Belgian nationality or controlled by advisers 
to recently appointed and often inexperienced Congolese officials" . 211 
The element of Belgian control of the secessionist move was regarded by 
the UN as justifying actions to counter the secession. Paragraph one of
(209) S/4988, On November 17, 1961, in a message to the Security Council.
(210) It could also be argued that the controlling elite in Katanga was 
not representative of the province at all. The Baluba of North 
Katanga were hostile to Tshombe's regime, while the southern 
intelligentsia composed primarily of Kasai Baluba had been largely 
reduced to refugee status in UN camps, see Abi-Saab, op.cit. 
pp.133 note 36 and 167. The US delegate stated before the Security 
Council that the present Katangan authorities had no claim to speak 
for the entire province, the parliament was merely a rump 
organisation of the original Assembly and the ethnic groupings 
supporting the regime were a minority of the province’s 
inhabitants, see 42 Department of State Bulletin, 1061 and 1062 
(1961).
(211) A/4557, para.38.
316
Security Council resolution S/5002 -strongly deprecates the secessionist
activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of
Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign
mercenaries", and thus demonstrated that the fact of foreign intervention
was considered to be the crucial relevant point concerning the secession.
Indeed, force was to be used by the UN not to end the secession itself
but to apprehend and/or deport all foreign military and para-military
personnal and political advisers not under the UN command and mercenaries.
Although that amounted to the same thing as ending the secession in
practice, the difference is crucial, for the UN was not using force to
end a secession. Nevertheless, it was always recognised by the UN that
the territorial integrity and national unity of the Congo should be
maintained. There was strong African hostility to the secession, which
was never recognised by any State and the impact of African views was
marked. Hoskyns noted that this case provided the first experiment in
pan -Africanism in a practical sense and demonstrated the influence of
joint African action. As soon as the UN and the USA decided to take
active steps against Katanga, however, the African role diminished in 
212importance. 213
213(2) Biafra
The Eastern Region of Nigeria declared its independence 
on May 30, 1967, as the sovereign State of Biafra. This followed two 
coups in 1966 and widespread disturbances in the north of the country
(212) Op,cit. p.471.
(213) See generally Stremlau, The International Politics of the 
Nigerian Civil War 1967-70, 1977; Wodie, "La
Biafra et le Droit International Public" 73 Revue Generale de 
Droit International Public, 1969, p.l02lj Panter-Brlck, "The 
Right of Self-Determination; Its Application to Nigeria" 44 
International Affairs, 1968, p.254 and Post, "Is There a Case 
for Biafra?" 44 International Affairs, 1968, p.28.
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which resulted in massacres of Ibos and the fleeing of the rest to the 
Ibo heartlands in the Eastern Region. As a result, the military 
government of the Eastern Region led by Colonel Ojukwu boycotted 
constitutional talks until the security of Ibos was guaranteed. An 
agreement was ultimately signed at Aburi in Ghana between the military 
governors of Nigeria in an attempt to resolve differences between the 
Eastern Region and the rest of the country, but it broke down over 
questions of interpretation.
In March 1967, Ojukwu announced the cessation of revenue payments
to the federal treasury and the federal government responded with an
economic boycott. At the end of May, a decree was issued decentralising
Nigeria and creating twelve new States and this provoked the secession
214of the Eastern Region. Fighting commenced on July 6 , 1967, and 
continued until the Biafran surrender on January 12, 1970.214 15
In spite of some Nigerian misgivings, the situation was discussed 
by the Organisation of African Unity at the Kinshasa Conference of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in September 1967. The 
resolution that emerged reaffirmed the adherence of the African Heads of 
State and Government to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member-states and reiterated their "condemnation 
of secession in any member-State". The Nigerian situation was recognised 
as an internal one, the solution of which was a Nigerian responsibility 
and it was resolved to send a consultative mission of six Heads of State 
to the Head of the Nigerian Federal Government "to assure him of the 
Assembly’s desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of
(214) Stremlau, op.cit. pp.59-60.
(215) Africa Research Bulletin, January 1970, pp.1642-54.
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216Nigeria". The situation was therefore seen as a matter of legitimate
concern to African States, while the support of the principle of
territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs and the
consequent condemnation of secession were crucial in the diplomatic field.
This was so, not only because any support for Biafra was at best
postponed but because the UN Secretary-General emphasised that regional
organisations should deal with local conflicts and accordingly the UN
217did not become involved. The mission consisting of the Heads of State 
of Cameroon, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Niger216 718  
arrived in Lagos after initial Nigerian reservations219 on November 23. 
The communique issued afterwards condemned all secessionist attempts 
in Africa and reaffirmed that any solution to the crisis had to be in 
the context of Nigeria's unity and territorial integrity. 220
Between April 15 and May 20, 1968, four African States (Tanzania, 
Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia) recognised Biafra as a sovereign 
State. The first was Tanzania, which declared that the need for African 
unity was superseded by the need of the Ibo people who could not be 
protected in Nigeria. President Nyerere stated that "where borders were
(216) See Stremlau op.cit. p.93; Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in 
Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-70. 1971. vol.ll^ ~  
pp.172-3 and Africa Research Bulletin, September 1967, p.856.
The Assembly also reaffirmed the principle of territorial 
integrity in a resolution dealing with the Israel-Arab conflict
ibid.
(217) See UNMC August-September 1968, p.104 and ibid, February 1969, 
p. 39.
(218) I n  fact, the Presidents of Congo (Kinshasa) and Liberia declared
that they were unable to attend due to internal duties, see 
Chime, "The Organisation of African Unity and African Boundaries" 
African Boundary Problems (ed. Widstrand), 1969, pp.74, 75. *
(219) It was reported that the Nigerian Head of State only agreed to 
receive the mission after being reassured of OAU support for 
Nigerian unity and condemnation of secession, see Cervenka,
The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter. 1968, p.197 
and Africa Research Bulletin, November 1967, p.901,
(220) Ibid.
drawn up without African consent they need not be respected. 221 The
Foreign Minister of Burundi took the view that if the war continued
many African States would recognise Biafra. He noted that the civil war
issue was non-political and "should be viewed from humanitarian grounds".
The Information Minister of Congo (Brazzaville) declared that the war had
become a human problem "and it is that aspect which concerns the Congo 
22 3government". However, a number of African States feared that
recognition of Biafra would, far from helping the Ibos, encourage further
224disintegration and warfare on the continent. The following month
three African States recognised Biafra. Gabon emphasised the pogrom
225against the Ibos and consequent massacres, the Ivory Coast declared
its indignation against the "inexplicable guilty indifference of the
226whole world towards the massacres", while Zambia, although wanting
African unity, emphasised the belief that "it would be morally wrong to
227force anyone into unity founded on bloodshed". Accordingly, it is 
within a humanitarian context that one ought to view the four African
(221) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1968, pp.1031-2 and 1041. This 
was ironic in view of the fact that it was Tanzania that had 
proposed the famous border resolution at the OAU in 1964.
(222) Ibid, p,1044.
(223) Ibid.
(224) See, for example, the comments of the governments of Congo 
(Kinshasa), Guinea, Madagascar and Mali, ibid. 2567
(225) Ibid, May 1968, p.1072. Gabon declared later that its recognition 
had been because of humanitarian reasons, ibid, January 1970, 
p.1647.
(226) Ibid, May 1968, p.1073.
(227) Ibid. Nigeria broke off diplomatic relations with Tanzania, the 
Ivory Coast and Zambia but not with Gabon as they did not maintain 
embassies in each other's countries, ibid. The Kampala peace talks 
the same month broke down upon Nigeria's insistence on the 
renunciation of secession and Biafra's refusal to accept this, see Cervenka, op.cit. pp.199-204.
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recognitions. Such recognitions did not result in the establishment 
of normal diplomatic relations and were apparently an effort to moderate 
Nigeria's declared aim of total victory and facilitate negotiations. 229 
The comments made by the four States at the time bear out this view.
228
The worsening conditions in the battle areas impelled a renewal of
the activities of the OAU mission in July 1968 and the leaders of both
sides went for talks to the Niger capital of Niamey at which it was
decided to continue negotiations at Addis Ababa in August. 230 These
negotiations eventually petered out at the beginning of August, folloelng
the Nigerian declaration of a final offensive. 231 In September, the
fifth Assembly of the 0A0 met at Algiers and adopted a resolution calling
on member-states of the OAU and UK to refrain from any action detrimental
to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria and appealing
for the restoration of peace and unity in Nigeria.232 However, Uganda
announced the neat month that it was considering recognising Biafra 233 234
while Sierra Leone hinted in September 1969 that it might soon recognise
234
the secessionist State. Very little mention was made of the Nigerlan 
crisis at the 1968 session of the UN General Assembly. Only a few States 
raised the issue of possible UN discussion of the crisis and no State 
sought to have the question inscribed on the agenda. 235
(228) Haiti recognised Biafra in March 1969 for reasons 
unclear, see Stremlau, op.cit. p,14l. that remain
(229) Ibid, pp.127-8.
(230) Cervenka, op.cit. pp.206-10.
(231) Ibid, pp.210-16.
<232> Ibid.^p.217. Sea also Africa Reaearch Bulletin, September 1968
(233) Ibid, October 1968, p.1214,
(234) Ibid, September 1969, p.1531.
(235) Stremlau, op.cit. p.279.
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The last meeting of the OAU mission was held in Monrovia, Liberia, 
in April 1969 and ended with no progress towards reconciling Nigeria and 
Biafra. The mission proposed that the "two parties of the civil war 
accept, in the supreme interest of Africa, a united Nigeria, which
ff
ensures all forms of security to all citizens . While Nigeria accepted
2 36this, Biafra did not. In September 1969, at the sixth Assembly of the
OAU at Addis Ababa, a resolution was adopted which called on both sides
"to agree to preserve in the overriding interests of Africa the unity of
Nigeria", although the four African States that had recognised Biafra
237plus Sierra Leone abstained. On January 12, 1970, Biafra surrendered,
238both sides referring to the acceptance of the "OAU resolution".
The overwhelming majority of African statee clearly accepted the 
need to maintain Nigeria's territorial integrity and wished to achieve 
an African solution to the conflict that would uphold that territorial 
integrity. The concept of self-determination was not regarded as
2 39applicable. The four African recognitions of Biafra appeared to have 
been motivated primarily by humanitarian considerations rather than being 
an assessment of the fulfilment by Biafra of the criteria of statehood 
international law. The Biafran experience can be seen as a crucial piece 
of State practice in Africa with regard to post-independence secessions, 
and the high level of consensus reached by African Statee on this basic 
issue of territorial integrity demonstrates a strongly held belief 
militating against secessionist attempts. The viability of the colonial 
territorial frontiers was underlined both militarily and diplomatically.
(236) Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, p.ios
(237) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1968, p.i53i,
(238) Ibid, January 1970, pp.1643-4.
(239) See Panter-Brick loc.cit. p.256. Cf. Kamanu, "Secession and th.
Right of Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma" 12 JMAS 1974 „ l
See also Nayar, "Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context 
Biafra in Retrospect", 10 Texas International Law Journal '
p. 321, * >
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(3) Southern Sudan240 1 43
The three southern provinces of the Sudan, Bahr el Ghazal,
Equatoria and Upper Nile, differ radically from the northern part of the
country in that they are populated by Black Africans, Christian and pagan,
rather than by Moslem Arabs and consequently a different cultural identity
has developed. They were treated as a distinct entity under the Anglo-
241Egyptian condominium of 1899-1956, and were far less advanced, m  
1953 the Sudan was granted self-government and by independence in 1956 
a mutiny had taken place in the south which greatly embittered relations 
between north and south and precipitated a sixteen year war . 242 
Sudanese independence was declared on January 1, 1956, and, contrary to 
pledges made, consideration of federation as the basis of the proposed 
constitution was rejected. The military takeover of 1958 and the banning 
of political parties exacerbated the situation. In 1963, the Anya-Nya 
guerrilla organisation was formed and the fighting entered a new phase . 243 
In March 1965, after the overthrow of the military regime, a round-table 
conference was held in Khartoum attended by representatives from the 
south, delegates from six northern parties and observers from Algeria 
the United Arab Republic, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana . 244 However 
it ended indecisively with the north offering some form of regional 
government and the south demanding self-government or federation. This 
led to severe action against the south and southern calls for secession
(240) See Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan lass-vo 1 9 74. lllM.
Southern Problem in the Sudan", The Worîd Tod^v k ' The
p.512i Shepherd, '•K.tion.l
4 M S .  1966 P . m  - G r . „  "Th* Souther»
Contemporary History, 1971, p.108. fl8i or
(241) See The Basic,Facts about the Southern 0 ,
Central Office of Information, Khartoum, 1964~—  ---- “—
(242) Eprile, op.cit. pp.39-48.
(243) Ibid, pp.90-102.
(244) Ibid, p.21} Shepherd loc.cit. p.204 and Kyle loc cit n
See also Africa Research Bulletin, December 1964 n 207 4
January 1965, p,222 and ibid, February 1965, p.24lf* ' ibid*
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or merger with neighbouring African States. Ultimately, in 1971, the new
Numeiry regime in the Sudan began negotiations with representatives of 
245
the Anya-Nya which led to a peace agreement the following year after
246a conference in Addis Ababa. This called for a cease-fire and
amnesty, return and resettlement of refugees and regional autonomy for 
247
the south. Although some African States were sympathetic to the
248struggle of the Anya-Nya and Uganda appeared to tolerate the existence
of its bases on its territory, there was never any support at
governmental level for the proposed secession. Uganda and other
concerned African States directed their influence primarily at an attempt
to convince the separatists to compromise with the Sudanese authorities.
Touval concludes with regard to these States that "concern over possible
reprisals by the Sudanese army, fear of possible Sudanese aid to
separatist movements or subversive groups in their own territories and
commitment to the principle of the territorial status quo, resulted in
a fluctuation of policy between assistance to the rebels and pressure
on them to cease their activities and accept the Sudan government's 
249terms".
(4) Eritrea
This area was placed under Ethiopian administration in 
1952 as an autonomous unit245 678950 in a federal structure, but in 1955
(245) Eprile, op.cit. p.147.
(246) Ibid, p.151. See also Africa Research Bulletin, Februarv iovo
pp.2381-4. ’ uary 1972,
(247) Eprile op.cit, pp.151-2.
(248) However, the fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Ormaniest^
Conference in Ghana in 1965 criticieed the Southern Sudanretoit 
as an imperialist conspiracy. See Resolutions of the 
Afro-Asian Peoples' S o l i d a r i , 
1965, P *52, See also Touval, The Bound^rv PeiV';Trr~rr’ 1 ’
Independent Africa, 1972, p.118^ ” ' ~— -— — ——
(249) Ibid, p.154.
(250) Supra, Chapter 4, p,215.
324
Ethiopia became a unitary State. In November 1962, Eritrea was
252officially annexed as Ethiopia's fourteenth province, following a
period during which all signs of Eritrean separatism were abolished.251 53
The Eritrean armed struggle began in 1961 and received intermittent aid
from Arab States, particularly Sudan, Syria, Iraq and Libya.254 256 In
many respects, a curious parallel developed between Eritrea and Southern
Sudan, the former an Arab-backed insurgency against an African State and
255the latter an African rising against an Arab State. By 1970, violence
had substantially increased in the area and the declared aim of the
Eritrean Liberation Front was a UN held referendum for an independent 
256Eritrea. The headquarters of the movement was established in Damascus,
and Ethiopia accused certain Arab States of causing the disorders.257 258
The Second Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Countries held at
Karachi in 1970 adopted a resolution pledging support for the struggle of
258the people of Eritrea for freedom and independence, while the Fourth
(251) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.14598.
(252) See Cervenka, "Eritrea: Struggle for Self-Determination or 
Secession", 12 Afrika Spectrum, 1977, pp.37, 40.
(253) For example, political parties, labour unions and the Eritrean flag. 
The authorised languages of Tigrlnya and Arabic were replaced by 
Amharic as the official language in 1959, see Bell, "Endemic 
Insurgency and International Order: The Eritrean Experience" 18 
Orbis, 1974, pp.427, 431. Boyce notes that the federation of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea "was a fiasco", "The Internationalising
of Internal War: Ethiopia, the Arabs and the Case of Eritrea" 5 
Journal of International and Comparative Studies, 1972, pp.51, 56.
'(254) Infra, Chapter 7, p.509,
(255) See Bell loc.cit, p.433.
(256) Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.23306, 23606, 24400 and 24507.
(257) Ibid, p.24507. See also Africa Research Bulletin, December 1970, 
pp.1056-7.
(258) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.24482.
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Conference of this organisation in 1973 strongly backed the Eritrean
259
Liberation Front. Arab support of the Eritrean movement was limited
260and sporadic at times, however. Ethiopia refused to concede the
principle of its national unity and territorial integrity, as the Ten
202. 262 Point Plan of 1974 and the Nine Point Plan of 1976 demonstrated.
By spring 1977, it was estimated that some two-thirds of the coast-line
and some eighty per cent of the countryside of Eritrea were in Eritrean 
26 3rebel hands. Sudan pledged open support for the separatists in early
1977259 601364 and was condemned by Ethiopia for breaking the OAU Charter.265 26
With Soviet and Cuban aid, Ethiopia launched a counter-attack in Eritrea
266in early 1978 that met with considerable success. African attitudes 
towards the Eritrea issue reflected the concern for the territorial
integrity of the independent African States that had proved so potent on 
the Continent.267 268 It is also worthy of note that the headquarters of the 
Organisation of African Unity is situated in Ethiopia’s capital. The 
OAU itself has been noticeably reluctant to criticise Ethiopia and the 
overall African position remains that of support for the territorial
o C O
integrity of that country. This has also been true of the United
(259) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1973, p.2778.
(260) See the comments of Osman Salih Sabbe, one of the Eritrean leaders 
quoted in Cervenka loc.cit. p.43.
(261) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.27029. Point I stated that
"Ethiopia would remain a united country without ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or cultural differences". Ibid. *
(262) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1976, p,4025, This called for an 
Eritrean Administrative Region.
(263) Ibid, April 1977, pp.4393-5. See also ibid, December 1977, p.4675,
(264) Ibid, January 1977, p.4282 and ibid, October 1977, p.4603,
(265) Ibid, p.4603.
(266) Ibid, May 1978, p.4840; ibid June 1978, pp,4886-7 and ibid, July 
1978, p.4925. See also ibid, October 1978, pp.5027-8.
(267) This was recognised by a spokesman for the Eritrean Liberati™ 
in 1973, see Cervenka loc.cit. p.45. Note also the imnact I T  
Arab-Israel dispute, ibid, p.46. pact of
Front
the
(268) See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, pp,70 and 83
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Nations, although it could be suggested that as a result of the binding 
power of disposal granted the General Assembly by the Big Four Powers 
and the consequent Assembly resolution on the status of Eritrea,269 
the Assembly retains a special interest in this matter in the light of 
the unilateral incorporation of Eritrea into a unitary Ethiopia.
(5) The Dissolution of the Mali Federation
The one example so far of a successful secession from a 
recognised independent State is afforded by the break-up of the Mali 
Federation, but there are grounds for regarding the case as exceptional.
On January 19, 1959, a federal constituent assembly drawn from the
Republics of Senegal, Soudan, Dahomey and Upper Volta met at Dakar and
unanimously adopted a draft constitution for the Federation of Mali
consisting of sixty-two articles and a preamble adhering to the
constitution of the Fifth French Republic and the fundamental rights of 
270man. The Federation of Mali came into official existence on April 4
minus Dahomey and Upper Volta, and at the end of the year Mali requested
271full independence within the French community. The French National
Assembly ratified the agreement for Mali's independence in June and the
agreement was subsequently ratified by the Assemblies of Senegal and
Soudan. Mali was proclaimed an independent State on June 20 and was
immediately recognised by seventeen States, including the USA, UK and 
■ 272USSR. Mali's membership of the UN was unanimously approved by the
273Security Council on June 29. However, after increasing discord
(269) Supra, Chapter 4, p.218.
(270) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.16618. 
French Constitution, Articles 76 and 86. 
not independent States, but "autonomous",
See also the 1958 
These Republics were 
ibid, Articles 77 and 78.
(271) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.17207.
(272) Ibid, p.17513.
(273) Ibid, p.17535.
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between the leaders of the two components of the Federation, the Senegal
Legislative Assembly unanimously proclaimed its independence and secession
274from the Federation in August.
The acting Premier of Soudan declared that the Federation was
indissoluble and asked for French troops to ensure Mali's territorial
275integrity. An appeal was also made for UN intervention. Further
requests for UN military assistance and appeals for a Security Council
meeting were also made, while Senegal asked to be admitted to the 
2 76organisation. On September 11, France formally recognised Senegal,
which was soon recognised by a number of other countries including the
UK, and the General Assembly agreed to defer a decision on the Mali
Federation's application for membership. Ultimately, the Soudanese
Assembly decided to proclaim Soudan independent as the Republic of Mali,
declaring that the Federation had ceased to exist and that the new State
277was to be free of all ties with France. A few days later, France
recognised the Republic of Mali and the General Assembly recommended
278UN membership for both Senegal and Mali, Senegal justified its
secession by declaring that the component parts of the Federation
remained fully sovereign States with an inherent right of withdrawal.
It was argued that the Federation was a sui generis union emanating from
the application of international law to African needs and that the
279component States therefore retained their sovereign status. The 2745689
(274) Ibid, p,17685.
(275) Ibid, p.17686.
(276) Ibid, p.17687.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Ibid, p.17688. See Security Council resolutions S/4543 and
.■ S/4544. ■ ' '
(279) See Cohen, "Legal Problems Arising out of the Dissolution of 
the Mali Federation" 36 BYIL, 1960, p.375.
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tripartite thesis of sovereign status for Senegal, Soudan and the
Federation of Mali was difficult to sustain absolutely in view of the
provision in the Federal Constitution that «la souveraineté nationale
280appartient au peuple du Mali", the recognition of the Federation
by a substantial number of countries and its acceptance by the Security
Council for membership in the UN. According to the federal
constitution, it was the Federation itself which was to make treaties,
although the component States had to pass laws to enact them. Indeed
treaties were made with France. This would all appear to suggest that
the Federation was itself not only a legal person, but actually a State
281from which Senegal seceded.
However, to treat the matter as straightforward secession from an 
independent State would be to misinterpret the situation. The two 
component States retained considerable powers and many of the attributes 
and characteristics of States and the traditional international law 
specification of federations and unions is not particularly helpful in 
trying to determine the legal position in this case.280 182 Senegal and 
Soudan, as autonomous States within the French Community, agreed to form 
a federation and became independent in that form, after which Senegal
seceded. To compare th is  situation with that of a particular group
seceding from an independent State would not be accurate in view of the 
solidity of the identity of the two component elements. Of particular
(280) Loi Constitutionelle no.60-11, June 18, 1960, Journal Official ri
la République Soudanaise, 2nd yr. no.59, July 15, i960. 06
(281) Zemanek, "State Succession After Decolonisation" 116 HR 1965
pp.210-1. ’ '
(282) See O ’Connell, "State Succession and the Effect Upon Treaties of
Entry into a Composite Relationship" 39 BYIL, 1963, p 54 and 
Gandolfi, "Naissance et Mort Sur le Plan International d ’un Etat 
Ephemere : La Federation du Mali" AFDI, i960, p.904.
importance was the acquiescence in and acceptance of the situation by 
Soudan (later Mali), while international reaction also accepted the 
break-up of the Federation and the emergence of two separate sovereign 
States.
(c) Conclusions
Unlike cession which is accomplished by virtue of the 
attribute of sovereignty possessed by States, secession constitutes an 
act contrary to the will of the State. Like cession, secession 
necessarily impinges upon the territorial integrity of States and the 
inviolability of frontiers. One must distinguish, however, between 
territorial diminution occurring as a result of external forces or 
irredentism and that occurring as a result of internal revolt or 
secession proper. In the former instance, two or more States are 
included, in the latter case only one. International law is accordingly 
deeply concerned with territorial aggrandisement by States or attempts 
to achieve the dissolution of another State's territorial integrity and 
this has been noted on a number of occasions and particularly in the 
UN Charter, resolution 1514 (XV) and the 1970 Declaration on Principles 
of International Law, as well as in the 1974 Consensus Definition of 
Aggression. Thus, irredentist claims by States against other independent 
States are clearly not justifiable under international law and the use of 
force to accomplish such aims is unlawful. These propositions are true 
despite the existence of strong ethnic, historic, cultural and other ties 
that link the claimant State with the object of its irredentist assertion 
As Judge De Castro noted in the Western Sahara case, "to deduce, from 
the existence of ethnic, cultural and geographic analogies, the existence 
of legal ties is like leaping into an abyss",283 and such a leap has
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(283) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 165»
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proved particularly unsuccessful in Africa. Notwithstanding one or two 
exceptions, what is surprising with regard to African States is not the 
presence but the absence of territorial claims, despite the existence 
of ethnic and other ties across State borders. In other words, it is 
clearly accepted that such ties cannot found title to territory and 
irredentist claims offend against the principle of the territorial 
integrity of States.
In a rather different category, lies the problem of secessions. The 
international instruments relating to territorial integrity that are 
binding bind States and not particular inhabitants within particular 
States. Thus, as a general proposition, it can be stated that the 
principle of territorial integrity does not constitute an obligation 
under international law upon individual members or groups within State 
communities. Secession, therefore, is not contrary to international law. 
Where such a secession succeeds in the light of the principle of 
effectiveness in establishing a viable State and one that is recognised 
by other States, international law will recognise this situation. As 
a corollary to this, international law does not recognise that parts 
of sovereign States possess the right of secession. International law 
is neutral. However, what is clear from State practice, and particularly 
African State practice, is that the legal right of self-determination 
does not incorporate the right of peoples in independent States to form 
new States. Self-determination does not extend to secession. It may 
indeed be possible to go further than this and say that although 
international law neither permits nor prohibits secessions, the 
presumption of the maintenance and continuity of the concept of 
territorial integrity of States means that the question of the establish­
ment of secessionist States is weighted in favour of the original State 
and against the secessionist endeavour. This in turn will influence the
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level of proof of effectiveness relative to the creation of such a new
State. State practice shows that there exists a bias in the international
community against secessions, although this bias will not extend to the
use of international force to suppress it in the absence of other factors.
The United Nations Secretary-General noted that when a State joined the
UN, there was an implied acceptance by the entire membership of its
territorial integrity and sovereignty. In addition, "as an international
organisation, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of
284a part of its member-State". This, together with specific State
practice, would appear to point not to an underlining of the classic
international law relating to secessions, but to a subtle modification
285of it to strengthen the presumption against secession. 2845
(284) UNMC, February 1970, p.36,
(285) See infra, Chapter 7, p.523.
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CHAPTER 6 - STATEHOOD, TERRITORY AND TITT.r
Within the body of international lawlaw, the concept and consequences
of Statehood clearly play a crucial role 1 -n,* 1536 Stat® la the primary,
although not the sole subject of international law and ,•law and the law cannot
therefore re^ln lediff.ree, to the circumstances of lt8 coml„e
existence. The creation of nee Statee can cnly be accompll.h.d >s .
reault of the break-up of or aeceaelon from existing states, alnoe
terrae nulliua no longer present themselves 2 ru*The consequent disruption
on the international acene haa of necessity to he carefully regulated. 
The struggle for Statehood haa constituted the prime objective of the 
decolonisation movement and has lead to a rs-examlnation of the nature 
and relevance of the traditional criteria whU. t6, phenome„OB of ^  
entity of controversial status3 has added to this process.4
Ihe creation of new State« and their entry into international Ufa 
raise questions as to the relative balance between factual and legal 
criteria. la the birth of a new State primarily an issue of fact or of 
law? If the former, then is effectiveness sufficient to guarantee
membership of the international community within the framework of 
international law irrespective of the method by which the result was 
achieved? If the latter, the problem of enforcement is immediately 
raised. The relationship between effectiveness and various other *r * «a.**""
clples of international law deemed of relevance is of crucial importanc
(1) See eg.. Higgins, m e  ,ggIel0Effi£nt of jnternationai Law Through 
Political Organsof _thfJtojtM Katicna .•/ j S S a ^  ii
’■The Criteria for Statehood in International Law” 48 DYIL, 1076/7 
p.93. V  .
(2) See as regards Antarctica, O ’Connell, International Law 9 ^  ^
1970 vol. 1, p.451.
(3) Eg. Rhodesia, Transkel, Taiwan.
(4) Note also the problem of the divided States, such as Korea, Germany 
m d  ore-1975 Vietnam. See eg. Caty, Le Statut Juridique dea
'Divises : 190S-' : : -
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here. Of especial interest is the concept of self-determination and 
the extent to which it has or has not modified the traditional criteria 
of Statehood embodying as they do the tests of effectiveness. Other 
factors may also be regarded as part of the concerns of actors on the 
international scene such as the nature and status of dependent terri­
tories and the impact of international constitutional documents like 
5the UN Charter. Since Statehood is but one method of participation 
in the international community, the question of legal personality is 
thus brought into focus.
I Statehood and Territory
(3.) The Criteria - In any examination of the concept of Statehood 
in international law, the role of territory is obviously indispensable. 
There can be no State without territory, The most widely accepted 
formulation of the criteria of Statehood in international law is pro­
vided in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States, 1933. This stipulates that »’the State as a person of international 
law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent popu­
lation (b) a defined territory (c) government and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with the other States", The definition of each of these 
elements is far from settled and these four elements are not to be seen 
as exhaustive.5 6 7 It is apparent, however, that this framework is to a 
large extent concerned with territorial effectiveness. A permanent 
population is, of course, essential but the notions of government and 
capacity to enter into relations with other States, linked as they are
(5) See Riggins op.clt., p.ll.
(6) See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2nd ed. 1073. 
p.75 cf. Higgins op.cit. p.13.
(7) Any reasonable number of inhabitants may suffice, see the cases of 
Nauru and Tuvalu. As regards nationality, see O ’Connell, State 
Succession in Municipal Law and International Law. 19G7, vol. I
p 497et.seq7-and Brownlie op.cit. p.638.
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with the concepts of sovereignty and in a
y "  , relate to factcrs of
internal and external authority founded upon a ,
uPon a determinate piece of
territory.
(a) - A_defined territory. - n,. requirement of . „
01 * “«ilned territory i.
U s e  atrlngent than mould flret appear, it l8 ,ot cecessarj ^  ^  
frontiers of the new State to he precisely d e l i m i t  „  >s
long as an accepted core of territory is rendered subject to the 
authority of the new entity. It was stated m  Deutsche .........  ,
State, that in order to say that a State
exists »it is enough that this territory has a sufflcl»n*
lclent consistency
even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited and
that the State actually exercises independent public authority o v e r e a t
territory» 8 Jessup declared that »one does not find in the general
classic treatment of this subject any insistence that ♦„ *m a t  the territory 0f
a State must be exactly fixed by definite frontier*
ers both reason and
history demonstrate that the concept of territory dee«y 0068 necessarily
include precise delimitation of the boundaries of that t 9 10* tory, **
Albania was recognised by a number of States prior to the fixing of
10 0 its
frontiers, while »ost of the new States that emerged after the First
World War were recognised d© facto or de jure before their fronti
were determined by treaties, 11 Despite arguments that Israel did not
constitute a State since its boundaries were in disout« 12 ***, *^Ul6» that country
(8) (1929) AD. 5, no,5 p.15,
(9) SCOR, 3rd Year, 383rd Meeting p.41 Jessup was speaking on
the U.S. with regard to the admission of Israel to the V.K, * U  °f
(10) Brownlie op.cit. p.75. See also LNOJ 1st Ass. 651 and the 
at St. Saoutt Case, (1924) PCIJt series B, no.9, pp.9-i0f
(11) See Lauterrachts Recognition,inInternational Law, 1948, p ,30.
(12) By Arab States eg. $COR 3rd Year, 385th meeting pp.3-4 and ibid
386th meeting pp.19-20 and by the B.K., ibid 383rd meeting pp.i5-36
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was admitted to the UN on lx May 1949 13 ^
The general rule was
reaffirmed by the International Court of Ju,tlr .
. .. ,. Juatlee in the North See
Continental Shelf case.14
In certain c.„ee the new state may be faced with
d wlth a dispute not m
regards its frontiers, but with respect to all Gf «*
this h tS territ°ry. Wherethis happens, the rules relating to the effect!,. contro. „
'-«niroi of a central
territory may be augmented by other principles of international 
law. such as that of self-determination, which lays do» ln
cases the territorial framework of the selfself within Which the choice as
to political status may be made. 5 The
The Moroccan objection to M au ritan ia ..
independence and admission to the UN is an enampl. of
mis. Morocco
claimed that the territory of Mauritania belonged to it and that
sovereignty had been interrupted by French occupation «i lon* °»ce the French
left, it was alleged, the territory should revert to Moroccan sovereignty.1« 
In the event, Morocco’s contentions attracted little support and 
Mauritania was admitted to the UN.1^
<b> Government - Crucially linked with the availability of a coh 
piece of territory is the exercise of effective
cixve control over i t  by the
authorities of the entity claiming Statehood. Laut»^
««xerpacht defines this
requirement in terms of "a sufficient degree of internal stabilit 
expressed in the functioning of a government enjoying the habitual 
obedience of the bulk of the population,’’18 if the community is internal!
(13) See General Assembly resolution 273 (Hi) m d  Security
resolution 70 (1049). By that time, all the membersi t * * ! ' 1 
Security Council bar Egypt had recognised Israel as had '
thirds of the members of the General Assembly, Higgins 0p cit^0”
(14) ICJ Reports, 1369, pp.3,32. It does not appear necessary t w
there should be * minimum size of territory, See Opnenheim 
International Eaw, 8 th ed., 1955, vol, I p .415 , '
(15) See Supra,
(10) See A/4445 and Add. 1 Supra.
(17) S/4369 and C.A. resolution 1631 (XVI). See also the case of k »* 4
Higgins, cp.cit., P.13. ait»
(18) Op.cit., P»S8.
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so unstable "as to be deprived of a represents
©presentative and effective
government" the result will be that th«that the c o m u B U y  ,v i n  ^  ^  ^
a vital condition of Statehood "l9 tt,«• » »  C o » lsslon of Jurlats ^
Oh the Aaland Island. dispute declered that i, was
was difficult to say at
«hat date the «»l.hhepuhUe actuall, beean. . d e l i n g ,  
sovereign State. It .ae .a.erted that -tu. eert.lnl, dld not ^
Place until . .table politic.! organle.tlon had been created „
treated and until
the public euthcrities had becone strong enough to
assert themselves
throughout the territories of the State without the *
20 8 61106 of for©lgntroops." Higgins has also emphasised how, prior to
prior to the admission of
certain African States to the UN, a tendency had been manifest to inter*
pret the government criterion of Statehood to mean "democratic rather^ 
than purely effective gov e r n m e n t 21
<c> J.°.lc£S5udJH££' * 1116 opacity to enter its relations „
ns wlth other States
is not limited to States, Accordingly, this criterion t« w *
« i s  better examined
in terms of the concept of independence.22 in ,
“ &ay analysie of Statehood
in international law, independence is clearly of fundamental importance
It is a manifestation of territorial effectiveness in relation to
entities of international law and to this extent it iau  ** w  external
aspect of government founded upon internal facts it
■ vnererore amounts
to a conclusion of law, in the light of international law, dependent
particular circumstances. Judge Anzilotti in the classic formulation
of the concept stated that "independence is really no more than *k
««.the normal
(19) Ibid.
(20) LNOJ, Bp. Sxippl. no, 4 (1920) pp.8-9. Eut #
Commission of Rapporteurs in this case Lea ** ttie viev Of the 
Doc H7 21/68/106 (1921) pp.2 2, ' guo °* Nations Council
(21) Op,clt, p.21« Emphasis in original. See w i +k 
Vietnam, SCO* 7th Ve.r 603rd meeting p. 1 2 .nd lJrfeT
385th »eating p.t-5. See aleo Okeke, Controverat i, ^  ff0» 3rd Vear. Contemporary International'Law. 1974f p -[ cTT— -*-«— fLL p^ b.fect«
(22) See eg, Crawford loc.cit., p.119 and Brownlie op,cit,, P.76,
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condition oi States according to international law, it may also be
described as sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external sovereignty,
by which is meant that the State has over it no other authority than
23that of international law." Independence was to be contrasted with
the class of dependent States, thus demonstrating the requirement of
24formal independence. A certain degree of "actual" independence may
25also be necessary. Independence in actuality is a relative pheno­
menon. In a world of increasing interdependence, absolute self-sufficiency 
is a rare commodity, but while a certain degree of real as distinct from 
formal dependence will not result in the extinction of Statehood, there 
may come a point beyond which such dependence may be incompatible with 
Statehood. An interesting instance of what may or may not prejudice 
independence in the legal as opposed to political sense is that afforded 
by defence agreements with the former colonial power.
28It was argued that the treaty between the UK and Transjordan, 
which provided for the latter’s independence and permitted the station­
ing of British troops in the country legally restricted the sovereignty
■'■27of Transjordan on account of its military clauses. Similar arguments
28were raised with regard to Ceylon’s defence arrangements with the UK,
A mutual defence agreement was arranged between the UK and the government
(23) The Auatro-German Customs Union case, (1931) PCIJ Series A/B, no.41, 
nr> .57—8. See Marek. The Identity and Continuity of States in Public 
International Law, 1S54, pp.166-80, 245678
(24) See Rousseau, Droit International Public, vol.2, 1974, pp.55-93,
(25) See Higgins, op.cit., p.26, Lauterpacht op.cit., pp.46-51, and 
Crawford op.cit., p.126. See also Lighthouses in Crete and Samos 
case (1937) PCIJ, Series, A/B, pp.71, 127 per Judge Hudson, and the 
Commission of Jurists Report on the Aaland Islands case, LNOJ Sp, 
Suppl. no,4 (1920), p.8-9.
(26) 6 UNTS 143.
(27) SCOR, 1st Year, 2nd ser. suppl. 4 at p,136 and GAOR 2nd sess, 117th 
meeting, pp.1044-53. See also Higgins op.cit., p,31 and Okoye,
Tnfftmational Law and the New African States. 1972, p.16.
(28) SCOR 3rd Year 351st meeting pp.11-12,
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of Nigeria, but for political reasons was soon abrogated.286 A number
of former French colonies entered into defence arrangements with France29
and as of Spring 1978 France was maintaining bases in Senegal, Ivory
30Coast, Gabon and Djibouti and involved in armed action in Chad and 
31Mauritania. It was never suggested, however, that these countries
32thereby lost the attribute of legal independence.
Although the requirement of independence is primarily formal and
does not necessitate an analysis of political and economic ties with
other States, it may be that there is an irreducible minimum of real
independence in factual terms below which an entity may not fall and be
33entitled to Statehood. The question has been raised with regard to the
•3A
grant of independence by South Africa to its Bantustans, The OAU
35adopted a resolution in which it referred to the "so-called Independence" 
and "fraudulent pseudo-independence" of the Transkei, which was officially 
declared independent on October 26, 1976, General Assembly resolution
31/6A, adopted by 132 to 0, with 1 abstention (the USA), referred to the■ . ■ ■ ' ■ . ,
"sham independence" of the Transkei. The Transkei is heavily dependent
(28a) Commonwealth Survey (1960) p.501, Higgins op.cit., pp.31-32 and 
Okoye op.cit,, p.17,
(29) Higgins op.cit., pp.32-33.
(30) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, p.4859.
(31) Infra Chapter 7, p.506 and p,480.
(32) France was accused to trying to restore colonialism i n  Africa by 
the A l g e r i a n  President, ibid, while Libya stated that French 
"colonial" forces were used in Chad to repress a popular uprising 
using "genocidal" methods, ibid, July 1978 p,4924,
(33) One is talking here of entities becoming new States rather than 
existing States losing their Statehood. There is a presumption in 
international law against loss of Statehood, see eg. Crawford 
loc.cit., p.139.
(34) Infra, p.355.
(35) CM/Res 493 (XXVII).
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upon South Africa. Some 360,000 Transkeians work in South Africa each
year, contributing about 70% of Transkei’s internal revenue, while
South Africa has provided some 70% of the entity's budget.36 3789401 However,
it does possess a sea-coast. Bophuthatswana, on the other hand, does
not and is in addition, split into a series of areas divided by South
37African territory. Over half of this entity's citizens as defined
by South Africa live in South Africa itself. Bophuthatswana was
38declared independent on 6 December 1977. The OAU in a press statement
39critised the Bantustans as "pseudo-States". The status of these two
entities, unrecognised by any State apart from South Africa, is clearly
problematic. The fact that they are heavily dependent on South Africa
economically is of relevance, but numerous States are equally dependent
40on other States' assistance and it is clear that even if they were to 
become economically more successful, the international community would 
not treat this as adequate to recognise them as States, Formally they 
are independent, since South Africa is able under international law to 
alienate parts of its sovereign territory. It is submitted that the 
answer to the question of their status lies elsewhere than in the traditional
41
exposition of independence as a criterion of Statehood.
(36) Africa Research Bulletin, October 1976, p.4189.
(37) But geographical unity is not essential for Statehood, as the case of
pre-1971 Pakistan shows.
(38) Ibid, December 1977, pp.4666-8,
(39) Ibid, p.4668.
(40) Note eg. Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, etc., see Mendelson, 
"Diminutive States in the United Nations” , 21 ICLQ, 1972, p.609.
(41) Infra p.355, Note also that in April 1978, the Transkei broke off 
diDlomatic relations with South Africa and called for international 
aid, Africa Research Bulletin, April 1978, p,4817.
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(2) Self-Determination
(a) Af-.Modifying the Traditional Criteria of Statehood 
(i> — ned Territory - As noted above?3 the principle of self-
determination identifies the territorial unit within which the inhabi­
tants determine their political status, it reinforces the notion of 
territorial integrity, in that the territory as colonially defined on 
the eve of self-determination is the recognised spatial frame for 
the exercise of the right. In this sense, the core of territory neces­
sary for Statehood is reinforced in colonial instances. This is 
demonstrated by the acceptance of Mauritania as an independent State 
despite Moroccan claims, and within its colonial borders.42 34
(ii) Government - It is in this category that the principle of self- 
determination has most affected the application of the traditional 
criteria of Statehood. The earlier formulations of the criteria had 
primarily emphasised the stability and effectiveness needed for this 
factor to be satisfied, while the representative and democratic nature 
of the government was also put forward as a requirement. The concept 
of self-determination has affected both.
The notion of government has, as Crawford pointed out,45 two 
aspects. One is the right or title to exercise authority and the other 
is the actual exercise of authority. As far as the first is concerned 
the principle of self-determination, in those situations to which it 
has been accepted that it applies, will identify the people in question
(42) Supra, p.102.
(43) Supra, p .171.
(44) Supra, p,223.See also the Guinea-Bissau case, infra, p,342,
(45) Loc.cit., p.117.
42
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while a grant of independence by the former sovereign will specify 
those entitled to exercise authority. As far as the actual exercise 
of authority is concerned, it is submitted that practice has demon­
strated that in self-determination situations a lower level of effect­
iveness has now been accepted.
(a) The Congo, I960 - the Belgian administration of the colony 
had virtually excluded Africans from key posts, with the result that 
an educated elite scarcely existed. According to the UN Economic
Commission for Africa, 80% of commercialised production was in European 
46hands. By the date of independence on 30 June 1960, tribal fighting
had broken out, with widespread clashes spreading to the capital. ^
48On July 5, the Force Publique mutinied and Belgian troops became
involved again in the country. On July 11, the province of Katanga
50announced its secession. UN financial and military aid soon followed. 
Despite the virtual breakdown of government, the Congo was recognised 
by a large number of countries soon after independence and was admitted
5^
as a member state of the UN without opposition. The UN Security 
C o u n c i l  resolved on July 14 to provide the Congolese government with the
(46) UN Economic Bulletin for Africa. June 1981 p.72. The proportion 
in Katanga province was even higher, ibid.
(47) Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.17594-5.
(48) Ibid.pp.17639-40,
(4Q) Safi Hoskvns, The Congo Since Independence. 1965, pp,96-9.
(50) Ibid p.99.
(51) See Security Council Resolution 142 (1960) and General Assembly 
resolution 1480 (XV). At the time of the Assembly resolution in 
September i960, two different factions of the Congolese govern­
ment sought to be accepted by the UN as the legitimate representa­
tive of the Congo, The Assembly postponed a choice, referring 
the question to the Credentials Committee. Ultimately, the 
delegation authorised by the Head of State was accepted and that 
of the Prime Minister rejected, see Higgins op.cit. pp.162-4.
In any event, it underlines the doubt as to the existence of a 
stable and effective government at the time.
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necessary military assistance and ultimately took action to defeat
53the Katangan secession.
54(b) Ruanda-Urundi, 1962 - Tribal fighting broke out in the
territory in 1959 and a UN mission was despatched to discover the
relevant facts. The UN hoped to establish one independent State,
but it had to accept the independence of two States. A General
Assembly Commission sent in 1962 referred to the "psychosis of mutual
55distrust" in the territory, and expressed doubts as to the nature and
degree of governmental control in Burundi, while as far as Ruanda was
concerned, the situation, it was stated, was "not calculated to dispel
the many misgivings which the General Assembly had always felt with
regard to the conditions in which the people of Ruanda are approaching
Statehood." In the event, Assembly resolution 1746 (XVI), in adopting
the report of the Commission, permitted Belgian troops to remain in the
two States for a short while after independence. Rwanda and Burundi
57were soon after admitted to the UN.
(c) Guinea - Bissau, 1973 - After a number of years fighting in 
the Portuguese colony, a UN Special Mission was sent to the "liberated 
areas" of the territory pursuant to a decision of the Special Committee 
on Decolonisation,58 approved by the General Assembly.59 The Mission 52
52
(52) S/4387.
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
Supra, p.306.
Supra, p .208.
A/5126 and Add 1.
Ibid, cited in Higgins op.cit., p.23.
Security Council resolutions S/5149 and S/5150 and General 
resolutions 1748 (XVII) and 1749 (XVII). Assembly
See Yearbook of UN, 1971, pp.566-7,
Resolution 2795 (XXVI), The Special Af
sentatives from Ecuador, Sweden and Tunisia* ° f rePre- 
between 2 and 8 April 1972. 60(1 visited the area
343.
concluded that Portugal had lost effective adnlnlatratlve control of 
large areas of the territory. The liberation novenent. PA1CC, estinated 
that It controlled between two thirds and three quarters of the territory, 
and this was verified by .any foreign observers. The Mission further 
reported that the population In those areas supported the PAIGC, which 
exercised de facto administrative control in such areas and effectively 
protected the inhabitants’ interests.60
It was the Mission’s belief that the Special Committee’s recognition 
of the PAIGC as the de facto authority and the sole and authentic repre­
sentative of the aspirations of the people of the territory should be taken 
into account by States and UN organs.63.
The report of the Mission was endorsed by the Special Committee on
1 August, 1972. It was felt that the effectiveness of the control of the
PAIGC had been proved, and many States including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Guinea, India, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago and Tanzania were of the opinion
that Guinea-Bissau had achieved de facto independence and that the
PAIGC administration should be recognised as the de facto government
The PAIGC was recognised as the only authentic representative of the people
of the territory and the successful completion of its task by the Mission
was declared to constitute a major contribution to the process of decolon 
62isation.
On 24 September 1973, the PAIGC declared the independence of the 
' 63Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Within three days, the new State was
(60) A/AC 109/L 804, p.19.
(61) Ibid.
(62) A/8723/Rev 1. The General Assembly commended th» vi _ j
work and also affirmed that the PAIGC was thh l Î l  i f  for its 
tive of the true aspirations of the people of tha !nti? reP*®»enta- 
resolution 2918 (XXVII), P Pl® 0f the territory, see
(63) Africa Research Bulletin September 1973 p 299*» c
Générale de Droit International Public, 1974, ^ p H e  g * S° R @ v m
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recognised by Algeria, the Congo, Guinea, Upper Volta, Chad, Tanzania,
Ghana, Somalia, Togo, Nigeria, Mauritania, Madagascar, Libya, Senegal,
64Syria and Yugoslavia. By the beginning of October, 28 of the then 
41 members of the OAU had recognised Guinea-Bissau, as well as a number
of other States Including the USSB, Cuba, Iraq and the German Democratic
65Republic. During that month, Guinea-Bissau became the 18th member of 
the Liberation Committee of the OAU66 and by the middle of the month 62 
countries bad recognised the new State.66®
On 22 October an item was placed on the agenda of the General 
Assembly of the UN entitled "the illegal occupation by Portugese mili­
tary forces of certain sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and 
acts of aggression committed by them against the people of the Republic 67 
The pattern of the Assembly debate had already been set by the dis­
cussions in the General Committee, which had called for the inscription 
of the item by 17 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions. A number of States, 
including Mauritius, Somalia, Pakistan, Guinea, Madagascar and Ghana 
affirmed the validity of the independence of Guinea-Bissau in international 
law.68 France, Netherlands, the USA, and the United Kingdom declared that 
since Guinea-Bissau had not met the traditional Statehood requirement of 
effective control, it remained a non-self-governing territory.69
(64) Ibid.
(65) West Africa, October 8, 1973, p.1403,
(60) Africa Research Bulletin, October 1973, p.3008,
(66a) Ibid. p,3018,
(67) Proposed by 58 States, A/9196 and Add 1 and, 2.
(68) GAOR, 28th Session, General Committee, 213rd meeting pp 25-6
28 and 30, . *
(69) Ibid pp.28, 30 and 31.
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A number of different approaches were adopted in the debate in
the General Assembly as regards the question of the Statehood of Guinea-
Bissau. Portugal noted that a State only became independent when a people
in a well-defined territory have a sovereign capable of exercising supreme
70authority independent of any other entity. A series of questions were 
posed regarding the territory of the "phantom State", the exercise of 
effective control, the existence of a capital city and the proposed siting 
of the diplomatic missions of the recognising States.70 1 723 The net effect 
of this was to emphasise that the PAIGC did not in any way fulfil the 
criteria for Statehood.
Portugal maintained that the UN Mission had seen only 20 square
kilometres of a territory with a total area of some 36,125 square kilo- 
72metres and that the territory and its population were subject to the
73sovereignty of the Lisbon government. A number of western and Latin 
American States opposed the 65 power draft resolution74 on the grounds 
expressed by Portugal. Greece, for example, declared that the functional 
co-existence of the three indispensable elements of territory, sovereignty 
and people were not fulfilled to the degree necessary to enable the new 
entity to assume the full rights and responsibilities of a State.75 The 
UK stated that Guinea-Bissau as an independent State was factually and
' - ■ 75a ■ ■objectively not a reality, while the USA declared that since Portugal 
controlled the population centres, most of the rural areas and the 
administration of the territory, it must be regarded as the sovereign
(70) GAOR, 28th Session, plenary 2156th meeting, p.!2.
(71) Ibid, p.8.
(72) Ibid p ,16. See also Ventes, Portugal's War in ■Guinea-Bissau» 1073
Rrnce. Portugal: The Last Empire. 1975,
(73) See the comments of the Portuguese foreign Minister, GAOR, 2Rth 
Session, Plenary, 2138th meeting, p.76.
(74) A/L 702.
(75) CAOH, 28th Session, plenary, 2163rd meeting, p.27.
(75a) Ibid, p.35.
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under international law, otherwise facts would be disregarded.76 789
The majority of the 30 abstainers to resolution 3061 (XXVIII) also 
denied the status of Guinea-Bissau as an independent State, on the basis 
that effective control over the major portion of the territory in question 
was not proved, while at the same time condemning Portugal's colonialism?7
93 States, however, voted in favour of resolution 3061 (XVIII) which 
was accordingly adopted on 2 November 1973. This resolution welcomed 
"the recent accession to independence of the people of Guinea-Bissau, 
thereby creating the sovereign State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.1,78
Two themes may be discerned in the speeches of these States. One
attitude was that Guinea-Bissau did indeed fulfil the criteria for
Statehood as classically expressed. This was based on the report of
the UN Special Mission. Guinea noted that after 10 years of struggle,
over three-quarters of the territory had been liberated by the PAIGC,
which had established a working administration, comprising schools, health
79services, shops etc. Ghana stressed that unlike the current situations 
in Mozambique and Angola, the people of Guinea-Bissau fulfilled the condi­
tions for recognition of belligerency and that in addition the classical
(76) Ibid. p.56. See also the South African view, ibid p.62. Portugal 
Greece, UK, USA, South Africa, Brazil and Spain cast the 7 negative 
votes to resolution 3061 (XXVIII).
(77) Eg. Bolivia, GAOR, 28th Session, Plenary, 2156th meeting, p.51 Chile
ibid. 2163th meeting p.31 Belgium ibid p.37, Australia, ibid p 41 *
Netherlands, ibid p.52, Ireland, ibid p.57, France ibid p.61 and * 
West Germany, ibid p.6B. See also the joint declaration of Denmark 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, Revue Genérale de Droit *
International Public, 1974, p,H69,
(78) The resolution also demanded that Portugal desist from further viola­
tion of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guinea-Bissau 
drew the attention of the Security Council to the critical situation 
resulting from the illegal presence of Portugal in Guinea-Bissau and 
Invited all member-States of the UN and all organisations within the 
UN system to render all assistance to the government of Guinea-Bissau,
(79) GAOR, 28th Session, plenary, 2157th meeting, pp.22-25.
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prurugumteg ior the recognition ot e new state, viz. de facto control
of territory and machinery of government, the aeeent of the bulk of the
population and willingness to comply »tth International obligations
were in existence in this ease. The second theme manifested in a
number of speeches by delegates supporting the resolution was the impor-
tance of the concept of self-determination.
Senegal declared that the western powers were applying the classical
rules of international law with regard to recognition among European
States to deny recognition to Guinea-Bissau, but colonial liberation
called for the application of other rules of law. Such other rules were
those enshrined in the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.81
Madagascar emphasised that the agenda item under discussion resulted
directly from the implementation of the principles of resolution 1 5i4 <XV)82
while Uganda stressed the importance of resolutions referring to the right
of self-determination such as General Assembly resolutions 1514(XV) and
2918 (XXVII) and Security Council resolution 322 in interpreting Chapter
83XI of the Charter,
84(d> Angol»^1975^6 - On November 1 0 , 1975, the departing Portuguese
High Commissioner proclaimed the independence and full sovereignty of the
(80) Ibid pp.65-7. See also Uganda, ibid 2159th meeting nn se'i 
Ethiopia, ibid 2160th meeting, pp,21-2, Rwanda, ibid 2162nd L
^ d i p S s M r on behau of the 18
(81) Ibid p.36.
(82) Ibid 2158th meeting p.26. See also Ghana, ibid 2157th meeti™ » 
Hungary, ibid 2158th meeting p,7 and Poland ibid pp.33-33 S P ’62
(83) Ibid, 2159th meeting, p.86. Note that in February 1974 the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law adopted a resolution by consensu«
(from which Portugal dissociated itself) calling for the p a r t i e L -  
tion in the Conference of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau with th*. 
same rights as all other participating states, see CWU/BR 4 , pp.3 3 .3 7
(84) See further infra, Chapter 7, p.515.
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State of Angola. Two governments of Angola were thew,,««6 * were thereupon proclaimed,
that of the MPLA and that of the FNLA - Unit a u At.coalition, both purporting
to speak for the whole country. 85 Both of „4 .y. Both of the rival movements controlled
determinate areaa of territory and both received increaaing foreign
support. A number of States recognised the MPLA regime, but OAU polio,
»a. to seek to set up a government of national unity, the event after
the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA victory over the South-African, Zaire
and USA supported forces of FNLA and Units, a majority of African States
recognised the MPLA government. On 11 February, 197« in»«,.y» Angola was admitted
gf?
as the 47th member of the OAU. A distinction, however, has to be
drawn between the existence of Angola as an independent State and the
recognition of the MPLA regime as the legitimate government of that State.
Whereas a recognised government only emerged as regards the majority
of African States, the OAU and a large number of other States by January
or February 1976, it is clear that an independent State of Angola was in
existence as of 11 November 1975. The alternatives of a continuation of
non-self-governing territory status until early 1976 or the existence f
an intermediate status are not viable propositions.
It thus appears that practice, and Primarily African practice at
that, has succeeded in modifying the effective government criterion of
the existence of Statehood, In the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and
Angola, circumstances were such at the commencement of independence as to
deny the existence of effective government. However thi« h *,»> wiAiB aia not result
lu . denial of Ststehood. On the contrary, the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi 
were admitted to the UN at the time of upheaval or relative instability 
This weakening of the effective government requirement is a result of the 
principle of self-determination, which stipulates that in colonial situa­
tions the people of the particular territory has the right to determine
(85) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, p.3819.
(86) Infra, p.518.
its own political status. This right is not qualified by any reference 
to the need for an effective government. Indeed, it is a question not 
of territorial control or efficacy but of status. The maintenance 
of the traditional approach with regard to government might well have 
resulted in the creation of entities with an intermediate status as 
territories decolonised, occasionally with weak or non-existent
authorities. Such a situation, even were it remotely politically viable, 
would have led to serious problems as to the rights and duties of such 
entities. In the event, this hag not proved to be the case, and the 
international community has accepted that in self-determination situations,
the requirement of effective government for Statehood ha, been aubetan- 
tially modified. The Cuinea-Bieaau type of eituation, nevertheleee, 
remain, problematic, «hile the territory „a, non-a.lf-gov„rall)g J  lt< 
people entitled to the exercise of eelf-determinetien. on. was M t  
with the poaition where, a, for example in the caaea diacueeed above, . 
colonial power granted independence to an indigenoua government which 
could not be regarded as affective. It wa, , aitua.ion ^
power wan maintatnlng it. claim, to aovaraignty and denying the liberation 
movement control over the whole of the territory. Although the report 
of the Special Mission of the-UN stated that the overwhelming bulk of 
the territory was under the effective control of the PAIGC administration, 
many western and Latiu-American States denied that this was so or at the
leant argued that a aubatantial degree of ambiguity exiated as to th
- §7precise factual situation. In such circumstances it l, ,'•“ t « is isr froa clear
that the foot, warranted a viable claim of Statehood from the PAlor , even
in the .light of the impact of self-determination.
83
(87) See eg. the statement of the US Department of State on 10 October, 
law, mgest of US Practice j n  lnternatlonal Law 1973. 1974. r,.n
(88) As to the relevance and effect of the recognitions of Guinea-Bissau, 
see infra, p.359.
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Although tbe criterion of effective government« control hue been 
modified by the principle of eelf-d,termination,89 lt s t l n  exlat> M  
regards other situations. For example, it is submitted that the rule 
remains Intact as far as secessionist attempts are concerned, and, 
indeed, with respect to divided States. Katanga and Biafra are both 
Instances of entitles that for a time exercised "gov.n „ u t H "  control 
over determinate areas of land, but such control could not be seen as 
effective until the factual situation had been clearly resolved. Where 
there Is continued fighting, effective control m  the sense of the Inter­
national law criteria of Statehood cannot be established. Okeke, 
however, has argued that Biafra satisfied the essential elements of 
Statehood in international law for the time it lasted 90 But it i 
suggested that in such circumstances, international law requires the 
criteria of Statehood be fully satisfied. The exception with regard to 
recognised self-determination situations is not applicable in other case 
and certainly not where secession is concerned, for that involves a 
violation of the territorial integrity of the existing State.91* IS
not in the Interest of States in general to sanction the break-up of
existing States by the lax application of the requirement of Statehood.
Although once the factual position has been clearly resolved international
law will accept the result, there is a presumption against the status
92of Statehood in secession situations.
(89) See also Higgins ©p.eit, pp.23-4 and Brownlie, op,cit, p 75
(90) Op,cit, p.165 cf. Higgins "International Law and Civil Confn«+»t
in The International Regulation of Civil Wars (ed . Luard?” 1972 
pp•169| 175# *
(91) Secession itself, of course, is not contrary to International U w
gee Lauterpacht, op.cit, p.409. ■iaw»
(92) As regards the Katanga and Biafra cases, see supra pp.306 and 316.
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(iii) Independence - The concept of self-determination, once the people
concerned has attained sovereignty, emphasises the independence of the
new State as against external interference. It maintains that the
93people as a whole and as previously defined may freely determine its 
political status and freely pursue its economic, social and cultural 
development. It reinforces the domestic jurisdiction provisions of 
international law.
(b) An additional requirement of Statehood
The principle of self-determination has clearly had an important 
effect in qualifying the traditional criteria of Statehood in certain 
circumstances. Is it then possible to go further than this and state 
that it has become itself one of the criteria of Statehood? If this 
were to be so, not only would Statehood be concerned with the right of 
a colonial people to become independent but the nature of that people's 
progress to independence would also be at issue. In general, it would 
appear that international law is not interested in how a people exer­
cises its right to determine its political status and pursue its economic,
social and cultural development. It imposes no restriction on the type of 
political structure chosen nor does it bar particular economic systems 
from consideration. But it seems as if there may be an important exception 
to this, with regard to racial discrimination. The argument would be that 
in situations of racial discrimination enshrined in the political system 
of a new entity, that entity may be denied the status of Statehood in 
international law even though the criteria traditionally enumerated have 
been fully complied with. The issue is clearly a difficult one, and 
important State practice with respect to it has, however, been rather spars©. 
The Rhodesia case is the prime instance of material which is of relevance 
and one may also add the case of the "independent” South Africa Bantustans.
(93) Supra, P
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<*> RhPQeg1? “ In October 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 
2012 (XX) which called on the UK not to accept a unilateral declaration 
of independence by the authorities in that territory as it would be 
in the sole interest of the minority. Resolution 2022 (XX), adopted 
on November 5, called on the UK to effect, if necessary by force, 
the release of political detainees and the repeal of all discrimina­
tory legislation. The day after UDI, on November 12, the Assembly 
adopted resolution 2024 (XX) condemning the UDI ’’made by the racialist 
minority" and requesting the UK to end the rebellion. Resolution 
2151 (XXI) re-affirmed the inalienable right of the Africans to 
freedom and independence and condemned any arrangement for the trans­
ference of power unless based on self-determination. Security Council 
resolution 216 (1965) called on all States not to recognise "this 
illegal racist minority regime” or assist it, while resolution 217 
(1965) called the continuance in time of the rebellion a threat to 
international peace and security. The declaration of independence was 
deemed to be of "no legal validity" and the regime in power an "illegal 
authority". The UK view was that UDI had no constitutional effect and
that the only way the territory could become independent was by way of
94an Act of Parliament. In international law, of course, this is not 
strictly correct. The test revolves around the criteria of Statehood and 
the municipal law requirements of the metropolitan State are not critical 
Lauterpacht has written that "the refusal of the mother country to recog­
nise such independence is not conclusive" and that once evidence has 
demonstrated the displacement of the mother country and that the "effect­
iveness of its authority does not exceed a mere assertion of right ...
the illegality of origin, from the point of view of the constitutional
95law of the parent State, is of no consequence." Fawcett had written
(94)
(95)
See Fawcett, "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" 41 BYIL, 
,1965-6, pp. 103» 107.
Op.cit. p.26.
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that the UK claim with regard to post-UDI Rhodesia is only a "mere
96assertion of right." In factual terms, the undoubtedly effective 
control maintained by the Smith regime over the territory and population 
of the former Southern Rhodesia for some years after UDI meant that in 
this respect at least the entity seemed to fulfil the classical require­
ments of Statehood. The British response could not be described as a 
vigorous attempt to end the rebellion by all possible means. However, no 
State recognised Rhodesia. The UN persisted in regarding it as a non- 
self-governing territory and the legal responsibility of the UK96 78 9 and 
adopted a number of resolutions denying legal validity to the regime in
QQpower. One could nevertheless still regard Rhodesia as a State in the
light of its satisfaction of the factual requirements of Statehood in inter-
99 anational law, but this seems a dubious proposition. The fact that no 
State at all has recognised it as a State coupled with the strenuous denun­
ciations of the validity of its declared independence detract substantially 
from the viability of this alternative.100 Adoption of the constitutive 
theory of recognition would solve the problem of the reason in law for its 
existence as a State, but there are strong objections to this theory.101*2
(96) Op.cit. p.112,
(97) See the statement by the UN Secretary General, SCOR, 21st 
4 Year, 1280th meeting, p,23.
/o«> See eg. Security Council resolutions 217 (1965), 221 (1966),
1 232 (1966), 253 (1968), 277 (1970), 288 (1970) and 328 (1973)
and Assembly resolution 2024 (XX).
(99) Supra, p.352.
(99a) But cf. Okeke, op.cit. pp.104-5.
_ alBO Higgins, "International taw, Rhodesia and the United 
*100* Nations" The World Today, (1967) pp.94, 98 and Brownlie, 
op.cit. p.lOl.
(101-2) See further infra, p.358.
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It would seem that the firmest legal foundation for denying the 
existence of Rhodesia as a State lies in the development of an additional 
criterion of Statehood, viz. the principle of self-determination.
According to this approach, if the requirement of consistency with the 
provisions of self-determination was not present on entity claiming 
Statehood would not fulfil the requisite conditions and its claim would 
therefore fail. However, the proposition cannot be as broadly stated 
as that, for the reasons that practice has demonstrated that States 
have emerged with regimes in control which have not acted in accordance 
with the postulates of self-determination. The application of this 
additional criterion of Statehood is restricted at the moment, it is 
suggested, to those peoples regarded as having the right in international 
law of self-determination. It would therefore not apply in cases of 
secessions from existing States, for example. One may envisage a situa­
tion in which the international community might wish for this to happen, 
but practice to date is insufficient to substantiate this. The proposi­
tion does not operate in cases of already existing States so as to lead 
to the extinction of Statehood. The instance of South Africa demonstrates 
this. It has never been argued that South Africa has ceased to be a 
State, despite apartheid and violation of the principle of self- 
determination. However, in the case of an entity seeking to become a 
State and accepted by the international community as being entitled to 
exercise the right of self-determination, it may well be necessary to
4-+„rnallv it is complying with the requirements of the demonstrate that inte x** *
inciple of self-determination. In view of State practice to date, one
. fhls condition too severely, but institutionalised andcannot deiine
103stematic discrimination will semble invalidate a claim to Statehood. *34
«tt op.cit. pp.112-3, and ibid, The Law of nations 2nd Ed.
(103) See ' twine, "The Requirements of Statehood Re-examined"1971 p.46, cr* »
34 MLR, 1971, p.41°.
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It has been suggested that this additional requirement forms an
104appendage to the criterion of effective government. However, 
while the concept of self-determination in this context is naturally 
concerned with the character of government of the territory in 
question, it does appear a confusion to link the two in this fashion. 
Government as an element in the creation of Statehood refers primarily 
to the relationship between the authority of an entity and the terri­
tory involved, although clearly the notion of effectiveness is related 
to the degree of acceptability of that authority by the inhabitants 
concerned. It has been seen also how in self-determination situations, 
the requirement of effectiveness has been modified. The notion of 
self-determination as an additional requirement for Statehood is essen­
tially concerned with the relationship between the government and the 
people and centres around the absence of systematised discrimination 
within that entity. While the object of such discrimination could be
religious, cultural and distinct national groups, the issue is most
105likely"to be raised in a racial context.
(il) «independent" Bantustana - If an entity claiming Statehood 
»ay be denied such a claim on the grounds that it is a territory 
©cognised as within the self-determination context and it has enshrined 
B discriminatory system within its authority structures, the prime 
example being the Rhodesian situation, is it possible to go beyond this 
to deal with cases where the new entity is being established as part of
’’Some Legal Aspects of the Rhodesian Situation".
(104> Journal of Contemporary Law, (1974) pp, 1,19, Starke
5 Nigeria ent" as it appears in Article 1 of the Montevideo
defines i*a 'government to which the population renders habi-
Convention introduction to International Law, 8th ed. 197?.tual obedience , ¿iihi----- - --— --------------------
p.107.
(105) See Biggin® op.cit. p.106.
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* Cam,ilen *° de”y ■•“ -'«.«in.tion? This Is c„e of the que8tlons 
raised by the purported grant of Independence by South Africa to Its 
Eantuatans.106 A sovereign State nay legitimately dispose of part of 
Ita own territory should It ao wish. Thl. i. „„6 of th> ^
reignty of States under International law and it baa been regarded as 
being more or less without exception. What la therefore under considera­
tion la a derogation from the general rule, such exception being baaed 
upon the principle of self-determination,
The Status of the Transkei Act adopted in 1976 by South Africa 
declared the territory known as the Transkei to be a sovereign and
independent State, free from any authority exercised by the Republic of 
107South Africa.
However, it was South Africa which determined the relevant citizen­
ship conditions for the new entity. In particular, it covered a large 
number of Xhosas living in the Republic itself.108 The Prime Minister 
of the Transkei took exception to this, stating that the Transkei was not
responsible for the Xhosas living and working in South Africa 109* *»8*
noted above, the UN and the OAU have declared themselves firmly against
(106) Supra, p.287.
(107) IBM, September 1976, p,1175.
(108) The Status of the Transkei Act 1976 also included as ,
citizens, ©very South African citizen, not a citiz«» Jlanskel 
tory within the Republic who speaks a language used
or Sotho speaking section of the population of the T r L * ^ ^ 8* 
is related to any such a person or who has i d e n t ? ? J ^ !  1 °r *ho 
any part of such population or is culturally or oth klmself with 
with any member as part of such population, see associated
of schedule B, ibid p.1177, paras and (g)
(109) African Research Bulletin, October 1976 p.dlgs.
(110) Supra, p.287.
recognising any of the Bantustans as independent and no State apart
from South Africa has recognised such independence 1X1 As reasons for
such non-recognition UN resolutions have cited the principles of
112territorial integrity and self-determination. * As far as the former
is concerned it is to be doubted whether it may be understood to include
the proposition that a State's territorial definition may never be
altered. The principle of self-determination, however, is more relevant.
It has been suggested that this principle applies to South Africa, as
the one exception to date to the rule that the principle applies only to
113non-independent States, in the light of the institutionalised and
systematic racial discrimination established by the government of that 
114country. Accordingly the policy of creating the Bantustans and pur­
porting to endow them with Statehood In an attempt to further the policy 
of apartheid may be seen as a device to avoid the norms of self- 
determination as relevant in that particular case and thus as a violation 
of that principle. I* would thus appear that where an entity is granted 
independence in order to prevent the legitimate exercise by a people 
of the right to self-determination, such an entity would not be accept­
able as a State. 1234
(111) Bophuthatswana was declared "independent" on 6 December 1977, 
African Research Bulletin, December 1977, p.4666, while a third 
Bantustan, Vends, is scheduled for "independence" in the latter 
half of 1979, ibid, April 1978 p.4817.
(112) Eg. Assembly resolution 2775 £ (XXVI).
(113) Self-determination is  relevant with regard to independent States in the sense that it  reinforces the sovereignty of that Stateand underlines the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs
(114) Supra, p.257.
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(3) Recognition
Recognition is one mechanism whereby the international community 
accepts certain factual situations and endows them with legal signi­
ficance.115 But the relationship between fact and law is a complex 
one and susceptible to many conflicting interpretations. The law may 
endorse the legality of a particular situation even though it is fac­
tually precarious and the extent of the interaction between effective­
ness and the law is a constantly changing one. As far as Statehood 
itself is concerned, two opposing doctrines have been preferred. The
constitutive theory "deduces the legal existence of new States from the
116will of those already established" so that it is only through recog­
nition that a State becomes an international person under international 
law*117 the declaratory theory, on the other hand, maintains that once a 
State satisfies the criteria of Statehood, it becomes a subject of inter­
national law and recognition is merely a political act of no legal
1X8significance in this context. The problem with the former approach
119is that State practice appears to be inconsistent with it, and it
(115) Blum notes that recognition is one of the ~ '-----
consent in international relations, History °f « W e s s i n g
L » ,  196! p.49. Schwarzenberger
general character and has a "wide actual rec°gnition i s b F T — ~~
potential, scope", "Th. P„ndJenla* P rlla iT lL'* !\1U * « « «
87 HR, 1955, pp.195, 228. PX®8 of international Law"
(116) Lauterpacht, op.cit, p.38.
(117) Oppenheim op.cit, p.125. See also g e n e r a l ! ,
in International Law" 35 AJIL, 1941, n eon ^  lsf“ "R®cognition 
on Lauterpacht’s Recognition in International?* 'Critical Remarks 
p,713 and ffrlgbt "So„e Tbongbts about , 1950,
(118) See Chen, The International Law of _
La Reconnaissance Internationale iTg^rr-— ' :J51» Charpentier. 
Gens. 1956 and LauterpactiiT op oi *■, rfTiTT"— dea 19
(119) See eg. Deutsche Continental Gas Gp ««t ..
AD 5, noTT p.15 , "The Report o f T h T ^ w i i ^ ^  <1929)
Aaland Islands case LNOJ sp. Suppia jjo, 4 a g n n °f on the
Concessions Arbitration, (1923) 1 RIAA p 369* * P*8i The Tinoco 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of*?** Article 3 °f the
also Brownlie op.cit. p.04 O ’Connell op.cit 1933. SeeA Modern Introduction to International and Akehurat------- ----- — ¿j££, 3rd ad. 1D77, p.60-63,'
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copes with difficulty with the question of the unrecognised State.
The problem with the declaratory approach is that it ignores or decries
the effect upon a situation of its recognition by States of the
international community. The constitutive position cannot be accepted
as formulated, it is suggested, while the declaratory theory needs to be
modified. Lauterpacht's view that once the criteria of Statehood are
121fulfilled, a legal duty to recognise arises is not borne out in 
122State practice, but as Brownlie notes "if an entity bears the marks
of Statehood, other States put themselves at risk legally if they ignore
122athe basic obligations of State relations." Recognition can have a
strong evidential effect as regards fulfillment of the various criteria 
of Statehood. In those cases, where there is dispute as to the satis­
faction of the necessary factual requirements recognition by States will 
tend to settle the issue. This may also be true with respect to non­
recognition. African practice has provided examples of both.
The PAIGC movement in the Portuguese territory of Guinea (Bissau) 
declared itself independent on 26 September 1973 and within a short
space of time was recognised by the majority of States in the international 
123community. This was despite the fact that Portugal controlled at least 
one-third of the territory by the PAIGC's admission and all of it by its 
own account, In addition to States' recognitions of the new Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau, 93 States voted in favour of resolution 3061 (XXVIII), 1203
(120) States not recognising other States do not regard the latter 
as free from the obligations of international law eg. with 
regard to the law relating to the use of force, see Brownlie 
op.cit. p,92 note 1.
(121) Op.cit. pp.73-7.
(122) See Brownlie op.cit. pp94-5 and Kunz op.cit. pp,713-9.
(122a) Op.cit, p,94,
(123) Supra, p,342.
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which "welcomes the recent accession to independence of the people of
Guinea-Bissau, thereby creating the sovereign State of the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau". A number of questions thereby arise. Was such recogni-
124tion (prior to Portugal's recognition on 10 September 1974) premature? 
What is the effect of such recognitions? And, what was the effect of 
the General Assembly resolution?
Oppenheim states that an untimely and precipitate recognition not
only violates the dignity of the mother State, but is an unlawful act
and "it is frequently maintained that such untimely recognition amounts 
125to intervention". The test of whether an entity is sufficiently well
established to be recognised (in the absence of the recognition of the
mother-State) may be found "either in the fact that the revolutionary
State has utterly defeated the mother-State, or that the mother-State has
ceased to make efforts to subdue the revolutionary State, or even that the
mother-State, in spite of its efforts, is apparently incapable of bring-
126ing the revolutionary State back under its sway," None of these was 
the case with regard to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau at the time in 
question. Thus, the issue centres around whether the fact that the con­
flict was a self-determination one effects any change in the traditional 
position.
Portugal maintained during the General Assembly debate in October 
1973 that since the PAIGC regime did not exercise effective control over 
the particular territory and population and did not alternatively possess 
control over a substantial part of the territory and population and was 12456
(124) See 78 Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1974, 
p .1170.
(125) Op.cit. p .128. See also Hyde, International Law Chiefly as 
Interpreted and Applied by the US, 2nd rev. ed, 1947, vol 1,
; ; pp.152-3.'
(126) Ibid p.129. See also Lauterpacht op.cit. p.283 and Hall, 
International Law, 8th ed. 1924, para. 26.
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not in a position to displace the parent State's government, any
recognition was premature and premature recognition was tantamount to
127intervention and participation in the conflict. A couple of States
invoked the French recognition of the United States in 1778 and the US 
and UK recognitions of the former Spanish colonies in the 1820's, as 
well as the American recognition of Panama immediately after its seces­
sion from Columbia in 1903, as valid precedents for recognising Guinea- 
12 BBissau. However, it is to be doubted whether such examples consti­
tute a strong justification for the recognition of Guinea-Bissau prior
to Portuguese recognition. French recognition of and military aid to
129the USA in 1778 has been accepted as "precipitate" and a "breach of
130international law", The British and American recognition of the
former Spanish South American colonies occurred over a decade after the
131initial declarations of independence in 1810, while the immediate
American recognition of Panama was declared by Oppenheim to be an 
132intervention. These instances, therefore, illustrate the parameters 
of premature recognition and are of relevance with regard to secessionist 
attempts to break away from existing, independent States, but not neces­
sarily in self-determination situations.
There was little attempt in the debates by those supporting the 
PAIGC to argue that the effect of the numerous recognitions was to endow 
Guinea-Bissau with Statehood, but this is perhaps not surprising since 1278930
(127) GAOR 28th Sess,, plenary, 2156th meeting, pp,12-13.
(128) Ibid 2157th meeting p.26 (Guinea) and ibid 2158th meeting pp.77-81 
(Uganda).
(129) Oppenheim op.cit. p.129 note 2.
(130) Lauterpacht op.cit, p,8,
(131) Oppenheim op.cit. p.120 note 2,
(132) Ibid, note 1,
362.
the preponderant argument was that Guinea-Bissau did indeed fulfil
the requisite criteria for Statehood. Cameroon did state that the view
that Guinea-Bissau was a fiction could not be maintained since a fic-
tion recognised by over 70 UN members was a reality, while Nigeria
declared that the large number of UN members recognising the new Republic
134was evidence that Guinea-Bissau was a reality. Apart from this the 
effect of such recognitions was not discussed. This in itself argues 
against the constitutive position, but it should not be taken to mean 
that the question is peripheral. It has been seen that in self- 
determination cases, the requirements for Statehood have been modified, 
so that the test for effectivity of government is by no means as strin­
gent as in other cases of claims for Statehood. Recognition is one way 
in which a State may signal its belief that a particular entity has 
complied with the pre-requisites of Statehood. In the normal course of 
events, the impact of individual recognitions in terms of the generality 
of international law will be minimal. However, in difficult cases 
where the factual conditions have not been conclusively ascertained, 
recognition may constitute evidence of the fulfilment of the necessary
* Oftrequirements. The large number of recognitions of Guinea-Bissau, 
therefore, demonstrates that a majority of States in the international 
community accepted that the new State satisfied the relevant conditions, 
as modified by the doctrine of self-determination.
Recognition by one or two or a small number of States might have 1345
(133) GAOR, 28th Session, plenary, 2161st meeting p .92.
(134) Ibid, 2162nd meeting, p.107,
(135) See generally, Fall, "La Reconnaissance de la Guinée-Bissau et 
le Droit International" Annales Africaines (1973) p.153.
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been regarded as premature, but where some 80-90 States are involved,
it is submitted, a decisive statement with regard to the relevant fac-
136tual situation has been made.
The effect of such recognitions was reinforced by the admission
137of Guinea-Bissau as a member of the OAU and by resolution 3081 
138(XXVIII). Both mark further evidence of conformity with formal
criteria on the part of Guinea-Bissau. The former is of interest not
only as a forceful example of Africa State practice but also as providing
for one of the possible consequences of Statehood in Africa. The
General Assembly resolution was not of itself binding, of course, but it
is an instance of collective recognition, and as such of importance,
though this importance is diminished by the fact that Guinea-Bissau was
not admitted to the UN as a member-State until 17 September 1974, ie.
139one week after Portuguese recognition.
The non-recognition of Rhodesia also illustrates this point for 
it may be taken as evidence of the non-compliance of Rhodesia with the 
necessary requirements of Statehood. The fact that this was also the 136789
(135a) As for example in the Biafra case, see Ijalaye, "Was 'Biafra' at any time 
a State in International Law?", 65 AJIL, 1971, p.551.
(136) See also Akehurst op.eit. p.58 and Higgins op.cit. p.41.
(137) Noted in a letter circulated on 20 November 1973 by Morocco in 
the UN, A/9332 and S/11125.
(138) See also Assembly resolution 3181 (XXVIII), adopted by 108 
votes to 0, with 9 abstentions, which approved the credentials 
of the Portuguese representatives "on the clear understanding 
that they represent Portugal as it exists within its frontiers 
in Europe and that they do not represent the Portuguese- 
dominated territories of Angola and Mozambique nor could they 
represent Guinea-Bissau, which is an independent State.”
(139) Note also Guinea-Bissau's membership of the World Health 
Organisation on 16 May 1974, see 78 Revue Generale de Droit 
International Public, 1974, p.1171, and its admission to the 
Conference on International Humanitarian Law as a participating 
State by consensus, see CDDH/SR4 p.34 (28 February 1974).
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result of UN direction makes it of added emphasis.-1 The UN had
141implicitly called for the non-recognition of Katanga in 1960-1 and 
with respect to South Africa's Bantustans, the General Assembly
explicitly called on all governments to deny any form of recognition
142to the "so-called independent Transkei". According to the consti­
tutive theory, such entities cannot be States in the absence of all 
recognition, while in the view of the adherents of the declaratory 
theory, the issue revolves around the possession or otherwise of the
necessary requirements of Statehood, It is suggested that Rhodesia
142aand the two Bantustans declared "independent" by South Africa are 
not States in international law, not because they have not been recog­
nised but because they have failed to conform with the criteria for 
Statehood as modified by the principle of self-determination, and the 
absence of recognition constitutes evidence of this, A further question 
arises at this stage, and that is whether there exists a duty not to 
recognise in such circumstances.
Recognition here may be deemed contrary to the principle of self-
determination since it is aimed at the acceptance of a situation based
143 ■ -upon its contravention. Non-recognition may operate as a sanction 
of international society, but its use is sometimes controversial and not 
always efficacious. States may be obliged not to recognise territorial 14023
(140) Supra, p.352 et. seq.
(141) Supra, p,306.
(142) Resolution 31/6A, See further supra, p,287.
(142a) See generally Fischer, "La Non-Reconnaissance du Transkei"
AFDI, 1976, p.63.
(143) See generally, Lauterpacht op.cit. Chapter XXI Langer, Seizure
of. Territory, 1947 and Sagay "Non-Recognition of the Illegal .
Occupation of Territory," 16 Indian Journal of International 
Law, 1976, p.219.
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changes based upon the use of force, but recognition may sometimes 
be the means whereby the law accepts factual situations despite 
illegality of origin. As a policy weapon, non-recognition is clearly 
of value here, but it is felt that abuses of self-determination which 
prevent the attainment of Statehood should not be endorsed by the use 
of recognition and that until the facts demonstrate compliance with 
the criterion of self-determination in Statehood cases, a positive duty 
of non-recognition may arise.
The consequences of non-recognition were discussed by the International
145Court of Justice in the Namibia case, in which it was stated that acts,
treaties etc. which implied recognition of governmental authority were
illegal, although in cases of general conventions of a humanitarian
character, the non-performance of which may adversely affect the people
of the territory, the same rule would not apply. Non-recognition should
not in general result in depriving the people involved of any advantages
derived from international co-operation.14 546 147
In the cases of Rhodesia and the Bantustans concerned, de jure
title remains in the UK and South Africa respectively, although de facto
administration may be carried on by other regimes. This sui generis
147status will clearly cause some problems in municipal courts but this 
should not detract from the importance of maintaining such status and 
refusing to accept the Statehood of such entities. Denial of Statehood 
in such cases cannot be taken to mean that the issue is removed from the 
jurisdiction of international law. Practice has shown that with regard
(144) Infra, p.525.
(145) ICJ Reports, 1971, p.16.
(146) Ibid pp.55-6, Cf. Judges Petren ibid p,134 and Onyeama, ibid 
p.149.
(147) See eg. Madzimbamuto v, Lardner - Burke Il96g) 1 A.C. 645, and
Re James (19771 Ch. 41. ~ *
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to Rhodesia, the rules of international law regarding the use of force 
148are applicable and the same would be true if analogous situations 
arose with respect to the so-called independent Bantustans. It is 
clear that other relevant norms of international law would apply in such 
cases, since to deny such applicability would be to create a situation 
wherein such entities of dubious origin would be unrestricted by law 
in their activities and thus in an advantageous position vis-à-vis 
States and other subjects of international law. To conclude that 
international law covers such entities does not mean that such entities 
must be regarded as States, since international law regulates interna­
tional activity in general and its scope is not confined to inter-State 
149relations.
Conclusions
The doctrine of Statehood in international law has historically 
been an ambiguous amalgam of law and fact. The birth of a new State is 
a question of fact. That is clear. One cannot spirit a State out of a 
vacuum. On the other hand, it is a question to which the law is not 
indifferent. To put it another way, the criteria of Statehood may be 
founded upon effectiveness, but not exclusively so. The traditional view 
of the requirements of Statehood has, it is felt, concentrated heavily 
upon the notion of effectiveness as the basis of the creation of new 
States. Moushkely notes that in this context "il s ’agit d ’un phénomène 
sociologique et historique indépendant de toute condition juridique."15° 148950
(148) Infra, Chapter 7, p.423.
(149) Such an entity would not, however, be able to benefit from the
whole range of international rules, for example it cannot maintain 
full diplomatic and consular relations with existing States while 
the scope for the conclusion of treaties is necessarily limited.
(150) "La Naissance des Etats en Droit International Public" 66 Revue 
Generale de Droit International Public, 1962, pp.469, 472, See 
also Charpentier op.cit, pp.127-8 and the comments of the Israeli 
delegate to the UN, Briggs, The Law of Nations. 2nd ed. 1953, p.66.
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While effectiveness itself may well be a criterion or prerequisite 
established by law, it is in essence a political manifestation and not 
a legal one. Thus law followed demonstrated fact. Modern practice, 
however, has seen a modification of the exclusive reliance upon effect­
iveness, and such modification has arisen as a result of the principle
151of self-determination. In the case of Rhodesia, effectiveness alone
would have posited the existence of a State, and the same would apply
as regards the "independent" Eantustans. But their creation without
fulfilling the criterion of self-determination, as evidenced by the
lack of third party recognition, has meant that such entities are not
States, despite the factual situation. On the other hand, it is
believed that the case of Guinea-Bissau demonstrates that the criterion
of effectiveness is seriously weakened in self-determination situations,
so that while a reliance upon effectiveness alone would have led to a
denial of Statehood, this must be qualified in the light of the principle
of self-determination. The large number of recognitions made by States
of the new entity as a State must enhance the conclusion that Guinea-
Bissau, despite the factual situation, was, at that stage and prior to
Portuguese recognition, a State. In other situations, effectiveness
remains the prime basis for Statehood. It is only with regard to the
scope and contents of self-determination that this criterion is qualified.
It is believed that this is consistent with the classic formulation of
Lauterpacht to the effect that "international law acknowledges as a
source of rights and obligations such facts and situations as are not the
152result of acts which it prohibits and stigmatises as unlawful." 152
(151) See also the case of Taiwan.
(152) Op.cit. p.409.
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II New States and Title to Territory
Under traditional international law, a severe problem was posed 
concerning the acquisition by new States of title to their own territory 
since until the new State was created there was no legal person compe­
tent to hold the title. This demonstrated a gap in legal theory for
153title to territory is a fundamental requirement of Statehood. The 
classical modes of acquisition of territory are unhelpful in this 
respect since they are predicated upon activity by a particular type of 
subject of international law and in any event fail to explain the factual 
circumstances involved.
There are a number of ways in which the theoretical problems may
be overcome, but first a brief survey of the means whereby an entity
can obtain independence will be attempted. The most usual method is by
the consent and agreement of the colonial power, whether it be signalled
by internal legislation or by some form of agreement with the accepted
154representatives of the new entity. In some cases, a plebiscite will 
be held putting various options to the population, Including that of 
independence, as for example the Algerian plebiscite of July 1962. 
Independence may be achieved, on the other hand, as a result of a rebel­
lion contrary to the wishes of the administering power. Although in most 
cases, a successful war of secession from the colonial power has culminated 
in a grant of independence as for example in Algeria, Angola and Mozambique, 1534
(153) Jennings has written that the case of the emergence of a new State 
is "by far the most important case of territorial change at the 
present time" and that international law respecting this problem 
is "singularly undeveloped, uncertain and ... comparatively unstu­
died". The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, 
p,12, See also ibid p,8.
(154) Starke, "The Acquisition of Title to Territory by Newly Emerged 
States" 41 BYIL (1965-6) p,411. See, for example, the manner in 
which the French African territories became Independent, EeesingS 
Contemporary Archives, pp.17513, and 17569.
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the theoretical problem is posed since it is not invariably so.
Title cannot be derived through the previous territorial sovereign 
where the latter has refused consent. It is also possible for such a 
rebellion against the administering power to be contrary to international 
law. The Rhodesian case is the prime example of this.
One factor which has constrained the development of the law in 
this field has been that the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction has 
historically hidden from international law those events taking place 
prior to the establishment of a new State, so that the way in which 
territory was acquired was not a matter of concern to the traditional 
law. This appeared to lead to either one of two conclusions. Either 
the factual possession by a State of territory was just accepted in 
law, or the constitutive theory of recognition extended to legitimise 
the acquisition by the State of its own territory. The classic approach 
to the problem was put by Oppenheim, who noted that the "formation of 
a new State is ... a matter of fact not law" and that the foundation of 
a new State must not be confused with the acquisition of territory by
155
an existing State. International law did not create States but 
recognises their factual existence and gives legal effect to that 
situation. The declaratory view of recognition and Statehood would 
semble leave the issue at this point, relying fundamentally upon the 
principle of effectiveness. However, this approach can no longer be 
strictly maintained. The right of peoples to self-determination in 
certain circumstances has imposed a corresponding duty upon administering 
States to permit the exercise of that right and international law has 
been vitally concerned with this process. This has led to a reassessment 15
(155) Op.cit. p .544.
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of the role of domestic jurisdiction in such cases and therefore the 
consideration of particular events and facts prior to the establishment 
of the new State. It also means that international law theory can no 
longer merely assume that States have acquired the right to their 
territory by virtue of the factual situation upon independence, but 
may have to delve further.
One approach to the problem is that of the constitutive theory of
recognition. This view proposes that recognition not only constitutes
the new State as an international legal person but also yests the title
156to its territory in that State. By this method, a series of recog­
nitions would establish a new legal personality complete with a good
title to its territory. This has led Starke to refer to an "International
157quasi-adjudication of territory". Jennings appears to be in favour
of this approach, and notes that in such a situation "recognition plays
a primary and perhaps decisive role in the constitution of a territorial 
158title." He continues by saying that in this case "it is ordinarily
impracticable to separate out from the process of the creation of the
new State the simple element of title to sovereignty over its territory
159for each is a constituent of the other." In other words, the creation
of a State of necessity involves the acquisition by it of title to its
territory, This is achieved, however, by recognition or rather a series
of recognitions since international law has not developed any collective
machinery in this respect. It is a process which may be termed non-
160historical consolidation since time is unimportant, Many of the 1567890
(156) See ibid.
(157) Op.cit. p.413.
(158) Op.cit. p ','37,
(159) Ibid.
(160) Ibid.
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criticisms made with regard to the constitutive theory are applicable 
in this context, for example inconsistent State practice and the problem 
of the status in international law of an entity recognised by some 
States as a State, but not by others. Title to territory and Statehood 
must march together, so that in this sense non-recognition by a large 
number of States can be a crucial problem.1600. The issue of the 
unrecognised entity may be disposed of by the constitutive theory, but 
it is to be queried whether the means whereby this is accomplished are 
truly satisfactory, particularly in view of the development of the doc­
trine of self-determination. The 'factual' approach to the problem of 
newly emerged States and title to territory suffers from the disadvantage 
that matters prior to the establishment of the new State upon the basis 
of the principle of effectiveness are clearly of relevance in the contem­
porary law of territory. Self-determination has undoubtedly effected an 
important change here and one that cannot be ignored. The problem with 
accepting the alternative "recognition" thesis is that it is predicated 
upon an espousal of the constitutive doctrine of recognition and it is 
believed that the disadvantages of this theory make it unwise to found 
the solution to the question of tracing title to territory upon it.
There exist a number of other possibilities. Various writers have 
concentrated upon the vast majority of cases whereby non-independent
territories have become independent with the consent of the administering
161power, and have characterised the situation as one of succession, 1 or 16
(160a) A further problem with the constitutive approach to a new
State's title to territory is that the boundaries of that State 
might thus be left uncertain, since it is rare for a recognising 
State to specify the extent of the recognised State's territory.
(161) Greig, International Law, 2nd ed. 1976, p.156, Greig believes 
that where the territory establishes its independence by 
force, however, "the international status and the creation of 
the new title to the territory depend upon recognition", ibid,
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1 6 1 a  i  ¿ » i  i .quasi-cession or quasi-prescription.161b Such cases are baged Qn 
the proposition that in non-self-governing territories, sovereignty 
rests with the administering power which then transfers title to the 
people or representatives of the emerging State. But such approaches 
also appear to accept the legitimacy of looking beyond the fact of 
independence to establish title and in a way which centres upon the 
relationship between the administering power and the pre-State entity.
The approaches which concern themselves with the question of the 
nature of this pre-State entity will be examined, but first the distinc­
tion between self-determination and non-self-determination situations must 
be stressed. In the latter case, and the primary example of such a 
situation will be secession from an existing non-colonial State, the 
traditional rules of Statehood apply, so that the seceding State will 
establish its Statehood by adhering to the relevant conditions and its 
title to territory will be based upon its successful acquisition of the 
same from the parent State. The element of effectiveness is thus crucial 
Recognitions by third States and particularly by the parent State will 
constitute vital evidence of the compliance of the new State with the 
necessary criteria. In such cases, the fact of Statehood will comprise 
also the transference of title.
In the case, however, of non-independent territories within the pur­
view of the right to self-determination, the interposition of that right 
creates a different juridical situation. Where mandate and trust terri­
tories were concerned, of course, it was always accepted that sovereignty
(161a) Akehurst op.cit. p,141 but cf. Starke op.cit. p.415.
(161b) Akehurst op.cit. p.143. But prescription is founded upon an
adverse or at the least uncertain title which is then validated 
though the process of time and acquiescence, see Greig op. clt 
p .163,
373.
and title did not lie with the administering power; Judge McNair
declared that a new legal institution was involved which did not fit
the old conception of sovereignty and that indeed sovereignty was in
abeyance until "the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as
162an independent State." The International Court noted that the "rights 
of the mandatory in relation to the mandated territory and their inhabi­
tants have their foundation in the obligations of the mandatory and 
they are so to speak mere tools given to enable it to fulfil its 
obligations." These obligations related to the eventual self-
i /*pfl
determination of the population of the territory.
Judge Nervo declared with regard to Namibia that "the mandate did
not confer ownership or sovereignty or permanent rights but consisted
only of a conditional grant of powers for the achievement of a purpose -
not for the benefit of the grantee but for the benefit of a third party,
the people and territory of Namibia."162 364 165
Sovereignty over colonies and other non-self-governing territories,
on the other hand, lay with the administering power. But the development
of the principle of self-determination as a legal concept appeared to
render the situation with regard to such territories on a par with man-
165dated and trust territories, although there was apparently a difference 
as regards the immediate sovereign. With the acceptance of the right to
(162) ICJ Reports 1950, pp.128, 150.
(163) ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.319, 329.
(163a) ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31,
(164) Ibid, p,115 Judge Ammoun declared that Namibia was a subject of 
law lacking only the exercise of its national sovereignty which 
"did not cease to belong to the people subject to mandate", ibid 
p .68. See also Brownlie, "A Provisional View of the Dispute con­
cerning sovereignty over Lake Malawi/Nyasa", East Africa Law 
Review, 1968, p.258, 271.
(165) Ibid p .31. See also the Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, 
pp.12, 31.
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self-determination it could no longer be said that the administering
power possessed absolute sovereignty, since it was clearly subject to
a duty with regard to the exercise of the right. As the 1970 Declaration
on Principles of international law stated "the territory of a colony or
other non-self-governing territory has, under the Charter, a status
separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering
it ... until the people of the colony or non-self-governing territory
have exercised the right to self-determination." The Declaration did
not state that title rested with the people concerned, it should be
noted. Indeed, a number of territorial adjustments were made by the 
16Scolonial powers, so that title was accepted as residing in the admin­
istering authority. However, contemporary international law has restricted 
the sovereignty of the administering State and made it subject to the 
right of the people to self-determination. Thus, while the administering 
State in such a situation still possesses the title to the territory in 
question, it is qualified by the right of the people of the territory to 
call for its transfer in the context of the exercise of self-determination. 
In cases, where the administering power seeks by force to deprive the 
relevant population of this right, the people may take action in order 
to establish its own sovereignty and Statehood, and consequently title to 
that territory. It is believed that the Guinea-Bissau episode, 1973-4, 
demonstrates this. But it is predicated upon a number of factors, viz. 
the active hampering by the use of force of the right of the people to 
self-determination, action taken by the people to counter-act this, the 
achievement of a certain minimum of success expressed in terms of terri­
torial control and effectiveness by the people and the consequent formal 16
(166) See further supra, p.87 et. seq.
375.
declaration of independence which will implicitly include a claim to 
the title of the territory concerned. The point that differentiates 
this situation from an attempt to secede from a non-colonial independent 
State is the lower level of effectiveness that needs to be manifested 
as a result of the operation of the principle of self-determination.
In addition, the territory with regard to which title is claimed, will 
be all of that territory formerly administered by the colonial power, 
unless there are exceptional circumstances.167
This means that the veil of domestic jurisdiction barring inquiry 
by international law before actual independence has been clearly pierced 
in self-determination situations. It leads to the conclusion that 
events and facts prior to the claim to formal independence may be 
examined in order to test the legitimacy of the claim, as for example 
in the Rhodesia and Bantustan cases. Indeed, the test of self-determination 
may prevent a successful claim to title and Statehood. In addition, it 
opens the way to a consideration of the proposition that territorial 
sovereignty may be transferred prior to the moment of independence, thus 
obviating the doctrinal problem relating to the tracing of title. This 
suggests that where a people is entitled in law to self-determination 
and demonstrates the intention to seek Statehood and title, then, providing 
the minimum effectiveness criterion is satisfied, title may be acquired 
pending or at the same time as Statehood.
Since in the case of non-independent territories (not forming part 
of a non-colonial sovereign State) title remains in the administering 
power but subject to the right of the people to call for its transfer m  
conformity with the principle of self-determination, while in the case 
of mandated and trust territories the territorial sovereignty possessed
(167) As for example in the mandated territory of Palestine, 1948, and
the trust territory of Rwanda-Urundi, 1961-2, supra, pp.264 and 208.
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by the administering power is further restricted, it is not possible 
to talk in terms of absolute title. Title in either case is to a 
certain degree subject to external constraint. This raises the further 
question of the identity of the transferee in such instances. Is it 
the people as a whole or the representatives of people or some other 
entity? It is submitted that in general one should regard the people 
of the territory in question as a whole as the legal personality capable 
of receiving the transfer of title, then held by the authorities of 
the new State on its behalf. This is because the right of self- 
determination is vested in the people as an entity and not in some 
other body. The theoretical possibility of the disposal of part of the 
territory by the people prior to the actual emergence of the new State 
is thus presented, but for many reasons this is highly unlikely to take 
place in practice.
This leaves open the question of the status of national liberation 
movements in the process of acquiring title and Statehood, and to this 
issue we shall now briefly turn.
Ill The Status of National Liberation Movements and the Question of Title 
As Lauterpacht noted, "the orthodox positivist doctrine has been 
explicit in the affirmation that only States are subjects of international 
law."168 However, this doctrine has been modified, particularly in the 
years since 1945. The International Court of Justice recognised the 
status of the UN as an international person and subject of international
(168) "The Subjects of International Law? in International Law vol. 2, 
part 1, 1975, p.489, See also Anzilotti, Cours de Droit 
International, 1929, p.134, Schwarzenberger, International Law.
3rd ed. 1957 pp.140, 155, Kelsen, Principles of International 
Law, 2nd ed. 1966 p.180, Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2nd ed.
1953 p .95 and Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations. 1948 p,16.
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law in the Reparations case while the characterisation of individuals
170as subjects of international law has proceeded apace. In addition,
the development of the concept of self-determination has raised the
question of peoples as subjects of international law. The issue of
personality in the law is therefore complex and the required conditions
needed to be satisfied rather ambiguous. In fact, it has to be left to
international practice to determine whether an entity is accepted as a
legal person and the consequences in international law of such persona-
171lity as is presented. Although the UN Charter restricts membership
to States, recent years have witnessed a proliferation of what have
172been variously termed non-territorial actors, non-governmental
173 173aentities and supranational functional communities. Therefore,
the question as to the status of national liberation movements has to be
discussed in the light of the developing requirements of the international
174community as demonstrated through practice.
In the early years of the UN, the peoples of non-self-governing 
territories were regarded as within the jurisdiction of the administering 16970234
169
(169) ICJ Reports, 1949 pp.178, 179.
(170) See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights. 1950
and Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. t
1973, pp.535-81.
(171) Lauterpacht, op.cit. previous footnote, p.12,
(172) Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies. Prospects 
and Proposals" 84 Yale Law Journal, 1975, p.969.
(173) "US Positions at 29th UN General Assembly", US Department of 
State, Special Report no. 13 (1975) p,4,
(173a) Verzijl, International.Law in Historical vol 2
1969, p.205^ -------- *-------*
(174) See Lauterpacht, International Law, vol. 2 nnrt- i iovr
p .137. ’ ’ ’
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power and not entitled to a separate status. The next stage involved
the characterisation of what might be generally regarded as prototype
national liberation movements as petitioners within the framework of
176the UN. It was originally part of the trusteeship system but was 
extended beyond this to relate to colonial territories in general.
However, the hearing of such petitions was discretionary and the peti­
tioners themselves participated as private individuals and not as
177representatives of organisations. As a result of dissatisfaction
178with this approach, the General Assembly Fourth Committee (which deals
with trusteeship and non-self-governing territories) decided to admit
representatives of certain national liberation movements to take part
in proceedings in an observer capacity. The request for observer status
in order to enable representatives of national liberation movements to
participate in discussions in the Fourth Committee on the questions of
the Portuguese African territories, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia
emanated from a letter sent to that committee from the chairman of the
179Special Committee on Decolonisation. Significantly, the invitation 
was to be made in consultation with the OAU. This proposal was accepted 
by the Fourth Committee by a vote of 79 to 13, with 16 abstentions on 
27 September 1972. In accordance with this decision, representatives 1756890
(175) However, in the cases of a number of International organisations non- 
independent territories were permitted separate representation, see 
Kovar, "La Participation des Territories non Autonomes aux 
Organisations Internationales", AFDI, 1D69, p.522.
(176) Beaute, Le Droit de Petition dans les Territories Sous Tutelle, 1958.
(177) Lazarus, "Le Statut des Mouvements de Liberation Nationals a 
1 'Organisation des Nations Unies", AFDI, 1974, pp.173, 177.
(178) Not all States were dissatisfied with this approach, however, see 
eg. A/C4/SR 1976.
(179) A/C4/744,
(180) A/C4/SR 1975 p.2Q. An Irish proposal to seek the opinion of the 
UN Legal Counsel was rejected, ibid.
175
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of Frelimo and the PAIGC took part in the debates regarding Portugal's
African territories. In 1973, representatives of those movements and
those of the FNLA and MPLA took part as observers in the discussions in
181the committee on Portugal's colonies in Africa, and the pattern was 
established.
The interposition of the OAU requirement was intended as a screening 
process and also as a method of excluding in practice secessionist move­
ments from such status and participation. In effect, only those move-
182ments recognised by the OAU were to benefit from observer status
in the UN. The OAU organ with the capacity to recognise such movements
183is the Liberation Committee. The main criteria for recognition centre
upon the effectiveness of the struggle of the organisation concerned
184and the degree of support it enjoys. Although ideological and politi­
cal considerations are supposed to be absent, in fact they are often 
crucial. The backing given to FNLA by Zaire and to Unita by Zambia com­
plicated the issue as regards Angola, and threats by Morocco and
Mauritania to leave the OAU if Polisario was given the status of an OAU
_  185liberation organisation proved effective. The importance awarded 
OAU recognition in the context of the status of liberation movements was 
never actually debated by the UN, but arose naturally out of the conscious 
use by the African group at the UN of its power in order to further OAU 182345
(181) A/C4/759 and A/9174,
(182) This was extended to the Arab League, see eg. resolution 3102
(XXVII). Only the Palestine Liberation Organisation has been so 
recognised.
(183) See Boutros-Ghali, L'Organisation de l'Unit* Africaine. 1968.
pp.70-74 and infra Chapter 7, p.491. ------------ ’
(184) Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, p.47. The recog­
nition awarded to the FNLA in 1963 was withdrawn the following 
year for failing to meet the criteria, ibid,
(185) Ibid p.48.
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1 fifíobjectives, such as decolonisation/ One should note here in parti- 
cular that by resolution 3151G (XXVII), the General Assembly authorised 
the Committee on Apartheid, in consultation with the OAU, to associate 
the African liberation movements recognised by the OAU, with its work.
In accordance with this, the ANC and PAC186 87 1890*joined the committee as
. , 188 observers, in 1974.
The General Assembly endorsed the Fourth Committee's decision
regarding observer status for liberation movements recognised by the
OAU, in resolution 2918 (XXVII). The process continued in resolution
3247 (XXIX) whereby liberation movements recognised by the OAU or the
Arab League were to participate as observers in sessions of the General
Assembly, in conferences held under the auspices of the Assembly as
well as in meetings of specialised UN agencies and its various organs/89
Attempts to persuade the Assembly to permit a declaration before it by
one of the leaders of African liberation movements, Amilcar Cabral 
190failed and further attempts were rendered pointless by the Portuguese
coup of April 1974. However, the leader of the PLO was Invited to
191deliver a speech at the Assembly.
(186) See generally Andemicael, The OAU and the im t qv«
pp.29-30. See alee LaaaruTHoc..It. p.i , ~ " f  elleT ly' 
situation operates with regard to the UN administered territory J 
Namibia, where the UN Council for Namibia acts as inter alia * 
recognising agent, see A/8024 paras, 28-36, resolution 2248 
and A/AC 131/SR 77 p.6. (S~V>
(187) The two South African liberation movements recognised by the OAU.
(188) Lazarus loc.cit. p,189,
(189) See also resolution 3280 (XXIX),
(190) A/C4/SR 1978 p.23.
(I91> t h . T f S . b l A e H r  ‘re“"ent “ y be »“ • cPltlciBinethis move by the Assembly and the recognition of the PLO a ng
liberation movement relating to a non-colonial situation ! *  
Lazarus loc.cit. PP.193-4 and Silverburg, "The Palestine1L i b ^ i '  
Organisation in the United Nations: some Implications for 
International Law and Relations” 12 Israel Law Review (1 9 77) p365
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National liberation movements have also been invited to attend a
number of international conferences, for example the World Conferences
on Population (held in Bucharest in 1974) and Food (held in Rome in 
1921974). The World Health Organisation in resolution EB 53 R5g 
recommended that liberation movements recognised by the OAU should be 
permitted to participate in WHO activities. J At the Caracas session 
of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the internal rules of 
the conference were amended in order to permit national liberation move­
ments recognised by the OAU and the Arab League to participate.192 394 in 
the case of the conference on International Humanitarian Law, the 
General Assembly had already adopted a resolution195 *urging that the 
liberation movements recognised by the various regional intergovernmental 
agencies concerned be invited to participate in the conference as 
observers "in accordance with the practice of the United Nations." 
Accordingly and despite some opposition the Conference adopted by con­
sensus a proposal permitting this, at its first 1974 session.20®
It may therefore, be stated that the question of observer status 
for liberation movements recognised by the appropriate regional inter­
governmental organisation has been affirmatively settled in international 
practice. The issue of the meaning in law of such status is consequently 
raised.
(192) See Lazarus loc.cit, p.195,
(193) Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly
and Executive Board, 1st ed. 1973-4, vol, II p,76, y
(194) A/Conf 62/SR 38. The voting was 88 to 2 with 35 abstentions.
(195) Resolution 3102 (XXVIII).
(200) CDDH/SR 7 p.l.
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In general, the term observer in such a context would seem to
imply that the party concerned has been recognised as having an interest
with regard to the matter being discussed in the particular forum and
possibly that that party possesses some form of international personality.
By itself, not more than this would seem to be implied. However, by
relating this to the principle of self-determination something wider
might seem to emerge. The link between the two is constituted by the
recognition of the movements as the authentic representatives of the
people as a whole of the territory. At the ninth summit of the OAU,
liberation movements were given the status of representatives of their
people at OAU sessions instead of their former status of observers,201 20
while a number of UN General Assembly resolutions have commented on the
nature of particular movements. Resolution 2918 (XXVII), for example,
declared that "the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau)
and Cape Verde and Mozambique are the authentic representatives of the
true aspirations of the peoples of those territories" and this was
202repeated in resolution 3113 (XXVIII). By resolution 3295 (XXIX),
SWAPO was recognised as the authentic representative of the Namibian 
people. What would seem to be suggested is that such movements represent
(201) See Resulovic "Ten Years of the Organisation of African 
24 Review of International Affairs, 1973, p f3 4.
(202) But without reference to Guinea (Bissau) which had declar d
independence. A number of UN resolutions have stated that th 
views of particular movements have been taken into account l! 
resolutions 2707 (XXV) 2795 (XXVI), 2871 (XXVI) 2652 fxxvl 
2796 (XXVI) and 31/30, while many resolutions hiv. called L e i  
fically for moral and material assistance to be given to 
liberation movements generally and particulars ational
tion. 2X05 (XX, . 2189 (XXI, , 2704 ¿ V
3300 (XXIX, and 3421 (XXX). Prisoner-of-war statu, for o.n^rej ' 
members of such movements has been called for, see resolution!
2674 (XXV), 2621 (XXV), 2795 (XXVI), 2796 (XXVI) and 3103
see also Article 44, Protocol I, additional t ^ L  t n e r f l ? '
Conventions of 1949. The use of mercenaries
ments has been declared to be criminal, see en , m°ve-
(XXIV), 2708 (XXV) and 3103 (XXVIII). ’ ^  2548
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the attempt of the people concerned to secure the exercise of the 
right to self-determination and thus are seised of that right by virtue 
of a process of delegation. It is important to note, however, that 
recognition plays a vital role in this as well as effectiveness. The 
fact that a people is deemed in law to possess the right to self- 
determination has an effect upon the minimum of effectiveness necessary 
for the purposes of status and Statehood; recognition plays here an 
evidential role. However, in deciding whether a movement can be taken 
to embody the rights of a people, what is needed is recognition by the 
appropriate regional organisation. In this sense and in this context, 
recognition can be stated to be playing a constitutive role. Effective­
ness is, of course, an important determining factor in leading to recog­
nition but it itself cannot create the necessary status for the movement 
in question. In the absence of such recognition, as in Rhodesia“ or 
Angola for example, the full right to self-determination remains in the 
people as a whole and it is left to the principle of effectiveness to 
resolve the dilemma of the identity of the authority of the emerging
State.
Ago has written that "what in fact, characteriaea the situation 
created by the emergence of an insurrectional movement as defined in 
international law is the very existence parallel with the State and in a 
portion of the territory under its sovereignty of a separate subject of
.  ^ , „203 G„ch a movement is essentially a "provisional"International law." ®ucn » *203
(202a) But note that while in resolution 3297 (MIX) it was reaffirmed 
that the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe were the 
sole and authentic representatives of the true aspirations of 
the neoole no attempt was made to designate which of the com­
peting movements was to be treated as the representative.
(203) Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, 
Yearbook of the ILC, 1972. «1 .  II, p.129.
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subject of international law204 since it is on its way to Statehood,
205or even an "embryo State". Ago was writing of insurrectional move­
ments in general in the light of a new State’s retroactive responsibi­
lity for acts of the successful liberation movement, not specifically 
those operating within the context of self-determination, and related 
the question of personality solely, it seems,to the criterion of effect­
iveness,206 but he was prepared to accept the possibility not only of 
international personality but also that "the structures of the organisa­
tion of the insurrectional movement then became those of the organisation 
of the new State." This appears to be suggesting that such movements 
are potentially States, only requiring a particular level of effective­
ness to be manifested before Statehood is actually acquired. Accordingly, 
could one accept that such entities may hold title to territory pending 
actual Statehood? It is recognised that for some legal purposes there
may be continuity before and after Statehood is firmly established.208
209National liberation movements ultimately derive their personality
from the right of the people of the territory in question to self- 
210determination. Such peoples are subjectsof international law by virtue
(204) Ibid.
(205) Ibid, p.131.
(206) h« was criticised on this point, rightly it is suggested, byH Z T r , îeTboo* •* M .  » » .  "I- » *•«.
(207) Op.cit, p.131.
(208) Brownlie op.cit, P*82*
(209) Insurrectional movements in general may possess personality in th„ light of rules relating to insurgency and belligerency see * th 
Lauterpacht, Recognitionin International w  X948 I* m  
It is here suggested that movements relating to people accepted 
as entitled in law to exercise the right of self-determination 
form a distinct category subject to special rules. See also 
Yearbook of the ILC, 1975 vol. I p.59.
(210) ~ thlg effect eg. the Moroccan delegate to the 1974 session ofthe conference on International Humanitarian Law, CDDH/I/SR2 p.6 
and the Senegalese delegate, CDDH/I/SR.6 p,3. See also Article 1 (4) 
of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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of this right, although this does not mean that they are thereby
211assimilated to States, since "the subjects of law in any legal 
system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent 
of their rights, and their nature defends upon the needs of the 
community".21 12 213 The issue of personality in this context is particularly 
acute where there is armed conflict between the people and the admin­
istering power. Farer has characterised the status of "rebellious 
non-self-governing territories” as "inchoate States with a right of
213immediate accession to full participation in the international community", 
while Sanborn has talked of "quasi-States" in the sense of entities with 
international rights and duties but lacking one or more of the criteria 
of Statehood.214 Clearly, such entities are not entitled to the same 
rights as States nor are they subject to the same obligations.215 One 
must not confuse personality and capacity. However, it is felt that 
such peoples may acquire title to the territory in question pending 
Statehood. It could be argued that this title may be acquired and
(211) But cf. Blishchenko and Solntseva, "The Struggle Against 
Portuguese Colonialism in the Light of International Law."
8 International Affairs (Moscow) 1971, p,60,
(212) The Reparations case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp.174 178. See also 
the Western Sahara case ICJ Reports 1975 pp.12, 63.
(213) "The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed 
Conflict". 142 H.R., 1974, pp.291, 369.
(214) "Standing Before the International Court of Justice: The 
Question of Palestinian Statehood Exemplifies the Inconsistencies
of the Requirement of Statehood", 7 California Western International 
Law Journal, 1977, pp.454, 456.
(215) Abi-Saab has argued that common Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 could cover both States and non-State entities 
in particular belligerent entities, "Wars of National Liberation 
and the Laws of War" 3 Annals of International Studies 1972, 
pp.102, 107. See also Sagay "The Legal Status of Freedom 
Fighters in Africa" 6 East Africa Law Review, 1975, pp.15, 27.
But cf. letter by Draper in The Times, 22 September 1978 p.15.
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held on their behalf by national liberation movements, by virtue of 
a process of delegation, in relation to which effectiveness and recog­
nition are crucial, but State practice is not sufficiently developed
to be able to accept this proposition. Indeed, it is noticeable that
216no such claim has apparently been put forward by any State. 216
(216) Note that in the case of Namibia, UN resolutions have charac­
terised the armed conflict as between South Africa and the 
people of Namibia, see eg. resolutions 2787 (XXVI) and Security 
Council resolutions 264 (1969) and 301 (1971). This would 
appear to minimise the status of the UN itself with regard to the 
territory.
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CHAPTER 7 - THE USE OF FORCE
The rules governing the use of force form a central element 
within the system of international law and pose crucial issues for the 
international community. Linked as they inextricably are to the 
concepts underlying the notion of territorial sovereignty, such rules 
and the changes to which they have been subject reflect some of the 
predominant preoccupations of the post-war era. They have also been 
deeply influenced by the changing expectations of actors upon the 
international scene, expressed both within and without the United 
Nations framework. African practice has been marked in this field 
and has emerged in general terms, through the United Nations and the 
OAU and, more specifically, in relation to particular colonial and 
other problems. Indeed, it is felt that any discussion of the 
principles relating to territory in the light of African practice 
would be deficient if an analysis of the relevant rules with respect 
to force was not attempted.
The legal regulation of armed conflicts between sovereign States 
resolves around the twin Charter provisions of Articles 2(4) and 51. 
Article 2(4) stipulates that all U.N. members1 "shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations". Article 51 declares that "nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
(1) Article 2(6) of the Charter notes that "the Organisation shall 
ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations 
act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and security". See 
Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations. 1950r pp. 109-110.
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international peace and security". The precise relationship between
othese provisions has occasioned considerable scholarly debate,
concerned to a large extent with the exhaustiveness or otherwise of
the Charter in the legal regulation of force. Certain writers^ posit
a wide interpretation of Article 2(4) and a narrow interpretation of
4Article 51, while others take the view that the scope of Article 51
is wider than some analyses would indicate. The point is also made
that the use of the phrase "inherent right" in that Article underlines
the continuing applicability of the customary rules of international
5law relating to self-defence.
Whatever the accepted connection, it is at least indisputable 
that these two Articles constitute the primary considerations in any 
discussion of the legality or otherwise of an armed conflict between 
States. When one seeks to analyse the situation, however, where one 
of the parties involved in the conflict is not a State, the problem 
of the relevant legal framework is immediately raised. Such 
situations would include insurrectionary movements ranging from 
national liberation movements in accepted anti-colonial wars to 
internal attempts to overthrow governments, secessionist wars and 
third party intervention in such conflicts. We shall examine in the 
course of this Chapter the changes that have occurred in international 
law concerned with such phenomena and the guidelines that may be 
utilised in determining the legality of any given situation.
(2) See in particular Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force 
bv States, 1963, pp.264-280, Bowett Self-Defence in International"" 
Law, 1958, pp.184-199, Stone Aggression and World Order, 1958. and 
Legal Controls of International Conflict. 1958, McDougal and 
Feliciano Law and Minimum World Public Order. 1961, and Waldock 
"The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law", 81 HR, 1952, p,455,
(3) Eg. Brownlie, op.c it . p.113.
(4) Eg. Bowett, op.cit. pp.185-6, and Stone, op.cit. pp.43-44 and 97-98,
(5) Brierly, The Law of Nations 6th ed. 1963, pp.417-8, and O'Connell 
International Law 2nd ed, 1970, vol.l, p.317. See also UNCIO Vol.6 
p,334,.: to ..the effect that "the use of arms in legitimate self-defence 
remains admitted and unimpaired".
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The primary distinction that has been drawn in the field of armed
g
conflicts is that between international and internal conflicts.
Traditional international law posited the differentiating criterion as the
test of status, the status of the contending parties. As Siotis notes,
in the case of international armed conflicts two or more subjects of
international law are involved, whereas in the case of non-international
(or internal) armed conflicts, only one subject of international law is 
7
involved. As far as the former are concerned, the rules of customary 
and conventional international law clearly apply. However, international 
law does not govern all internal conflicts. A further division was 
therefore made between those internal acts of violence purely within 
the legal order of the State concerned and those acts deemed also 
within the purview of international law. It is here that customary law 
developed the categories of rebellion, insurgency and belligerency.8'18
I - The Use of Force by the Colonial Power 
(a) International Doctrine
Much depends upon the characterisation of colonialism in 
international law. If it is regarded as a lawful institution, the use 
of a certain degree of force by the colonial power would have to be
(6) As to the technical meaning of "armed conflict" see Brownlie op.cit. 
pp.392 and 399-401. Article 2, common to the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, specifies that the Conventions are to "apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
is not recognised by one of them". The use of the phrase in the 
Conventions was intended to obviate the difficulties caused by 
definitional controversies concerning the existence of a legal state 
of war, see Draper, The Red Cross Conventions of 1949, 1958, p.il,
L7) Le Droit de la Guerre et les Conflicts Armes d'un Caractere Non- 
International, 1958, p.21. Siotis qualifies this by referringto 
subjects with full legal capacity, so as to point to the availability 
of the status of belligerency, ibid.
(8-18) See further Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1947. 
pp.175-328, Falk, "Janus Tormented: The International Law of 
Internal War", International Aspects of Civil Strife (ed. Rosenau), 
1964, p.185, Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History 
and International Law 1956, Higgins "Internal War and International 
Law". The Future of the International Legal Order, vol.3, Conflict 
Management (ed. Black and Falk), 1971, p.81, and Castren,
rM  « H  1 W ar*  1 O ttA
accepted as lawful, whereas its definition as an illicit relationship
would undermine this.' The U.N. Charter acknowledges the lawfulness
of "the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government" and in Chapter XI seeks
to regulate it. One cannot regulate what is illegal, therefore the
institution of colonialism was recognised as well as circumscribed,
by the Charter in 1945. As far as the use of force is involved,
Article 2(4) is predicated upon the phrase "all members shall refrain
in their international relations". So the use of force by Members of
the U.N. not "in their international relations" would not be within
the purview of Article 2(4). That at the time the question of force
within the colonial sphere was regarded as not within the scope of
19States' international relations is fairly clear. This can be 
illustrated by reference to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common 
Article 2 stipulates that "in addition to the provisions which shall 
be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to 
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no resistance". The point that colonial wars do not 
come within the umbrella of international armed conflict is rendered 
even more explicit in a draft prepared by the International Committee 
of the Bed Cross and submitted to the XVII International Red Cross 
Conference at Stockholm. This would have added to the proposed
(19) Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War",
3 Annals of International Studies, 1972, pp.93, 94-6 
Salmon "La Conference Diplomatique sur la Reaffirmation et le 
Développement du Droit International Humanitaire et les Guerres 
de Libération Nationale", 12 Revue Belge de Droit International, 
1976, p.27.
Article 2, a paragraph specifying that "in all cases of armed conflict 
which are not of an international character, especially cases of Civil 
War, colonial conflict or war of religion, which may occur in the 
territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the 
implementation of the principles of the present Convention shall be 
obligatory on each of the adversaries. The application of the 
Convention in these circumstances shall in no way depend on the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict and shall have no effect on that 
status".20 Although this was not accepted, the 1949 Conventions 
clearly regarded colonial conflicts as non-international armed 
conflicts.21 In other words, the rules of customary international law, 
as briefly noted in the preceding section, still applied in the case of 
colonial conflict as a species of internal wars. This, therefore, 
Permitted the administrating power to use force in the territory. 
Conversely the use of force by inhabitants of the territory in question 
was governed exclusively by the municipal law of the colonial power, 
subject to the aforementioned rules of insurgency and belligerency.
The change in this predominantly State-oriented approach to the 
international law of force can be traced to the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly on 14th December 1960 - resolution 1514(XV) 
This solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and 
unconditional end, colonialism in all its forms and manifestations 
and to that end declared that the subjection of peoples to alien
Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ed. Pictet) vol. III, 
I960, p.31. " ' ■ ' '
(21) In fact, common Article 3 provided for a minimum protection for 
both parties in cases of a non-international armed conflict 
occurring in territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.
The application of the provisions was not to affect the legal 
status of the parties to the conflict.
subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of
fundamental human rights and was contrary to the U.N. Charter. All
peoples had the right to self-determination and "all armed action or
repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples"
were to cease in order to enable them to exercise their right to
independence. This resolution implicitly acknowledged the legality
hitherto of colonialism in international law and stated that from that
point immediate steps were to be taken in non-independent territories
to transfer all power to the people of their territories, without any
conditions or reservations. However, within a short time the emphasis
had changed. The preamble to General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX)22 234
adopted on 20 December 1965, declared that the continuation of colonial
rule and apartheid, as well as all forms of racial discrimination,
threatened international peace and security and constituted a crime 
23against humanity. Resolution 2131 (XX) adopted the following day,
declared in operative paragraph 3 that "the use of force to deprive
peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their
inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention". The
confluence of the principles of non-intervention, self-determination
and the use of force achieved in this resolution, marked out the path
24that was to follow. The important Declaration on Principles of
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(22) This resolution also called on all States and international 
institutions, including the specialised agencies of the U.N.,
to withhold assistance of any kind to the governments of Portugal 
and South Africa until the policies of colonial domination and 
racial discrimination were renounced.
(23) This preambular paragraph was adopted by 63 votes to 16, with 22 
abstentions, the resolution as a whole by 74 votes to 6 with 27 
abstentions, a clear indication of the contentious nature of 
the provision in the preamble.
(24) Resolution 2160 (I) adopted by 98 votes to 2 with 8 abstentions, 
declared that any forcible action direct or indirect which deprived 
a people under foreign domination of the right to self-determination 
freedom and independence constituted a violation of the Charter and ' 
reaffirmed the provisions of Res.2131 (XX). The continuation of 
colonialism was declared to threaten international peace and 
security, see resolutions 2189(XXI), 2326(XXII), 2465(XXIII) and 
2548(XXIV).
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International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
adopted by the Assembly without a vote on 24th October 1970, in
resolution 2625(XXV), stipulated that "every State has the duty to
refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples ..., of their
right to self-determination and freedom and independence". It was
further provided that "the use of force to deprive peoples of their
national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights
and of the principle of non-intervention" while it was reaffirmed
that the territory of a colony and other non-self-governing territory
had under the Charter "a status separate and distinct from the
territory of the State administering it". One of the aims of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as
elaborated in the Declaration, was to bring a speedy end to colonialism.
The 1970 Declaration, thus, does not declare colonialism illegal per se,
although the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation and domination
is deemed contrary to the Charter as well as a violation of the
25principle of self-determination. The position, therefore, appeared
to be that the administering power was bound to apply the principle of
self-determination and was prevented from treating the non-self-
governing territory as an integral part of its own territory. The use
of force contrary to the terms of the principle violated, it seems, a
number of legal norms including those concerned with self-determination,
non-intervention and human rights. None of this, however, would prevent
the use of force in pure law and order situations, and to prevent an
26armed attack from outside in certain situations. 256
(25) See in particular the Reports of the Special Committee on Principles,
1966 A/6230 paras. 457 and 458, and ibid 1969, A/7619, paras. 161 ’
and 162. See also Chapters on Self-Determination, supra, pp.102 and 171,
(26) See further infra, p.395.
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This interpretation of the regulation of force by the administering
power is borne out by an analysis of the discussions of the Special
Committee on Principles. The issue of the use of force by the
colonial power was first introduced in a Czechoslovakian proposal of
271966. Paragraph 3 provided that "every State has the duty to
refrain from all armed actions or repressive measures of any kind
directed against peoples struggling against colonialism for their
freedom and independence". In the same session, a proposal by five
28Latin American powers suggested that "every State has the duty to
refrain from the threat or use of force against those dependent
peoples to which General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) on the granting
of independence to colonial countries and peoples is applicable".
Differing opinions were put forward on those formulations. There
was the belief expressed that all armed actions or repressive measures
against peoples demanding recognition of the right to self-determination,
should be prohibited, while on the other hand, others declared that
under the Charter, administering powers had to preserve law and order.27 89 301
During the 1969 session, the view was put forward that force against
oppressed peoples fighting for independence constituted a crime and
30violated the Charter. Conversely, it was stated that international 
law required the protection of the interests and nationals of other 
States within the jurisdiction and that therefore there was a duty to 
prevent disturbances from damaging such interests in dependent 
territories as well as in the metropolitan territories. The final 
text approved in 1970 marks thus a move away from the very wide-ranging
(27) A/AC.125/L. 16 part 1. See also A/6230, para. 25,
(28) A/AC.125/L. 49/Rev, 1.
(29) Eg. Reports of the Special Committee, 1968 A/7326, para. 173.
(30) A/7619, para.164.
(31) Ibid, para.165.
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proposals put forward. The Australian delegate correctly noted that
while States could not act forcibly to deprive peoples of the right to
self-determination, normal action to maintain law and order, which
would by definition be of a temporary nature, could still be taken.32 3
This was underlined by the U.K. delegate, who noted that the violation
of self-determination by forcible action meant action involving the use
of military or other armed force. Limited police action to maintain or
restore law and order to establish conditions in which the peoples of
non-self-governing territories could proceed to exercise the right of
33self-determination was not precluded. Similarly, the view expressed 
in the 1966 Czechoslovakian proposal declaring colonialism to be 
"contrary to the foundation of international law and to the Charter"34 
was not incorporated in the final Declaration, nor indeed had it been 
included in the influential 13 Afro-Asian powers proposal of 1966.35 
Therefore, the institution of colonialism itself could not be said to 
be illegal, although there was clearly a duty to bring it to a speedy 
end. Accordingly, the use of force by the colonial power could not be 
said to be illegal merely on account of that.
Interestingly, the provision that all States were under a duty to 
refrain from forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to 
self-determination appears both in the section dealing with the 
principle that "States shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations" (one of which is the 
development of friendly relations among States based on respect for
(32) Report of the Special Committee 1970 A/8018 para.204, See also 
the French delegate, ibid para. 151.
(33) Ibid, para,234.
(34) A/6230, para.457.
(35) Ibid, para.458.
for self-determination) and the principle concerned with equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. This demonstrates clearly the
uncertainty as to whether the use of colonial force was illegal by
virtue of the Article 2(4) principle or by virtue of the principle
of self-determination, or indeed by virtue of both. A number of
States took the view that Article 2(4) was concerned only with the
use of force by one State against another and did not apply to
situations relating to dependent peoples and therefore the proposition
should have been properly stated within the context of the elaboration
36of the principle of self-determination. One was not dealing with
"international relations". On the other hand, the majority view
appeared to be that "international relations" is not restricted to
interstate relations and did include issues concerning non-self-
governing territories, particularly since Chapter XI of the Charter
37regulated such relationships.
The view that force by the colonial power to prevent the attainment 
of self-determination was illegal, was reaffirmed in a series of UN
g oresolutions during the 1970’s. Assembly resolution 2734(XXV) 3678
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(36) See eg. A/7619, para.168, and A/8018, para.228. A point in fact 
made also by Skubiszewski, "Use of force by States", Manual of 
International Law (ed. Sorensen), 1968, pp.739, 771, but see 
Stone 63 AJIL, 1969, pp.157, 162.
(37) A/8018, paras.187, 207 and 217. See also Rosenstock, "The 
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations ; A Survey", 65 AJIL, 1971, pp.713, 720, and Sinclair, 
"Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States", Essays on International Law in Honour 
of Krishna Rao, 1976, pp.107, 120-121, See also, generally, 
McWhinney, "The ’New’ Countries and the ’New' International Law: 
The UN Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States" 60 AJIL, 1966, p.l, Lee "The Mexico City Conference 
of the UN Special Committee on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States" 14 
ICLQ, 1965, p,1296; and Howben, "Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States"
61 AJIL, 1967, p.703.
(38) As recommended by the First Committee, A/8096.
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adopted by 120 votes to one (South Africa) with one abstention (Portugal) 
called on all States to desist from any forcible or other attack which 
deprives peoples, in particular those still under colonial or any other 
form of external domination of their inalienable right to self-determin­
ation, freedom and independence and to refrain from military and 
repressive measures aimed at preventing the attainment of independence
Oqby the dependent people. Resolution 2908(XXVII) reaffirmed that the
continuation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations,
including the waging of colonial wars against the national liberation
movements of the colonial territories in Africa, was incompatible with
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Colonial Declaration and posed a threat to international peace and
security. Resolution 3103(XXVII) set out the basic principle governing
the legal status of combatants struggling against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes. It declared that the continuation of
colonialism was a crime (not, it should be noted, colonialism per se)
and specified that any attempt to suppress the struggle against colonial
and alien domination and racist regimes was incompatible with the
Charter, the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Colonial Declaration
It also stated that armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples
against such domination and regimes, were to be regarded as international
armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This is a
point that was taken up later in the Conference on international 
40humanitarian law. 3940
(39) Based on a 55 power draft A/L.677 adopted by 99 votes to «î «,-h -k
23 abstentions. See A/8723/Rev. 1. See also resolutions 262HXXVÏ 
3163(XXVIII) , 3328(XXIX) , 3481 (XXX) and 31/91 utions ^ K X X V )  ,
(40) See further, infra p.401.
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Further protracted discussions on the inter-relationship between
the principles relating to the use of force and the concept of self-
determination took place in the meetings of the Special Committee on
41the Question of Defining Aggression, out of which ultimately emerged
42the definition of aggression, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 
without a vote, in resolution 3314(XXIX). The discussions regarding 
this aspect of the definition revolved around the capacity of the 
people in question seeking self-determination to use force against the 
power denying it and as such will be looked at in a following section. 
However, the definition does reaffirm in the preamble "the duty of 
States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial 
integrity", and a number of representatives posited a right of self- 
defence by such peoples, which in turn depended upon a prior 
designation of the activities of the colonial power as aggression.
At the first session of the Special Committee, a 12 power proposal^
suggested that "any use of force tending to prevent a dependent people
from exercising its inherent right to self-determination in accordance
with General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), is a violation of the Charter
of the United Nations". Virtually the same formulation was used in a
44draft proposal by 4 Latin American States, In the Sixth Committee,
(41) Established, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee A/6988
para , 21 by the Assembly on 18 December 1967 in resolution’2330CXXttn 
It consisted of 35 member States appointed by the President th ' 
Assembly. It was in fact the fourth Special Committee on the .
since the inception of the UN. For a general introduction to tho Ct 
and earlier attempts to define aggression, see Ferencz Defini 086 
International Aggression, 2 vols, 1975. ’ --- --- S-&
(42) See in particular Stone, Aggression and World Order, lass
McDoueal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum Wori h " nrHer' in.'—  ----- --------PP* 121-260
(43) A/AC.134/L.3 and Corr.l and 2 and Add. 1,
(44) A/AC.134/I,.4/Rev.l u d  Corr.Xjwd Add.l.A ia,broader proposal
contained In an amendment by the Sudan and the OAR (A/AC 1R4 /I a? 
to a 13 power draft, A/AC. 134/h.e and Add.l W  1, “ . „ t  ’
"any use of force tending to deprive any neonle nf -n-o * v. Iect ths
to self-determination, sovereignty and territorial intetrritv60! *l8hviolation of the Charter of the United Nations" ' y. is a
399
some representatives made the point that apartheid, racism and
45colonialism were forms of aggression. In the 1969 session, the USSR
46submitted a draft proposal in which a preambular paragraph stated
that "the use of force to deprive dependent peoples of the exercise of
their inherent right to self-determination in accordance with General
Assembly resolution 1514(XV) is a denial of fundamental human rights,
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the
development of co-operation and the establishment of peace throughout
the world". A number of representatives made the point in the ensuing
debate that a definition should include a clause relating to the
principle that the use of force against a people exercising self-
determination was a violation of the Charter. Others, however, thought
47such a provision would be out of place in this definition, and a
6 power western nations draft was severely criticised for ignoring self- 
48determination. The view that dependent peoples were the victims of a
permanent attack on their sovereignty, thus enabling them to resort to
force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, was also
49strongly put in succeeding years. It was also stated that colonialism 
per se was aggression as was the use of force to prevent self-determin­
ation. 45 67890 One formulation proposed in the debates in the Sixth Committee 
in 1972 was to the effect that "the use of armed forces or other 
instruments of control to impose or maintain colonial rule over a 
people or deprive them of the fundamental right to self-determination
(45) Report of the Sixth Committee, 1968, A/7402, para.16
(46) A/AC.134/L.12 and Corr.l. A 13 power draft submitted that sessio 
merely noted that none of its preceding provisions were to be ° 
interpreted as limiting the Charter’s provisions regarding self- 
determination, A/AC.134/L.16 and Corr.l and Add.1 and 2
(47) A/7620 para.49. These sentiments were echoed in the debate in th« 
Sixth Committee, Report of the Sixth Committee, 1969, A/7853 para 18
(48) Ibid, para.77
(49) Eg. A/8019, para.143 (1970).
(50) Report of the Sixth Committee 1970, A/8171, para.35
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and independence" qualified as aggression. Colonial domination, in
51effect, could be assimilated to continued aggression. It was argued 
as against this that there was no basis in the Charter or the works of
legal writers for linking the concept of aggression to the right of
52self-determination. It merely created an extraneous issue. In an
effort to reach a consensus on a number of contentious points, a
Working Group was established in 1973. A consolidated text was
produced which referred in the preamble to "the duty of States not to
use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination,
53freedom and independence". It was proposed in the Sixth Committee to
extend this by amending it to refer to all forms of the use of force and
54to the principle of territorial integrity. The argument that any 
form of colonialism, military occupation or foreign domination
Reconstituted in itself an act of continuing aggression was reiterated.
The final definition in this respect, quoted above, is very similar 
to the corresponding provision in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, apart from the addition of a reference to territorial 
integrity and the substitution of "armed force" for "forcible action".
It is a moot point, therefore, whether the 1974 definition is narrower as 
regards this issue. The conclusion must be that these debates and the 
definition relating to aggression went in this respect no further than 
the 1970 Declaration had done. Colonialism as such was not stigmatised 51234
(51) Report of the Sixth Committee,1972, A/8929, para.33.
(52) Ibid, para.34
(53) A/9019, Annex II, Appendix A, p.15
(54) Report of the Sixth Committee, 1973, A/9411, para.11,
(55) Ibid, para.26. See also A/C.6/SR 1476 para.15, where the 
representative of the German Democratic Republic declared that 
colonialism, apartheid and alien suppression constituted 
permanent aggression.
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as aggression, despite demands that it should be so characterised and 
the use of force by the colonial power was illegitimate only to the 
extent that it was applied to deprive peoples of their acknowledged 
right to self-determination.
Discussions on colonial wars also took place in 1974, within the 
framework of the first session of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts held in Geneva. The Conference was 
intended to supplement the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
followed a series of resolutions by the General Assembly relating to 
human rights in periods of armed conflict. 0 Two additional protocols 
were under discussion, the first of which related to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts. Article 1 of Protocol 1 was 
concerned with general principles and scope of application and was 
intended to supplement common Article 2 of the 1949 Convention 56 7 
The crucial question was whether national liberation or self-determination 
wars were to be included in this Article 1 . If they were, then they 
would be clearly recognised as international armed conflicts, a fact 
which would influence the characterisation of such conflicts within the 
terms of Article 2(4) of the Charter. In the event, they were so 
recognised. Article 1(4) as discussed and accepted included within 
Protocol 1 "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination" . 58
(56) Eg. resolutions 2444(XXIII), 2597(XXIV), 2674(XXV) 2676(XXV)
2852(XXVI), 3032/XXVII), 3102(XXVIII), 3242(XXIX), 3318(XXIX)" 
3500(XXX), 31/19 and 31/64. The conference was convened by the Swis 
Federal Government and was preceded by the 1968 Teheran Conference o 
Human Rights, and the XXIst International Red Cross Conference held 
in Istanbul in 1969 and two Conferences of Government Experts in 
Geneva in 1971 and 1972. See also the Reports by the UN Secretarv- 
General in 1969 (A/7720), 1970 (A/8052) and 1971 (A/8370).
(57) Supra, p.389.
(58) See further infra, p.429.
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The effect of this was to make clear that conflicts involving the
use of force and concerning the struggle for self-determination can no
longer be regarded as internal only. In this, the pattern of the
relationship between Article 2(7) of the Charter and self-determination
has been repeated with respect to Article 2(4). The use of the phrase
"international relations" to mean "interstate relations" can, it is
59submitted, no longer be adequately maintained. International doctrine
has accepted that certain issues of self-determination, that is basically
those arising in a colonial context, are susceptible to international
legal regulation. This has arisen as a result of the evolution of norms
finrelating to self-determination contained in the Charter and with 
regard to Article 2(4), which can be understood to oblige States to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with 
the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
Article 2(4) therefore manifests a link between rules regulating the 
use of force and the principle of self-determination. States, 
therefore, are prohibited from the use of force to deprive such peoples 
as are entitled to exercise the right of self-determination,59 601 so to do. 
Again, there is nothing inherently objectionable about the duplication 
of this norm within the context of the principles of international law 
relating to force on the one hand and self-determination on the other.
In a sense, its incorporation within the framework of Article 2(4) 
emphasises it more clearly as a manifestation of international 
law. This was the implication behind the desire of the UK and French
(5 9) But see Contra, Wengler "L'Interdiction de Recourir a la Force". 
Revue Beige de Droit International, 1971, pp.401, 422, and 
Ronzitti "Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation", Current 
Problems of International Law (ed. Cassese), 1975, pp.319, 323^
(60) See the Namibia case, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 31.
(61) See supra, p.171 et seq.
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representatives to subsume the colonial force element under the heading
62of the principle of self-determination. It is true that no resolution
has as yet criticised States in such situations upon the basis of a
63breach of Article 2(4) as distinct from contravention of the right
of self-determination, but this of itself cannot prevent the relevance
of the provision. In any event, a number of resolutions already 
64referred to have declared that the waging of colonial wars to suppress
the liberation movements of the colonial territories in Africa was
incompatible with inter alia the UN Charter, it is difficult to specify
the moment at which the "international relations" barrier succumbed and
rendered Article 2(4) relevant. The debates surrounding the adoption
of one of the early resolutions, resolution 2160(XXI), demonstrate that
it was not so at that date. A number of western countries manifested
65particularly strong opposition. However, by 1970 this opposition 
to the prohibition of force in such circumstances appears to have 
subsided. The Declaration on Principles was passed without dissent 62 3456 
and the comments made by States in the Special Committee after the 
declaration had been drawn up demonstrate that it was felt by virtually 
all that the use of force in circumstances outlined in the Declaration 
contrary to self-determination was unlawful. 67 The adoption without
(62) A/8018 paras.149 (France) and 228 (UK)
(63) But see infra, p.429.
(64) See supra, footnote 39,
(65) See eg. GAOR, 21st session, plenary meeting 1482 paras 65-70 nnrs
74-79 (USA), 89-98 (Australia), 135-6 (New Zealand), 139 (ItalvV ' 
and 221 (Lebanon). * * iy>
(66) A/PV. 1860, 1870-1883
(67) A/8018, paras.151 (France), 204 (Australia) and 228 (UK) In the 
context of discussions relating to international terrorism the 
US stated that it was "opposed to the use of force to deny'the 
right to self-determination", A/AC. 160/1 at p.44.
404
dissent of the 1974 Definition of Aggression reinforces the universal 
acceptance of the ban on force by administering powers contrary to the 
exercise of the right of self-determination by the peoples concerned 
and is strong evidence with regard to the characterisation of colonial 
wars as part of international relations.
Further, it has been suggested that the maintenance by forcible 
action of a colonial situation may constitute an international crime. 
This appears in Article 19(3) of the International Law Commission’s 
draft Articles on State Responsibility, which provides that "an 
international crime may result from .... a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the 
right of self-determination of peoples such as that prohibiting the 
establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination" . 68 69
(b) Practice Relating to Africa 
(1) The Tunisian Question
On 13 February 1958, the Tunisian Government sent a letter to
the United Nations entitled "Complaint by Tunisia'in respect of an act
of aggression committed against it by French on 8 February 1958 at
69Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef". This was followed the next day by a 
communication from France on "The Situation Resulting from the Aid 
Furnished by Tunisia to rebels enabling them to conduct operations from 
Tunisian territory Directed against the Integrity of French Territory 
and the Safety of the Persons and Property of French Nationals" , 70
The issue then came before the Security Council. Tunisia alleged 
that on 8 February, the village of Sakiet was bombed by twenty-five B26 
airplanes coming from Algeria. Three-quarters of the village was
(6 8) Yearbook of the ILC. 1976 Vol.II, part 2, p.75.
(69) S/3952
(70) S/3954
people were killed
and 130 wounded. 71 723 French troops had therefore been prohibited from
72leaving their barracks in Tunisia. On 18 February the debate was
adjourned on hearing of a good offices offer from the United Kingdom
and United States and an agreement was reached on 15 March providing
for the evacuation of French troops from the areas outside the base 
73at Bizerta. However, a series of incidents including air attacks 
and raids, brought renewed complaints from both Tunisia and France, 74 
again as a consequence of the spreading of the Algerian war , 75 76 and the 
Security Council debate resumed. Tunisia declared that for nearly 
two years it had been subject to acts of aggression by French troops, 
both those stationed in Tunisia and those engaged in hostilities in 
Algeria, who had violated Tunisia’s territorial Integrity and airspace. 
It requested the Council to determine the existence of an act of 
aggression in this particular case. The French view was that Sakiet 
was a military centre of the Algerian rebels supported by the 
Tunisian army and administration. It had served as a training centre 
for the rebels and a transit point for the supply of arms to Algeria 
and was protected by the Tunisian army. 77 78 The support given to the 
Algerian rebel F.L.N. by Tunisia constituted an aggression and 
infringed the principle of non-intervention. Accordingly, the French
destroyed, Red Cross lorries were damaged. 71
(71) SCOR, 13th Year, 819th Meeting, para.9.
(72) Ibid, paras.10 and 11
(73) Ibid, paras.13-17
(74) Ibid, paras.23-32 and S/4013 (Tunisia) and S/4015 (France).
(75) See Fraleigh, "The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in
International Law". The International Law of r<tr41 _
1971, pp. 179, 206-7. ------------ ----- “ <ed. Falk)
(76) SCOR 13th Year, 819th Meeting, paras.51-55
(77) Ibid, paras.70-71
(78) Ibid, paras.74 and 80
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argument rested upon its right of self-defence in respect of the 
administered territory of Algeria. In the event, the debate was 
adjourned in a further attempt to negotiate an agreement. The Council 
was later informed by the parties of the successful completion of an 
agreement based on the evacuation of the French troops. The issue 
never came before the Council again, although a number of letters 
were sent by both parties during the latter stages of the Algerian war, 
reflecting a continuing series of minor incidents across the Algerian— 
Tunisian border. However, the matter was inconclusively resolved 
from the point of view of a determination of international legal 
violation of the norms relating to force by either of the parties.79 801 82
(2)-The Question of Portugal's African Territories
The issue of the use of force by Portugal in its African
territories first came before the UN in 1961, following an uprising
in Angola, which induced Portugal to introduce repressive measures.83
84At the request of Liberia, the matter came before the Security Council
(79) SCOR, 13th Year, 826th Meeting, paras.3-4 (France) and 9 (Tunisi )
(80) See eg. S/4163, S/4307 and S/5000 from Tunisia, and S/4309
France. . from
(81) The treatment of the Indonesian question by the UN in 1947 
demonstrated that the use of force at that stage by the ad i*80 
power was not per se illegal, even when used in operations t lstering 
nationalist movement. The prime consideration for the UN i ° Crush a 
case was the conclusion and enforcement of a cease-fire b ^
the de facto areas controlled by the parties. See Securit^r UP°n 
resolutions 30 (1947), 36 (1947) and 63 (1948), See also C n m Cl1 
"The United Nations and Indonesia" International Conciliate 11108 
1950, pp.113-200. lon,
(82) Resolution 1542(XV) classified such territories as non-self-
governing territories within Chapter XI of the UN Charter ~Thi 
was not accepted by Portugal, who regarded them as "overseas ■ ’
provinces" under the constitution of 1951. See Nogueira „
Nations and Portugal, 1963, p.78. ® ^  ^^igJUnited
(83) See Andemicael, The OAU and the UN, 1976. p.1 0 9» ■
Unfinished Quest for Unity, 1977, p.135, and Gibson, African*"^ 
Liberation Movements, 1972, p.199 et seq. ' ~~ -
(84) S/4738
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but a draft resolution calling for the appointment of a Committee of
85Inquiry and for Portuguese reforms was not adopted. The General
86Assembly then adopted a resolution which recalled resolution 1514 (XV)
(the Colonial Declaration) and declared that failure to act speedily and
effectively to ameliorate the disabilities of the African peoples of
Angola was likely to endanger international peace and security.
Following further disturbances in the territory, the Security Council
met again at the request of 44 Afro-Asian States, and adopted resolution
163 (1961) without opposition (UK and France abstaining), in which it
stated that the situation was "likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security". In other words, the situation was
not yet one which under the provisions of Article 39 of the UN Charter
would render enforcement measures a possibility. The resolution,
however, did call upon Portugal to "desist forthwith from repressive
measures". However, in December 1962, Assembly resolution 1819 (XVII),
adopted by 57 votes to 14, with 18 abstentions, declared that the waging
of a "colonial war" by the Portuguese in Angola constituted "a serious
threat to international peace and security". It recommended that
Portugal be denied support which could be used to suppress Angolans
and that the Security Council should take appropriate measures, including
86asanctions, to secure Portuguese compliance with UN resolutions.
The establishment of the OAU in 1963 provided an additional forum 
and organisational mechanism for the pressuring of Portugal. One of the 856
(85) It received 5 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions, thus failing to obtain 
the necessary 7 concurring votes.
(86) Res. 1603 (XV). A Special Committee on Territories under 
Portuguese Administration was set up under resolution 1699 (XVI).
(86a) It is interesting to note Higgins* comment that at this stage
"it is difficult to believe that the Assembly's attitude towards... 
Portuguese repression has been anything other than patient and 
moderate", The Development of International Law Through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations, 1963, p,126.
purposes of the OAU, in Article 2(i)d of its Charter, was the
eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, while Article
III(6) stated that as a principle of the organisation "absolute
dedication to the total emancipation of the African Territories which are
still dependent". The 1963 Addis Ababa resolution on Decolonisation
declared that the colonial administration of the dependent territories
was "a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate
inhabitants of the territories concerned". The Portuguese were accused
of conducting "a real war of genocide" in Africa and a diplomatic and
87economic boycott against that country was proclaimed. The OAU also 
sent a delegation in 1963 to the UN to draw the Security Council's 
attention to the explosive situation arising from Portugal's colonial 
policy and South African apartheid practices, and the Council accordingly
DOmet in the latter part of 1963. The Council called on Portugal to
negotiate the independence of the territories and recommended that all
States prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment that
89would enable Portugal to continue its repressive policies. In
resolution 218 (1965), the Council declared that the situation "seriously
disturbs international peace and security" and recommended the broadening
90of the arms embargo. The OAU similarly recommended diplomatic and
91economic measures against Portugal. In 1967, the Assembly adopted 87901
(87) CIAS/Plen 2/Rev,2, Res.A, See also Cervenka, The Organisation of 
African Unity and its Charter, 1968, pp.16-8. The resolution also 
set up a Special Fund to be used for aiding the African national 
liberation movements.
(88) Andemicael op.cit. p.109
(89) Resolutions 180 (1963) and 183 (1963).
(90) Negotiations between Portugal and representatives of the African 
Group at the UN speedily broke down, following the former's refusal 
to accept the principle of self-determination, S/5448, pp,55-61.
(91) See eg. OAU Assembly resolutions AHG/Res.9(1) and AHG/Res,45/11) 
and Council of Ministers' resolutions CM/Res.34(111) and 
CM/Res.49/IV).
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resolution 2270 (XXII) in which it declared itself "gravely concerned 
about the critical and explosive situation which is threatening 
international peace and security owing to the methods of aggression 
and the military operations which continue to be used against the 
African peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination". The 
Assembly condemned Portugal's actions which were designed to perpetuate 
"its oppressive foreign rule" and strongly attacked "the colonial war 
being waged by the Government of Portugal against the peaceful peoples 
of the Territories under its domination, which constitutes a crime 
against humanity and a grave threat to international peace and security". 
It urged that country to desist forthwith from all acts of repression 
and to withdraw all military and other forces which it was using for 
that purpose.
93In 1972 the Security Council met in Addis Ababa and further 
considered the problem of the Portuguese territories. It adopted 
resolution 312 (1972) in which grave concern was expressed that 
Portugal was continuing its measures of repression in its military 
operations against the African peoples of Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea (Bissau) in order to suppress the legitimate aspirations of the 
peoples for self-determination and independence. It reaffirmed that 
Portuguese policies both in its colonies and in its provocations against 
neighbouring States seriously disturbed international peace and security 
in the African continent. Portugal was called upon to "cease immediately 
the colonial wars and all acts of repression against the peoples of 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)" and to "withdraw all its armed 923
(92) Adopted by 82 votes to 7 with 21 abstentions. See also Assembly 
resolutions 2107 (X) and 2184 (XXI).
(93) Resolution 308 (1972). Adopted unanimously.
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forces as presently employed for the purpose of the repression of the
peoples" of these territories. The resolution was adopted by 9 votes
94to 0 with 6 abstentions. In resolution 322 (1972), unanimously
adopted, the Council further called on Portugal to cease forthwith its
military operations and all acts of repression against the peoples of
its African territories. In a similar vein, the General Assembly
95adopted resolution 2918 (XXVII) that year in which the immediate
cessation of the colonial wars and all acts of repression, withdrawal
of Portuguese forces and the elimination of all practices violating the
inalienable rights of the peoples of those territories were demanded.
96And in resolution 3113 (XXVIII) the Assembly condemned in the 
strongest possible terms, the intensified armed repression by Portugal 
including massacres, destruction of villages and the use of chemical 
substances and demanded the cessation of the colonial wars and the 
withdrawal of the Portuguese troops. The Assembly also called on 
Portugal to treat captured guerrilla fighters as prisoners of war in 
accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Issues relating to the use of force by the colonial power were
97posed in the case of Guinea-Bissau during 1973. 58 Member States of
the UN requested that an additional item be included on the agenda of 94567
(94) Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy, UK and USA. The resolution was 
based on a proposal by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan, as orally amended 
by Japan, S/10607 and rev.l. The Council also expressed in this 
resolution its deep disturbance at the reported use by Portugal of 
chemical substances in operations against the peoples of its 
African territories. See also, the resolution of the Special 
Committee on Decolonisation, 1971, A/AC109/368.
(95) By 98 votes to 6 with 8 abstentions. See also resolution 2795(XXVI).
(96) Adopted by 105 votes to 8 with 16 abstentions. See also the 
Declaration on Territories under Portuguese Domination, adopted by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 
10th Ordinary Session, held at Addis Ababa 1973.
(97) The facts relating to the declaration of independence by the PAIGC 
liberation movement and subsequent recognitions are discussed 
supra, Chapter 6, p.359.
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the 28th Session of the General Assembly as a matter of priority
entitled "Illegal occupation by Portuguese military forces of certain
sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and acts of aggression
98committed by them against the people of the Republic". The request
99was granted by the General Committee of the Assembly at which
Mauritius speaking on behalf of the African States declared that
Portugal's illegal occupation of parts of the territory was an open
breach of the fundamental principles of the United Nations .10° The
101 102resolution adopted by the Assembly by 93 votes to 7 with 30 
abstentions, strongly condemned the policies of the Government of 
Portugal in perpetrating its illegal occupation of certain sectors of 
the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the repeated acts of aggression 
committed by its armed forces against the people of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde and demanded that Portugal desist forthwith from further 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic 
and from all acts of aggression against the people of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde by immediately withdrawing its armed forces from those 
territories. The attention of the Security Council was drawn to the 
critical situation resulting from Portugal's illegal presence in 
Guinea-Bissau. In an interesting move, the Assembly in that resolution 
specifically recalled Article 2(4) of the Charter, to the effect that 
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat 
of use of force. The proclamation of independence by the PAIGC 
inserted a qualitative change in the discussions with respect to this 98102
(98) A/9196 and Add.l and 2,
(99) GAOR, 28th Session, General Committee 213rd Meeting. By 17 votes 
to 1, with 5 abstentions. See A/9200/Add.5.
(100) Ibid, para.5
(101) Resolution 3061 (XXVIII) o n 2 November 1973 as proposed by 65 
powers, A/L702,
(102) Brazil, Greece, Portugal» South Africa, Spain, UK and USA.
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territory, and this can be seen by way of comparison with the treatment 
of both Angola and Mozambique. The discussions in the plenary sessions 
of the Assembly centred primarily upon the validity of Guinea-Bissau’s 
independence as a sovereign State with the corollary that Portugal was 
thereby illegally occupying part of the territory of an independent 
State. Virtually no analysis of Article 2(4) in the light of this
IfjOsituation took place, but this was probably because once one accepted
the independence of Guinea-Bissau, it became self-evident that Article
1042(4) was being violated by Portugal. The crucial point in the 
debate was rather the international legal validity of the declaration 
of independence. It was on this point that the contributing States 
concentrated.103 405 The inclusion of the reference to Article 2(4) in 
this resolution can therefore be seen as a reaffirmation of the vital 
function of the article within the framework of inter-State relations 
rather than as a guide to its validity in the case of self-determination 
armed conflicts simpliciter. The sponsors of the resolution did not 
argue that the PAIGC remained solely a national liberation movement and 
that therefore Article 2(4) applied. They argued that Guinea-Bissau was 
an independent State. Those who opposed the resolution, and many of 
those abstaining based their decision virtually exclusively upon the 
failure of Guinea-Bissau to fulfill the necessary criteria for the 
recognition of Statehood. The arguments with regard to the relevance 
of Article 2(4) in self-determination situations thus remained unaffected 
one way or the other by this case.
(103) But see the delegate of the GDR, GAOR 28th Session. Plenary
Meetings, 2160th meeting, p.27.
(104) But cf. Ronzitti "Resort to force in Wars of National Liberation" 
Current Problems of International Law (ed. Cassese), 1975, pp.327-9, 
who argues that the'resoiuUon is of little practical value as 
evidence as to whether a government exercising repression in a war 
of national liberation is violating Article 2(4).
(105) See supra, Chapter 6, p.359 et seq,
413
(3)-Portuguese Attacks on Neighbouring States
At one time or another, Portugal used its African territories of 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau to launch armed raids into the 
neighbouring States of Guinea, Senegal and Zambia as part of its 
continuing war against the national liberation movements of its 
territories■
The first time the issue of such use of colonial territories came
before the UN was in April 1963 following a request by Senegal to the
Security Council to consider the repeated violations of its territory
X06and airspace that had taken place from Portuguese Guinea-Bissau .
It was claimed in particular that the village of Boumick had been 
bombed on April 8. Portugal maintained that only small-scale 
operations had occurred and those had taken place within its own
1 AOterritory. It accused Senegal of allowing infiltrators to enter
109Guinea-Bissau and broadcasting anti-Portuguese propaganda. Senegal 
rejected a Portuguese proposal that a commission be set up to 
investigate the allegations it had made. The Council unanimously 
adopted resolution 178 (1963) which deplored Portuguese invasions into 
Senegal and called on its Government to take action to prevent any 
violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In May 
1965, Senegal brought a similar complaint before the Council alleging 
that Portuguese troops had invaded a number of villages, causing damage. 
Portugal rejected those charges and declared that Senegal had aided 
guerilla attacks on G u i n e a - B i s s a u . l a  resolution 204 (1965) 106789
(106) S/5279
(107) SCOR 18th Year, 1027th meeting, para.48 et seq.
(108) Ibid, para.76 et seq.
(109) Ibid, para.103
(110) SCOR 18th Year 1031st meeting, para.14.
(111) SCOR 20th Year, 1206th meeting, para.3 et seq.
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unanimously adopted, the Security Council again called on Portugal to
112respect Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In July 1969, Zambia requested a meeting of the Council to discuss
a series of Portuguese violations of Zambian territory, including the
113bombing of a village in the Katete District of its Eastern Province.
At the meeting, Zambia claimed that between May 1966 and June 1969,
there had been some 60 Portuguese incursions into its territory in
114open violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Portugal, on the
other hand, denied that the bombing of the village had taken place. It
noted that prior to 1966 no incidents had occurred. It was only in
that year that Zambia had decided to open its territory to hostile
activities against Angola and Mozambique and had authorised the
establishment of training and supply bases for armed attacks on the
adjoining Portuguese territories. While Portugal had issued strict
instructions to its forces to respect Zambia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, it could not allow its forces to be fired
115upon from across the border without reacting in self-defence. in
resolution 268 (1969),12 34516 17the Council strongly censured Portugal for 
its attack on the village and called upon it to desist forthwith from 
violating Zambia's territorial integrity.
Senegal again requested the Security Council to discuss Portuguese
117attacks in November 1969. The representatives of Senegal recounted
(112) Note that in Security Council resolutions 226 (1966) and 241 (1967) 
Portugal was called upon not to allow mercenaries to use Angola
as a base for operations in the Congo (Zaire).
(113) S/9331. This request was supported by 35 Member States acting on 
behalf of the Organisation of African Unity, S/9340 and Add.1-3.
(114) SCOR 24th Year, 1496th meeting para.6 et seq.
(115) Ibid, para.63 et seq. See also ibid 1488th meeting para.27 and 28.
(116) Adopted by 11 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.
(117) S/9513. 36 African States supported the request and condemned
Portuguese aggression, S/9524 and Add.l.
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earlier incidents and recalled Security Council resolutions 178 (1963)
and 204 (1965), and accused Portugal of shelling a village in Southern 
118Senegal. Portugal pointed to continuing artillery attacks and
raids on Guinea-Bissau coming from Senegal and declared that fire had
11Qbeen returned. No one could contest its right of self-defence.
During the discussion, this claim to self-defence was denied. It was
stated by a number of countries that since Portugal's continued colonial
presence in Africa was illegitimate and in contravention of the UN
Charter and Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, it had
120no such right of self-defence. Portugal replied that its right of
self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter could not be denied and
121criticised the "double standard" adopted in its case. In resolution 
273 (1969), adopted by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions, the Council 
strongly condemned Portugal and called upon it to desist from violating 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal. Although it did 
not therefore rule on the general principle of the applicability of 
Article 51 in such circumstances, it clearly did not accept the 
Portuguese point of view.
In December 1969, Guinea called for a meeting of the Security
Council to discuss "the aggression recently committed by the Portuguese
colonial army" against its territorial integrity, A series of attacks
122and shellings were instanced. The Council again condemned Portugal 18920
(118) SCOR, 24th Year, 1516th meeting, para.47 et seq. Further 
incidents took place in December 1969, S/9541.
(119) Ibid, para.101 et seq.
(120) See SCOR 24th Year, 1518th meeting, paras.18-9 (Madagascar),
131-2 (Mauritania), 116-21 (Nepal), 37 and 42-4 (Tunisia),
104-5 (USSR), 57-62 (UAR), 17 (Pakistan) and 46 (Syria).
(121) SCOR 24th Year, 1520th meeting, paras.9-19.
(122) S/9525, S/9528 and S/9554. The request was supported by 40 
African States, S/9549,
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and called upon It to desist from violating Guinea's sovereignty and
123territorial integrity. Portugal was also solemnly warned that if
such acts were repeated, "the Council would have to seriously consider
further steps to give effect to this decision". In fact, the issue
reappeared on the Council's agenda within a year. By a letter of
22 November 1970, Guinea requested an urgent meeting of the Council.
It was stated that Portuguese forces had landed at the capital of
Guinea and the town had been shelled. A request for immediate
124intervention by UN troops was made. Portugal, however, denied the
125charge. The Council treated this incident differently from
preceding events, on the grounds of the large number of forces
involved and the more serious nature of the allegation. As a first
step, it was unanimously decided to send a special mission to Guinea
126to report on the situation immediately. The mission reported that
in its best judgment the force of 350-400 men that had invaded Guinea
had been assembled in Guinea-Bissau and was composed of naval and
military units of the Portuguese armed forces acting in conjunction
127with Guinean dissident elements from outside Guinea. The 
representative of Guinea made the point, which was becoming more and 
more a crucial element in the discussion of Colonial situations, that 
Portuguese aggression was rooted in the determination of imperialism 
to deny African peoples their sovereignty and independence. The grave 1234567
(123) Resolution 275 (1969). Adopted by 9 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions.
(124) S/9987.
(125) S/9989. See also S/10014.
(126) Resolution 289 (1970).
(127) S/10009 and Add.l. See African Contemporary Record, 1970/1,
1972, pp,13365-71 for a detailed account of the event. See also 
Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, pp.136-7.
Portugal, however, declared that the mission's conclusions were 
not acceptable S/10024,
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situation, which constituted a constant threat to international peace
and security, resulted from the persistence of the Portuguese colonial
128regimes in Africa. Algeria noted that all Africa was involved and
Algeria regarded itself as directly concerned by the aggression 
129against Guinea. Tanzania called for effective measures to be taken
130under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. The Council in resolution 
131290 (1970) emphasised the right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique
and Guinea-Bissau to self-determination and significantly declared that
the presence of Portuguese colonialism on the African continent was a
serious threat to the peace and security of independent African States.
Portugal was condemned for the attack and requested to pay full
compensation. In addition, it was warned that in the event of any
repetition of armed attacks on African States, the Council would
immediately consider appropriate effective steps or measures in
132accordance with the Charter,
Incidents took place, however, the following year with respect both
to Senegal and to Guinea, and the Council continued its more active
involvement. Senegal complained in July 1971 to the Security Council
that Portugal had inter alia been laying anti-tank and anti-personnel
133mines in its territory. The Council sent a special mission to 128930
(128) SCOR, 25th Year, 1559th meeting, paras.21-39 and 45.
(129) Ibid, paras.52-6
(130) Ibid, paras.102 and 111-3
(131) Adopted by 11 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.
(132) The emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers convened at 
Lagos in December 1970 resolved to set up a special fund to provide 
aid to Guinea, to increase its aid to the anti-Portuguese 
liberation movements and to coordinate cooperation between Member 
States on all questions of defence and security, see resolutions 
ECM/17 (VII) and ECM/18 (VII).
(133) S/10251, See also S/10182 and S/10227. Portugal maintained that 
the PAIGC was in fact responsible for these incidents, S/10255,
418
134examine the situation along the Guinea-Bissau - Senegal border.
Its report designated the Portuguese authorities as responsible for 
the incidents and concluded that the acts of violence and destruction 
were the consequence of the special situation prevailing in Guinea-Bissau
which was in contradiction to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on
135the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
136These conclusions were categorically rejected by Portugal, which
stressed its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.
It should be noted that the mission was the first to which the Council
had granted authority to make recommendations necessary to guarantee
137peace and security in the region, and it recommended that Portugal 
should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal and 
enable the right of self-determination and independence of the people of 
Guinea-Bissau to be exercised without further delay. Security Council 
resolution 302 (1971) adopted by 14 votes to 0 with 1 abstention, 
condemned Portuguese attacks on Senegal and called for the exercise of 
self-determination by the people of Guinea-Bissau. A special mission 
was similarly despatched to Guinea following further complaints by that
country.134 56738 13940 The mission made no recommendations and submitted no
13Q 140conclusions, and the Council issued a statement of consensus.
(134) Resolution 294 (1971).
(135) S/10308 and Corr.l.
(136) S/10343.
(137) SCOR 26th Year, 1586th meeting, paras.5-8.
(138) Security Council resolution 295 (1971). See S/10280.
(139) S/10309/Rev.1.
(140) SCOR 26th Year, Resolutions and Decisions, p.5.
419
This expressed Guinea's concern at the possibility of renewed acts of 
violence against it and emphasised that "the failure by Portugal to 
apply the principle of self-determination, including the right to 
independence in Guinea-Bissau is having an unsettling effect on 
conditions in the area".
The Council also dealt with complaints against Portuguese
activities emanating from its African territories in 1972. Senegal
declared that a frontier post had been attacked and persons killed 
141and wounded. The Council in resolution 321 (1972) condemned the 
attacks and called on Portugal to respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the independent African States and to take
142immediate steps to apply the principle of self-determination.
The Security Council debates and decisions relating to Portuguese 
armed activities against neighbouring independent African States during 
the years 1963-1972 are very important in evaluating the relevant norms 
governing the use of force by the colonial power. The Council 
consistently accepted the facts as alleged by the complainant States 
and ignored Portuguese requests to establish commissions of enquiry.
On the other hand, when Portugal did not make such a request, the Council 
proceeded to set up and despatch special missions to examine the 
relevant facts. The Council did not accept Portuguese arguments that 
the neighbouring States were to blame for encouraging and aiding 
guerrillas to attack Portuguese administered Guinea-Bissau. Although one 
cannot go so far as to declare that the Security Council established that 142
(141) S/10672/Rev.1, This incident was admitted by Portugal, and the 
mental instability of the unit commander involved blamed, S/10682.
(142) The General Assembly in resolution 3113 (XXVIII) condemned the 
repeated acts of aggression committed by the armed forces of 
Portugal against independent African States.
Portugal by virtue of its colonial position was denied a right of self- 
defence from its African territories, it certainly seems that it 
accepted that conditions under which the right would operate in respect 
of colonial territories were not the same as those that apply in normal 
inter-State situations. The reduced reliance upon the facts of any 
given incident as objectively ascertained that appears to have been 
operative in these cases is thus the consequence of the consensus 
perception of the dubious legality of the use of force by the colonial 
power to suppress the liberation movements of the particular territories 
and thus by implication to suppress the right to self-determination.
In two of the three cases in which the Council sent out special missions, 
Portugal was condemned before the reports of the missions were compiled. 
This suggests that the real use of such missions was more in the nature 
of a demonstration of support for the claimant State than an attempt to 
ascertain the facts and apportion blame objectively with regard to the
particular incidents involved. Accordingly, and in the light of the
143separate and special status of colonial territories, the colonial 
power could not successfully defend its use of force in neighbouring 
States on the grounds of the role of such States in participating in 
violence against it. In other words, in self-determination situations, 
the colonial power was not able to involve Article 51 as its legal 
justification. The separate status of colonial territories was a 
crucial factor here. This is reinforced by the clear declaration in 
Council resolution 290 (1970) that the presence of Portuguese colonialism 
in Africa was of itself a serious threat to the peace and security of 
African States. 143
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(143) See supra, p.134 et seq.
(4)-The United Kingdom and Rhodesia
The conclusion that while the use of force to suppress self- 
determination in colonial situations is contrary to international law, 
a total ban on force in such situations is not suggested can be 
illustrated by reference to the UN view of the role of the UK with 
regard to the Rhodesian problem.
By virtue of Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI) adopted on 28 June
1962, Southern Rhodesia was declared to be a non-self-governing
territory within the meaning of Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter
and Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The UK, however, rejected this,
arguing that since 1923 Southern Rhodesia had been a self-governing
colony. The 1923 arrangement and the 1961 constitution, it was noted,
curtailed the powers and functions of the UK government to such an
extent that the territory could not validly fall within the scope of
144UN non-self-governing territories. By autumn 1965, with a unilateral
declaration of independence by the white minority apparently imminent,
the OAU called on Britain to suspend the 1961 Constitution of Southern
Rhodesia and "take all necessary steps including the use of armed force"
in order to resume control over the territory’s administration and set
145up a Constitutional Conference. In resolution 2012 (XX), the General 
Assembly called on the UK to take all possible measures to prevent a 
UDI and in the event of such a declaration "to take all steps necessary 
to put an immediate end to the rebellion", Resolution 2022 (XX) 
requested the U K  government to employ "all necessary measures including 
military force", in order to remove all the restrictions on African 145
(144) See eg. GAOR, 17th session, 4th Committee, 1360th meeting, 
paras.31-53.
(145) A H G / R e s .  25/Rev.l (ID*
political activity in the territory and call a conference to make new
constitutional arrangements. Once UDI had occurred on 11 November 1965,
the international community continued to press the UK to use all means
146necessary to end the rebellion in the territory. The Security
Council called on the UK to "quell this rebellion of the racist
minority" and to "take all other appropriate measures" in order to
147eliminate the authority of the usurpers. The UK, after UDI,
declared that it was a British responsibility to re-establish the rule
of law in Southern Rhodesia and it also accepted that the UN had an 
148interest.
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The African States in a series of OAU resolutions consistently
demanded inter alia that the UK apply effective measures, including the
use of force, to end UDI and to prevent supplies reaching the illegal
regime,146 7849 150 and the terms of such resolutions were usually reflected in
150resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The Security Council,
however, took a more cautious line due to fears of a western or UK veto.
The word "force" was rejected in favour of "appropriate measures"151 152
152and the Council ultimately adopted a policy of economic sanctions.
In the face of a British unwillingness to use force, an African policy 
which included pressure on the UN to induce the UK to use force was
(146) See Assembly resolution 2024 (XX) adopted by 107 votes to 2 
(Portugal and South Africa), with 1 abstention (France). The 
UK and Uruguay did not participate in the voting,
(147) Resolution 217 (1965) adopted by 10 votes to 0 with 1 abstention 
(France).
(148) SCOR, 20th Year, 1257th meeting, paras,19-22,
(149) See eg. OAU resolutions AHG/Res. 25/Rev. I(II), AHG/Res. 39(B) ( m
ECM/Res,13(VI), ECM/Res,14(VI), CM/Res,75(VI) and CM/Res,78(VII) *
(150) See eg. resolutions 2138 (XXI) and 2151 (XXI)
(151) Eg. in Security Council resolution 217 (1965)
(152) See resolutions 233 (1966) and 253 (1968)
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established.153 This had some success in the General Assembly,154 1567
but the Security Council refrained from recommending the use of force
155by the UK against the illegal regime. In 1970, the OAU strongly
condemned Britain for its consistent refusal to use force and again 
„ 156urged it so to act.
Although the Security Council did not demand that Britain use force 
to remedy the situation, it accepted that Britain possessed the legal 
basis for such action should the intention be present. UN practice, 
as well as African practice, quite clearly recognised that the UK, 
as the responsible power until the exercise of self-determination, 
could use force to end UDI. In other words, colonial force was 
legitimate where used in order to further or protect the right of the 
inhabitants of the particular territory to self-determination.
II - The Use of Force by Illegal Regimes
The two major provisions regarding the use of force in international
law both assume a substantial degree of personality by the actor
involved. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "all Members shall
refrain" although this is widened somewhat by Article 2(6) to the effect
that the UN should ensure that non-Member States should act in
157accordance with the principles of the UN, while the corresponding 
provision in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
(153) A good example is OAU resolution CM/Res.153 (XI)
(154) See resolution 2508 (XXIV)
(155) See resolution 277 (1970)
(156) CM/Res.207 (XIV)
(157) By virtue of the pacta-tertiis rule, this cannot, however, be 
regarded as creating of itself obligations under international 
law for third parties.
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stipulates that "every State has the duty" to refrain from the threat 
158or use of force. The question, therefore, is whether non-State
entities are bound by this fundamental provision in international law.
A strict interpretation would lead to the result that such entities
would possess a degree of freedom of action unregulated by law which
would render absurd any claim for international law to be a viable
mechanism of conflict management. Arab non-recognition of Israel as
a State has never included the proposition that Israel is totally free
159from international law restraints regarding the use of force.
Practice in the UN in particular has shown that the organisation has
not hesitated to condemn the illegitimate use of force by unrecognised
States or indeed non-State entities of controversial personality.158 960 16
Brownlie regards it as "certain that, for the purposes of applying the
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, de facto
10 ^
governments may be treated as equivalent to States." It now seems
acknowledged that beyond this the use of force by such entities falls 
to be regulated under Article 2(4) or more accurately by customary law 
provisions equivalent to the terms of Article 2(4) save for the identity 
of the author of the event. In addition, of course, illegal regimes, 
such as those in Rhodesia and Namibia, are bound by the principle of 
self-determination so that forcible actions preventing the exercise of 
the right by the inhabitants of the territory in question are unlawful.
(158) Note that by virtue of explanatory note (a) attached to Article 1 
of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, the term "State" is used 
without prejudice to questions of recognition or whether a State 
is a Member of the UN. See also Article 1 of the 1974 Definition 
of Aggression.
(159) Raa Brownlie. International Law and the Use of Force by States. 
1963, p.379.
(160) Brownlie instances references to North Korea and Communist China 
in the early 1950‘s, op.cit. p.380.
(161) Ibid.
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(1) The Case of Rhodesia
The intensification of the guerrilla war during the early 1970's 
led to the illegal regime's use of force against targets within 
neighbouring independent African States. The UN adopted a number of 
resolutions condemning those actions. In February 1977, the Security 
Council in resolution 403 (1977) unanimously condemned the attacks
ICOmade by the illegal Rhodesian regime on neighbouring Botswana and
this was repeated in resolution 406 (1977), which reaffirmed support
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Botswana against the
"continued attacks and acts of provocation by the illegal racist
16 3regime of Southern Rhodesia", In July that year, the Security
Council unanimously condemned the "illicit, racist, minority regime
164in Southern Rhodesia" for attacks on Mozambique, and this was
followed by a resolution of the Special Committee on Decolonisation
condemning Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana.162 3465 16789
Such attacks continued, however. In September 1977, an air raid into
Zambia was made, while a major attack on Mozambique took place in
167November, reportedly killing some 1,200 persons. In February 1978
ICOan incursion took place by Rhodesian troops into Botswana. A more
serious incident occurred on 6 March 1978 when Rhodesian troops crossed
into Zambia to destroy guerilla bases. Aircraft were reportedly
169involved in this attack. Zambia brought this incident before the
(162) See UNMC February 1977 pp.5-15. See also resolutions 326 (1973) 
and 328 (1973).
(163) Also unanimously adopted.
(164) Resolution 411 (1977). See also Africa Research Bulletin,
August 1976, p.4133,
(165) A/AC. 109/554-5.
(166) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1977, p.4580.
(167) Ibid, November, 1977, pp.4644-5.
(168) Ibid, March, 1978, p.4793.
(169) Ibid.
Security Council170 which unanimously adopted resolution 424 (1978).
This resolution strongly condemned the invasion into Zambia "by the
illegal racist minority regime in the British colony of Southern
Rhodesia" which constituted "a flagrant violation of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Zambia". In the Security Council debate
preceding this resolution, Zambia claimed that Rhodesian forces had
repeatedly launched premeditated attacks against Zambia along its
entire border with Rhodesia. Villages had been destroyed and mines
laid.171 The representative of Upper Volta, speaking on behalf of the
African Group, termed the 6 March attack a case of premeditated
aggression,172 while the Canadian delegate spoke of a long series of
irresponsible raids against the territorial integrity and sovereignty
. 173of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique.
The fact that all the resolutions dealing with the Rhodesian 
attacks referred to the violation of the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the neighbouring African States, demonstrates that it 
was understood that the Rhodesian actions had violated international 
legal norms relating to the use of force. The existence of an entity 
of dubious personality under internationaal law as the author of 
aggression could not be held to constitute a barrier against the 
application of the relevant provisions of international law. The 
terms of the resolutions of the UN relating to Rhodesia also reveal
(170) S/12589
(171) UNMC April 1978, p.33.
(172) Ibid, p.34.
Ibid P.35. See the statement of the UK representative,(173) l i P* * Note also the major Rhodesian attack on nationalist
’ P 1 Nkomo in October 1978 causing an estimated 300 deaths, 
African Kese.rch Bulletin, October 1978, pp.S041-3.
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that the use of force by the illegal regime to suppress the rights of 
the inhabitants including that of self-determination was unlawful.174 17568
(2) The Case of Namibia
The growing guerrilla war in this territory illegally occupied by 
175South Africa similarly led to raids being conducted against
neighbouring States. In October 1971, Zambia requested a meeting of
176the Security Council to consider a series of serious incidents and 
violations of its sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity by 
South African forces. The Zambian delegate referred to an incident 
at Katine Mulilo in which South African boats and helicopters had 
entered Zambia as well as 24 other incidents which had taken place 
since October 1968. The South African representative stressed 
that Zambia had violated South West Africa's airspace and that persons 
laying mines inside the territory had returned to Zambia. Armed bands 
had infiltrated into the Caprivi Strip from Zambia causing death and 
destruction, and such bands had operated from Zambia and had received 
support from the Zambian government. South Africa, it was stated, had 
a duty to protect the inhabitants of South Africa and South West Africa 
against terrorist acts. The Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 300 (1971) in which it called upon South Africa to respect 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia and further declared 
that in the event of South Africa violating Zambia's sovereignty or
(174) See eg. Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 
326 (1973).
(175) The Namibia case, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp.16, 58.
(176) S/10352. Supported by 48 States, S/10364 and S/10368,
(177) SCOR 26th Year, 1590th meeting, para.7 et seq.
(178) Ibid, paras.59-72.
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territorial integrity, the Council would meet again to examine the
situation in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.
No mention was made of the South African claims. Indeed, the Security
Council later made the point that it was the continued illegal
occupation of the territory by South Africa that created "conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the region".179 18023
This was reinforced by Declaration of Lusaka adopted by the UN Council
180 _ ,for Namibia in March 1978. In it, it was asserted that the aggressive
nature of the South African occupation regime was reflected in its
repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring independent African
States. In May 1978, a major operation by South African forces based
in Namibia took place against Angola. In the 12 hour invasion involving
700 South African troops and aircraft, several hundred persons were
killed.1**1 The Security Council adopted a resolution1"  unanimously
condemning the raid, referring to "this latest armed invasion
perpetrated by the South African racist regime against the People's
Republic of Angola". The resolution demanded the "immediate and
unconditional withdrawal" of all South African forces from Angola and
stated that in the event of further violation of Angolan sovereignty
and territory by South Africa, the Council would meet again "to
183consider the adoption of more effective measures". In other words,
the use of force by the illegal South African regime in Namibia against
(179) Resolution 310 (1972).
(180) A/S-9/2-S/1263. See also UNMC April 1978 pp,42—6.
(181) For the details see African Research Bulletin, May 1978, pp;4865-8.
(182) Resolution 428 (1978). See also resolution 387 (1976),
(183) Condemnatory statements were also issued by the OAU and the 
five western members of the Security Council known as the 
"contact group". African Research Bulletin, May 1978, p.4866,
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the neighbouring States, as well as against the indigenous inhabitants, 184 185
i fiHwas a violation of international law.
-1-*-1 “. The, Use of Force by Peoples Entitled Under International t.™ 
to Self-Determination “ ---- --------- aw
Until a number of years ago, it could be stated that customary
international law in regarding self-determination wars as internal wars
and therefore exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State concerned,
did not govern the use of force in such circumstances. The use of force
by both the administering power and rebel and/or liberation movements
was outside the regulatory mechanisms of customary international law and
Article 2(4) of the Charter. However, international doctrine has now
altered that perception and this has been reinforced by practice
relating to particular territories.
(a) International Doctrine
The development of self-determination as a legal principle was the 
method used whereby the traditional rules relating to the use of force 
and colonial peoples were modified. But the recognition of the legality 
of armed struggle as a means of achieving self-determination under 
international law lagged behind the acceptance of self-determination as 
the right of peoples in colonial situations. The Charter does not refer 
to the use of force within a self-determination context, and neither does 
resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. The issue was, however, raised in the 
course of the Security Council debates following the Indian take-over of 
Portuguese Goa in 1961. India argued that the Portuguese title to the
(184) See eg. Security Council resolutions 310 (1972) and Assemblv 
resolution 31/146.
(185) See infra with regard to the situation in South Africa itself, p .459
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enclave was unlawfully acquired through conquests in 1510 and that
since Goa was inhabited by Indians and was geographically part of India,
India could not commit aggression against it. Indeed, it was argued that
since colonialism constituted permanent aggression, India was entitled
186 187to act in self-defence. A resolution declaring the enclaves a 
threat to international peace and security and rejecting the Portuguese
1 OOcomplaint was defeated by 4 votes to 7, while a resolution deploring
the use of force by India and calling for an Indian withdrawal received
7 votes to 4; it was defeated by virtue of a Soviet veto. The Indian
189thesis was not accepted but the issue once raised remained alive.
A series of resolutions beginning with Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) in
1965 recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial
rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, but
without stating that such legitimate struggles could encompass armed 
190struggles.
The question concerning the relationship between colonialism, self- 
determination and the right of peoples to struggle to attain self- 
determination was exhaustively examined in the debates of the Special 
Committee culminating in the adoption of the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law in 1970. Czechoslovakia introduced a proposal at 
the first session of the Special Committee in 1964 to the effect that 
one of the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force was the 186790
(186) SCOR, 16th Year, 987th meeting, pp.9-11,
(187) S/5032.
(188) S/5033.
(189) See Wright, "The Goa Incident" 56 AJIL, 1962, p,617. As regards 
Portugal's title to the enclaves, see the Right of Passage case, 
ICJ Reports, 1960, p.8 .
(190) Eg. resolutions 2189 (XXI), 2326 (XXII), 2465 (XXIII) and 
2548 (XXIV).
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thesis that a right of self-defence of peoples against colonial
domination in the exercise of the right to self-determination existed. 191
This was reflected in a Yugoslav-India-Ghanaian proposal. 192 19345 While some
representatives believed that the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV)
supported this contention, others regarded the issue as being outside
Charter provisions in the light of the reference in Article 2(4) to
193"international relations". In the Czechoslovak proposal of 1966, it
was stated that peoples had a right to self-defence against colonial
domination in the exercise of their right to self-determination and that
colonial domination could be eliminated by such peoples "by whatever
means". A 13 power proposal drawn up by Afro-Asian States provided
that peoples in the exercise of their legitimate right to self-
determination were entitled to exercise "their inherent right of self- 
195defence". This aroused both fervent support and strong criticism.
Some representatives asserted that the Declaration could proclaim the
right of peoples under colonial domination to fight for their
liberation by armed force if necessary, should the colonial power refuse
to recognise the right of self-determination. Such struggles were a
sacred right. Colonialism could only be defeated by force. 196 197 On the
other hand, it was stated that one could not legalise in advance
197revolution and violence. To recognise a right of self-defence in
(191) Report of the Special Committee, 1964 A/5746 p.20.
(192) Ibid, p.23
(193) Ibid, pp.42-5
(194) A/AC. 125/L 16 part I. Colonialism was declared to be contrary 
to the foundations of international law and to the Charter ibid.
(195) A/AC.>125/L 31 and Add.1-3. See also the similar provision in 
a 10 power proposal, A/AC. 125/L 48.
(196) Report of the Special Committee 1968, A/7326, paras.103 and 109. 
See also ibid para.175.
(197) Ibid, para.105 .
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such circumstances would be contrary to the prohibition of force and
the principles of non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of 
198disputes. It was also maintained that peoples could not be
identified with States and did not have the same rights, such as, for
199example, the right to self-defence. As against this, one
representative asserted that where there was a right, there was a
, 200 remedy.
In the event, the Declaration declared that all States were under
a duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence,201 and
that "in their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action",
such peoples could receive support in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter. This limited formulation, tied as it is to
the forcible action taken to suppress self-determination and replacing
the phrase "legitimate struggle" which had been understood implicitly to
202include the use of force, can hardly be regarded as recognising a 
right of self-defence inherent in peoples entitled to self-determination. 
The phrase is ambiguous as regards the acknowledgement of the use of 
force by such peoples; even in response to forcible action taken to 
deprive them of the right to self-determination, it could be taken to 
refer solely to non-violent actions and resistance. The modest phrase­
ology was criticised by a number of representatives in their comments
(198) Ibid, para.177
(199) Report of the Special Committee 1969, A/7619, para 168
(200) Ibid, para.167
(201) Supra, p.395. Note that Schwebel called this "a remarkably bold and 
progressive step", "Wars of Liberation as fought in UN Organs"
Law and Civil War_ in the Modern World (ed. J.N Moore), 1974 
pp.446, 453.
(202) See Sinclair "Principles of Intern at i  nr. »1 tFriendly Relations and Cooperation among States""^«*118International Law, in Honour of Krishna L , 1976(‘
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after the Declaration had been agreed. Yugoslavia’s representative
stated that he would have preferred an unequivocal affirmation of the
203right of self-defence of peoples under colonial rule. The UK
representative emphasised that the provision "could not be regarded as
affording legal sanction for any and every course of action which
might be taken in the circumstances contemplated". The UN Charter
neither confirmed nor denied a right of rebellion. It was neutral.203 04 2056
205This view must be regarded as correct. However, in 1970 General
Assembly resolution 2649 (XXV) affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle
of peoples under alien and colonial domination recognised as being
entitled to the right of self-determination to restore to themselves
the right by any means at their disposal. This was re-emphasised in
resolutions 2708 (XXV) and 2627 (XXV), 2734 (XXV) and 2621 (XXV), which
referred to the inherent right of colonial peoples to struggle "by all
necessary means at their disposal" against colonial powers suppressing
the aspiration for freedom and independence. Another approach adopted
in the Assembly at that time was to call for the participants in such
struggles for self-determination to be treated on arrest as prisoners-
of-war in accordance with the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva
206Conventions of 1949. The aim of this was to reinforce the thesis 
of a right of armed struggle for self-determination. In any event, 
it marked a further step in the recognition of the distinctive status
(203) Report of the Special Committee, 1970, A/8018, para.161. See also 
eg. Kenya, ibid, para.187, and cf. Syria, ibid, para.206.
(204) Ibid, para.235.
(205) See Schwebel "Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modem 
International Law", 136 HR 1972, pp.484 n.20 and 486 n,22, and 
Farer, "The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed 
Conflict" 142 HR 1974, pp,291, 369.
(206) Resolutions 2674 (XXV) adopted by 78 votes to 0 with 28 
abstentions, and 2621 (XXV). See also A/8086,
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under international law of national liberation movements. Both of
207these approaches were repeated in succeeding years. In 1973 a further
208step was taken when resolution 3070 (XXVIII) reaffirmed the legitimacy
of the struggle of peoples for liberation from colonial and foreign
domination and alien subjugation by "all available means including armed
struggle". And this was reaffirmed a number of times at succeeding 
209sessions. In resolution 3103 (XXVII) the recognition of the
legitimacy of such struggles was coupled with a provision to the effect 
that struggles against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes 
were to be regarded as international armed conflicts, in the sense of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and a declaration that captured 
combatants in such struggles were to be accorded the status of prisoners- 
of-war.
These positions came under discussion in the debates in the Special
Committee leading to the consensus definition of aggression in 1974,
The view was put that action by subject or colonised peoples for national
liberation should be regarded as legitimate and in accordance with the
210terms of the Charter of the UN, while on the other hand the opinion 
was expressed that this Issue was not appropriate for inclusion in a
" . 2ii'
definition of aggression. A Soviet draft in 1969 included the 
provision that "nothing in the foregoing shall prevent the use of armed 207891
(207) See resolutions 2787 (XXVI), 2878 (XXVI), 2955 (XXVII), 2909 (XXVII) and 3185 (XXVIII).
(208) Adopted by 97 votes to 5 with 28 abstentions.
(209) See also resolutions 3163 (XXVIII), 3332 (XXIX), 3246 (XXIX),
3222 (XXIX), 3328 (XXIX), 3481 (XXX), 31/91, 31/92, 31/34,
32/42 and 32/154.
(210) A/7185/Rev.1 para.60. See also A/74Q2, para.16,
(211) Ibid, para.61.
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force in accordance with the Charter, including its use by dependent
peoples in order to exercise their inherent right to self-determination
212in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV). A number of representatives 
argued that the definition should specifically include a clause providing 
an exception when force was necessary to ensure the exercise of the
right to self-determination, based on the principle that force against
213peoples in such cases was a violation of the Charter, and this was
214reiterated in the discussions in the Sixth Committee. The same
arguments centring around the USSR, 13-power and 6-power draft proposals
reappeared in subsequent years. Some representatives felt that the
215issue was extraneous to a definition of aggression, others that it
should be acknowledged that the use of force was legitimate in the case
of national liberation movements or oppressed peoples, as derived from
216the inherent right of self-defence. The argument regarding self-
defence was countered by the view that since the prohibition of force
related only to international relations, Article 51 in principle did
217not apply to civil wars or to liberation movements. This view also 
held that the definition of aggression under consideration should only 
be concerned with acts directed by one State against another. The 
Charter had established an effective system to govern self-determination 2134567
(212) A/AC.134/L.12 and Corr.l. The 13 power draft of that year merely 
provided that none of its preceding provisions were to be inter­
preted as limiting the Charter’s provisions regarding the right 
of peoples to self-determination, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, A/AC.134/L,16 and Corr.l and Add.l and 2. A 6-power 
western draft did not include any reference to self-determination. 
A/AC.134/L.17 and Add.l.
(213) A/7620, para,49.
(214) A/7S53, para,18.
(215) A/8019, para.47. See also A/8419, para.39 and A/8929, para.34.
(216) Ibid, para,73.
(217) Ibid, para.74.
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which did not envisage the use of armed force by dependent territories.218 219034
Many representatives, however, denied that the dependent territories
issue was not international. It was suggested that the use of force
by dependent peoples to liberate themselves from oppression stemmed
from the notion of self-defence in Article SI of the Charter, because
such peoples were the victims of a permanent attack on their 
219sovereignty. The confusion that was appearing with regard to the
self-defence thesis became apparent in the Sixth Committee in 1970,
when a number of representatives declared that colonialism was 
220aggression. The question is thus posed as to whether the use of
force by dependent peoples was legitimate as self-defence against the
very existence of colonialism itself or whether as a response to force
utilised to suppress the right of self-determination. Both approaches
were expressed. There was no agreement on the issue of self-
determination wars and the definition of aggression in the reports of
221the working groups set up, and a series of alternative formulations
222 22^were discussed in the reports of the 1972 and 1973 working groups.
It was eventually agreed that some reference to the Charter provisions 
relating to self-determination should be made, but some representatives 
agreed that this could only be achieved by peaceful and non-violent 
means while others believed that acts committed to realise self-determin­
ation were legitimate exercises of the right of self-defence as expressed
224in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the event, Article 7 of the
(218) Ibid, para.142.
(219) Ibid, para.143. See also A/8929, para.33.
(220) A/8171, para.36.
(221) See A/8419, Annex III, paras.22-24.
(222) A/8719, Annex II, Appendix A, para.II. See also ibid,
Appendix B, paras.B, C and E.
(223) A/9019 Annex II, Appendix A and Appendix B, paras.B, F and J.
(224) A/9411, paras.26 and 27.
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consensus Definition of Aggression provides, in a somewhat cumbersome
formulation, that "nothing in this definition, and in particular 
225Article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, 
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples, 
forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law, concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes, or 
other forms of alien domination, nor the right of those peoples to 
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above- 
mentioned Declaration".
The comments of members of the Special Committee made at the
concluding stage of the 1974 session following the adoption of the
draft definition by consensus reveal some ambiguity as to the meaning
of Article 7. A number of representatives felt that the Article did not
226sanction the use of force by peoples in self-determination situations.
227Others declared that it did. These opposing interpretations were
228repeated in the Sixth Committee in 1974. A number of delegates also 25678
(225) This Article specifies a series of acts qualifying as acts of 
aggression.
(226) Eg. A/9619, Annex I, pp.22 (France), 24 (USA), 32 (UK) and 
35 (Canada).
(227) Ibid, pp.26 (Yugoslavia), 37 (USSR), 38 (Algeria) and 40 (Egypt).
(228) See eg. A/C.6/SR. 1472, paras,5 (USSR), 27 (Italy) and 48 (Jordan); 
A/C.6/SR.1473, para.15 (Canada); A/C.6/SR.1474, paras.12 (Mongolia), 
24 (Kenya), 33 (France) and 39 (Madagascar); A/C.6/SR.1475,
paras,10 (Yugoslavia), 13 (China) and 20 (Syria); A/C.6/SR,1476, 
paras.11 (Belgium) and 15 (GDR)- A/C.6/SR.1477, para,,24 (UK); 
A/C.6/SR.1478, paras.19 (Federal Republic of Germany),
22 (Portugal) and 41 (Hungary); A/C.6/SR.1479, paras.9 (Yugoslavia), 
27 (Democratic Yemen), 29 (Algeria) and 42 (Cuba); A/C.6/SR.1480, 
paras.S(Mali), 17 (Senegal)» 25 (Ghana) and 73 (USA); A/C.6/SR.1482, 
paras.8 (Burundi) and 26 (Tunisia); A/C.6/SR,1483, paras.14 
(Cameroon) and 32 (Egypt), and A/C.6/SR.1504, para.13 (Sudan).
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referred to the ambiguous nature of the Article. What is clear is 
that no consensus existed at that stage regarding the legality under 
international law of the use of force by dependent peoples in the 
struggle to achieve self-determination. Article 7, by linking the 
right of peoples to struggle for self-determination to the provisions 
of the Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law, and indeed omitting the adjective "armed", cannot be cited in 
support of a right to use force in such circumstances. The existence 
of widely diverging subsequent interpretations of Article 7 reinforces 
this thesis. The fact that it was only in 1973 that UN resolutions 
began specifically referring to the use of armed force by peoples in 
order to achieve self-determination may also be noted.
However, crucial discussions on these issues took place during
the 1974 session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed
Conflicts where, following on from resolution 3103 (XXVII), attempts
were made to characterise wars of self-determination as international
armed conflicts. A large number of States declared that the legitimacy
of such wars in international law had already been established and that
practice, particularly in the UN, provided abundant proof of the
230international character of national liberation conflicts. Other 
delegates, primarily Western, denied that self-determination conflicts 
could be regarded as international. Various arguments were adduced in 
support of this approach. One recurring theme was to the effect that a
(229) Eg. A/C.6/SR.1472, para.38 (Spain), and A/C.6/SR.1478, para.33 
(Congo). See in general Stone, Conflict Through Consensus. 1977,
pp,66-86. '
(230) See in particular the Egyptian delegate, CDDH/I/SR.2, paras.8-11, 
See also ibid paras.17 (Yugoslavia), 36 (GDR) and 41 (Nigeria), 
and CDDH/I/SR.3, paras.1 (USSR) and 2 (Burundi).
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basic principle of humanitarian law reflected inter alia in the Hague
Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was that legal
and humanitarian protection applied irrespective of the motives of
231those engaged in the struggle. This fear of the introduction of 
subjective criteria was stressed by the Swiss delegate who declared 
that "it would be very dangerous, and against the spirit of 
humanitarian law, to classify armed conflicts on the basis of non­
objective and non-legal criteria". The question of the legitimacy of
232national liberation struggles lay within the province of other forums.
The USA representative declared in the plenary sessions of the
conference in 1974 that the introduction into humanitarian law of "just
war" concepts would inevitably result in a lowering of the standards of
233protection afforded to war victims. Some delegates, however, took
the view that humanitarian law had to distinguish between the aggressor
and the victim and afford greater protection to the victim acting in
234the exercise of the right of self-defence. A further argument raised
against the concept of self-determination wars as international armed
conflicts was the need to separate the political approach dealing with
political solutions to specific problems as exemplified in the UN and
the norms of humanitarian law as developed via the International
Committee of the Red Cross, which were to remain free of political 
2 35motivation. This view was an attempt to undermine one of the main 23145
(231) This was specially argued by Col. Draper, the UK delegate CDDH/I/
SR.2, paras.44 and 45.
(232) CDDH/I/SR.3, para.13. See also ibid paras.3 (Uruguay), 19 (Spain), 
CDDH/I/SR,4, para.39 (Netherlands), CDDH/I/SR.5, para.22 (Denmark). 
The Japanese delegate declared that any attempt to apply the 1949 
Convention as a whole to armed conflicts in which entities other 
than States were involved, would tend to destroy the established 
system and would lead to practical difficulties, CDDH/I/SR.5 para.49.
(233) CDDH/SR.11 para.47, See the Netherlands delegate, ibid, para.5.
See also Graham,''The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War",
32 Washington and Lee Law Review, 1975, p,25.
(234) See in particular ibid para.12 (Rumania) and CDDH/SR.12 paras.15-16 
(China). See also CDDH/I/SR.4 para.17 (China).
(235) CDDH/I/SR.2, para.49 (France and ibid paras,50-51 (USA),
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bases of the self-determination argument, which relied heavily upon the
international legitimacy of the right to self-determination as expressed
through the UN. It was answered by the Egyptian delegate who declared
that international law constituted an indissoluble body of complementary
rules. No separation could be made between the decisions of the UN and
236the work of the conference.
A 9-power proposal drafted by Communist States with Algeria,
Morocco and Tanzania provided that Article 1 of Protocol I (dealing with 
international armed conflicts) should include a provision that 
international armed conflicts also comprised "conflicts where peoples 
fight against colonial and alien domination and against racist regimes".236 37 2389
A 15-power proposal submitted by Afro-Asian and Arab States, with 
Norway, Australia and Yugoslavia, provided that the situations referred 
to in common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (relating to 
international armed conflicts) should include "armed struggles waged by 
peoples in the exercise of their right of self-determination" as 
enshrined in the Charter and defined in the 1970 Declaration on
2 gg
Principles of International Law, It was the latter amendment which
formed the centrepiece of the 1974 debates. It was founded upon the
recognition of the international character of wars of national
liberation by contemporary international law and was aimed at applying
030this general rule within the particular context of humanitarian law.
(236) CDDH/I/SR.5 para.2. See also CDDH/K/SR.6 paras.2 (Tanzania) 
and 10 (Senegal),
(237) CDDH/I/5 and Add. 1.
(238) CDDH/I/11 and Add. 1,.
(239) See CDDH/I/SR.2 paras.8-11 (Egypt), 16-20 (Yugoslavia) and 21-29 
(Norway). See also Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the 
Development of Humanitarian Law", in Declarations on Principles 
(ed. Akkerman, Van Kreiken and Pannenborg), 1977, p.43. As to 
the arguments that national liberation movements already came 
within the purview of common Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions, 
see Abi-Saab, "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War"
3 Annals of International Studies, 1972, pp.93, 102-7. Cf. 
CDDH/I/SR.3 para.38 (Italy).
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A number of proposals sought to bridge the gap between the States
advocating the inclusion of wars of self-determination in Protocol I
240 241and those opposed. In the event, an amendment was adopted, by
70 votes to 21 with 13 abstentions, which ultimately formed the basis
of Article 1(4) of Protocol I. This declares that the situations
referred to in common Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions, relating to
international armed conflicts, "include armed conflicts in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination" as enshrined in the Charter of the UN and the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law. Article 1 of
Protocol I was adopted in plenary by 87 votes to 1 (Israel) with 11
abstentions. The result of this is that such conflicts cannot be
recognised as being purely internal and this has consequences with
regard to the relative status of the parties involved.
A number of States regarded Article 1(4) as reaffirming the
right of peoples to fight against colonialism, alien domination and
242 243racism. Others treated it as rather ambiguous and vague. Some
States were disquieted by the absence of objective criteria of a
244basically legal character in the paragraph, and yet others
expressed concern that the reference to the motives and cause for
which belligerents were fighting was in contradiction to the norms of
245international humanitarian law. One significant point of 240135
(240) Eg. CDDH/I/12 (by Members of the Western Group) and CDDH/I/41 
(by Sponsors of CDDH/I/11).
(241) CDDH/I/71,
(242) See the Explanations of votes at the plenary session of the 
Conference 1977, eg. CDDH/SR.36 paras.65 (USSR), 72 (GDR),
79 (Hungary) and 90 (Nigeria).
(243) Eg. ibid, para.77 (Italy)
(244) Eg. ibid, Annex p.61 (Federal Republic of Germany)
(245) Ibid, paras.60 (Israel) and 83 (UK).
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interpretation was made by the UK delegate. He emphasised that the
"armed conflicts" to which Protocol I applied could not be of less
intensity than those to which Protocol II would apply. A certain level
of intensity of fighting had to be present before Protocol I could be 
246relevant. Linked with Article 1(4) was Article 44 of Protocol I,
the effect of which was to grant prisoner-of-war status to combatants
in situations of self-determination conflicts and many of the same
247arguments reappeared. If one is to accept that peoples involved in
self-determination situations, as defined in international law, have
the right to use force under certain circumstances, the juridical basis
for this must be clear. There are, as has been seen, a number of
alternatives. One might regard such peoples as subjects of international
law entitled to the benefit of the international law right of self-
defence either because the colonial power is per se an aggressor or
because it is involved in suppressing the exercise of self-determination.
Another possibility is to treat the legitimacy of the recourse to force
as an integral element of the principle of self-determination. Wars of
248national liberation have been an important phenomenon of the post- 
World War II years and have accompanied the process of decolonisation 24678
(246) Ibid, paras.87-8.
(247) See CDDH/SR,18 paras.2-8 (1974), CDDH/III/SR.6 Annex (1975),
CDDH/III/SR.41-53 (1976), CDDH/III/SR.54060 (1977) and CDDH/SR.40-41 
(1977). The Article was adopted by 73 votes to 1 (Israel) with
21 abstentions.
(248) This term also may be used to cover the struggles of peoples against an invading power, eg. resistance movements in the Second World War, and conflicts with the aim of changing government. We are here concerned with struggles to attain self-determination as i t  has been defined earlier, see supra.
See also Ronzitti, "Wars of National Liberation - A Legal 
Definition". (1975) 1 Italian Yearbook of International Law 
p.192, and Ginsburgs, "Wars of National Liberation and the 
Modern Law of Nations - The Soviet Thesis" The Soviet Impact on 
International Law (ed. Baade), 1965, p,66.
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and the birth of scores of new States. Those in favour of the thesis 
that peoples entitled under international law to self-determination 
may use force in self-defence may argue either that the original act 
of colonisation was an unlawful aggression and that the people 
therefore have a continuing right of self-defence by virtue of 
Article 51 of the Charter as a kind of notional State, or that, by 
denying the exercise of the right of self-determination, administering 
powers are violating Article 2(4) of the Charter and the consequence 
of this is that Article 51 is applicable. The former argument is 
dependent upon the acceptance of the original colonisation as a 
continuing Illegal act under international law as well as the 
characterisation of the inhabitants of the territory in question as 
colonially defined as a notional State or at least a subject of 
international law. The first condition is, however, unacceptable.
Apart from the fact that the original colonisation may very well not 
have taken place by the use of force, international law has clearly 
accepted the legitimacy of colonial titles. Certainly during the 
19th century and for much of the‘20th century, until the establishment 
of the legal right of self-determination queried the validity of 
colonial titles, international law acknowledged that the colonial 
power possessed legally valid titles to all territories in question.
There is more to be said for the second point. It is now accepted 
that, as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law states, 
"the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has, 
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory 
of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status 
under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non- 
self-governing territory have exercised their right of self-determination 
in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and
principles". However, it is doubtful indeed that international law
recognised this separate status, this statement of juridical
personality, at the time of colonisation and thereafter. It is only
a relatively recent phenomenon under international law, therefore the
argument under Article 51 has to be founded on a reverse perspective.
That is, a people now recognised as a subject of international law may
extend this recognition back over time to claim a continuing right of
249self-defence against the colonisation. This is highly
249aquestionable. A further objection to this thesis is that
Article 51 provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" (emphasis
added) and such peoples cannot be so regarded. The thesis that by
suppressing the right of self-determination the colonial power is
acting in contravention of Article 2(4) of the Charter is more solidly
based. As we have seen, the "international relations" barrier has been
dismantled over the years, so that it is quite clear that self-
determination conflicts are part of the administering States'
250international relations. The question is therefore what is the 
position of a people denied the right having recourse to force under 
international law? In particular, does Article 51 apply? A number 24950
(249) Alexandrowicz has argued that once the people have attained 
independence the new State reverts to its former sovereignty.
"New and Original States", 45 International Affairs, 1969, 
p.465.
(249a) Nor can it be said that any definition of the customary right 
of self-defence could encompass this.
(250) See also Bedjaoui, ILC Yearbook 1975 vol.I, p,49.
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251 252of States and authors believe that it does. The representative
of the GDR stated in the 1974 session of the International Humanitarian
Law Conference that "in international practice, a people under colonial
oppression had the same right to self-defence as a State under armed 
253attack". But the problem remains of the terminology of Article 51
requiring as it does an armed attack against a Member of the UN. The
barrier seems insuperable and recourse must therefore be had to the
customary right of self-defence, preserved as it is, in Article 51 and
254as amended by UN resolutions to incorporate dependent peoples, or 
to re-interpretations of Articles 51 and 2(4) in the light of UN 
resolutions. In both cases, there are difficulties but the dynamic 
of international activity since the 1960's has been leading to the 
recognition of a jus ad bellum for peoples entitled to self-determination, 
especially in the light of the contravention of Article 2(4) by colonial 
action to suppress self-determination and the acknowledgement of the 
special status in international law of colonial territories. It is 
therefore believed that the former proposition relating to the
development of customary norms'is the more viable of the two. But the
>problem here is that a customary rule does not bind a State which has
255"always opposed any attempt to apply it". 25134
(251) See supra, p.431 et seq.
(252) See eg. Blischchenko and Solntseva "The Struggle Against Portuguese 
Colonialism in the Light of International Law" 8 International 
Affairs (Moscow), 1971, p.60, and Bokor-Szego, New States and 
International Law 1970, pp.35-39. But cf. Ronzitti "Resort to 
Force in Wars of National Liberation", Current Problems of 
International Law (ed. Cassese) 1975, pp,319, 323, and Dugard
"The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into 
the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the Use of Force 
in the Eradication of Colonialism". 16 ICLQ, 1967, p.157.
(253) CDDH/I/SR.2, para.36.
(254) Supra, p.433,
(255) The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.116, 131. 
See also the Asylum case, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.226, 276-8. Akehurst 
writes that a State can prevent a customary rule becoming binding
on it provided it opposes the rule in the early days of the rule's 
existence or formation and maintains its opposition consistently 
thereafter, "Custom as a Source of International Law", 47 BYIL, 
1974-5, pp.l, 24.
There is, however, another possibility, and that is that the 
principle of self-determination, as recognised in international law, 
incorporates within its framework the right of dependent peoples to 
resort to force, where forcible action has been taken to deprive such 
peoples of the exercise of the right. The principle would, of course, 
refer only to such force as was necessary to achieve self-determination 
and would directly relate to the level of force used by the 
administering power. This approach would be compatible with the terms 
of UN resolutions which have consistently upheld the legitimacy of the
struggle of dependent peoples to exercise the right of self-
256determination by all necessary means. Skublszewski has written that 
the right of peoples to fight against colonial governments inter alia
"is not to be deduced from the law on the use of force but rather from
257the principle of self-determination". Crawford has noted that with
regard to self-determination, "it seems most unlikely that the use of
258force to assert that right should be illegal". But he continues
rather curiously that "the use of force by a non-State entity in
exercise of a right of self-determination is legally neutral; that is,
259not regulated by law at all". This would appear on the face of it
to be a reversion to the traditional law regarding such conflicts as
internal conflicts, but since Crawford accepts that force to suppress
260self-determination is a violation of Article 2(4) one is left with 
a strange situation, one that could be remedied by an analysis of the 
principle of self-determination which includes the right to resort to 2567890
(256) Supra, p. 433 et seq.
(257) "The Use of Force by States", Manual of Public International Law 
(ed. Sorensen), 1968, pp.739, 771.
(258) "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law” 48 BYIL 
1976-7, pp.93, 167.
(259) Ibid.
(260) Ibid, p.172.
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force in response to forcible action to suppress the exercise of the
261right to self-determination. Doctrine, it is believed, favours this
approach since a right to self-defence in colonial situations, although
often posited, has met with a great deal of opposition and has not been
formally incorporated in any international document. The fact that a
breach of Article 2(4) in such situations does not automatically bring
262into operation the self-defence provision of Article 51 can be 
regarded as one consequence of the status of dependent peoples, ie, 
subjects of international law but not sovereign States,
(b) Practice Relating to Africa
African doctrine as expressed through the OAU has long accepted the
legitimacy of the struggles of dependent peoples and, as will be seen in
the following section, machinery has been established to realise this
support. At this stage, it suffices to quote from the message marking
the eighth anniversary of the OAU from the organisation's Administrative
Secretary-General. He wrote that "since it was established, the
Organisation of African Unity’s' prime and urgent objective has been the
total liberation of our Continent from all forms of foreign occupations,
263oppression and exploitation". 2613
(261) Judge Ammoun has declared that the struggle of peoples has been 
"one if not indeed the primary factor in the formation of the 
customary rule whereby the right of peoples to self-determination 
is recognised", ICJ Reports 1971, p.70. See also ibid, ICJ 
Reports 1975, pp.99-100.
(262) Judge Ammoun, however, stated that in law "the legitimacy of the 
people's struggle cannot be in any doubt for it follows from the 
right of self-defence inherent in human nature which is confirmed 
by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter", Ibid. It is 
submitted that this is misleading.
(262a) It could be argued that UN resolutions regarding the use of force 
by liberation movements merely reiterated the traditional legal 
position that civil wars were not per se unlawful. However, the 
terms and frequency of such resolutions demonstrate, it is felt, 
that what was previously a liberty to resort to force in such cases 
has now been transmuted, in certain situations, into a right,
(263) Press-Release of the OAU Secretariat, Addis Ababa, May 25 1971 
quoted in Cervenka, "Major Policy Shifts in the Organisation of 
African Unity, 1963-1973", Foreign Relations of African States
(ed. Ingham), 1974, pp,323, 336,
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(i) Portugal's African Territories
Although the UN dealt with the question of the territories under
Portuguese domination in Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) and proceeded to
265condemn Portuguese repressions in subsequent resolutions and later
266called for an arms embargo, it was only in 1965 that references were
made to the struggle of the peoples concerned. Resolution 2109(XX)
recognised the legitimacy of the struggle to achieve the rights laid
down in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
resolution 1514 (XV). The right of the people of the Portuguese
administered territories in Africa to freedom and independence in
accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) and their right to struggle to
267that end was reaffirmed in a series of resolutions. Resolution 2707 
(XXV) introduced the phrase "by all necessary means at their disposal".
In 1972 at its meetings held in Addis Ababa, the Security Council 
discussed the problems inter alia of the Portuguese administered 
t e r r i t o r i e s a n d  in resolution 312 (1972) reaffirmed the inalienable 
right of the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique to self- 
determination and independence,- as recognised by the General Assembly in 
its resolution 1514 (XV) and the legitimacy of the struggle by those 
peoples to achieve the right. This resolution adopted by 9 votes to 0 
with 6 abstentions was succeeded later in the year by resolution 322 (1972) 264578
(264) Although the General Assembly recognised the right of the Algeria 
people to self-determination in 1960 in resolution 1573 (XV), no 
reference was made relating to the use of force or to the legitimacy 
of the struggle for self-determination, see Fraleigh, "The Algerian 
Revolution as a Case Study in International Law" The International 
Law of Civil War (ed. Falk) 1971, pp,179, 190.
(265) Eg. Assembly resolutions 1819 (XVII) and 1913 (XVIII) and Security 
Council resolution 163 (1961).
(266) See Security Council resolutions 180 (1963), 183 (1963) and 218
(1965). ■ . .
(267) See resolutions 2184, (XXI), 2270 (XXII), 2395 (XXIII), 2507 
(XXIV), 2707 (XXV) and 2795 (XXVI).
(268) SC0R, 29th Year, Meetings 1627-39.
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in which the Council unanimously repeated its reaffirmation of the right
to self-determination and its recognition of the legitimacy of the
269struggle to attain that goal. The Special Committee on Decolonisation
that year adopted a resolution in which the legitimacy of the struggle to
achieve self-determination and independence "by all available means" was
recognised,269 70 271and in resolution 2918 (XXVII) adopted by 98 votes to 6
with 8 abstentions, the General Assembly noted "with satisfaction the
progress towards national independence and freedom made by the national
liberation movements in their territories, both through their struggle
and through reconstruction programmes". The legitimacy of the struggle
was reaffirmed once again. This resolution also affirmed that the
national liberation movements of these territories were the authentic
representatives of the true aspirations of the peoples of the territories
and called for the treatment of captured freedom fighters as prisoners-
272of-war in accordance with the 1949 Conventions. These points were
re-emphasised the following year in Assembly resolution 3113 (XVIII) 
which this time recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples 
"by all ways and means at their disposal". By 1972-73, any possible 
ambiguity over the nature of the "struggle" whose legitimacy was 
recognised by the UN must surely have been dispelled. The recognition of 
the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the 
aspirations of the peoples and the satisfaction expressed at the progress 
made towards independence through struggle, as well as the call for the
(269) The Security Council Meeting, at which this resolution was passed 
was requested by 37 African States S/10828.
(270) A/8723/Rev. 1.
(271) As recommended by the Fourth Committee, A/8889.
(272) See also the resolution of the Special Committee on Decolonisation 
of 1973, adopted by 21 votes to 0 with 1 abstention, A/9023/Rev.1.
treatment of captured guerillas as prisoners-of-war, underline this.
The additional phrase inserted in the Assembly resolution of 1973 must 
be regarded as a manifestation of this situation. By 1974, however, 
with the Portuguese coup d'etat, the issue was resolved and Assembly 
resolution 3294 (XXIX), adopted without objection, welcomed Portugal’s 
acceptance of self-determination and the timetable for the independence 
of its African territories.
273(ii) Namibia
In resolution 2074 (XX) the General Assembly referred for the first 
time to the legitimate struggle for freedom and independence of the 
indigenous people of South West Africa. The following year, the Assembly 
terminated the mandate of South Africa for the territory and entrusted 
the UN with direct responsibility for the administration of the 
territory.273 74 2756 Thereafter the UN was continually concerned with the issue, 
both from the viewpoint of the inhabitants of Namibia and from the view­
point of the organisation itself. This interesting dualism can be seen
in the series of resolutions on the problem as from the late 1960's.
275The Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S.V.) a six-power proposal,
2 76already endorsed by the OAU setting up an international administration 
for the territory by means of a UN Council. Any action by South Africa 
which obstructed the work of the Council would be regarded as an act of 
aggression against the people and territorial integrity of the territory, 
which would require enforcement action by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. In resolution 2372 (XXII), the Assembly 
declared that the continued South African occupation of the territory
(273) See Supra, p.191.
(274) Resolution 2145 (XXI).
(275) A/6640, paras.45, 52, 66 and 82.
(276) CM/Res.97 (VIII).
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constituted a grave threat to international peace and security and
called on the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance
with "the appropriate provisions of the Charter". Security Council
resolution 264 (1969) declared that in the event of a South African
refusal to withdraw from the territory, it would meet to determine the
necessary steps or measures, and this was in essence repeated in
resolution 269 (1969). Resolution 269 (1969) also recognised the
legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibia people against foreign
occupation. There were a number of Assembly resolutions to the same 
277 278effect. Following the Namibia case, an OAU delegation was sent
27Qto the UN, but it failed in its attempt to persuade the Security
Council to apply the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.280
The Assembly, however, in resolution 2871 (XXVI) reaffirmed the legitimacy
of the struggle of the people "by all means" against the illegal
280aoccupation of the territory by South Africa. This was repeated in
aqi 282 coo
resolutions 3031 (XXVII), 3111 (XXVIII) and 3295 (XXIX), The 
South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) was also recognised as 
the authentic representative of•the Namibia people by the latter two 
resolutions, and South Africa's illegal occupation was condemned. An 2789013
(277) See eg. resolutions 2403 (XXIII), 2498 (XXIV) and 2519 (XXIV) 
and 2678 (XXV).
(278) ICJ Reports, 1971, p.16,
(279) AHG/Res.65 (VIII).
(280) See Andemicael The OAU and the UN, 1976, p.130. See also 
resolutions 309 (1972)and 310 (1972).
(280a) See also The Report of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, 
1972, A/723/Rev.1, especially Chapter IX B (Consensus adopted 
on Namibia).
(281) Adopted by 112 votes to 2 with 15 abstentions.
(282) Adopted by 107 votes to 2 with 17 abstentions.
(283) Adopted by 112 votes to 0 with 15 abstentions.
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International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights held in Dakar during
January 1976, sponsored by the UN Council for Namibia, declared that the
284use of force in the situation was justified and, in April of that year,
the Special Committee on Decolonisation again reaffirmed the legitimacy
of the struggle by all means against the illegal occupation of Namibia by 
285 286South Africa. A proposal that year to have the Security Council
declare the situation in Namibia a threat to international peace and
security and institute an arms ban, acting under Chapter VII of the
287 28ftCharter was, however, defeated, Assembly resolution 31/146 in 
December 1976 rendered UN support for the Namibian people’s struggle 
more explicit. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the 
people "by all means at their disposal" against the illegal occupation 
and in a significant move declared in operative paragraph 3 that the 
Assembly "supports the armed struggle of the Namibian people, led by the 
South West Africa People's Organisation, to achieve self-determination, 
freedom and national independence in a unified Namibia", It is to be 
noted that this paragraph stands separately from the one that reaffirms 
the legitimacy of struggle against the illegal occupation, and that it 
relates not to the end of the occupation but to the attainment of self- 
determination. It also refers explicitly to the armed struggle of the 
people. The conclusion must therefore be that the use of force by the 
people is legitimate both in the light of the particular situation of 
Namibia as an illegally occupied international territory, and within the 
context of the denial by force of the exercise of the right to self- 
determination. The resolution also reiterated that the continued illegal 284567
(284) Africa Research Bulletin January 1976, p.3909. See also UNMC 
February 1976, pp.31-2.
(285) See UNMC April 1976, p.34.
(286) S/12211.
(287) See UNMC November 1976, pp.4-10 and 115-21.
Adopted by 107 votes to 6 with 12 abstentions.(288)
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occupation by South Africa constituted an act of aggression against the
people and against the UN as the legal authority there until independence,
and also was a threat to international peace and security. In accordance
with this the Security Council was called upon to impose a mandatory arms
embargo against South Africa. Thus, the special situation in Namibia
gave rise not only to the legitimacy of the struggle by the people, but
also to a legally valid internationally imposed reaction.289 290 in fact a
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was unanimously imposed by
the Security Council in November 1977, by resolution 418 (1977) under
290Chapter VII of the Charter. The relevant terms of resolution 31/146
referred to above, were substantially repeated in resolution 32/9D
adopted by 117 votes to 0 with 24 abstentions.291 in the Lusaka
Declaration adopted by the UN Council for Namibia in March 1978,292 the
Council stated that it considered the illegal occupation of Namibia by
South Africa to be a threat to international security and urged the
Security Council and the Assembly to adopt the necessary measures, and
a special session of the Assembly dealing with the problem was held in 
29 3Spring 1978. The use of force by the people of Namibia, at least 
in pursuance of the right of self-determination, it is submitted, has 
been clearly accepted by the international community, in addition to 
the legitimacy of the struggle to end the illegal occupation.
(289) See also the Programme of Action Adopted for the Liberation of 
Namibia at the Maputo Conference in Support of the Peoples of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, May 1977, UNMC June 1977, pp.41-8,
(290) See UNMC December 1977, pp,5-14, acts of repression in continuance 
of the apartheid system and attacks against neighbouring independent 
States. Namibia was not mentioned. See supra, p.260.
(291) A number of States expressed reservations about the condoning of 
armed struggle by the UN, eg. Australia, New Zealand, Finland
Belgium, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Iceland. Ireland 
and Costa Rica. See UNMC December 1977, pp.38-41. Their arguments 
did not appear to centre on whether the people of Namibia did or 
did not possess a legitimate right to use force, but rather on the 
UN stand with respect to the support of force,
(292) A/S-9/2-S/12631.
See UNMC May 1978, pp.18-21.(293)
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(iii) Rhodesia
That the administering power, the UK, could legitimately use force
to end the illegal regime, and thus advance the right of the people of
294' the territory to self-determination, has been discussed. The 
question at this stage is whether the people themselves could lawfully 
resort to force within the context of the rules of international law. 
Following the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965,
the UN called on the UK to end the rebellion and in the meantime on all
295Stages not to recognise or assist the illegal regime. The General 
Assembly in resolution 2151 (XXI) referred to the legitimate struggle 
of the people to overthrow the illegal, racist regime and achieve 
freedom and independence, and this was re-emphasised in subsequent
295«years, reference being made to resolution 1514 (XV). The general
approach was reiterated in Security Council resolution 253 (1968) in 
which the Council recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights 
as set forth in the UN Charter and in conformity with the objectives of 
resolution 1514 (XV). This resolution also affirmed the primary 
responsibility of the UK government to enable the Southern Rhodesian 
people to achieve self-determination and independence, and imposed 
sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter,having determined that the 
situation in the territory constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. This three-tier structure dealing with the issue of 
Rhodesia is a fascinating example of the interaction of various levels 
of responsibility under international law. The absence of any reference
(294) Supra, p.425 et seq.
(295) General Assembly resolution 2024 (XX) and Security Council 
resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965).
(295a) See resolutions 2262 (XXII), 2283 (XXIII) and 2508 (XXIV).
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to self-determination in the provisions relating to the struggle of 
the people is marked and probably indicated a desire to emphasise the 
primary obligation of the UK as a means of pressure upon that State to 
end the illegal situation. Resolution 2652 (XXV) in its reaffirmation 
of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people to obtain freedom and 
independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) added the phrase 
"by all means at their disposal". This was repeated in resolution 
2796 (XXVI). The phraseology used by the Security Council in 
resolution 253 (1968) remained constant in resolutions 277 (1970) and 
318 (1972) and in resolution 328 (1973) with the difference that 
Zimbabwe was substituted for Southern Rhodesia. The continuing concern 
of the UN with the levels of responsibility maintained by the UK and 
the UN itself was also manifested in resolutions adopted. Reference
to the right of the people to self-determination as well as to freedom 
and independence within the context of the legitimacy of the struggle was, 
however, made in resolution 2769 (XXVI) and repeated in resolution 
2945 (XXVII), and can be seen as a change in emphasis within the 
international community from reliance upon the primary responsibility of 
the UK to concentration upon the people of Zimbabwe itself. This can 
also be demonstrated with the change in 1974 in resolution 3297 (XXIX) 
adopted by 111 votes to none with 18 abstentions, in which the Assembly 
reaffirmed that the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe were the 
sole and authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people. 
In resolution 31/154, the Assembly referred to the leadership of the 
national liberation movement in the people's determination to achieve 
freedom and independence and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle, *320
(296) Eg. Security Council resolutions 288 (1970), 314 (1972) 318 m q v -jx
320 (1972), 328 (1973) and 333 (1973). . C 972)*
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by all means at the disposal of the people, for self-determination.
The UK was defined as having the primary responsibility for putting an
end to the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The
297Maputo Declaration of May 1977 stated that the development of the
armed struggle and the concerted efforts of the international community
were creating positive conditions for a negotiated settlement based 
298on majority rule. The General Assembly, later that year, invited
the OAU and the UN to cooperate fully in speedy implementation of the
299Maputo Declaration, the provisions of which were reaffirmed in 
Assembly resolutions 32/41 and 32/42. The latter resolution, it will 
be remembered, underlined the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples 
under colonial and alien domination for self-determination and 
independence by all the necessary means at their disposal. This 
provision was made specific with regard to Zimbabwe in resolution 32/116 
by which the Assembly stated that it "firmly supports" the struggle of 
the people of Zimbabwe for self-determination by all means at their 
disposal. The recognition by the international community of the right 
of the Zimbabwe people to resort to force to achieve self-determination 
was not expressed in such explicit terms as in the Portuguese Africa 
territories and Namibia cases, but this should be seen in the light of 
the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in an attempt to obtain 
a settlement in accordance with the right of self-determination,300 and 
with reference to the juridical framework which placed primary 297830
(297) See footnote 289, See also the resolution of the Special Committee 
on Decolonisation in 1977 reaffirming the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the people by all means at their disposal for self- 
determination and independence, A/AC.109/554-5,
(298) UNMC June 1977, p.42.
(299) Resolution 32/19 adopted without a vote.
(300) See eg. Security Council resolution 423 (1978).
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responsibility upon the UK Government - a responsibility maintained by
301the UK as well as by the UN. And since the UK has adopted policy
guidelines which amount to an acceptance of the conventional view of
302self-determination in international law, the situation is therefore 
very different from the Portuguese African territories case (up until 
1974) and the Namibia question, with regard to the perceived functions 
within an international law framework of the administering power 
concerned.
It is believed that practice relating to Africa in situations in 
which the right to self-determination has been recognised demonstrates 
that the use of force is legitimate in order to secure the exercise of 
the right, but that this situation has crystalised over a number of 
years since the early 1960's. The use of the term "struggle" does not, 
of course, automatically mean armed struggle, but the comprehension of 
the term was refined in each particular case over the years, so that 
by the mid-1970's a right to resort to force by a people acknowledged 
by the international community as entitled to exercise self-determination 
to the extent necessary to attain that right was clearly established.
The opposition expressed by a number of Western States, when examined, 
as regards later resolutions, seems to centre around the approval by 
the UN of the resort to force rather than on the right of the people 
concerned to use force legitimately within the framework of international 3012
(301) See the comments of the UK delegate to the UN, UNMC April 1978
- p. 85. ■ • ’
(302) See eg. cmnd.2807, 1965, pp.65-8.
(303) See eg, UNMC January 1978, pp.42-4. Although it is, in essence
difficult to separate the two. '
458
Conclusions as to the Use of Force in Recognised Self-Determinatinn 
Situations ~~ -----— —
We have seen how the traditional law with regard to internal 
conflicts recognised the applicability of international law once the 
rebels, in general terms, had attained those objectives which to some 
extent resembled the legal conditions of Statehood, viz. an organisation 
with a clear authority structure and the possession of territory. These 
basic conditions, of course, were surrounded by some degree of 
uncertainty, particularly with respect to the concept of insurgency, 
but they remain valid conditions nonetheless. However, a number of 
changes have taken place respecting those situations in which 
international law has recognised the applicability of the right of 
self-determination. In such cases, international law is relevant and 
regulates the resort to force by both sides, so that the administering 
power may not use force to suppress the exercise of the right to self- 
determination, while the people may legitimately use force to attain 
freedom and independence where denied contrary to international law 
For our purpose it is the characterisation of the situation as one 
concerned with self-determination that determines the applicable rules 
of international law rather than the question of the possession of 
territory by the rebel side. In other words, status rather than 
effectiveness acts as the factor triggering the appropriate responses 
of international law. Many of the national liberation movements never 
gained undisputed possession of territory but rather disputed 
possession of areas with the forces of the administering powers.
Often it was at night that the liberation forces controlled areas with 
the administering power controlling these areas by day. This does not 
mean to say that the factor of effectiveness or the undisputed control 
of territory ceases to be relevant. On the contrary, the Guinea-Bissau
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case demonstrates that this factor may be crucial with regard to the 
proclamation of independence by the liberation organisation, thus moving 
the conflict from the category of a self-determination war to that of an 
inter-State war. But in other cases, the characterisation of the 
conflict as one concerned with self-determination, as internationally 
recognised, is sufficient to make the rules of international law 
applicable and render the situation governable by the norms of the 
international community.
Where conflicts of a non-self-determination character are involved, 
the traditional classification and exposition of international legal 
rules become operative. Thus, conflicts may be either international or 
internal and the appropriate norms apply. For example, the various 
secession wars of Africa such as Nigeria, the Congo and Southern Sudan 
may be regarded as internal wars. Although it could be argued that in 
such instances peoples were seeking self-determination, the situations 
do not fall within the recognised international law typology of self- 
determination cases. The issue is further discussed in the section on 
intervention.
304IV - Apartheid and the Use of Force
Following the Sharpeville incident of 1960 in which South African 
police fired on an unarmed African crowd, killing 69 and wounding 180,304 05 306
the Security Council adopted resolution 134 (1960) declaring the 
situation in that country as "one that has led to international friction 
and if continued might endanger international peace and security".
(304) Supra, Chapter 4, p.257,
(305) See Gibson, African Liberation Movements. 1972, p.56,
(306) By 9 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (UK and France).
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In resolution 1761 (XVII) the General Assembly called on Member States,
separately or collectively, to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions
and an arms embargo against South Africa, and established a Special
307Committee on Apartheid. Under OAU pressure, the Council imposed a 
non-mandatory ban on the sale and supply of arms to South Africa,307 08 
and resolution 182 (1963) described the situation as one "seriously 
disturbing international peace and security". The OAU continued to 
seek an extension of the sanctions as well as their application309 and 
in 1965 the General Assembly in resolution 2054A (XX) declared that the 
only means of peacefully solving the apartheid problem was by universal 
application of economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.310 
In addition to the attempt to apply Chapter VII sanctions against 
South Africa, other approaches were adopted. In resolution 2396 (XXIII)311 
the Assembly called apartheid "a crime against humanity" and called for 
the exercise of "their right to self-determination" by the inhabitants 
in order to "attain majority rule based on universal suffrage". The 
Security Council was requested to adopt comprehensive mandatory sanctions 
against South Africa. All States were called on to provide assistance 
"to the South African liberation movement in its legitimate struggle", 
and "freedom fighters" captured by South Africa were to be treated as
(307) See a similar resolution at the June 1960 Conference of 
Independent African States, Legum, Pan-Africanisml962. pp.155-6,
See also Assembly resolutions 1598 (XV) and 1663 (XVI) and OAU 
resolution AHG/Res,7 (I).
(308) Resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963), By resolution 191 (1964)
an expert committee of Council members was set up to study measures 
which could be taken by the Council in the situation under the 
Charter. It did not reach agreement. See S/6210 and Add.1.
(309) See OAU resolution AHG/Res.34 (II).
(310) The resolution was adopted by 80 votes to 2 (Portugal and South 
Africa) with 16 abstentions. The Special Committee on Apartheid 
was also enlarged.
(311) Adopted by 85 votes to 2 with 14 abstentions. See also resolution 
2309 (XXII).
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prisoners-of-war. This went further than the Council was likely to go
and in any event in the late 1960's the focus of attention centred on
Namibia and Rhodesia. In 1970, however, the Council condemned
violations of the arms embargo it had previously called for and
312appealed for its strengthening. In resolution 311 (1972) the Council 
by 14 votes to 0 with 1 abstention (France) declared that the 
situation in South Africa seriously disturbed international peace and 
security in Southern Africa and recognised "the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their 
human and political rights as set forth in the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights". In this resolution all States 
were called upon to observe strictly the arms embargo. The absence of 
any reference to self-determination should be noted, but it did mark a 
new stage for the Council in its treatment of the South African problem.
In the same year, the Assembly adopted resolution 2923 E (XXVII) by which 
it reaffirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of 
South Africa to eradicate apartheid and racial discrimination by all 
available means and to attain in the country as a whole majority rule 
based on universal suffrage". This was reaffirmed in resolution 
3055 (XXVIII) and resolution 3151 (XXVIII). In the latter resolution,312 13 
it was declared that "the struggle of the oppressed people of South 
Africa by all available means for the total eradication of apartheid is 
legitimate and deserves the support of the international community".
(312) Security Council resolution 282 (1970). The UK and France had 
earlier declared that they would continue to supply arms for 
South Africa's external defence. See SCOR, 18th Year, 1078th 
meeting, paras.16-20 (UK) and 31 (France).
(313) Adopted by 88 votes to 7 with 28 abstentions. By resolution 3151 C
(XXVIII) the Unit on Apartheid and the Office of Public Information 
of iho Secretariat of the UN were requested to publicise as widely 
as possible inter alia the legitimate and just struggle of the 
people of South Africa for the eradication of apartheid.
In the same year, the Assembly adopted in resolution 3068 (XXVIII) the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
314Crime of Apartheid, article 1 of which declared that apartheid was
315a crime against humanity. The Assembly rendered its view more
316explicit in resolution 31/61. It declared the South African
regime illegitimate and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of
the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements by
all possible means for the seizure of power by the people and the
exercise of the inalienable right to self-determination. 314 5617 318 It
declared that the situation in South Africa was a grave threat to
peace and required action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In
addition to this resolution following the violent disturbances at
318Soweto during the summer of 1976, the Security Council also adopted 
by consensus resolution 392 (1976) in which it expressed its 
conviction that the situation involving "the callous shooting of 
African people" was brought about by the continued imposition of 
apartheid. The South African Government was strongly condemned for 
its resort to "massive violence against and killings of the African 
people" and the Council reaffirmed that apartheid was a crime against 
the conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbed 
international peace and security. The South African government was
(314) See also Article 3, International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, and Article 1(b) 
of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 1968.
(315) The Convention entered into force on 18th July 1976,
(316) Adopted by 108 votes to 11 with 22 abstentions. The EEC 
countries objected to this resolution, particularly the 
references to illegitimacy and self-determination in a non­
colonial context, see UNMC December 1976, pp.39-40.
(317) This was reaffirmed in resolution 31/77. See also A/CONF 91/4 
and Addenda, and resolution 3324 C (XXIX).
(318) See S/12100 and S/12101. See also Africa Research Bulletin, 
August 1976, pp.4123-7, and September 1976, pp.4158-61.
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urged to end the violence, and the legitimacy of the struggle of the
South African people for the elimination of apartheid and racial
319discrimination was recognised. A World Conference for Action
against Apartheid was held in Lagos, Nigeria, during August 1977.
In its Declaration, adopted by acclamation, apartheid was emphasised
to be a crime against humanity as well as a violation of the
inalienable right to self-determination of all of the people of
South Africa. The Conference referred to the UN recognition of the
legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people and condemned
the South African regime for its repressive measures designed to
perpetuate white racist domination. The "inalienable right of the
oppressed South African people and their national liberation movement
to resort to all available means of their choice to secure their
320freedom" was recognised. In resolution 32/19, the Assembly
invited the OAU and the UN to cooperate fully in order to implement 
321this speedily. Despite the strongly held view that self-determination
322does not apply as respects an independent State, it is believed that
international doctrine and practice have recognised an exception with
regard to racial discrimination or apartheid practised by a government
323in a broad and systematic fashion. The question therefore is as 
regards the use of force within the context of international law. To 
recognise the resort to force against an independent State in a non­
colonial situation as an international legal right is clearly a serious 
step to take, for it could be used to legitimate a whole series of foreign 31920
(319) See also resolution 417 (1977).
(320) See UNMC August-September 1977, pp.6-9, and S/12426.
(321) See also resolutions 32/14 and 32/42,
(322) Supra, p.268 et seq.
(323) See further supra, p.257.
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interventions on behalf of the peoples concerned. It therefore must 
be treated as highly exceptional. On the basis of the particular facts 
regarding South Africa and in the light of the material referred to in 
this section, it is submitted that the apartheid situation is sui generis 
and that the rules as to force in international law pertaining to the 
principle of self-determination are applicable. The use of force to 
enforce the apartheid system is against international law; for one 
cannot regard as legitimate an attempt to set up and enforce a structure 
deemed contrary to international law. The struggle may encompass the 
right under international law to resort to force. 324 325
V - Intervention by Third Parties
The traditional law relating to third party intervention in armed
conflicts is founded upon the dichotomy of international and internal
wars. In the former case, the primary norms are exemplified in
325Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, while in the latter case the 
relevant rules depend upon the characterisation of the situation as 
one of rebellion, insurgency or belligerency. These traditional rules 
however, have come under increasing attack. The question of the nature 
of internal wars and changing community perspectives as to policy 
objectives in such wars have provided the backcloth upon which the
(324) Note, of course, that Article 1(4) of Protocol I, additional to' the Geneva Conventions includes in international armed conflictsthose in which peoples are fighting against racist regimes.
(325) Resolution 2131 (XX) declared that "No State has the right to 
intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State, Consequently 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political economic and cultural elements, are 
condemned".
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re-evaluation has taken place. The Charter does not provide any 
assistance with regard to the legitimacy of intervention in internal 
conflicts, being primarily concerned with inter-State armed aggression 
and the corollary of the right of States to self-defence, while 
customary law concepts have proved inadequate in an age of ideological 
rivalry, subversion and decolonisation. The traditional rules 
basically concerned with stability and sovereignty, seemed to posit 
the lawfulness of aid to a recognised government and the unlawfulness 
of aid to the rebels until the recognition of belligerency. 326 27 328 Upon 
recognition of belligerency, neither side could be assisted. This in 
turn depended upon a particular factual situation, so that the key to 
the rules of intervention under international law was the notion of 
effectiveness.
Other approaches, however, were also suggested. Wright put forward
the view that aid to either side in a conflict for control of authority
structures was not permitted in international law once the outcome of
328the struggle had become uncertain. Falk divides violent conflict 
into four types, ranging from massive use of military force across
(326) See eg. Falk "Janus Tormented: The International Law of>
Law" -1-ternatj^rm 1 /Aspects of Civil Strife <ed. Rosemanl 
p,185, and Higgins "Internal War and International Law" Th« ’ 
Future of ■t-he--In-te.rnati°nal Legal Order (ed. Black and FaTif 
vol.3, 1971, P>81, and also Moore, "The Control of Foreign ’ 
Intervention in Internal Conflict" Law and the
(ed. Moore), 1972, p.115; Rohlik, "Some Remarks on SeT?-n~T~ 
and Intervention" 6 Georgia Journal of International a^d 06 
Comparative Law, 1976, p.395. d
(327) See Moore loc.cit. p.252, Falk loc.cit. nD 206-7
"Intervention, Civil War and the Buie ot L e r ^ t ^
1065, pp.67, 72. See aleo Lauternacht n ^  "*1 W  t>4SILLaw, 1947, pp.230-3, “‘“ "Pecht, S S S O g a i t i a U ^ J t ^ ^
(328) "United States Intervention in the Lebanon" 57 attt
122. See also Hall International I.»«, oth r , . *L ’ 1939’ PP-H2,
Friedmann The C h a n g i i ^ i i i i ^ r ^ J ^ ^ :  1924_’ P*347. **d 
pp,264-7. This approach la crlti f f ^ f f ^ ^ g ' 1^ 4 - 
against legitimate governments, loc.cit » 95« fQ U ? bi 
A_Mddern_ Introduction to lnte_rnatlon,l L l ' 3^  e d ^ m ? 0 1
p p . 2 6 3 —7. ~ ~ — 4 t o l , i
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frontiers to internal struggles, the outcome of which is dependent upon
external participation and a hierarchy of appropriate responses is 
329proposed. Farer has suggested there should be a flat prohibition
of foreign participation in tactical military operations in internal
330conflicts, while Barnet declares that only UN collective intervention
331is lawful. Moore proposes that intervention may be lawful inter 
alia where authorised by the UN and where it is to aid a widely 
recognised government prior to insurgency (during insurgency, pre­
insurgency aid may be continued but not increased) or in the event of
332impermissible assistance to insurgents. One interesting approach, 
although suffering from difficulties of practical application, is that 
adopted by Boals, who suggests a principle of modernising legitimacy 
as a central criterion for evaluating the lawfulness of intervention 329 0133 
These approaches have demonstrated the inadequacy of the traditional 
rules and a number of mutually incompatible alternative formulations 
have been suggested, but the situation with regard to the theoretical 
structure of international law relating to foreign intervention 
remains fluid.
(329) Legal Order in a Violent World. 1968. pp.227-8 and 273
(330) "Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal" 67 Columbi 
Law Review, 1967, pp.266, 275. Thus, foreign forces "could 
not even enter a zone in which combat with enemy units was 
foreseeable, either to fight, advise or transport". Ibid.
(331) Intervention and Revolution 1968. pp.278-80.
(332) Loc.cit. pp.280-2.
(333) She writes that "in order^for a State’s intervention to be
permissible, there would have to be a reasonable expectation 
that it would contribute to the modernisation of the societv 
1„ which it took place" - "The Belevanc. of înîernatiônaî U w  
to the Internal War in Yemen", The International Law of Civil 
War (ed. Falk), 1971, pp.303, 342^6T~— ~---
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One of the major reasons for the reconsideration of this subject
334in international law, has been the process of decolonisation.
335 336Communist and Afro-Asian States have affirmed the legitimacy 
of wars of national liberation and the lawfulness of third party 
assistance. Ideological and anti-colonialist sentiments combined and 
precipitated attempts to change the international law of intervention 
in self-determination situations.
1. Intervention Contrary to Self-Determination
In many ways, the development of principles concerning intervention
contrary to self-determination parallels the creation of the legal right
to self-determination itself, since intervention to defeat the
application of an accepted legal right has to be unlawful. Such
intervention can be seen as contrary to the purposes of the UN Charter
one of which, according to Article 1(2) is the development of friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples. This of course raises issues
337of interpretation already discussed. There may be a viable argument
that certain types of intervention are forbidden under resolution 1514(XV)
paragraph 4 of which states that "all armed action or repressive measures
of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to
enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
338independence". While this prohibition is primarily aimed at the
administering power, the expressions used certainly permit the 345678
(334) Other major reasons include the American intervention in the 
Vietnam war and super-power intervention within spheres of 
interest, US in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the USSR in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
(335) See Ginsbergs loc.cit. and Falk loc.cit. p.233,
(336) See eg. Anand, New States and International Law 1972, pp,53-60,
(337) Supra, p.102 et seq and p.171 et seq,
(338) Emphasis added.
interpretation that armed interventions by third parties against such 
peoples are illicit. In a similar vein, resolution 2131 (XX), the 
Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, stated that "the use 
of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a 
violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non­
intervention" and this approach was reaffirmed in a number of UN 
339resolutions. Since the UN has now termed colonialism a crime and
340called for its speedy end, action by third parties to prolong
colonialism would be unlawful. This is so not only upon the grounds
of contravention of the principle of self-determination, but also in
the light of the application of Article 2(4).to self-determination 
341situations. The Declaration on Principles of International Law,
1970, stated that every State was under the duty to refrain from any
forcible action which would deprive peoples entitled to self-
determination of the exercise of their rights, while in the section
discussing the principle concerning the duty not to intervene within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter,
it was noted that the use of force to deprive peoples of their national
identity constituted a violation of their inalienable rights and of the
342principle of non-intervention. The consensus definition of aggression
of 1974 reaffirmed "the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive
343peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence!' 394012
(339) Eg. resolutions 2160 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2734 (XXV).
(340) Eg. resolutions 1514 (XV), 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI), 2326 (XXII),
2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV), 2708 (XXV), 2621 (XXV), 2908 (XXVII), 
3070 (XXVIII), 3103 (XXVIII) and 3481 (XXX).
(341) Supra, p.402.
(342) See also A/7326 paras.28, 83 and 173, and A/7619 paras.164 and 165,
(343) Article 1 of the definition declared that aggression was the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State or "in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations".
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In terms of State practice relating to Africa, the Algerian 
conflict can be seen as an Important stage m  the relative development 
of the decolonisation approach to Intervention situations as against 
the traditional norma. With regard to support given to the French 
authorities, the Arab States In particular made strenuous efforts to
prevent American equipment supplied to the colonial power from being
344used in Algeria. During 1956 and 195T, It was argued that American-
supplied equipment was being utilised to suppress the liberties of the
345Algerian people. In fact, the USA did Impose some restrictions
In August 1955, a statement was forthcoming from the French Foreign
Minister to the effect that in accordance with assurances given to the
USA, American supplies were not being used for the "maintenance of
346order" in Algeria. However, by late 1956 and 1957 the itcA a‘ * tne us government
declared its unwillingness to attach a non-Algerian use condition to
347military equipment for France. Reference was made in 1958, following
the use of US-supplied aircraft in bombing raids on Sakiet , 34 *6748 349 to the
existence of some restrictions on use of American equipment in North
349Africa by the French. Fraleigh concludes that the US satisfied the
requirements neither of the traditional law of neutrality350 nor of the
351developing law of decolonisation. In this, he is correct. American
(344) See Fraleigh loc.cit. pp.215-18.
(.345) See eg. American Foreign,Policy: Current Documents ias? rr 1nC7 cp
(346) Fraleigh loc.cit. p.216.
(347) Ibid.
(348) Supra, p.404.
(349) Fraleigh loc.cit, p.219. See also American Foreign Policv- 
Current Documents 1958, pp.1086-87.
(350) The US Government in fact never stated whether or not the conflict 
in Algeria could be categorised in terms of belligerency. See alsn 
Whiteman’s Digest of International Law, vol.IV, 1964, pp.513-4.
Loc.cit, p.216.
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(351)
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policy seemed at times uncertain. No recognition of belligerency was 
made, as, in terms of the traditional law, the US either regarded the 
conflict as a rebellion, in which case it could freely supply arms to 
France as the legitimate government, or as an insurgency, in which 
case it could create such rights and duties with regard to the 
situation as it wished. In both instances, America could lawfully 
assist the French. The fact that it clearly felt some constraint may 
be seen as the effect of the nascent law of decolonisation in the
political field. It cannot really be seen as recognition of a legal
352constraint, however.
It was with regard, however, to the policies of Portugal, South 
Africa and the rebel regime in Rhodesia that the norms of decolonisation 
relating to intervention on behalf of the colonial power or power 
acting in defiance of self-determination particularly developed. In 
1963, the OAU adopted its resolution on decolonisation in which it 
inter alia called upon the western powers, especially Britain and the 
United States, to cease all direct and indirect support given to 
Portugal, which was conducting "a real war of genocide" in Africa.
The year before, the General Assembly in resolution 1807 (XVII) had 
pointed out that Portugal was using equipment supplied by its allies 
for the purposes of repression and called upon States to refrain from 
assisting the Portuguese repression and to take all measures to prevent 
the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal, In 
resolution 1819 (XVII) States were requested to deny Portugal any 
support or assistance which might be used for the suppression of the 
people of Angola and to terminate the supply of arms. The OAU had 352
352) In 1960 the FLN submitted a memorandum to the NATO powers
declaring that military aid to France was unlawful as contrary 
to the laws of neutrality, whereas aid to the FLN itself was 
not so banned; see Fraleigh loc.cit p.218. This may be seen 
as an attempt to reconcile the traditional law of intervention 
with the developing norms of decolonisation.
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since its inception sought to establish a diplomatic and economic
353boycott of Portugal. The attempt in November 1965 by the African 
States to persuade the Security Council to adopt diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against Portugal failed, but these efforts succeeded 
with respect to the General Assembly with its adoption of resolution 
2107 (XX) by 66 votes to 26 with 15 abstentions. It should be noted, 
however, that France, the UK and the USA did not accept that Portugal
354was using military supplies in Africa received from its NATO partners.
In succeeding years, the Assembly adopted further resolutions calling on
all States, especially those in NATO, to desist forthwith from giving
Portugal any assistance which would enable it to continue the repression
in Africa and to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military
equipment. 35 455 356 The OAU secretariat in accordance with AHG (Res.9(1) of
21 July 1964) established a coordinating bureau of sanctions, but this
met with relatively little success. The aid provided by South Africa to
356Portugal with regard to the latter’s African colonies, was also 
criticised by the UN. In resolution 2507 (XXIV), South African 
intervention against the peoples in the Portuguese territories was 
condemned and this was repeated in resolutions 2707 (XXV) and 2795 (XXVI). 
The Assembly condemned the continued collaboration of Portugal, South 
Africa and the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, "designed to 
perpetuate colonialist and racialist domination in the region, and the
(353) See eg. CIAS/Plen 2/Rev 2 Resolution A, AHG/Res 9(1), AHG/Res 45(11), 
CM/Res 34 (III) and CM/Res 49 (IV).
(354) GAOR, 20th Session, Plenary 1407th Meeting, paras.57-60 (France) 
and ibid 4th Committee, 1592nd Meeting, paras.10 (US) and 24 (UK).
(355) Eg. resolutions 2184 (XXI), 2270 (XXII), 2395 (XXIII), 2507 (XXIV), 
2707 (XXV), 2918 (XXVII) and 3113 (XXVIII).
(356) See passim, Arnold, The Last Bunker, 1976.
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persistent intervention against the peoples in the territories 
357concerned by police and armed forces as well as mercenaries from
358South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
Portuguese and South African intervention on the side of the
illegal regime in Rhodesia clearly represented substantial assistance.
This was so particularly with regard to South Africa who committed
armed forces for the use of that regime for a number of years. South
African units first appeared in Rhodesia during the latter part of 1967
and suffered their first casualty in Spring 1968.357 859 36012 Following the
growth of the guerrilla war during 1972, South African troops in
Rhodesia were increased, their numbers ranging from 2,000 to 5 000 369
Both the 0AU and the General Assembly of the UN adopted resolutions
361with respect to sanctions and condemning Portugal and South Africa
362for their support of the illegal regime. Shortly after the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the minority regime, the Security Council 
called upon all States not to recognise the regime in Southern Rhodesia 
and to refrain from rendering any assistance to it.363 Resolution 217 
(1965), similarly adopted by the Council, with only France abstaining, 
specified in particular the need to desist from providing the illegal 
regime with arms, equipment and military material and called for an oil
(357) Ie. those under Portuguese domination,
(358) Resolutions 2918 (XXVII) adopted by 98 votes to 6 with 8 
abstentions and 3113 (XXVIII) adopted by 105 votes to 8 with 
16 abstentions.
(359) Arnold, op.cit, pp.147-49.
(360) Ibid p 149.
(361) Supra, p,421 et seq.
(362) Eg. AHG/Res 25/Rev.l (II), AHG/Res 39(b) (II), ECM/Res 13 (VI) 
ECM/Res 14 (VI), CM/Res 75 (VI), CM/Res 78 (VII) and General
Assembly resolutions 2022 (XX), 2138 (XXI) and 2151 (XXI).
(363) Resolution 216 (1965).
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embargo. The UK was called upon to prevent, by the use of force if
necessary, the arrival at the Mozambique port of Beira of vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia. 364 65 36789 In
1967, the Assembly criticised States still trading with Rhodesia,
particularly Portugal and South Africa, and condemned the presence of
South African armed forces in Rhodesia and its arms aid for suppressing
366the legitimate struggle of the people. In resolution 2283 (XXIII),
adopted by 86 votes to 9 with 19 abstentions, the Assembly again
condemned the "illegal intervention" of South African forces in Rhodesia,
characterising it additionally as a serious threat to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of African States, and called on the UK as the
administering power to ensure the immediate ex pulsion of such forces
367and to prevent all armed assistance to the regime. The Security
Council in 1970 by 14 votes to none with 1 abstention (Spain), acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that member States "shall
refrain from recognising this illegal regime or from rendering any
assistance to it". It condemned the policies of the South African and
Portuguese governments for maintaining links with the regime and
demanded "the immediate withdrawal" of South African police and armed
368personnel from Southern Rhodesia. The General Assembly in succeeding
years condemned South African intervention in contravention of this 
369resolution. Thus the illegality of South African armed intervention
(364) Mandatory economic sanctions were instituted in Security Council 
resolution 232 (1966) and extended in resolutions 253 (1968),
277 (1970) and 388 (1976).
(365) Resolution 221 (1966).
(366) Resolution 2262 (XXII).
(367) See also General Assembly resolution 2508 (XXIV).
(368) Resolution 277 (1970). See also resolutions 320 (1972),
328 (1973) and 333 (1973).
(369) Eg. resolutions 2652 (XXV), 2796 (XXVI) and 3297 (XXIX).
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in support of the illegal regime was quite clearly demonstrated by the 
international community, and on the grounds not only of the suppression 
of the right to self-determination but also as constituting a serious 
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African States, 
primarily Zambia.370 1273
The case of Namibia is special in that one is concerned with an
illegal occupation by South Africa of a former mandated territory,
rather than a traditional colonial situation. In other words, the legal
position revolves around not only the right of self-determination of the
people of the territory but also the terms of the mandate and the
situation created by its revocation. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
South Africa is in an analogous position to an unlawful colonial
situation and that intervention on its behalf with respect to the
territory is unlawful as contrary to the principle of self-determination.
The International Court in the Namibia case declared that so far as third
States were concerned, they were "under obligation to recognise the
illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of
its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts
and in particular any dealings with the government of South Africa implying
recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such
371presence and administration". This would clearly cover intervention
on the side of South Africa with regard to the territory of Namibia
Indeed the General Assembly has deplored on a number of occasions support
given by any State to South Africa relating to the territory372 including
373the supply of military equipment.
(370) Note, that the South African action was also contrary to the wiah«o
of the colonial power, wisnes
(371) ICJ Reports 1971, pp.16, 58.
(372) See eg, Assembly resolutions 1899 (XVIII), 2871 (XXVI) 3031 /yyvttn and 3111 (XXVIII). 1 3031 <XXVII)
(373) See eg. Assembly resolutions 31/146 and 32/9,
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In a different category to the issues of the Portuguese African
territories, Rhodesia and Namibia is the problem posed by South Africa’s
apartheid policy. South Africa is an independent State and it cannot be
374classified as a colonialist entity, but as we have seen the right of
self-determination is applicable to the situation as a direct result of
the apartheid policy of wide-ranging and institutionalised systematic
racial discrimination. In traditional international law, aid to South
Africa's government is perfectly legitimate since a state of belligerency
or of insurgency does not exist, nor can one talk in terms of a rebellion.
But the application of the principle of self-determination has clearly had
an effect with regard to the perceived relevance of norms relating to the
control of intervention. This case, arguably more than any other,
demonstrates with clarity how in self-determination situations the
traditional rules relating to intervention have been modified so that
they rely upon status rather than an acceptable level of territorially
based effectiveness. Under the impact particularly of the African States
and, after 1963, the OAU, the General Assembly has adopted a number of
resolutions calling for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South
Africa. The Security Council in 1963 adopted resolution 181, with
France and the UK abstaining, calling on all States to stop the sale and
shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa.
This was extended in resolution 182, adopted unanimously, to include
equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of armaments.
Britain and France maintained in fact that the embargo covered only arms
that could be used for internal repression and that arms for external
376defence could be supplied. The Council in resolution 282 (1970) 
strongly condemned all violations of the arms embargo called for in 37456
(374) Supra, p. 257 ♦
(375) Eg resolutions 1761 (XVII), 2054 (XX) and 2396 (XXIII).
(376) SCOR 18th Year, 1078th meeting, paras.16-20 (UK) and ibid 
para.31 (France),
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previous resolutions. It urged the strengthening of the arms ban by a 
variety of means including withholding the supply of all vehicles, 
equipment and spare parts for the use of the armed forces and para­
military organisations of South Africa. An attempt to declare a
mandatory arms ban on South Africa failed in June 1975 due to a triple
3 7 7  3T8veto cast by the UK, USA and France, and in 1976. The Anti-
379
Apartheid Conference at Lagos 1977, organised by the UN in co­
operation with the OAU and Nigeria, called on all States to "cease 
forthwith" all sales and supplies of arms and military equipment and to 
refrain from any assistance to the South African regime in its military 
build-up and in its attempts to obtain a nuclear capability. The 
Conference also recognised the urgent need for economic and other measures, 
universally applied, to secure the elimination of apartheid, and called 
upon the UN and all governments, as well as economic interests including 
transnational corporations, urgently to consider such measures. The 
termination of sporting contacts with South Africa was also recommended. 380
In November 1977 the Security Council unanimously imposed a mandatory
381arms embargo against South Africa. *378
,377V The 0AU called this action a testimony to "their well-known
' commitment on the side of the South African racist regime". See
CM/Res 428 (XXV) which also criticised the increasing aid given 
to South Africa by those three countries and the Federal Republic 
of Germany.
(378) But with regard to the situation in Namibia, see S/12211.
.„7gv Attended by representatives of 112 Governments, as well as by 
} representatives of the OAU, liberation movements, UN bodies, 
apartheid groups and prominent individuals.
¿380) UN Monthly Chronicle, August-September 1977, p.8 . The General
’ Assembly had earlier declared that States and organisations aiding 
the colonial and racist regimes in Southern Africa were accomplices 
to inhuman practices, see resolutions 31/33 and 31/6. In resolution 
32/35, the Assembly condemned strongly all States which collaborated 
politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily with South 
Africa. See also resolutions 32/14 and 32/42.
/38D Resolution 418 (1977), citing acts of repression by South Africa, 
its defiant continuation of the system of apartheid and its attacks 
ainst neighbouring independent States. See supra, p.260,
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The South African policy of creating independent Bantustans has also
been greatly criticised by the international community and aid by third
parties to implement it condemned. In General Assembly resolution 3411 D
(XXX), all governments and organisations were urged not to deal with any
institutions or authorities of the Bantustans or to accord any form of
recognition to them. 382 * In resolution 31/6A adopted by the Assembly on
the same day as the purported independence of the Transkei.all governments
were urged to deny any form of recognition to that entity and to refrain
from any dealings with it or with any other Bantustan. All States were
requested to take effective measures to prohibit all individuals,
corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction from having
383any dealings with any Bantustan. The OAU urged member-States not to 
recognise any Bantustan and declared that a violation of this commitment 
would be seen as a betrayal of the continent of Africa. The OAU also 
committed itself to a campaign to dissuade all UN member-States from 
recognising the Transkei. 384 385 In June 1977, the Security Council
, 385
unanimously endorsed Assembly resolution 31/6A, From the foregoing
survey of practice with regard to South Africa, it can be stated that 
arms aid to that country is now illegal as would be any form of military 
intervention. In other words, the world community has recognised the 
existence of a self-determination situation in South Africa and has 
condemned the resort by the authorities of that country to various means, 
including the policy of Bantustanisation, to suppress that legitimate 
right. Accordingly# intervention on the side of South Africa in its 
repressive activities would be contrary to international law.
(382) Adopted by 99 votes to none with 8 abstentions.
* „„mhpr of western countries expressed reservations about this 
request, see UN Monthly Chronicle, November 1976, pp.14-15.
(384) CM/Res 493 (XXVII).
(385) Resolution 407 (1977). See also Assembly resolution 32/14.
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It is submitted that a clear example of the use of force by a
third party contrary to the principle of self-determination is afforded
by the case of Western Sahara. The conclusion of the UN Visiting Mission
was that there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans in the
territory in favour of independence and opposing integration with any
386neighbouring country, while the International Court declared that
there existed no legal ties between the territory and neighbouring
countries which would affect the right of the population to self- 
386 eldetermination. Within a couple of days of the publication of these
documents in mid-October 1975, the Moroccan Government stated that a
march of some 350,000 civilians from Morocco into the Sahara territory
387would take place to urge recognition for its claims. Spain declared
that the proposed march threatened international peace and security and
388brought the matter to the Security Council, The Council adopted
resolution 398 (1975) calling upon the Secretary-General to consult the
concerned and interested parties and to report back to enable the
389appropriate measures to be taken. It also called for restraint and
moderation, and, while not explicitly referring to self-determination,
reaffirmed Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant General
Assembly resolutions relating to the territory. The report of the
Secretary-General summarised the positions of the parties and declared
390the situation to be grave. Spain called for a further meeting of the 
Council on November 1st since Morocco had announced that the proposed
o n  imarch ("the green march") would commence on November 4th, The Spanish 3867901
(386) A/10023/Add 1. Annex paras.202 and 229. See also supra, p.227, 
(386a) ICJ Reports 1975, pp.1 2, 6 8.
(387) S/11852.
(388) S/11851.
(389) A stronger Costa Rica draft resolution calling upon Morocco to 
desist immediately from the proposed march was not adopted,S/11853.
(390) S/11863.
(391) S/11864.
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representative declared that if necessary force would be used to defend 
392the territory. In resolution 379 (1975) the Council called on
concerned and interested parties "to avoid any unilateral or other action
393which might further escalate the tension in the area". On the 6 th
November, the first wave of the "Green March" left Tarfaya in Morocco to
cross the border, to be followed by a second wave the next day.33-* The
Security Council reconvened and in resolution 380 (1975) deplored the
march and called on Morocco to withdraw all marchers from the territory
and resume negotiations. The Secretary-General declared that the march
395had increased tension. On the 9 November, King Hassan of Morocco
announced that the marchers would be withdrawn and two days later talks
396between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania commenced. These led to a
tripartite agreement, partitioning the territory between Morocco and 
397Mauritania.
The Moroccan action in employing "the threat or use of force" in a 
"manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" contrary to 
Article 2(4) of the Charter in the light of the provisions relating to 
self-determination,constituted an unlawful intervention contrary to the 
principle of self-determination. The meek response of the UN cannot 
disguise the fact that the action concerned directly contravened the 
terms of the principle as can be clearly seen by an examination of the 
report of the UN Visiting Mission and the opinion of the ICJ. The 3924567
(392) S/PV.1852, pp.13-15.
(393) French and American pressure succeeded in preventing any stronger 
reaction, see Franck "The Stealing of the Sahara" 70 AJIL, 1976 
pp.694, 713.
(394) See Gretton, Western Sahara - The Fight for Self-Determination 
1976, p.47. See also African Research Bulletin, November 1975, 
pp,3836-8.
(395) S/11874.
(396) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, pp.3836-8.
(397) See supra, Chapter 4, p.235.
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inhabitants of the territory were faced with a fait accompli produced by
the tripartite agreement and were thus prevented from "the free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory" noted by 
398the ICJ. The sad conclusion that the UN proved itself incapable of
enforcing or pressing hard the right it had itself strenuously 
emphasised is inescapable, but this should not obscure the recognition 
of the illegality of the Moroccan action. If the measures taken by 
Morocco and Mauritania contrary to the free exercise of the right to 
self-determination of the inhabitants of the territory of Western Sahara 
cannot be ac cepted as legitimate, the question arises as to the 
characterisation of the armed support given by France to Mauritania.
Following the partition of the territory, hostilities commenced
between Morocco and Mauritania on the one hand and the Algerian-backed
forces of the Polisario on the other. Since Mauritania was the weaker
partner of the anti-Polisario alliance, it became the favoured target
for attack. Moroccan troops with Mauritanian permission entered
Mauritania and the Mauritanian—held part of Western Sahara. According
to the Moroccan Foreign Minister in January 1978, some 6,000 Moroccan
troops and half of its air force were stationed in Mauritania and
equipment was also being supplied. 398 400 401 In addition to this help,
Mauritania had also requested French arms and military equipment in 
401June 1977. In November 1977, French paratroopers were sent to Senegal
(398) ICJ Reports, 1975, pp.12, 6 8 .
(399) See eg. Africa Research Bulletin, May 1976, pp,4029-30. The 
capital of Mauritania was twice attacked, see Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, pp.28343 (June 1976) and 28574 (July 1977).
(400) West Africa, 9 January 1978, p.81.
(401) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.28492. On May 1, 1977, Polisario 
had attacked the Mauritanian mining town of Zouerate and a French 
couple were killed and 6 French nationals taken hostage,
ibid p.28573.
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and French planes began reconnaissance flights over Algerian desert 
402areas. A systematic photo-survey of Mauritania's desert regions was
completed at the end of November and was followed by a series of direct
air strikes against Polisario guerrillas, involving Jaguar combat jets.402 03 405
In addition, French arms deliveries arrived in Mauritania and that
country's telecommunications network was expanded and operated by French 
404military experts. Polisario expressed the view that the war had
become a direct French aggression against the Saharan people and had
405adopted the form of genocide.
As a general principle, governments not involved in a belligerency 
situation may legitimately request foreign aid, even military aid. This 
does not apply where the government concerned represents a colonial admin­
istration and is acting in a fashion contrary to the principle of self- 
determination. Mauritania is not in this category. However, it is clearly 
pursuing a course of action incompatible with the implementation of the 
internationally recognised right of the Saharan people to self-determin­
ation. French aid took the form inter alia of direct air assaults upon 
the Polisario movement in an attempt to protect Mauritanian installations 
and economic interests and French nationals working in the area 
UN Visiting Mission in 1975 found that Polisario had considerable
support among all sections of the population406 and was « m «  *was abl® to organise
(402) West Africa, 7 November 1977, pp.2234-5. Ostensiblv
French nationals seized, see previous footnote + V earch for
were released in December 1977, Africa / r,Eight hostages1977, p.4688. ’ rlC“ Res<!ar‘*  Bulletin, December
(403) Africa Research Bulletin December 1977 nn a
battles involving French aircraft w e r e Three major 
of which two were confirmed by the French**01" ^  dur4ng this month 
authorities, see Ibid and XeesineaSlngs Contemporary Archives, p.2 8 82 2.
(404) Ibid p.4690. For further details of the 4
Mauritania, see ibid,February 1978, p .4750 ** lnvolvement in
(405) Ibid, June 1978, p.4875. The French in„ni
criticised in the Benin Conference on m  lvement was als°
1978. See ibid, January 1978, p.4 6 9 9.MerCimaries held ln January
(406) A/10023/Add 5, Annex para.219.
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•± \J /mass public demonstrations. It clearly formed the vanguard for the
expression of the view of the Saharan people. Indeed, both the commander
of Spanish forces in the Saharan territory during 1975 and the Secretary
General of the government of Spanish Sahara during 1975 stated before the
Spanish Parliament in March 1978 that Polisario was the sole representative
408of the Saharan people in 1975. The conclusion appears, therefore, that 
France has militarily intervened against a legitimate self-determination 
movement and the legitimacy of this action must be seen as highly dubious.
International practice, and African practice in particular, has
clearly established a principle to the effect that certain types of
intervention on behalf of colonial and other regimes acting contrary to
409the right of self-determination are unlawful.
It is notoriously difficult to define the nature and extent of 
410intervention, and extremely difficult to determine the types of 
intervention, in favour of States acting contrary to the principle of 
self-determination, which would be unlawful. Clearly military inter­
vention would be illicit and possibly also the supply of military arms 
and equipment, though this would depend upon the particular situation.407 89111 
Nevertheless, a presumption against such supply would not be 
unreasonable. The question of other forms of aid is, however, on a 
different plane. It is believed that the onus of proof that such
(407) Ibid para,220. The movement succeeded in producing mass support 
among the population, ibid para.237.
(408) Africa Research Bulletin March 1978, p,4771.
(409) The test of behaviour with regard to self-determination is crucial 
since international aid to the UK, the colonial power In the 
Rhodesian situation, has been consistently called for, see 
further supra, p.421.
(410) See Thomas and Thomas, Non-Interventionf 1956, pp.67-78,
(411) Included in this category would be the supply of mercenaries, 
see eg. resolution 31/7 and 0AU resolutions ECM/Res 5 (III) and 
AHG/ReS.49 (IV).
assistance is unlawful shifts in these circumstances, so that it is the
complainant States that have to establish a reasonable case. The test
of validity would here revolve around the nature, extent and efforts of
such aid within the context of the particular case concerned. It should
be noted, for example, that the UN on a number of occasions has adopted
resolutions condemning the activities of foreign economic and other
interests in the colonial territories that impede the implementation of
resolution 1514 (XV) and the efforts to eliminate colonialism,
412apartheid and racial discrimination.
2. Intervention to Promote Self-Determination
UN Practice - Article 2(4) of the Charter stipulates the basic rule
prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State. Resolution 1514 (XV) notes that
any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, while the 1965
Declaration of Inadmissibility of intervention (resolution 2131 (XX) )
stated that "no State has the right to intervene directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any
other State". In addition, it was stated that "no State shall organise,
assist, forment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State". Those
propositions were reiterated in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
413International Law. In the face of those expressions of what must be 4123
(412) See eg. resolutions 2621 (XXV), 3398 (XXX), 31/7 and 32/35, See 
also the Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia, 1977, and the Declaration of the World Conference for 
Action against Apartheid, 1977. Nuclear collaboration with 
South Africa has been especially condemned, see resolutions 
31/7 and 32/35.
(413) See also the 1974 Definition of Aggression.
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regarded as a fundamental norm of International law and in the light of 
the establishment of the legal right to self-determination, the question 
arises as to the lawfulness of intervention by States on behalf of 
' peoples struggling for self-determination. It is more difficult to 
satisfy the requirements regarding the possible legitimacy of such 
intervention than to demonstrate either the legality of the resort to 
force by the peoples concerned or the illegality of intervention contrary 
to self-determination. This is because the legal rules circumscribing 
the recourse to force by States are far more substantial and fundamental 
than those in the preceding situations. The question of the legal 
justification required to demonstrate the alleged exception to this 
basic rule of international law is therefore more problematic. There 
are a number of possible bases for the licit nature of intervention on 
the side of peoples recognised as having the right to self-determination, 
including the concept of self-determination itself, the notion of 
collective self-defence and the justification of humanitarian intervention 
A brief survey of some relevant international practice will first be 
attempted.
The first UN resolution that called for aid to such peoples in
general terms is Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). This invited all States
to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation
414movements in the colonial territories. Hesolution 2160 (XX)
recognised that peoples subject to colonial oppression were entitled to 
seek and receive all support in their struggle which is in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter, while resolution 2465 
(XXIII) called for political, moral and material support for the peoples 
f colonial territories. The relevant paragraph in the 1970 Declaration 41
(414) See also resolution 2187 (XXI).
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on Principles of International Law confined itself to a statement that
A \ e"in their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action 
in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such 
peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter". It should be noted that 
the word support is not enhanced by the insertion of "all" or "armed". 
This leads to the conclusion that the 1970 Declaration cannot be so 
construed as to recognise or establish a right to provide every kind 
of support to such peoples by States, in particular armed support.* 416 *
A number of resolutions in 1970, however, adopted by the General
Assembly of the UN recognised the right of peoples under colonial and
alien domination in the legitimate exercise of their right to self-
determination to seek and receive all kinds of moral and material
assistance in accordance with the resolutions of the UN and the spirit 
417of the Charter. In all cases, reference was made to the right of 
self-determination and aid rendered in accordance with the Charter.
These constituted the only restraints upon the provision of help to such 
peoples. The former defined the permitted recipients of assistance and
M15> Ie any forcible action which deprives peoples entitled to self- 
determination of their right to self-determination, freedom and 
independence.
,416, See for example the remarks of the UK representative to the
Special Committee on Principles of witernational Law, 1970, A/8018 
naras 234 and 235. See also the comments of the USA delegate ibid 
oara 269, and the Australian representative ibid para.204. Cf. the 
Kenyan delegate ibid para.187, the Syrian delegate ibid para.207 
and the Indian delegate ibid para.217. Rosenstock notes that the 
&uestion of the type of response permitted to forcible deprivation 
of self-determination was ambiguously phrased "to permit acceptance 
bv those who believe third States have a duty to send arms and men 
and those who believe third States should supply only moral and 
litical support", "The Declaration of Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey" 65 AJIL 1971, pp.713, 732
(417) Resolutions 2649 (XXV), 2627 (XXV), 2621 (XXV) and 2734 (XXV).
the latter the extent of permitted assistance. In view of the
continuing series of resolutions in such terms adopted since 1970,418 419
it does appear as if the request for the provision of all assistance to
peoples entitled to self-determination has become an accepted component
within the principle of self-determination as defined by UN practice.
But the question is whether all assistance comprises also the provision
of military supplies, bases and men from third States. No resolution
has explicitly stated this, but they have spoken rather of all. political,
moral and material assistance in accordance with the UN Charter. The
provision of such aid to anti-government forces within a State by another
State is clearly illegitimate. But is there an exception to this rule in
self-determination cases? The answer in terms of UN declarations and
resolutions has always appeared to be ambiguous. This is so also with
regard to the results of the deliberations of the Special Committee on
Aggression. It was argued that the draft definition had to contain a
provision with regard to self-determination in order to protect States
supporting peoples entitled to exercise the right from being accused of
419indirectly aiding aggression. The point was also made that the
p r o p o s e d  definition should cover the case where a dependent people was
operating from a territory other than its own, ie. that of a third
State.420 421 As against this, it was stated that recognition of the
legitimacy of the use of force to aid dependent and oppressed peoples
might well provide a pretext for manifest acts of aggression and that
therefore the formula adopted in the 1970 Declaration on Principles
421should be retained intact. A number of representatives strongly
(418) Eg. resolutions 2787 (XXVI), 2878 (XXVI), 2908 (XXVII), 3070 
(XXVIII), 3163 (XXVIII), 3118 (XVIII), 3246 (XXIX), 3328 (XXIX)
3421 (XXX), 31/92, 31/30, 31/33, 32/10 and 32/154.
(419) A/8019 para.144,
(420) Ibid para.145,
(421) A/8171 para.36. See also A/8419 para.43 and ibid Annex III
para.22,
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maintained that States which gave material support to dependent peoples
422could not be accused of supporting aggression, while others felt that
the linking of self-determination and aggression created an extraneous
423issue. There was no exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter. Some
representatives declared that any reference to self-determination should
not lead to a weakening of the prohibition of aggression or the use of
force. The proposed definition was intended to restrain not encourage 
424violence. In the event, Article 7 provided that nothing in the
definition of aggression could in any way prejudice the right to self-
determination of peoples "forcibly deprived of that right ... nor the
right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive
support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter" and in
conformity with the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.
Article 3 was particularly mentioned as not being able to affect such
rights, This article enumerated certain examples of acts of aggression
and two of them are especially relevant, Article 3(f) dealt with the
action of a State in allowing its territory which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating
an act of aggression against a third State, Article 3(g) is concerned
with the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State or its substantial involvement therein. It should also be
noted that in addition to express references to the 1970 Declaration on
425Principles of International Law, the definition states explicitly that 
nothing contained in it shall be construed as in any way enlarging or 
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning 4235
(422) A/8929 para.33.
(423) Ibid para.34.
(424) A/9411 para.27.
(425) In preambular paragraph 8 and Article 7.
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cases in which the use of force is lawful. The interpretation of
intervention by third States in support of peoples entitled to exercise
the right of self-determination as expressed in the 1974 Definition
therefore depends upon the inter-relationship of all these factors. The
ambiguity of the formulation in Article 7 opened the way to diverse
interpretations. Some of the western powers, bearing in mind references
to the Charter and the 1970 Declaration and the absence of an explicit
reference to the use of force in Article 7, declared that the right to
struggle meant only struggle by peaceful means. The American representative,
for example, stated that Article 7, like Article 6, merely provided
assurances with regard to rules not being dealt with. It did not legitimise
acts of armed force by a State which would otherwise constitute
aggression. The French representative declared that Article 7 was a
safeguarding clause, essentially political in nature and somewhat alien to
428the text of the definition, while the Netherlands delegate emphasised
that it was important to guard against interpreting the affirmation of the
right of peoples to receive support for self-determination as a
429legitimisation of armed support. On the other hand, representatives
from Communist and Third World States took a different view. The USSR
representative declared that nothing in Article 3(g) could be construed
as casting doubt on the legitimacy of guerrilla warfare and peoples in
self-determination struggles had the right to receive material and 
430political aid. It was the Yugoslav view that struggle meant struggle
431by all means at the disposal of such peoples while the Mongolian 426789301
(426) Article 6.
(427) A/9619, Annex I p.24. See also the Canadian delegate ibid p.35.
(428) Ibid p,22.
(429) A/C.6/SR.1473 para.5. See also the Belgian representative,
A/C.6/SR.1476 para.11 and the UK representative A/C.6/SR.1477 
para.24.
(430) A/9619, Annex I p .37.
(431) Ibid p .26. See also the Democratic Yemeni representative, 
A/C.6/SR.1479 para.27.
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representative declared that Article 7 recognised another case where
432the use of force was lawful. The Algerian representative argued
that Article 7 included the right to use armed force in pursuit of
self-determination and every State had the right, even the duty, to
provide support of all kinds to ensure the exercise of that right 432 33
What is interesting, however, was the view expressed by a number of
third world representatives to the effect that Article 7 should have
provided unequivocally that a State furnishing armed or other support
to national liberation movements was not committing aggression.434 435
In spite of this, many delegates strenuously denied that Article 3(g)
could affect the right of States to support self-determination 
435struggles. In the light of this clear division in the interpretation 
of the right of support by third States for peoples in self-determination 
situations and in view of the absence of express affirmation in the 
text itself, it is difficult to maintain that the 1974 consensus 
Definition of Aggression altered the existing state of affairs.436 it 
merely safeguarded the status quo, although there was a diversity of 
opinion as to what that consisted of.
(432) A/C.6/SR,1479 para.12. See also the Hungarian representative, 
A/C.6/SR,1478 para.41.
(433) A/C.6/SR.1479 para.36. See also the representatives of Senegal 
A/C.6/SR.1480 para.17; Ghana, ibid para.25; Burundi A/C.6/SR.1482 
para.8; Cameroon A/C.6/SR.1483 para.14; Egypt ibid para.32 and 
Sudan ibid para.13.
(434) Eg. The Congo A/C.6/SR.1478 para.35; Upper Volta A/C.6/SR.1480 
para.36 and Dahomey A/C.6/SR.1482 para.39. See also Egypt 
A/9619, Annex 1 p.40.
(435) Eg, those from Bulgaria A/C.6/SR.1472 para.43; Kenya A/C.6/SR.1474 
para.24; Algeria A/C.6/SR.1479 para.33; Cuba ibid para,42;
Mali A/C.6/SR.1480 para.8; Uganda ibid para.20; Upper Volta ibid 
para.36 and Egypt A/C.6/SR.1483 para.32.
(436) See in particular Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, pp,66-86,
and Ferencz, Defining International Aggression vol,2, 1975, p,48, *
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African Practice
Since UN practice is unclear as to whether third States may provide 
armed and other types of military assistance to peoples struggling for 
the legitimate exercise of self-determination, recourse must be had to 
other material. It should be recognised, however, that the acceptance 
of a legal right to self-determination in certain situations does impose 
an obligation upon States not to act in a fashion contrary to its 
legitimate exercise and does permit States to give their political and 
moral support should they so wish. The only outstanding question is 
whether armed support may also be lawfully proffered.
OAU practice in this respect offers a relatively consistent pattern.
At the Addis Ababa conference of African States in 1963 which led to the 
creation of the organisation, a major speech was made by the Algerian 
President in which he pledged 10,000 Algerian volunteers to free African 
nations still under colonial or white minority control. Other African 
leaders offered facilities for training troops for such purposes.437 
The Charter of the OAU declared as one of its purposes the eradication 
of colonialism in all its forms and as one of its principles absolute 
dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories still 
dependent. One of the specialised commissions created by the 
organisation was the Defence Commission. It first met in Ghana in 1963 
and attempts were made to institute an African High Command. While its 
primary function would be to defend the territorial integrity and 
independence of African States, another Important function was declared 
to be the provision of assistance to the freedom fighters of Africa, 
as properly organised and recognised, to liberate their countries from
(437) ^ r v ^ t , , iIhg.0re.„ts.t>QO of African,Unlty lt„ Ch,rt„,
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foreign d o m i n a t i o n . F o r  a variety of reasons, both political and 
military, the Defence Commission proved ineffective.438 39 401
Of crucial importance was the resolution on decolonisation 
adopted in 1963 by the Addis Ababa conference. This stated that "it is 
the duty of all African independent States to support dependent peoples 
of Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence". Six decisions 
were incorporated in this resolution. These included the creation of a 
coordinating Committee (later called the OAU Liberation Committee) to 
supervise operations against colonial and white minority regimes a 
special Fund managed by this Committee to provide the necessary practical 
and financial aid to the liberation movements and agreements to assist 
nationalists from the liberation movements in their educational training 
and in other ways. Cervenka interpreted this resolution as inter alia 
conference pledges to buy arms for the freedom fighters, militarily train
them and offer them shelter and transit in the forthcoming guerrilla 
440wars. The Liberation Committee, based in Dar-Es-Salaam, has faced a 
certain amount of political turmoil. It performs basic liaison and
diplomatic functions with respect to the various liberation movements
' ' ' 441'accredited to it. The fact that such movements have first to be 
recognised by the OAU is of great importance, for it enables the OAU 
not only to control the various financial and other advantages accruing 
upon recognition to a liberation movement, but also to perform something
(438) See the memorandum entitled Rationale for an African Hivh
AHG/3 (1964) quoted in Cervenka, ThTu^flnishSd' Quest for 
1977, pp.38-9 , — --- — ----- — -----*•*
(439) See Wolfers, Politics injhe Organisation of Africanist« ia,«
pp.92-97, and Cervenka op.cit. pp. 38-44, .. '
(440) The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter. 1968, p.17.
(441) See generally Wolfers op.cit. pp.163-194, and Cervenka, The
Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, pp.45-63 ~~~
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of a legitimising function. The creation of the Liberation
Committee also involved the institutionalisation of aid to the anti­
colonial and anti-racist struggle in general and to certain liberation 
' movements in particular. The Committee consists of 21 members (in 1977) 
and its policy position has been that while it will assist in various
financial training and supply matters the actual fighting is to be
443undertaken by the liberation movement concerned. In 1973, the Accra
Declaration on the new Strategy for the Liberation of Africa emphasised 
that the liberation of Africa was the collective responsibility of all
African States. Such collective responsibility was defined to include
444the payment of outstanding dues to the Special Fund, the provision 
of additional national and financial aid to the liberation movements and 
the establishment of training facilities for members of the liberation 
movements. States were also to be ready to provide collective military
and other assistance to any OAU State should it become the victim of
445aggression from Portugal, Rhodesia or South Africa. In any event,
the attitude of the OAU in general terms was quite clearly expressed
from the start in terms of the collective provision of support for the
liberation movements of the colonial and racist territories of Africa.
The only restraint (apart from practical considerations and various
personality and policy clashes) was that troops of the independent
446African States were not to be committed.
442
(442)
(443)
(444)
(445)
(446)
See supra, Chapter 6, p.379 et seq,
Cervenka op.cit. p,52 et seq.
In 1972, the OAU Conference of Heads of State resolved to 
increase by 50% its aid to the Liberation Committee, see 
Africa Contemporary Record 1972-3. 1973, p,C42,
Africa Research Bulletin January 1973, pp.2714-5
Thla »a. al.o th. .i.h o, the Liberation Movement* themselvea, 
see Cervenka op.cit. pp.58-9, *
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Thus one can see that whereas the attitude of the UN to the problem 
of military support for peoples struggling for self-determination has 
been ambiguously formulated, that of the OAU has been consistently 
favourable.
UN resolutions dealing with specific African territories have over 
the years called for all moral and material assistance to the peoples 
struggling for self-determination. Resolution 2107 (XX), dealing with 
Portugal’s African territories, declared that all States were, in co­
operation with the OAU, to render all moral and material support
necessary for the restoration of the inalienable rights of the peoples 
446 aconcerned. This is expanded to include specialised agencies and
447international organisations. Similarly, the UN called for all moral
and material assistance for the people of Zimbabwe in its legitimate
448 449struggle, and for the people of Namibia. A number of these
resolutions specifically referred to the OAU, either in terms of
450assistance being provided with its co-operation or as a conduit for 
451such assistance. This can be regarded as highly significant, for 
the special status thus accorded to the OAU can be seen as having 
repercussions with respect to the interpretation of such resolutions 
A request by the UN to provide "all moral and material assistance" in *4789501
(446a) See also eg. resolutions 2184 (XXI) and 2395 (XXIII),
(447) See eg. resolution 2507 (XXIV).
(448) See eg. resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2283 (XXIII) 2508 (XXIV^
2652 (XXV) and 2796 (XXVI). ’ '
(449) See eg. resolutions 2074 (XX), 2678 (XXV) and 3295 (XXIX). Note 
that in resolution 3324 C (XXIX), all States and international 
organisations were called upon to provide appropriate political, 
moral and material assistance to the oppressed peoples of South 
Africa and their liberation movements in the struggle for the 
eradication of apartheid, see also resolution 2505 (XXIV).
(450) Eg resolution 2!°7 (XX)relating to the Portuguese territories
« ? h  » C i M  * « °  R1,oae81“- °»» Should bear In mind,»1th regard to Namibia, the special etatua ot that territory as 
an international territory administered de jure by the UN Uself.
(451) See resolution 2283 (XXIII),
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African colonial and racist situations with an explicit reference to the
OAU may be understood in the light of the OAU comprehension of that
phrase. So that if the OAU understands "all" assistance to comprise
-armed support (falling short of outright military intervention by foreign
troops) this can play a relevant part in the interpretation of such UN
resolutions. The views adopted by the OAU with regard to specific
situations in Africa are of importance here and the OAU called for the
intensification of the armed struggles of the peoples of Portuguese 
452 453 454Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and for increased assistance to
the relevant national liberation movements to achieve this. A
significant step was taken with the publication of the Lusaka Manifesto
on Southern Africa in 1969. Originally adopted at the Conference of
East and Central African States held at Lusaka in April 1969, it was
endorsed by the OAU Assembly in September of that year.452 355 456 it was
welcomed by the UN General Assembly in resolution 2505 (XXIV) adopted
by 113 votes to 2 (Portugal and South Africa) with 2 abstentions. The
manifesto stated that the aim of the signatories was the right of self-
determination for the peoples of Southern Africa and noted that while
peaceful progress was blocked by those in power in the States of
Southern Africa, there was no other choice but to give the peoples of
the territories all the support of which the signatories were capable
456in their struggle. Following the OAU's rejection of "dialogue" with
(452) Africa Contemporary Record 1972/3. 1973 p.CIO
(453) Africa Contemporary Record 1975/6. 1976 pp.C9-C10
(454) CM/Res 499 (XXVII).
(455) A/7754.
(456) The Manifesto else contained a number of conciliatory expressions
which set in train the unsuccessful period of "dialogue" with 
South Africa see Cerve^a a e O r g g i ^ t ^  ofAtrlcan Unltv ar>„ 
its Charter, 1969, pp.114-22, — — --- -
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South Africa in 1971 at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference, 457 *the
signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto adopted the Mogadishu Declaration
which concluded that "there is no way left to the liberation of Southern
Africa except armed struggle to which we already give and will
45ftincreasingly continue to give our fullest support".
An intensification of fighting in Southern Africa in fact
resulted. 459 As far as South Africa itself was concerned, the OAU on
a number of occasions called for member-states to render maximum support
to the people of that country for the intensification of armed struggle
and the legitimacy of the struggle for the seizure of power by the people
was reaffirmed. 460 * The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa held at
Oslo in 1973 called for "massive assistance" to the liberation movements
461to isolate the colonial and apartheid regimes. The important OAU 
Declaration of Dar-Es-Salaam on Southern Africa 1975 identified the 
objective of the organisation in the region (following the demise of the 
Portuguese empire) as the total liquidation of the twin evils of 
colonialism and racism. The full commitment of the OAU to this aim 
could not be questioned and if peaceful progress towards this objective 
was blocked the OAU "will support the armed struggle carried out by the 
peoples of the oppressed areas". This was the "unshakeable position" 
of the OAU . 462 The Maputo Conference in support of the peoples of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia 1977 called on governments to provide and increase
(457)
(458)
(459)
(460)
(461)
(462)
CM/St.5 (XXVII).
See UN Document UN/93 (137), 23 February 1972
Cervenka The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 1977, p 119
See eg. Africa Contemporary Record 1972/3, 1973 C13 ri4.
CM/res 428 (XXV); Africa Conte m p o r a T T i ^ ^ ^  , 1 '
pp.C33-C34; CM/res 490 (XXVII) and CM/res~~500 (XXVII), ’
The UNrOAPjConferencet Oslo, 9^14_A£ril 1973 (ed. Stokke and 
Widstrand)1973, p.18. See also ibid pp.30-36
Africa Contemporary Record 1975/6. 107s, pp,C71-C75.
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material and financial support to the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia
and their national liberation movements in consultation and cooperation 
463with the OAU, while the Lagos World Conference for Action against
Apartheid urged governments, organisations and individuals to provide
all appropriate assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and
, 464its national liberation movement.
In other words, the OAU in general and African States in
particular have been quite clearly committed to providing assistance
to the peoples of colonial and racist States in Africa and such
assistance included the provision of training facilities for guerrillas
as well as economic aid and help in acquiring military supplies. It
equally clearly did not extend to direct military intervention in the
sense of providing troops. This policy also conditioned Africa's
attitude to non-African aid to oppressed peoples recognised as entitled
to exercise self-determination. Economic and arms supply assistance
was accepted plus limited numbers of foreign advisers to aid in training
guerrillas, but the use of troops from abroad in such situations
, 465remained unacceptable.
It should be noted that in no Security Council or General Assembly 
resolution has there been any condemnation of the support activities of 
the OAU, its Liberation Committee or African or other States. This 
remains true despite knowledge by the UN of the facts.463 566 Critical
(463) UN Monthly Chronicle June 1977, p.45. Note also the statement by 
the Five Front-line Presidents (of Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, 
Mozambique and Botswana) in September 1976 reaffirming their 
commitment to the cause of liberation in Zimbabwe and the armed 
struggles. See Legura, Southern Africa - The Year of the Whirlwind. 
1977, p.68.
(464) UNMC August-September 1977, p.7.
(465) See eg, Legum op.cit. pp.57-59.
(466) See eg. the Complaints made to the Security Council by South 
Africa and Portugal, SCOE 18th Year, 1042nd meeting paras.13 and 
38-39 and ibid 1050th meeting para.6.
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comment was reserved only for the policies and activities of the
colonial and apartheid authorities and their supporters. One could well
treat this as important evidence to the effect that the support provided
for peoples exercising self-determination did not contravene the terms
of the UN Charter. However, the question remains as to the basis in
international law for such support, in the light of Article 2(4) of the
Charter and the prohibition on the organisation, assistance, incitement
etc. of armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the
„ 467regime of another State.
One possible argument is on the basis of the collective self-
defence of the African continent. The President of Guinea stated at
the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference that "it is essential that this
Conference lays down a dead-line for the end of foreign domination in
Africa, after which date our.armed forces should intervene in the
legitimate defence of the African continent against aggressors".467 68 469
The Algerian delegate to the Sixth Committee of the UN noted that the
Charter accepted that the use of force was lawful in certain circumstances,
one of which was individual and collective action in the exercise of the
right of self-defence. The Addis Ababa Conference, it was declared,
"simply exercised that right by providing for collective action to
469assist national liberation". Judge Ammoun in his Separate Opinion in 
the Namibia case, strongly expressed the view that "in law, the 
legitimacy of the peoples’ struggle cannot be in any doubt, for it
(467) See the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, 1965, 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law 1970 and the 
Definition of Aggression 1974.
(468) 7 Ethiopia Observer, 1963, No.l, p.30, quoted in Dugard
"The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry 
into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the Use of 
Force in the Eradication of Colonialism" 16 ICLQ, 1969, pp.159,165.
(469) GAOR, i8th Session, Sixth Committee, 805th meeting, para.13.
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follows from the right of self-defence, inherent in human nature, which 
is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is also an 
accepted principle that self-defence may be collective; thus we see the
other peoples of Africa, members of the Organisation of African Unity,
470associated with the Namibians in their fight for freedom". While it
is perfectly legitimate under international law for independent States
471to establish a collective self-defence arrangement, and indeed
African States have declared that any aggression against any OAU
member-state by colonial and racist regimes is to be regarded as an
472aggression against all the members of the OAU, it appears distinctly 
odd to extend this to include peoples denied self-determination. The 
legal right to collective defence as provided in Article 51 of the 
Charter is restricted to where an armed attack occurs against a member 
of the UN470 1273 and could by no means be interpreted to include a non-State 
people.474 Nor is it believed that the principle of enforcement by 
regional agencies permitted under Article 52(1) of the UN Charter could 
be of use, especially since Article 53 requires that no such enforcement 
action be undertaken under regional arrangements or agencies without the
(470) ICJ Reports 1971, pp.16, 70.
(471) See Article 51 of the Charter. See also Brownlie op.cit. footnote 
2, pp.328-31, and Bowett op.cit. footnote 2, pp.200-248.
(472) CM/Res 154 (XI). See also AHG/Res 80 (XIII). But note that unlike 
the Charter of the Organisation of American States and the NATO and 
Warsaw treaties, the OAU Charter contains no reference to 
collective self-defence.
(473) But see S/1501, S/1511 and S/1588 re the Korean war. See also 
Brownlie op.cit. footnote 2, p.331, and Bowett op.cit. footnote 2, 
p.194. There is a controversy over the interpretation of "armed 
attack". See eg. Bowett op.cit. p.185, and Brownlie op.cit. p.280.
(474) As far as the contending theories as to the legal basis of the 
right to collective self-defence are concerned, see Bowett 
Self-Defence in International Law, 1958. pp.200-207, Brownlie 
International Law and the Use of Force by States. 1963, pp.329-33it 
Stone, Aggression and World Order, p.264. and McDougal and 
Feliciano.Law and Minimum World Public Order. 1961, pp.244-53,
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authorisation of the Security Council. Similarly, it is submitted 
that the customary right of self-defence does not extend to the 
recognition of the use of force in self-defence by third States on 
behalf of non-State peoples. States cannot be permitted to resort to 
force to defend any perceived interest, particularly such interests 
beyond territorial integrity and political independence and even more 
so when no nationals are involved, on the legal ground of self-defence. 
For that concept to have any relatively stable case of meaning, a 
careful definition of "self" is mandatory, and an aim to end 
colonialism and racism would not be sufficient within this category.
It may be argued that third States may legitimately intervene on
grounds of humanitarian concern. Whether such a doctrine does exist in 
476 477international law or not, the question of the international 
protection of human rights is highly controversial. It is to be doubted 
whether international law permits States to intervene militarily in 
other States in order to remedy an alleged violation of human rights. 
Even if one were to accept the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in 
customary law, certain limits would have to be recognised as regards 
the situations in which such interventions would not be illicit. Some 
of the authors in favour of the existence of such a right have laid down 475*
(475) See Akehurst, "Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies" 42 
BYIL, 1967, p.175.
f47fO See eg H i n  red.) Humanitarian Intervention and the UN, 1973,
 ^ ibid "Forcible Self-help by States to Protect Human Rights" 53
Iowa Law Review,p.3 2 5,ibid"Intervention to Protect Human Rights", 
15 McGill Law Journal,p.205; Fonteyne, "The Customary International 
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention s Its Current Validity 
under the UN Charter" 4 California Western International Law 
Journal p.203, and Chilstrom "Humanitarian Intervention under 
rontemoorary International Law : A Policy-Oriented Approach" 
lille Studies in World Public Order, P .93.
(477) See eg. Brownlie "Humanitarian Intervention" in Law and Civil War 
' in the Modern World (ed. J.N. Moore) 1974, p.217, ibid
TwVo'ynftttonal Law~and the Use of Force by States 1963, pp. 338-42 
and Franck and Rodley "After Bangladesh : The Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force" 67 AJIL, 1973, p.275.
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criteria for its application. Lillich discusses five tests as follows:
(1) the immediacy of the violation of human rights, (2) the extent of
the violation of human rights, (3) the existence of an invitation by
appropriate authorities, (4) the degree of coercive measures employed
and (5) the relative disinterestedness of the State involved in the
478coercive measures. Lillich further notes that such intervention may
begin "only on those rare occasions when the danger to the individuals
concerned is imminent and the State whose duty it is to protect them
479is unable or unwilling to do so". Nanda has proposed the following
guidelines: (1) a specific limited purpose, (2) an invitation by the
recognised government, (3) limited duration of the operation,
(4) limited use of coercive measures and (5) lack of any other recourse.478 980 481
Moore had additionally referred to "a minimal effect on authority
structures, a prompt disengagement consistent with the purpose of the
action and immediate full reporting to the Security Council and
481appropriate regional organisations". Intervention for the protection 
of human rights should be permissible beyond pre-insurgency assistance 
at the request of a widely recognised government, he writes, where 
inter alia there is "an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental 
human rights, particularly a threat of widespread loss of human life".482
(478) "Forcible Self-Help" loc.cit. pp.347-51.
(479) Ibid p.347.
(480) "The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis : Impact 
on World Order - Part I" 43 Denver Law Journal, pp.437, 475,
(481) "The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict",
Law and the Indo-China War 1972, pp.115, 185, Moore notes that 
to allow unilateral action in such cases would be to permit "all 
manner of self-serving claims for the overthrow of authority 
structures" ibid, p.186.
(482) Ibid.
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It can thus be seen that even those authors sympathetic to the 
existence of a right of humanitarian intervention express the criteria 
for validity of such action in restrictive terms. While such criteria 
may well have been, or be, extant with regard to a particular 
situation in colonially or racist dominated Africa at a given time 
, 483place, it is submitted that they cannot be regarded as having been 
fulfilled throughout the period of existence of the colonial and/or 
racist regimes, or more particularly since 1945. The doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, if it exists in international law, cannot be 
used in the context of permitting a regular and institutionalised 
system of assistance to the oppressed peoples in Africa
It is  the concept of self-determination it s e lf  that provides by far 
the most satisfactory legal mechanism for the acceptance of the 
legitimacy in international law of the assistance provided to the peoples 
of the colonial and racist territories concerned. It provides for th 
identification of the peoples entitled to decide their own political 
future in international law and regulates in a general sense the 
situations regarding the use of force by the parties concerned. By 
virtue of incorporating in accepted international documents, such as th 
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and the 1 9 7 4  
Consensus Definition of Aggression, the entitlement of peoples to seek 
and receive support in their struggle, within sections devoted to se lf  
determination, the approach is  enhanced that the provision of assistanc 
may be subsumed under the general rubric of self-determination i t  i s
(483) Possibly if the Soweto riots of July 1976 had been reneat»* ~
a wider area in South Africa and provoked a more bloody response
(484) The doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad in certai 
circumstances, while more firmly based in international law s 
not relevant here, see generally Akehurst, "The Use of u, ’ 1 8
~ Abroad" 5 International Relations, 1 9 7 7 °p
xx iuseuur v SH
Protect Nationals  1°
It is believed that the argument that there exist« I ll P*3, 
force "to protect kith and kin" as such abroad is incorrect^ * see Dugard loc.cit. pp.177-187. incorrect,
use
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clearly consistent with the stipulations of the principle and the 
phrasing of the relevant UN resolutions reinforces this approach. It 
is not, however, the case that third States have the right to intervene 
in support of every people entitled to exercise self-determination. This 
would be unwarranted and could prove highly disruptive in international 
society. Where a people, however, would be justified in resorting to 
force in the face of forcible action to deprive it of exercising the 
right to self-determination, it is suggested that a third State may 
legitimately intervene. Otherwise, no such right can be acknowledged.4843 
Nor is it correct to state that the right of intervention encompasses all 
possible measures the third State (or organisation) may wish to adopt. 
Practice demonstrates that it does not include the provision of foreign 
troops,484b but that it can include financial aid, training facilities, 
transit privileges and the supply of arms, as well as diplomatic support. 
The exception that this constitutes to the general rules of international 
law concerning assistance to groups acting to overthrow a particular 
regime has developed via the right of self-determination and the extent of 
assistance permitted in African situations has emerged as a result of the 
clear interpretation afforded by African practice of UN resolutions and 
declarations.
(484a) Higgins has argued that "the promotion of the right of self-
determination is counterbalanced by considerations of stability" 
and that "until the rebels have established themselves with a 
status tantamount to that traditionally regarded as meriting a 
recognition of belligerency, normal relations including the 
supply of arms may continue with the recognised government" 
op.cit. p.103. It is submitted that in self-determination 
situations as previously defined under international law, this 
is misleading. The concepts of stability and belligerency are 
not regarded as directly relevant in modern interpretations of 
the use of force in such situations.
(484b) As distinct from small numbers of non-combatant military 
advisers.
It can, therefore, be seen that the concept of self-determination 
has affected the traditional rules of international law relating to 
intervention. In recognised self-determination situations, the relative 
status in law of the parties will determine the appropriate rules once 
the appropriate threshhold of force has been reached. The classic 
criteria concerned with effectiveness, extent of control over territory 
and military success have given way in such cases to a consideration 
of the positions in law of the parties to the conflict in the light 
of the framework created by the principle of self-determination. Thus, 
the traditional approach based upon facts associated primarily with 
territory has been superseded and replaced by a status-oriented approach.
3 Intervention in Post-Self-Determination Situations4840
International law does not recognise any remaining rights to self- 
determination by sub-national groups once the colonially defined people 
has obtained sovereignty. The only exception to the general proposition 
that the people cannot exercise self-determination more than once is 
South Africa as a result of its systematical and State organised 
application of racial discrimination. Therefore, if a conflict breaks 
out after independence, the ordinary rules of international law dealing 
with intervention become relevant. The presumption in favour of the 
State authorities that exists in non-belligerency situations under the 
law, in fact reflects another aspect of self-determination and that is 
the emphasis upon the free exercise of sovereignty by the people of a 
State via the recognised State machinery. Each State has the right 
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and 
cultural systems without external interference and this necessarily 
involves refraining from intervening as regards the governmental
(484c) See in particular Moore loc.cit; Falk loc.cit. and Higgins
loc.cit.
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authorities and processes of any given State. Where a part of the
population of the independent State rebel, immediate aid to the rebels
would prima facie offend against the principle of self-determination a-
defined in international law. This applies all the more so, when the
rebels concerned are aiming not at capturing control of the government
to replace it, but at the secession of a portion of the territory of
the State concerned. In this situation, aid to the rebel secessionists
would infringe the fundamental rule of international law that "every
State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other
485State or country". In so doing the principle of self-determination
would be undermined not enhanced. Should any secessionist enterprise
meet with success, its defect in title would be cured by international 
486recognition.
(a) Intervention in Struggles to Overthrow Governments
(i) The Zaire-Shaba Crisis 1977-8
In March 1977, the Zaire Province of Shaba (the former 
Katanga) was invaded by members of the Congolese National Liberation 
Front (FNLC) most of whom had been living in Angola. The reported aim 
of the campaign was not the secession of Shaba, but the overthrow of 
General Mobutu and the creation of a government of national unity.
Mobutu appealed to western countries for help. The USA provided a grant 
of $lm of non-military aid, while the French despatched military equipment, 
Morocco sent troops, transported to the scene of the conflict by French 4856
(485) See the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and 
paragraph 6 of the resolution 1514 (XV).
(486) Eg. the Bangladesh case. The legality of India's intervention
remains in doubt, see Okeke, Controversial Subjects of 
Contemporary International Law 1974. pp.l42-K7 ~ ~
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planes. By the end of May, the rebels had retreated into Angola.487 
In May 1978, however, rebel forces captured the town of Kolwezi in 
Shaba. A western powers operation was mounted to rescue Europeans in 
the town. US planes supplied military equipment, while French and 
Belgian troops parachuted into Kolwezi. This mission was undertaken
4 Q O
at the request of the Zaire government. The French troops, ln fact
continued the operation and pursued the rebel forces. French speaking
African States supported the French intervention, as did Nigeria
489Egypt and other countries. Angola was accused of aiding the rebels
490but denied doing so. A Pan-African force was sent to the province
491to replace the French troops. Despite opposition to both the French
492and "Pan-African" operations, there appeared to be no argument that
such interventions were legally, as distinct from politically, wrong
The case can be seen as support for the accepted view that a recognised
government may call on outside assistance, even military intervention
in certain situations. On the other hand, no State was prepared to admit
aiding the rebels, a fact which is significant in that it tends to
underline the view that such aid would be unlawful intervention in the
493affairs of a State.
Africa Research Bulletin, March 1977 
op.cit. footnote 83 pp.95-6. * pp.4348-51, and Cervenka
(488) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, p.4855. The stated aim was
K to protect French and foreign residents of Kolwezi and to re­
establish security there, ibid.
(489) Ibid p.4860. A Franco-African summit attended by 20 African
' leaders unanimously endorsed the French action, ibid p.4861.
(490) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1978, pp.4890-1.
(491) This consisted of troops from Morocco, Senegal, Central African 
Empire, Togo, Egypt, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, ibid p.4891, 
Morocco stated that the force was intervening because of external 
involvement in the Zaire situation, ibid.
(492) See ibid pp.4892-3.
(493) Note, that in October 1965, the 0AU adnnt^ « r, ...
Problem of Subversion in which member-states vlldleTV'T th® 
tolerate subversive activities aimed at f e n /  dg®d not to 
AHG/Bea 27 (II). Note al.o that »ember-Statea,
226 (1966) and 241 (1967) the use by Portuall o ITa™  .resolutlo”s
of operations to overthrow the Congolese JL*- * A“6ola as a base 
condemned. See Akehurst, op.cit. pp.264-6 nfflen was unanimously
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(ii) Chad
In the continuing struggle between the government of Chad and
the National Liberation Front, Frolinat, foreign aid has been given to
both sides. France officially announced on July 19th 1977 that it had
given military aid to the Chad government to enable it to fight the 
494rebels. This was provided following an appeal by the Chad government 
and within the framework of bilateral accords. By April 1978 this aid 
consisted, according to the French Minister of Defence, of some 1 200 men 
and aircraft including 10 Jaguar fighter bombers.49 596 4978 The US declared 
that the intervention of French troops was justified since it was a 
result of an appeal by the government of Chad.496a By Summer 1978 it 
had become clear that only the activities of the French troops prevented 
the advancing Frolinat forces from capturing the Chadian capital.49^ 
Libya4"  has provided aid to the rebel forces and, it has been alleged,
(494) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1977, p.4492. The rebellion had
1 broken out in the north of Chad in 1966, ibid, and French troops
and equipment sent in 1968. These troops were withdrawn in 1971, 
see Hollick, "French Intervention in Africa in 1978", The World 
Today, February 1979, pp-71, 73.
(495) Ibid.
(496) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1978, p.4821. See ibid March
 ^ ' 1976 p.3975, regarding the original agreements relating to French
military "coopérants". There was a report by a Spanish journalist 
in June 1978 that some 3,000 French troops were involved in Chad 
and that they had virtually replaced the Chad army which had been 
decimated in battle and had suffered a large rate of desertions, 
Africa Research Bulletin, June 1978, p.4884.
(4 9 6a) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, p.4849. The US refused to
' draw a parallel between French and Cuban presences in Africa since
France had "unique relations with some of its former colonies in 
Africa for obvious historical and cultural reasons" ibid. If this 
is intended as a qualitative legal justification for intervention, 
it must surely be incorrect. However, it may only have been 
intended to explain the greater political acceptability of such 
intervention by French speaking African States.
(497) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1978, p.4924.
(498) For the Libyan-Chad border situation and the annexation of
* Chadian territory by Libya see infra, Chapter 8, p.594.
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troops as well.4"  Although Chad recognised Frolinat in Spring 1978,49 500 501
Libyan aid would appear to be unlawful, certainly in the earlier phases 
of the operation.
(b) Intervention in Struggles for Secession
501(i) The Congo 1960-64
The UN became involved at a fairly early stage of the Congolese 
Civil War and the Katangan secession, more specifically following the re­
entry of Belgian troops purportedly to protect its nationals in the wake 
of the mutiny of the Force Publique. Although the UN was at first against 
the use of its troops sent as military assistance to the Congo to 
intervene in domestic conflicts, it gradually became more and more drawn 
into the problem of the Katangan secession. The Security Council defined 
the mandate of the UN in the situation in terms of the protection of the 
territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. All 
States were called upon to refrain from any action which might undermine 
these.502 The General Assembly called for UN assistance with a view to 
preserving the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of 
the Congo.503 Ultimately, the Security Council resolved to take all 
appropriate measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, including the use 
of force.504 In resolution S/5002, the Council underlined UN support for
(499) See eg. Africa Research Bulletin, July 1977, p.4492, and ibid 
June 1978, p.4884. Libyan aid to the rebels appears to have been 
the reason for a split in Frolinat and the defection of one section 
to the government side, ibid August 1978, p.4958, See also ibid 
September 1978, pp.4982-3.
(500) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1978, p.4781. This stated 
recognition was presumably of a party to the Internal conflict.
It would not appear to have been intended as a recognition of 
belligerency. It occurred within the context of a ceasefire agreement guaranteed by Libya and Niger.
(501) See supra, Chapter 5, p,306.
(502) See resolution S/4405.
(503) Resolution 1474 ES-IV.
(504) S/4741.
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the unity of the Congo and condemned secessionist activities. UN forces 
were involved in military action to end the secession on the basis of 
this resolution. African States were against the secession505 and 
condemned any assistance to the Katangans. It should be noted that the 
role played by the Belgians and by foreign mercenaries was significant 
as regards the reactions of the UN throughout the period. Without such 
foreign support, the secession would probably not have occurred and 
would not have been suppressed with the use of UN force. Nevertheless 
the events constitute support for the legal position in favour of the 
recognised governmental authorities with regard to third party 
intervention.
(ii) Nigeria. 1967-70506
OAU opinion and that of the majority of African States was 
against the Biafran secession. At the Kinshasa Conference of the 
organisation in September 1969 a resolution was adopted condemning
secession and recognising the Nigerian situation as a purely internal 
507affair. A mission sent by the Conference to Nigeria declared that
any solution to the crisis had to be in the context of Nigeria's unit
508 yand territorial integrity. Arms were supplied to the federal
government of Nigeria by the UK, USSR, Czechoslovakia and Egypt and
Biafra received some supplies from France and Portuguese sources.509
However, as far as Biafra was concerned very little aid was forthcoming
from foreign governments.510 Four African States (Tanzania, Gabon,
(505) Supra, Chapter 5, p,306 et seq.
(506) See supra, Chapter 5, p.316.
(507) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1969, p.856,
(508) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1967, p.901,
(509) See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unitv. 1977. m>.97-8
See also Stremlau, The International Politics of the Niveri««
Civil War 1977, pp.220-23, 296-9.
(510) Stremlau, op.cit. p.223.
509
Ivory Coast and Zambia) in fact recognised Biafra during Spring 1968,
although feelings of sympathy for the suffering Biafrans appears to have
511been a strong consideration. The overwhelming majority of African 
States, however, accepted Nigeria's unity and territorial integrity.51 12 5134*6
Had Biafra succeeded in ensuring its existence in any permanent fashion, 
it is likely that more African States might have considered recognition, 
but its failure to do so meant a reliance in legal terms by States upon 
the notion of self-determination as reinforcing the sovereignty and 
integrity of independent States.
513(iii) Eritrea
The Eritrean Liberation Movement was formed in Cairo by
refugees from the province in the late 1950's and by 1961 was firmly
514established as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). ELF offices were
opened subsequently in a number of other Arab capitals. In the early
515 r iyears, Egypt provided some support to the ELF, as did Sudan and 
Somalia.517 Syria and Iraq gave aid also,518 but by the mid-1970's it 
appeared that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided the main financial support
(511) Supra, p.316 et seq.
(512) See Africa Research Bulletin, September 1968 n 174
September 1969, p.1517. > and ibid
(513) See supra, Chapter 5, p.323.
(514) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.21611, and Leaum t
Conflict in the Horn of Africa. 1977, p.23. S 80(1 Lee
(515) See Boyce, "The Internationalising of Internal War •
the Arabs and the Case of Eritrea" 5 Journal r EthioP1a
Comparative Studies, 1972, pp.51, 58-60. n ernat*onal and
(516) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.21611.
(517) Legura and Lee op.cit. p.25.
(518) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.24507, and Africa Research 
Bulletin, December 1970, pp.1056-7.
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while Libya was the major arms supplier. By this time, there were
520three Eritrean liberation organisations. Until the Ethiopian 
revolution in 1974, some assistance was also provided by the USSR and 
China. However, the OAU attitude adopted by the non-Arab members of 
the organisations, has remained one of central concern with the 
principle of the preservation of colonial boundaries and the territorial 
integrity of States and thus it has not supported the Eritrean struggle.519 2021 5234
In 1976 the USSR began supplying arms and advisers to the new 
522 523Ethiopian government. Unlike the Ogaden case, Cuban troops did not
intervene massively on the side of the Ethiopians, but they were, however,
introduced to Eritrea to strengthen the position of government forces
523abesieged in the main towns of the province. The Eritrean movement
EPLF, declared in the Spring of 1978 that some 3,500 Cuban troops were
stationed in the province. However, there appeared to be no sign that
Cuba was joining the Ethiopian offensive in the area on anything like a
big scale and Russia, too, was cautious in its support of the Ethiopian
524attempt to achieve a military victory in Eritrea. The Ethiopian head 
of State, in fact, denied in June 1978 that Russian or Cuban troops were
52*tplaying a supportive combat role against the Eritrean movements.
(519) Legum and Lee op.cit. p.26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation 
also gave aid to the Eritrean movements, ibid.
(520) Ibid pp.57-8.
(521) See eg. Cervenka "Eritrea : Struggle for Self-Determination or 
Secession" 12 Akrika Spectrum, 1977, pp.37, 45-6.
(522) Legum and Lee op.cit. pp.12-3.
(523) See infra, p.511.
(523a) Africa Research Bulletin, January 1978, p.4705.
(524) Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, pp.4840-1.
(525) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1978, pp.4886-7.
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Cuban advice and Soviet military suppliers, nevertheless, could reasonably 
be assumed to have been indispensable.
526(iv) The Ogaden
The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was established in
1961 and Somalis living in Ethiopia were recruited for training. Those
recruits served in the Somali army and became the leaders of the struggle
for the Ogaden.52^ In January 1976, the WSLF claimed additional
provinces in the south of Ethiopia, so that the area alleged to be
inhabited by Somali peoples consisted of some 625,000 square kilometres.526 728 529301
529Throughout that year, violence increased. By May 1977, it was 
confirmed that between 3,000 and 6,000 heavily armed WSLF members had
530invaded the Ogaden region from Somalia. The attack met with success.
Strategic bridges were destroyed and sections of the vital Addis-Djibouti
531railway line were taken over by the WSLF. In June, Ethiopia claimed
532that regular Somalia soldiers were involved in the fighting, and 
Kenya complained that 3,000 Somali troops had attacked a border police 
post.533 534 By August, it was clear that a full scale war was in progress,
and that the WSLF had captured a large part of the Ogaden 534 An attempt
(526) See supra, Chapter 5, p.297.
(527) Legum and Lee op.cit. p.33.
(528) Ibid and Keesings Contemporary Archives p.28633,
(529) Ibid p.68,
(530) Ibid p,87 and Keesings Contemporary Archives p.28633
(531) Ibid and Keesings Contemporary Archives p.28634.
(532) Ibid.
(533) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1977, p.4496. This was denied *
Somalia, ibid, but it arouaed Kenyaa ta.ra „ „ by
E t h l ° P l a ' “  B u U e u » ,
(534) Keesings Contemporary Archives p.28634, and Legum and Lee 
op.cit. p, 88,
to mediate by an eight nation OAU commission failed when a WSLF 
delegation was refused a hearing and Somalia boycotted the closing 
session of the commission. The commission reaffirmed the principle of
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respect for borders as in existence at the date of independence and
535the territorial integrity of member-States of the OAU. Although
536Somalia denied any involvement in the Ogaden at this stage,
remains of Somali tanks and planes were shown to correspondents in that
region.53 637 Somalia called for the application of the principle of
self-determination to the inhabitants of the area and diplomatic
relations between it and Ethiopia were broken at the start of September,
with the latter declaring that a full scale war was in progress between
the countries. 538 The fall of the main Ethiopian tank and radar base in
the area, Jijiga, and the strategic passes around it on September 14th
1977, after a particularly heavy battle, marked the greatest extent of
the WSLF advance. 539 540 At about this time, the Soviet Union began
supplying Ethiopia with military equipment, including large numbers of
tanks and planes, and Cuba sent advisers. Both countries expressed
540total support for Ethiopia's struggle. Somalia denounced its treaty 
of friendship with the USSR and expelled all Russian advisers and broke 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, claiming that up to 15,000 Cuban troops
(535) Africa Research Bulletin, August 1977, pp,4525-6,
(536) Ibid. Somalia did say, however, that "off duty soldiers were 
allowed to "volunteer" to serve with the WSLF, Legum and Lee 
op.cit. p.88.
(537) Ibid p .4530.
(538) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1977, p.4556. It was claimed 
that Somalia had sent its regular armed forces into the Ogaden, 
ibid p.4558.
(539) Ibid pp.4557-8.
(540) ibid and Africa Research Bulletin, October1977, p.4592, Kenya 
also expressed full support for Ethiopia; ibid p.4591.
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were fighting in the Ogaden. The Ethiopian counter-offensive,
spearheaded by Soviet equipment manned by Russians and Cubans, commenced
in early 1978. On February 11th, Somalia officially announced that its
regular army was being sent into the Ogaden. Until this point, Somalia
had admitted moral and material support for the WSLF, but had denied any
542involvement by its regular forces. This action did not affect the
situation and on March 9th, Somalia declared that its forces were being
543withdrawn from the Ogaden, Ethiopian forces stopped at the border,
but threatened to cross it if Somali support for the WSLF continued. 541 2344 546
545In fact, WSLF activity continued, with pledges of Somali support,
and Ethiopian planes carried out air raids on two towns in northern
o 14 546Somalia.
Somalia received no international support for its expansionist 
activities. The eight-nation OAU good offices commission, in calling 
for respect for borders as existing at the date of independence and for 
the principle of territorial integrity, implicitly condemned Somalia 
while west and pro-western States, fearful of the Soviet Union's
541
(541) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1977, p.4651. The USSR had 
ended arms shipments to Somalia, ibid. The US criticised the 
"excessive quantities of weapons" sent to Ethiopia as part of the 
Soviet Union's "unwarranted involvement" in the Horn of Africa, 
ibid, January 1978, p.470. Ethiopia declared that it could 
establish relations and receive aid from whatever quarter, ibid. 
The US estimated that by February 1978 between 800 and 1000 Soviet 
military advisers were in Ethiopia and about 3,000 Cubans, 2,000 
of whom were involved in combat, ibid, February 1978, p.4740.
(542) Africa Research Bulletin, February 1978, p.4742. At this stage, 
the US estimated that between 10,000 and 11,000 Cuban troops were 
in Ethiopia, ibid pp.4743-4.
(543) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1978, p.4773. Somalia announced 
on March 15th that all its regular forces had been withdrawn from 
Ethiopian territory, ibid p.4774. For details of the defeats 
suffered by Somalia see ibid pp.4773-4.
(544) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1978, p.4809.
(545) Ibid May 1978, p.4840. See also ibid July 1978, p.4917.
(546) Ibid June 1978, p,4878.
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ambitions in the area, made it clear that arms aid would only be
forthcoming to defend Somalia's recognised frontiers. Iran and Saudi
Arabia announced they would come to Somalia's assistance if its
547internationally recognised borders were violated. France declared
that, once Somalia withdrew its forces from the Ogaden, it might be
548given military aid. The US called on Somalia to renounce any claims
549to territory in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, African States
550refrained from any support of Somalia’s stance and the OAU called
551for an end to all foreign interference. Kenya expressed strong
552support for Ethiopia, as did the USSR, Cuba and communist countries
in general. Somalia received some financial aid from Iran, Saudi Arabia
553and Abu Dhabi and some equipment from Egypt. It was, however, 
apparent that no State was willing to provide more than token military 
aid while Somali troops were still in the Ogaden, and that no western 
or African States would endorse Somalia's territorial claims in the 
region, It is equally clear that Somalia’s strong moral and material 
support of the WSLF was an illicit intervention in Ethiopia’s internal 547890123
(547) Africa Research Bulletin, December 1977, p.4676 and ibiH 
January 1978, p,4701.
(548) Africa Research Bulletin, February 1978, p.4 7 43.
(549) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1978, p.47 76. At the b 1 
of June, the US announced that it would send’a delegatiof 
assess Somalia’s defensive weapons requirements after Som»i< 
gave a written undertaking not to alter boundaries bv
ibid June 1978, p,4878. y Iorc® ’
(550) Ibid.
(551) Ibid January 1978, p.4702, in a press statement,
(552) Supra, note 533.
(553) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1978. d 477fi v
carrying 19 artill.ry ana
forced to land in Kenya. This action by Ecvot *** & WSS
military equipment for Somalia was severely^riticised b t ^ ^ 0^  OAU, ibid February 1978, p.4742. ' y crlticiset* by the
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affairs, while its invasion of the Ogaden by its regular troops was 
contrary to international legal rules. The support that Ethiopia 
received, on the other hand, was perfectly legitimate as it was 
provided after an appeal by the acknowledged government in the face of 
an act of aggression. The fact that such support extended to vast 
quantities of Russian equipment and some 12,000 Cuban troops should 
not detract from this, especially since no counter-invasion of Somalia 
was attempted.
(c) Intervention in Situations of Authority Vacuum
Angola. While the traditional rules of international law provide 
some guide to the legitimacy of intervention in civil war situations, 
the position where there exists an authority vacuum is rather different. 
This is because of the absence of an accepted government and the 
consequent lack of recognised effectiveness criteria by which to measure 
the status of the insurgent forces. The case of Angola during 1975-6 
illustrates this, especially in the light of the extent of foreign 
intervention.
On 15 January 1975, the Portuguese government signed an independence
agreement at Alvor with the three Angolan nationalist movements, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total
554Independence of Angola (UNITA). This provided for the three movements 
to work with Portugal in a transitional government until the date of 
independence, 11 November 1975. However, fighting broke out between the 
MPLA, receiving arms from Russia and Yugoslavia, and the FNLA strongly 
supported with Zairean money (some of it from the US) and arms. 54 55
(554) See Africa^Cqntemporary Record 1974/5. 197s rr B339 C917 0
further supra, Chapter 6 . ' Uil7, See
(555) Legura and Hodges, After Angola.1976. pp.13-14
516
In June 1975 the three movements signed the Nakuru agreement, under OAU 
pressure, with a view to restoring peace in Angola, but this rapidly 
broke down. By September, the MPLA appeared in a commanding military 
position, controlling more territory than its rivals and 11 of the 
16 provincial capitals, as well as Luanda, the national capital, and 
practically the entire seaboard of Angola. Large quantities of Soviet 
and Yugoslav arms appeared to arrive in Angola for the MPLA as from
March 1975 and Cuban troops seem to have aided the MPLA, initially in
557relatively small numbers, as from July of that year. The US began
sending arms to the FNLA and Unita movements (as distinct from money)
558in September 1975.
The turning point in the crisis came on 23 October 1975, when South
African forces invaded Angola as a result of earlier negotiations with
559FNLA representatives. By early November, the MPLA had suffered heavy
losses, US supplies were arriving almost daily from Zaire and increasing
numbers of South African troops were entering the country. However,
Russian tanks, rocket launchers and troop carriers were being supplied
to the MPLA in large quantities and some 1,500 - 3,000 Cuban combat troops
560arriving from staging posts in neighbouring Congo* This was at a 
time when the legal authority in the country was vested (theoretically at 
least) in the coalition transitional administration of Portugal and the 567890
(556) Ibid pp.52 and 69-75.
(557) Ibid pp.19-21.
(558) Ibid p.27. However, there were suggestions that small Q u a n t a
of arms were shipped in June, ibid. ¿quantities
(559) Ibid p.15. South African forces had conducted raids on SWAP0 
camps in Southern Angola in preceding months, and had occupied 
positions around the strategic Ruacana Falls in August, ibid p.36. 
Estimates of the numbers of South African troops entering Angola 
varied from 12,000 to 4,000, ibid p.37.
(560) Ibid.
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three Angolan movements. Until October 1975, the accepted OAU policy
was that a government of national unity combining the MPLA, FNLA and
Unita should rule an independent Angola and that there should be no
562external intervention. The meeting of Central African Foreign
C/j n
Ministers*5 on November 16-19 at Libreville, Gabon, condemned all foreign
, „ . 563aintervention in Angola from whatever source.
On November 10, the departing Portuguese High Commissioner
solemnly proclaimed the independence and full sovereignty of Angola as
from midnight that day. However, sovereignty was vested in "the Angolan
people" as a whole and not in any particular government. 561 2364 56* Thus, as of
the date of independence no recognised authority was in being in Angola
and no legal government. In the centre of the country, the MPLA declared
the independence of the People's Republic of Angola, while simultaneously
the FNLA and Unita proclaimed the independence of the Popular and 
* 565Democratic Republic of Angola. In such circumstances, it was left to 
the tests of effectiveness and success to assert themselves. Some thirty 
States, led by Communist bloc countries and the other former Portuguese 
African territories, recognised the MPLA government. No State recognised 
the FNLA-Unita government. The majority of African States did not at this 
stage depart from their policy of recognising neither claimant. The
(561) However on 16 August 1975, the acting Portuguese High Commissioner 
announced that he was taking over full executive powers in the 
country in the absence of any functioning government, Africa 
Contemporary Record 1975/6, 1976, p.A6 8 .
(562) See ibid pp.A67-8 and A71-2. See further supra, p.348.
(563) Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Gabon and Zaire.
(563a) Legum and Hodges op.cit. p.30.
(564) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, p.3819.
(565) Ibid.
Ibid p.3820, and Legum and Hodges op.cit. pp.17 and 56.
561
(566)
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discovery of the South African intervention, however, caused some States
to reassess this policy. Nigeria reversed its previous policy and,
567citing the South African involvement, recognised the MPLA regime.
Dahomey and Tanzania followed suit, giving the same reason, as did a
number of other African States.56^8 The South African intervention
caused the USSR to increase its arms supplies and Cuba to send several
568thousand combat troops to the MPLA, and this swung the military
balance against the FNLA-Unita coalition and their backers. By
February 1978, the MPLA had effectively defeated the other forces and
made considerable territorial gains and South Africa had withdrawn its
troops.567 869 570 Recognition from a number of countries thereafter followed.
By 10 February , a majority of OAU member-States had recognised
the MPLA government so that the organisation formally admitted the new
State to membership. By late February over 70 countries had recognised
570the MPLA government, including the EEC countries and Portugal.
A number of preliminary points can be made about the Angolan 
situation. From January 1975 to 11 November of that year, the territory 
was technically ruled by a transitional coalition government comprising 
Portugal and the three nationalist movements while legally under 
Portug&l*s sovereignty. Until the end of 1974, aid and assistance to
(567) Ibid p.3824.
(567a) Ibid and Legura and Hodges op.cit. p.56.
(568) Legura and Hodges op.cit. p.57. It was estimated that by mid- 
January 1976, the MPLA was supported by 9,000 Cuban troops,
6,500 ex-Katangese gendarmes and 400 Russian advisers with 
extensive Russian military equipment, including tanks and planes, 
ibid pp.57-8. The London Institute of Strategic Studies later 
declared that South African troops had intervened before the 
Cubans, Africa Research Bulletin May 1976, p.4024.
(569) Ibid p.58.
(570) Ibid, note that in January, the OAU had been unable to adopt a 
resolution on the Angolan question as a result of a serious split, 
see Cervenka, op.cit. footnote 437, pp.145-7.
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these organisations could be justified on the basis of the self-
571determination rule; after that time it was more problematic, since
Portugal had agreed to withdraw and gave no sign of wishing to remain.
Nevertheless, since the policy of Portugal, the OAU and ostensibly, at
least, of the MPLA, FNLA and Unita was that a government of national
unity of the three movements was to be the recipient of the grant of
independence, aid to these movements could perhaps be regarded as
legitimate as aid to component parts of a transitional government that
5 72was to proceed to full sovereignty. It would not appear that such 
assistance could be justified under the self-determination rule, since 
Portugal had ceased to act forcibly to deprive the people of the 
territory of their right. The South African intervention in October 
1975 was, however, qualitatively different, both as regards the extent 
of the involvement (in terms of thousands of troops plus supporting 
equipment) and the identity of the intervening party. President Nyerere 
noted in November that the USSR had supplied the MPLA in its anti­
colonial struggle over the years and had thereby gained a certain
573legitimacy for its continuing supply. The point was also made that
whereas the presence of. Cuban troops could be deplored, it constituted
no threat to black Africa, but the same was not felt about the South
574African intervention. The fact that the South African troop 571234
(571) Supra, p.483 et seq.
(572) But the fact that the movements were fighting each other during 
this time does underline the problems of this approach.
(573) It is interesting to note that where other foreign States have 
supplied arms in situations of civil strife, US practice has 
distinguished between traditional and non-traditional suppliers 
in determining the legality of such actions. See Digest of US 
Practice in International Law 1976, p.7.
(574) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1975, pp,3824-5.
520
involvement preceded the entry of large numbers of Cuban soldiers
reinforces this argument. It appeared to have implications with regard
not only to the character of an eventual government of Angola but also
575as regards the Namibia situation.
With the Portuguese departure on November 11 and the declaration 
of two rival governments of Angola, the territory ceased to have an 
accepted authority structure. While this did not mean that the territory 
became res nullius, it meant that the question of a recognised government 
was suspended. It also meant that the ultimate test became one of 
territorial control and effectiveness. The majority of recognitions for 
the MPLA, including the important recognition by the OAU, came only after 
this test demonstrated the success of the MPLA side in the war. As far 
as external intervention in the post-independence era was concerned, both 
of the rivals in fact satisfied basic territorial control requirements 
under the belligerency guideline. But it is to be questioned whether 
that test, which relates to the status of forces rebelling against a 
legitimate authority, is relevant to a situation where there is no 
recognised authority. Additionally, of course, no State recognised the 
parties as belligerents.
In such cases, the basic relevant principle of international law 
would seem to be the non-intervention norm stipulated in the Declaration 
on Inadmissibility of Intervention in 1965. This condemned "armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic 
and cultural elements". Other expressions of the prohibition of 
intervention such as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the 1970 *
1575) Security Council resolution 387 (1976) demanded that South Africa 
' cease using Namibia as a base for provocative or aggressive acts
against Angola.
Declaration on Principles of International Law define the object of 
this rule as the State itself, rather than in terms of a recognised 
government within the State. However, the absence of detailed analysis 
of the legitimacy of intervention in authority vacuum States, is 
noticeable. The point of the non-intervention norm, nevertheless, is 
to permit political and economic development within a State free from 
the constraints of external interference. It is in this sense an 
inherent part of the principle of self-determination, whereby peoples 
may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. Outside interventions which 
may distort that are unlawful. It would thus appear that foreign 
intervention which would prejudice the outcome of such a civil war runs 
contrary to one of the fundamental principles of international law.
But such intervention may be permissible where prior foreign interference 
has occurred. In such cases, it may not be necessary for the party 
concerned in the civil struggle to demonstrate that it fulfils the 
conditions specified in the law of belligerency, nor would it appear 
that a presumption in law in favour of any particular party exists.
One should note in this context that both the USSR and the USA
appeared to justify their aid to factions in Angola on the ground of
576prior foreign intervention. 576
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(576) Leguro and Hodges op.cit. pp.18-19 and 25-27, Cuba and South 
Africa both justified their actions in terms of the prior 
intervention of the other, ibid, pp.20-21 and 35-38. It 
could also be argued that since neither side in the civil war 
was the established government, neither could act in the 
name of the State and thus invite foreign aid.
522
■(d) Conclusions
In post-independence situations, the relatively newly established
doctrine of self-determination taken together with the traditional
rules of international law relating to intervention would seem to have
produced a presumption in favour of the established government, Such a
government may, in certain circumstances, seek and receive outside aid,
even including military equipment and foreign troops. The Zaire and
Chad cases demonstrate this. In addition, the OAU Ministerial Council
unanimously adopted a resolution emphasising that in the exercise of its
sovereignty, each country had the right to call for aid from any other
577nation if it judged its independence or security to be in danger.
This was reaffirmed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU at Khartoum, which also stressed the principle of territorial
integrity,57 78 579 However, it is less clear where a genuine internal revolt
578ais involved that the government may legitimately request foreign aid.
The traditional law states that once rebels have established a 
degree of control and effectiveness in a determinate piece of territory, 
with an administrative capacity, then a duty of non-intervention may 
arise with regard to them. However, as Higgins notes, "if there is 
evidence of support of the insurgents from foreign States, the government 
may call for help from a foreign power itself, even if the fighting on
(577) Ibid July 1978, p.4911.
(578) Ibid p.4913. The Assembly also condemned attempts by non-African 
States to create instability on the continent, ibid. The 
Conference was characterised by disputes over the relative
legitimacy of French and Cuban involvements in Africa, ibid. It 
was estimated that in May 1978, French military personnel stationed 
in some 23 African States numbered 13,595, while Cuban military 
personnel numbered about 34,000 in some 12 countries, ibid, May, 
1978, p.4859.
(578a) See Akehurst, op.cit. p.267. In both Zaire and Chad foreign 
involvement would appear to have been the case.
(579) See eg. Higgins. The Development of International Law Through the 
political Organs of the United Nations 1963. p.211.
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580its territory has reached the dimensions of a civil war". This
proposition is supported in African practice by the case of Chad, whose
government in Spring 1978 controlled barely a quarter of the country
following a Libyan-supported advance by Frolinat rebels. The rapid
581despatch of French troops thereupon occurred. Another example of
this would be the Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia, following the
capture of the Ogaden by the Somali-supported WSLF. However, it is
important to distinguish between internal conflicts aimed at replacing
authority structures and those where secession is the aim. In the
former case and in the absence of foreign support of the insurgents,
the legal position would be that success on their part, territorially
defined, would prevent intervention against them by foreign States.
But where the insurgents are seeking secession, it seems that this rule
does not apply and that foreign intervention at the invitation of the
accepted government would not be precluded. It is believed that this
is demonstrated by the Biafra secession case. Where the secessionists
are backed by foreign powers then a right of counter-intervention
clearly exists, as shown by the Katanga and Ogaden cases. Of course,
should the insurgents succeed in establishing a separate State as a
matter of fact and supported by international recognition, international
582law will accept the situation.
It is nevertheless believed that in such secessionist conflicts, 
Lauterpacht's approach that, provided the conditions of belligerency are 58012
(580) Ibid, Moore declares that "assistance to a widely recognised 
government is permissible to offset impermissible assistance 
to insurgents" loc.cit. p.281.
(581) Keesings Contemporary Archivesp,28977,
(582) S e e  further supra, Chapter 6, p.358 et seq.
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"the contesting parties are legally entitled to be treated
583as if they are engaged in a war waged by two sovereign States", is 
inadequate.
In the case of civil strife, in a State where no established 
government exists and the parties concerned are struggling to win control 
over people and territory and secure foreign recognition and support, 
international law posits, it would seem, a non-intervention rule so as 
to allow the factual situation in the territory to be resolved by 
internal elements alone. Where, however, a foreign State does intervene, 
other States may seek to nullify this by the interposition of 
financial and military aid. Although such instances of civil war in a 
recognised State with an authority vacuum are likely to be exceptional, 
it does appear as if insufficient attention has been paid to the 
problem from the point of view of international legal doctrine.
The role of the UN and the OAU in situations of internal conflict 
is worthy of mention. Such organisations may well fulfill a 
legitimating function with regard to intervention as, for example, the 
UN in the Katanga crisis, especially where it is uncertain whether 
particular factual criteria have been satisfied. Conversely, these 
organisations may serve to establish the illegitimacy of intervention
584in particular situations as, for example, the OAU in the Biafra case. 
This is in addition, of course, to the part played by the UN and the 
OAU with regard to general discussions of the nature of intervention. 583
(583) Op.cit. P«175'
~ algo security Council resolution 387 (1975) condemning South 
' 84i Africa's "aggression against the People's Republic of Angola” 
adopted by 9 votes to none with 5 abstentions.
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VI - The Use of Force to Acquire Territory
Briggs wrote in 1940 that "for centuries title to territory
acquired by conquest has been regarded as valid against the rest of the
world". However, this approach has now been replaced by the concept
of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. A
variety of international instruments proved relevant in the development
586of this principle. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that
member-States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organisation. The
question, therefore, is that if the use of force against States is
prohibited in international law, can title to territory acquired as a
result of such illegal activities logically be recognised? The response
587has clearly to be in the negative, for ex injuria jus non oritur.
While illegality cannot in general create legal rights for the offending
party, legal rights may arise in certain cases for third States acting
in good faith as well as legal obligations with respect to the
wrongdoer.588 The doctrine of inter-temporal law will operate to protect
589existing titles based on conquest, but as from the entry into force of
/cog\ "Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the 
Doctrine" PASIL 1940, p.72.
X* the Porter Conventions of 1007 forbidding the use of force to 
(58b) b * debtg> the League of Nations Covenant which imposed a
ling-off period if a dispute arose between member-States likely 
t°°iead to a rupture in relations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928 the parties to which renounced recourse to war as an 
instrument of national policy. See generally Jennings, The 
a milsition of Territory in International Law 1963, pp.52-68, and
1 9 ^
,co_. <n,4. ia regarded by Lauterpacht as "one of the fundamental maxims
<587> of jurisprudence" op.cit, p.420, but cf. Kelsen Principles of 
International Law 2nd ed. 1966, pp.316-7
Lauterpacht op.cit. p.421. Note that an illegal possessor of
(588) w i U  be subject to and benefit from the rules of
belligerent occupation.
(589) Jennings op.cit. p.53.
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the Charter, if not earlier, new titles cannot thus he created. 
Article 11 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States 
declared that "every State has the duty to refrain from recognising 
any territorial acquisition by another State acting in violation of
CQ1Article 9", while Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) on the 
Middle East situation emphasised "the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war".
590
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law underlined
this point,'noting that "the territory of a State shall not be the
object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use
of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use
592of force shall be recognised as legal". The Definition of Aggression 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 provided in paragraph 3 of 
Article 5 that "no territorial acquisition or special advantage
593resulting from aggression are or shall be recognised as lawful". 590123
(590) Note eg. that the Assembly of the League of Nations resolved i 
1932 that "it was incumbent upon members of the League of Nation 
not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which mav h 7  
brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the Lea *
Nations or the Pact of Paris" LNOJ Sp.Suppl, 10 1, pp.87 8fU6 c* 
also Brownlie op.cit. footnote 2, pp.418-9. * * ’ See
(591) Article 8 prohibited resort to war as an instrument of natio 
policy and the threat or use of force contrary to Artin!
the UN Charter, ■ tlCle 2(4) of
(592) The Declaration continued by stating that "nothing in the
shall be construed as affecting: (a) provisions of the Chart1”6601”8 
any international agreement prior to the Charter regime and vli 
under international law; or (b) the power of the Securitv ( w l « ?  
under the Charter". m y  Council
(593) The preamble to the Definition reaffirmed that "the terHt
State shall not be violated by being the object even temporarii^ V 
military occupation or of any other measures of force taken * * °f
another State in contravention of the Charter and that it »,Dy 
be the object of acquisition by another State resulting f r o m W h 0* 
measures or the threat thereof". The Working Groun nf t>, c U h 
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression d e c U r e d ^ h a r ^  
paragraph 3 of Article 5 was not to be construed "so as tn J. * „  
the established principles of international law relating t.PJ®Judic® 
inadmissibility of territorial acquisition resulting from th~ 
threat or use of force", A/AC.134/L.46. the
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Egypt and Syria had in fact sought to broaden the prohibition to cover
594acquisitions arising from any use of force, but this was not accepted.
Ferencz makes the valuable point that in view of the state of international 
595legal doctrine, the reference to territorial acquisition was
redundant and reflected "the overwhelming concern for territory and
596national borders".
Similarly, it should be noted that territorial acquisition which 
results from a treaty imposed by coercion will not be valid in law.
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 
a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use 
of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in 
the UN Charter. However, it has to be realised that most peace 
treaties will reflect the existing balance of power between the parties 
and a conceptual distinction has to be drawn between coercion and 
legitimate pressure. Where that line is drawn will depend upon the 
circumstances of the case, particularly the overt stance of the weaker 
party and also the perceptions of the international community.
The question arises at this stage as to whether the use of force in 
lawful circumstances, eg. in self-defence, may found title to territory, 
Jennings is clear that it cannot and writes that "it would be a curious 
law of self-defence that permitted the defender in the course of his 
defence to seize and keep the resources and territory of his attacker" . 594 6798
(594) A/9019, p.23 and A/9619, p.20.
(595) See Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force" 81 HR 1952, 
pp,455, 481.
(596) Op.cit. p.45.
(597) In the ILC Commentary on this Article, it was stated that the 
Commission believed that the invalidity of a treaty procured by 
the illegal threat or use of force was a principle de lege lata 
in contemporary international law, see the Yearbook of the ILC 
1966, pp.246-7.
(598) Op.cit. p.55.
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Eli Lauterpacht, however, has declared that to delete the word "unlawful"
from the phrase "territorial acquisition by the unlawful use of force"
would be to "turn an important safeguard of legal principle into an
aggressor’s Charter. For if force can never be used to effect lawful
territorial change, then if territory has once changed hands as a result
of the unlawful use of force the illegitimacy of the position thus
established is sterilised by the prohibition upon the use of force to
599restore the lawful sovereign". But if the unlawful use of force 
cannot found title (and this is universally agreed) title cannot then 
pass to the wrongdoer and the right of self-defence remains in the 
dispossessed until the situation is either rectified or accepted. Title 
remains in the lawful owner. Entry onto the territory of an aggressor 
by the intended victim in pursuance of self-defence is perfectly 
legitimate and will set in motion the laws relating to belligerent 
occupation. 59 600 Title cannot thereby be transferred in the absence of 
agreement, but neither can the new occupant be compelled to undertake 
an immediate withdrawal prior to such agreement. 601 it should be noted 
that the 1974 Consensus Definition of Aggression expressly reaffirmed 
that the territory of a State could not be the object of military 
occupation or of any other measures of force taken by another State 
in contravention of the Charter.
Jennings has argued that the acquisition of territory by the 
illicit use of force might be legitimised by the use of the concept of 
recognition by the international community, since "the traditional
(599) Jerusalem and the Holy Places 1968, p,52,
(600) It is important to distinguish clearly between acquisition
title to territory by force and belligerent occupation See 
Wright, "The Middle East Crisis" 64 AJIL, 1970 p 74 ’ d
Higgins "The Place of International Law in the Settlement of 
Disputes by the Security Council" ibid, p,7. °f
(601) See eg. Stone Conflict Through Consensu« io77| ^
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procedure by which the law is adjusted to fact - by which indeed, the
law when occasion requires may seem to embrace illegality - is the
procedure of recognition". It appears, however, that this may now
be an arguable proposition since both the 1970 Declaration on Principles
and the 1974 Definition of Aggression prohibit recognition of the
acquisition of territory by aggression. Probably the better view is to
accept that the disposition of territory should follow an agreement
603between the parties directly concerned.
African doctrine has consistently stressed the principles of 
sovereignty of States and territorial integrity. With regard to the 
Middle East situation, the OAU member-States stressed the inadmissibili 
of acquiring territory by force. 602 304 * This »as enshrined in the program*, 
of action adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit of March ¿y/7 , which underlined
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of all States and affirmed adherence in addition to the 
principles of non-interference in internal affairs of States non 
aggression, self-determination and the illegality of the forcible
CAR
occupation and annexation of territory. °
Where a State's borders are delimited, demarcated and accepted by 
the international community, no problems should arise with regard t 
practical application of the relevant norms protecting territorial 
integrity and sovereignty and prohibiting the acquisition of territory 
by force. However, a number of borders lack this certainty and
(602) Op.cit. p.62.
(603) See eg. Rosenne, "Directions for a Middle East Settlement
Some Underlying Problems», in The Middle E««*- r,-. .Tfmt
International Law (ed. Haldermann) 1969", p,59'~ ~~1-----~”
(604) See eg. resolutions CM/Res 134 (X), AHG/Res 53 (V) 
AHG/Res 62 (VII), AHG/Res 66 (VIII) and ECM/Res 20 AHG/Res 56 (VIII). (VI)
(605) Africa Research Bulletin March 1977, pp.434-6. See also 
Cervenka The Unfinished Quest for Unity 1977, pp,156-175
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delimitation and demarcation disputes abound, not least in Africa I
such cases, it is submitted, the apposite rules apply to protect the
party in peaceful possession of the disputed territory.606 607 The Alg i
Moroccan war of 1963 demonstrates the acceptance of 1-1,1 „«a nns proposition.
Large areas of the border were not demarcated and areas were claimed
by Morocco which were in the possession of the French administration of
Algeria and taken by its successor in title, the government of
607independent Algeria. Morocco occupied a series of border posts and 
conflict ensued. Following the mediation of the President of Mali and 
the Ethiopian Emperor, an agreement was signed at Bamako in October 1963 
In November, an extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers 
was held which declared that OAU member-states scrupulously respect all
the principles” enshrined in the OAU Charter. 608 6091 inti «*+•<, iultimately, agreements
were signed between the two parties which proposed that the frontier 
between them was to be the same as during the colonial period 600
An example of the unlawful use of force in Africa to acquire
territory across internationally accepted borders is provided by the
610Libyan-Chad dispute. Libya claimed that the border was that drawn 
by the Laval-Mussolini agreement of 1935 (which never came into force) 
while Chad maintained that the border was that established by the Fre h 
in the colonial period and accepted by the Franco-Libyan treaty of 19 5 5  
The colonial border was not challenged upon Chad's accession to
(606) See also Higgins op.cit. p.187, Brownlie op.cit nn sno *Bowett op.cit. p.35. P 1 * P P ' 382~ 3 and
(607) Supra, Chapter 5, p.295.
(608) Article III (3) emphasises the principle of respect f ™  +v, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of eaclTKate.
(609) Supra, p.297.
(610) Infra Chapter 8, p.594.
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Independence or when the country joined the UN. Western newspapers
reported In Spring 1975 that Libya had occupied and annexed a 600 mile
strip of northern Chad including the town of Aozou  ^ ,"°“Ou• Libya denied the
annexation but stated that its troops were there protecting road 
engineers working in the area under a bilateral aid agreement it also 
accepted that a Libyan administration was operating in the area 611 
Libya issued a set of new official maps in 1976 including some 37,000 
square miles of northern Chad within Libya’s boundaries.612 Chad 
protested on a number of occasions, but neither bilateral nor 0AU 
attempts to resolve the problem succeeded. A complaint made by Chad to 
the rn Security Council wan later withdrawn, following an Improvement 1» 
Chad-Llbyan relations. No African State has recognised Libya’s claim 
while France has emphasised that it recognised only those borders which 
existed upon Chad’s Independence in I960.613 A„y acceptance of Llhya’a 
revised border, contrary as it is to the OAU's border policy 614 by 
African States is highly improbable. Even if the Libyan claim had more 
substance, the manner of its enforcement is not likely to be endor d
The use of force to acquire territory by a State in order to
incorporate it within its own jurisdiction is thus clearly contrary t
international law and in particular African doctrine and practice a
further example of such unlawful activity was the Ugandan invasion of
Tanzania in November 1978 and purported annexation of nU1 UI a 710 square mil©
strip of Tanzania territory between the recognised border and the
(611) See Africa Contemporary Record 1975/6, 1976, pp.B70 m d  B4~  „
See also UNMC March 1978, p.8. y B465-6.
(612) Ibid 1976/7, 1977, p,B75.
(613) See further infra, P .594. The reticence demonstrated bv Af H ,
States may be attributable partly to Libya’s strength 
weakness, and possibly uncertainty as to the flcts and m e r ^ ’8 
of the dispute. ana ®erlts
(614) Supra, p.272 et seq.
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6 XSKagera river. Within a short period, Uganda announced its intention
to withdraw irom the area. This was apparently done following pressure
from the OAU.615a But the use of force with the aim of detaching
territory from another State for other purposes is equally illicit.
In the Somali case, that country has been officially seeking not to
annex the claimed areas, inhabited by Somalis, of Djibouti, the Ogaden
and north eastern Kenya, but rather to ensure that its kinsmen have the
opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination, whatever the
616result of that may be.
In early 1964 fighting broke out between Somali and Ethiopian
regular forces on the Ogaden border. Both parties agreed to consider
SXTthe problem within an African framework. The matter was accordingly
discussed at an extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers
where a resolution was adopted calling for a peaceful settlement of the
dispute. At a further meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers a few
weeks later, resolutions were passed relating to both the Kenyan and
Ethiopian situations specifically referring to Article III (3) of the
OAU Charter, which calls for respect of the sovereignty and territorial
619integrity of every State. The Kinshasa declaration in 1967, issued 
following a Kenya-Somali meeting, stated that both sides had expressed
(615) The Times, 2 November 1978, p.7. Uganda claimed that its action 
was in retaliation for a prior Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, while 
the annexation was made in the light of previous Ugandan claims 
that the Kagera river would constitute a "natural" frontier, ibid. 
See also Africa Research Bulletin, November 1976, p.5052 et seq.
(615a) Ibid, pp.5053-4.
(616) Supra, p.297.
(617) See Wolfers, Politics in the Organisation of African Unity,
1976, p,134,
(618) The Somali-Kenyan issue was also put on the agenda, following 
armed clashes in the disputed area, supra.
(619) Resolutions CM/Res 16 (II) and CM/Res 17 (II).
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the desire to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
in the spirit of Article III (3) of the OAU C h a r t e r . A s  far as the 
Ogaden situation was concerned, an OAU good offices group was set up in 
1973 and in a resolution following the upsurge of fighting in 1977 
reaffirmed the principles of respect for borders as in existence at the 
date of independence and territorial integrity. This provoked a Somali 
walk-out, and demonstrated that State’s isolation on the issue of 
detaching the Ogaden from Ethiopia in order that its inhabitants could 
exercise self-determination. It was only the threat of an Ethiopian
attack across Somalia's accepted border that stimulated support for 
621Somalia.
The attitude of the international community in general and the
African continent in particular has been equally clear with regard to
Djibouti. Both the UN and the OAU adopted resolutions calling for the
territory’s independence from France and clearly precluded the possibility
of its legitimate annexation by either Ethiopia or Somalia. Both parties,
in fact, officially renounced any intentions of wishing to take over the 
622territory.
Although in the case of Libya's purported annexation of the Aozou 
strip in northern Chad, African States for political reasons have 
demonstrated a disinclination to adopt a forceful stand, it is believed 
that African practice has strongly endorsed the proposition that the use 
of force to acquire territory is unlawful and unacceptable and that the 
basis for the proposition, viz. respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of States, is in effect a manifestation of those 
aspects of the principle of self-determination as applicable in post­
independence situations.
(620) Africa Research Bulletin September 1967, p.856.
(621) Supra, P-514.
(622) Supra, p.220.
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CHAPTER 8 - BOUNDARIES
I - The Nature of Boundaries
Closely connected with the concepts of territory and territori 1
sovereignty is the notion of a boundary. Huber noted in the Island f
Palmas case that "territorial sovereignty is, in general a sit ti
recognised and delimited in space, either by so-called natural f ti
as recognised by international law or by outward signs of delimitatio
that are undisputed or else by legal engagements entered into between
interested neighbours, such as frontier conventions, or by acts of
recognition of States within fixed boundaries" 1 km u s  ooundaries mark
the limitation of State sovereignties and are themselves marked by
acceptance by members of the international community. Unrecognis d
unilateral determinations of where boundaries lie would thrnerefore remain
without international effect in the absence of acquiescence or
recognition. The importance of boundaries2 is that ttw.» *at tn®y demarcate State
jurisdictions,3 and thus profoundly influence the regime, nationality and
cultural milieu of the inhabitants of such areas. AccordinzlStyi the notion
and existence of boundaries is closely allied with the concept of
territorial integrity and plays a symbolic as well na <>as a practical role.
Actions relating to the establishment of boundaries bv St t^ ftro acts of
sovereignty, while the boundaries themselves constitute the limit of th 
exercise of sovereignty by States concerned. The existence of a b 
therefore, between two or more States would be conclusive of effectifive
(1) 2 RIAA, pp.829, 838.
(2) We are here concerned with international boundaries
uA..M Ad Kn ftuoon on v n of 4 a i n fill til©
coas
boundaries between any two national States" UXI the
of Boundary. Disputes in International Law WUr^h * 5L?_Settlement
1» 1976 .n i
(3) Verzijl, International Law in Historic! P ’
p.513 and Adami, National Frontiera ^^~i7rTT^T^g7^ ,_Vo1 •
, vuiknui’itu, m e  Sett]
_ nmnutes in International Law, 1967, p.9, excluding sea
^ r ternational Boundaries. 1940, p.22. See also 
stS* Tnternational Boundary Disputes and International Law.
Law, 1927, p.3. -S®i¿tion_to Internati ™ „i
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sovereignty and its limits as between such States.4 Huber stated in the 
Island of Palmas case that "sovereignty in relation to a portion of the 
surface of the globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion 
of such portion in the territory of any particular State" 5
The protection o£ the inviolability of boundaries has assumed an 
important role in the international system,6 while in th
1 16x0 Of
boundary determination the need for the harmonious interaction of at
least the interested States is pronounced. Indeedindeed, for a boundary to be
effective, it has to be accepted by the States concerned. Judge Bebler
in his dissenting opinion in the Indo-Pakistan Western .....
of Hutch) case, declared that "there is no doubt that an internati i
boundary ranks high among matters which cannot be + a.,.serried otherwise than
by agreement between neighbouring States concerned. One could in go d
logic, go so far as to suggest the axiom that a boundary Is there where
the neighbouring States have agreed it to be. The agreement may have
been entered into with more or less of freedom of w m  * *win, it may have been
forced on one side by force of arms, in a war and through the victory of 
one neighbour over the other, but it must have been accepted when p 
was restored, by both sides, the victorious and the defeated to be lo k 
upon as the boundary by the community of nations".7 The legal f 
boundary may derive therefore either from a treaty or by virtue of 
acquiescence or recognition by the parties concerned
(4) Sharma op.cit. p .2. ~~
(5) 2 RIAA, pp.829, 838. Huber also noted that "the f
and continuous display is still one Of the mo«, i;!!L°f.Peacef“l
considerations in establishing boundaries betweenp.839, oetween States", ibid.
(6) See supra, Chapter 5, p.268.
(7) 50 ILR, p .406.
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Since the concept of boundaries is of such <n cruc*al importance to
the international community, the element of stability ■>„ „in the determination
and maintenance of boundaries has been consistently emphaaiaed. The
International Court noted in the Temple case that »<«in Spheral, when two
countries establish a frontier between them one or the primary objects
ia to achieve atability and finality. Thia ia impoaaible if the line ao
established can, at any moment, and on the basis „oasis of a continuously
available protest, be called in question and its rectify + < «ification claimed” .
Jennings has written that "the bias of existine law i« +g A s toward stability,
the status quo, and the present effective possession- the ^' xn tendency of the
International Court is to let sleeping dogs lie. This is right for th 
stability of territorial boundaries must always be the ultimate i 
other U n d e  of legal ordering need to be capable of conetant change to 
meet new neede of deveioping eocietyi hut in a properly ordered eooiety,
territorial boundaries »ill be among the most stabie institutions" 9* This
aim of "stability and finality" appears clearly with re^« ,* ** * B®ru to th©
expressed purposes of boundary treaties in particular cas 10Ses and agreements
providing for arbitration". The Permanent Court in the Ira Turk 
Boundary case noted that "the very nature of a frontier and any
convention designed to establish frontiers between twn countries imports
that a frontier must constitute a definite boundary u „ e throughout its 
length",12 »bile tha court in the Beiale_a! g n£i Arbitration award
(8) ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.6 , 34.
<9> Th* Acquisition, of Territory in Internationa t r.. 1963
(10) See for example the 1929 Treaty between the iwdHaiti, in which the preamble stressed that the ni^fn Republic and 
final solution of the controversies which have "must flnd a
past in connection with the delimitation of th *Vlded theni the 
the respective territories". 6 frontier separating
(11) See for example the preamble to the 1925 a e r e ^ « *  k .and Holland leading to the Island of Palma? ^ twee» the USA
p.829; and the Guatemala-Hoiduras~“treatFof By-hi!3*8**0” ' 2 RIAA» ibid, p.1309. arbitration of 19 3 0,
(12) PCIJ, Series B, no.12, pp.19, 20.
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affirmed that it was common ground between the parties (Argentine and 
Chile) that the Boundary Treaty of 1881 "was intended to provide, and 
must be taken as constituting, a complete, definitive and final settlement 
of all territorial questions still outstanding at that time, so that 
nothing thereafter remained intentionally unallocated".13 Further 
consequences of the supremacy of the stability factor with regard to 
boundaries may be seen in the treatment of boundary treaties in the
context of the rebus sic stantibus rule and State succession to treaties.14 156
The tenor, therefore, of the discussion of boundaries in inter­
national law is characterised by the perceived requirement for certainty.
This militates against boundary changes and underlines the role played by
acts of sovereignty by the parties with respect to the disputed areas.
In other words, the criterion of effectiveness is of crucial importance.
The notion of stability, which implies a state of affairs conducive to 
peaceful enjoyment, may also affect the content of any delimitation 
whether by joint discussions or by a third party. The Chairman of the tribunal 
in the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) case, in referring
to two deep inlets in dispute, noted that "it would be inequitable to
15recognise these inlets as foreign territory. It would be conducive to 
friction and conflict. The paramount consideration of promoting peace 
and stability in this region compels the recognition and confirmation 
that this territory, which is wholly surrounded by Pakistan territory,
. i, 16also be regarded as such .
(13) The Award, HMSO, 1977, p.4.
(14) Infra, p.549 et.seq.
(15) Ie. Non-Pakistan in this context.
(16) 50 ILR p.520.
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lmp°rt“ * »»«tinctlon i. usu.ll, .ade batwaan boundarl(>8 ^
frontiers. A boundary Is a line separating States, whereas a frontier
connotes a zone, having therefore width as well as length 17 18920
Lapradelle regards a frontier as a non, o, eomnunleation bound to a
special legal, political and economic regime in municipal and inter- 
18national law, while Holdich noted that "a front!*». . .r is hut a vague and
indefinite term until the boundary sets a hedge between it and th
19frontier of a neighbouring State». Kristof pointed out that while a
boundary is defined and regulated by international and municipal law
the frontier was a phenomenon of history and always unique it was
difficult to pin-point essential features of the frontier which
20universally valid. Historically, the earliest boundaries were in the
form of separate zones, which Cukwurah has described as "the extrem
limit of the areas from which the people living within them obtained
their necessary supplies of food at any given time" 21 2 u m +uwith the decline
of nomadism and the rise of agricultural settlements , ifaxtinon zones
evolved, usually following natural barriers as thev wer* J* were conspicuous,
easily identifiable and physically unmistakable by any potential 
22trespasser". In ancient Greece, imperial Rome and during the Middle 
Ages, the concept of border zones predominated over fixed line 
23boundaries. The notion of a strict, linear boundary is a relati l 
modern conception, the need for defined boundaries arising as States
(17) Boggs op.cit. p.22, and Cukwurah op.cit. p.H.
(18) La Frontiers, 1928, p.14.
(19) "Political Boundaries» 32 Scottish Geographical Magazine i9ifi 
pp.4 9 7, 501, cited in Cukwurah, op.cit. p.li. S ’ 1916»
(20) "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries" 49 Annals of th
Association of American Geographers, 1959, pp.269 2 7 3 ^
(21) Op.cit, p.13.
(22) Ibid, p.14.
<23) see , l s °  E6‘ vo a ' » - o n « - M
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developed in the post-Westphalian era and populations expanded into 
border areas and communicated across boundary lines. Exact bound i 
however, could only develop when map-making and geographic techniques 
were sufficiently advanced to facilitate delimitations and demarcation.24 
To some extent, the doctrine of natural frontiers was an attempt to 
achieve precise boundaries in earlier centuries and was founded upon the 
assertion that certain natural features such as mountain ranges, forests 
water and deserts were preferable to artificial boundaries, which denoted 
"such signs as have been purposely put up to indicate the way of the 
imaginary boundary line" and which consisted of "posts, stones, bars 
walls, trenches, roads, canals, buoys in the water and the like” 25 
However, as Boggs pointed out, a line marked by nature did not always 
imply that it constituted the best line to separate neighbouring peoples 
The crest of a mountain range may not be a natural frontier where peopl 
of the same language and tradition inhabit both sides of the mountain 26 
Fenwick wrote that "if by natural should be meant 'desirable from an 
economic or social point of view', many present boundaries of States are
admittedly unnatural whatever natural landmarks there may be to design t 
27them". In other words, what constitutes a natural boundary is a 
complex of different factors of varying importance depending upon the
28 In reality, all boundaries are artificialcircumstances of the case, 
in that they are established by persons, i t  is  lust h,».» 8 •Ju some coincide
with geographic or ethnic divisions and others do not
. to Territory in International Law and Relations. 1945,(24) Hill» --- ■-- —  ” ■~*~
p.23.
(25) Internationa! Law, 8th ed. vol.I, 1955, pp.531-2.
(26)
(27)
(28)
Op.cit. p.23.
International Law, 4th ed. 1965, p,438. Emphasis in original,
Verzijl notes that the concept of natural frontiers is  highly political, op.cit. p.516. See also generally Schoenborn, "La Nature Juridique du Territoire" 30 HR, 1929, pp.85, 126-35.
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A distinction may also be drawn between boundary disputes and 
territorial disputes. Boundaries are lines defining a territory, marking 
the limits of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction, whereas 
territories are those areas over which such rights are exercised. 
Boundaries are part of the territory in that sense, of course, but they 
separate territories of different jurisdictions. While boundary disputes 
are concerned with either written or verbal or geographic uncertainties, 
territorial disputes involve large areas of land relatively and claims 
to title. The latter involve such rules of international law as relate 
to the acquisition of territorial sovereignty, for instance occupation, 
prescription, cession and conquest, while assertions of self-determination 
and historical continuity are frequently made. In the case of boundary 
disputes, the usual situation relates to ambiguities in the instruments 
creating the boundaries or to problems in fixing the borderline on the 
ground. Boundary problems in general concern disputes between adjacent 
States over the line to be drawn between their areas of sovereignty, 
whereas territorial disputes involve one State claiming to dislodge 
another from an area of its sovereignty on the ground of better title. 
However, there are a number of common elements that render it unwise to 
pursue this distinction too rigidly. Both boundary and territorial 
disputes ultimately involve the question of sovereignty over a defined 
piece of land, while many of the same types of State activity are relevant 
both to the question of title to territory and to the correct determin­
ation of a boundary. Examples would include manifestations of sovereign 
authority in various ways and geographical and historical factors, as well 
as any appropriate reactions or views adopted by the other party and 
third States. Treaties would be relevant in both cases, although more 
likely to be involved in disputes over boundaries. The best approach, 
therefore, would be to regard boundary disputes as a particular kind of
541.
territorial dispute, one that has evolved some special rules of its own.29
Prescott distinguishes between territorial disputes, which emerge as a
result of some quality of the borderland making it attractive to the
claimant State, and positional disputes, which concern the actual location
of the boundary.30 While territorial disputes generally arise out of the
superimposition of the border upon the cultural or physical landscape,
as for example in many cases in the colonial partition of Africa or the
granting of German-speaking areas south of the Brenner Pass to Italy,31
positional disputes arise, according to Prescott, because of incomplete
boundary evolution.32 34 Such defects in the boundaries become a source of
contention when the borderlands become utilised or developed, as for
example the boundary delimitation between Northern Nigeria and Niger,
at the beginning of the century, unquestioned by France until it was
discovered that an important communication route between Niger towns
33lay partially within British territory.
Accordingly, although boundary, or positional, disputes may involve
recourse to particular rules, such as the principle for example of the
thalweg, the fact remains that such disputes concern, as do territorial
disputes, both specific, or relatively specific, areas, and the display
of sovereignty. Judge Huber, it should be noted, declares that the fact
of peaceful and continuous display was one of the most important
34considerations in establishing boundaries between States and that if no
(29) See Jennings op.cit. pp.12-3 and Sharma op.cit. pp.4-7.
/oan —  - Of Frontiers and Boundaries, 1965, p.109. Prescott{'s ' —£so notes the existence of functional disputes and disputes over
resource development, which do not involve claims for changes in 
boundary location, ibid.
(31) Ibid, p.H3.
(32) Ibid, p.122.
(33) Ibid, p.123.
(34) 2 RIAA, pp,829, 839.
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conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists or if
there are gaps in frontiers otherwise established or if a conventional
line leaves room for doubt, "the actual continuous and peaceful display
of State functions is, in case of dispute, the sound and natural
35criterion of territorial sovereignty". This common reliance on display 
of sovereignty, depending always on the circumstances of the case, means
that the two types of dispute are closer than some analyses would
+ 36 suggest.
A number of views have been expressed concerning the nature and 
functions of boundaries. Ratzel regarded the boundary itself as an 
abstraction and the border area as the reality. The latter zone 
intimately reflected the power of the State itself and consisted of 
three zones, two of which were the periphery of the adjoining States
and the third a central zone where there oi tne two States
Ratzel held that one could not analyse a boundary separately from the 
State since it was an integral element of it and one could not maintain 
the greater importance of the centre. He also believed that as the 
relationship between States altered so the boundary would change, as it
.. n n e w e r , 37 Curzon talked in terms of natural and was an indication of power.
tificial boundaries, but distinguished between natural boundaries based
me physical feature and so-called natural boundaries, claimed by
38nations on grounds of ambition, expediency or sentiment. Artificial 
b d ries were divided into astronomical, mathematical and referential 
types Astronomical boundaries followed a parallel of latitude or a
Thid o 840. Huber also noted that "international arbitral juris- 
(35) ^  indisputes on territorial sovereignty....would seem to
^tribute greater weight to - even isolated - acts of display of 
sovereignty than to contiguity of territory, even if such 
contiguity is combined with the existence of natural boundaries", 
ibid, p.855.
But note that whereas a State must possess territory, it need not 
possess defined borders as a condition of existence, see supra 
Chapter 6, p.334.
(37)
(38)
Politische Geographie, 1895, as cited in Prescott op.cit
Frontiers, 1907, p.54, Curzon did not 
boundaries and frontiers. distinguish between
PP.10-11
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meridian, mathematical boundaries connected two specified points and
referential boundaries were defined with regard to some point or points
39and included arcs of circles and straight lines. Curzon also 
emphasised the strategic role of boundaries, as did Holdich, who remarked 
that "boundaries must be barriers - if not geographical and natural they
40must be artificial and strong as military device can make them".
Fawcett criticised the division into natural and artificial boundaries 
and held that frontiers were distinct regions of transition, whose 
function was to protect the State.41 De Lapradelle noted that "le 
caractère marquant de la notion de frontière est son universalité 
d ’acception" 42 While peripheral flanking areas between States, ie. 
frontiers, were governed by municipal law, a central zone or territoire 
limitrophe was subject to international law. This led into a two-fold 
division of the whole problem of frontiers into delimitation and voisinage.
oncerned the limits and method of establishment of frontierDelimitation cu
and voisinage concerned the effects of delimitation on the regime of the
„„ostión.43 * Rousseau, in fact, defined the concept of territory in que o .
voisinage in international law as "l’ensemble des problèmes juridiques 
que pose la proximité existant entre Etats limitrophes et les rapports
,ln divers qui en résultent tant pour ces Etats que pour juridiques û orar» «
„ 44 De Lapradelle held that only artificial frontiersleurs ressortissants .
existed While boundaries drawn with reference to a natural feature,
/00, also Prescott op.cit. pp. 12-14. Rousseau distinguishes between
(39) oee ^  artificial boundaries and sub-divides the latter into 
natronomical and geometric types, Droit International Public, 
vol!lII, 1977, pp.241-6.
(40) tirai Frontiers and BoundaryJlakin£, 1916, p.46.
rrnT,»4ar.g [ A Study in Political Geography. 1918. See also Prescott( 4 1 )
(42) t.° Frontière, 1928, p.9.
(43) Ibid, p.17.
Op.cit. p.273 and pp.273-88.
(44)
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such as a river or a mountain, were "derived artificial boundaries", 
boundaries astronomically, mathematically or referentially calcul t d 
were "artificial boundaries properly speakine" 45 .y this classification,
it could be seen that all boundary delimitations were accomplished by
persons in the light of perceived national interest* 46 r. *De Lapradelle
also referred to three stages in the evolution of a boundary. The
preparation stage consists in formulating the principles applicable t
the actual delimitation, the decision stage concerns the delimitation
itself and the execution stage consists of transcribing the delimitati
on to the territory in question.47 48 Boggs emphasised the changing role
of boundaries and listed the various functions of boundaries in the
48light of persons and things. His belief that one of the principal 
reasons for studying boundaries was the desire to determine what kinds 
of boundaries are "good" and what kinds have been found to be bad49 
criticised by Jones who noted that "each boundary is almost unique and 
therefore many generalisations are of doubtful validity" 50 prea tt
concludes that a review of the ideas regarding boundaries suggests that 
boundaries are of interest to many types of scholars and that most of 
the studies reflect the preoccupations of the period when written It 
has also been generally accepted that one must consider the boundar i 
its overall territorial context and the dangers of generalising abo,^
(45) Op.cit. p.175.
(46) Prescott points out that it is strange that boundaries raint  ^ *
cultural factors were not considered in thin Aated tomis scheme, op.cit. p.1 8 ,
(47) Op.cit. p.73.
(48) International Boundaries, 1940, pp.9-12.
(49) Ibid, p.21.
(50) Boundary-Making, 1945, p .v i. He declared that the process boundary-making is smoothed by considering each h m L .J  f special case with iaCiviCuallt, acre p rono ilM  S r l L Z *
to a theoretical type", ibid p,ll. resemblance
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boundaries are being appreciated. One clear distinction that Prescott
following Jones, does draw is between internal and international
boundaries, since "the presence or absence of overriding sovereignty is
52the crucial basis of classifying boundaries.
51
It is possible to classify boundaries in a number of ways in 
addition to the rather simplistic and discredited division into natural 
and artificial boundaries. Boggs elaborated a four-fold classification. 
Physical boundaries were those following a natural feature, geometric 
boundaries involved the use of straight lines, arcs, meridians and so 
forth, anthropo-geographic boundaries were closely related to human
 ^ while compounded boundaries comprised elements ofsettlement factors, w r
„ 4. .rn a a 53 Pounds, on the other hand, approached the problem the preceding types. »
historically and categorised boundaries in terms of the cultural
 ^ area Boundaries could be antecedent, that is priordevelopment of tne ««’»•
to the development of the "cultural landscape"; subsequent, or drawn 
after such a development; superimposed, that is subsequent to cultural 
development but without to It; or relict, that U  boundaries
54„„i foral landscape without any present political function, visible in the cultural
olonial Africa knew frontiers or zones rather than strict linear 
55 . i n «  colonial boundaries were in many cases originallyboundaries,
li h d on basically geometric lines radiating from the coasts into
(52) Ibid, p.30,
(53) Op.cit. pp.25-6. This scheme is followed by Cukwurah, op.cit p i8
<54> 1963, pp.61-5. Prescott defines * r
boundary as one which although abandoned is still m a relict 
differences in the landscape which developed durin^T 
op.cit. pp.30-31. See also Tagil, "The Study of lifetin>e,
Boundary Disputes", African Boundary DiRnm-oL . ieB'and
1M 9, p.22 cud K » p i l 7 ^ o r t h r c S H u T ^ i s f 1i j d: f '}'"?*«»<».
Boundaries in Africa" 4 World Politics, 1966, ■ 5
(55) See Anene, The International Boundaryea Qf Nieeri»
and Person, "L'Afrique Noire et sTs^ r o n u l i S s " ^ ^  PP.5-6,
d ’Etudes Politiques Africaines, 1972 Dn 1R oo o „ u® Pr&ncaise 
Chapter 1, p.45, PP ’ 22'3 * See supra,
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the interior, generally paralleling European power relationships in the 
nineteenth century. Kapil writes that African international boundaries 
are irrelevant to the historical-cultural patterns of African development 
and that except for Ethiopia none of them delimit the outcome of 
traditional, historical processes. Ethnic factors were generally ignored 
in boundary making.56 Such boundaries therefore were superimposed on 
established cultural patterns, it was argued, and thus were inherently
conflict-generating.
Two stages are particularly important in establishing a boundary. 
Delimitation is the determination of the boundary line by treaty or 
otherwise and its expression in verbal terms, while demarcation is the 
physical demonstration of the delimitation on the ground by means of
CO
boundary posts and the like. Tribunals have generally followed this 
distinction59 but occasionally the terminology has been confused.60
57
Usually the delimitation is political and established by diplomats, 
while the demarcation is a technical operation. Delimitation problems 
are more rare than demarcation disputes, since the latter often reflect 
the dangers of delimitation without precise geographic knowledge of the 
areas involved. The vast majority of Africa’s borders were delimited by
(56) Doc.cit. p.662.
refers to allocation, being the political decision on the(57) Jones also ^  territory, and administration, which is concerned
witiTthe regulation of activities in relation to the demarcated 
boundary, op.cit. p.5.
»international Boundaries" 84 Journal of the Royal(58) See McMah 1935, p.4, Curzon wrote that delimitation
Society o ^ eariier processes for determining the boundary 
"signlii®3 a lu£jing itB embodiment in a treaty or convention. But 
down to •» commissions get to work it is not delimitation but
defecation on which they are engaged", op.cit. p.51.
-I.» the Areentine-Ghile Award of 1966, 38 ILR, p.10.(59) For example, 
For example, see Judge Spender, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.6, 103.(60)
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agreement between European powers at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries when knowledge of the geographic 
and ethnic conditions of the interior of the continent was limited. This 
was one reason for the heavy reliance upon geometric lines. Barbour 
calculated "very approximately" that at the end of the 1950's somethin 
like forty-four per cent of the boundary mileage in Africa was defined 
according to parallels and meridians, thirty per cent by straight lines 
arcs of circles, and so on, and the remaining twenty-six per cent by
reference to topographical features such as rivers, streams, watersheds
61 *mountains and valleys. Demarcation commissions wer*e in general severely
restricted in their discretions when marking out the actual border, often
with absurd results. For instance, the Anglo-German agreement of 1910
dealing with the Uganda-Ruanda border allowed the demarcation commission
to depart from some of the delimited straight lines in order to make the
boundary coincide with natural features, provided the deviations "shall
not, however, exceed five kilometres on either side of the straight li
and neither the total area of British territory nor the total area f
62German territory shall be altered thereby".
This has meant that while there are relatively few delimitation
disputes in Africa, there are a number of demarcation problems resultl
from the difficulties in translating often ambiguous treats „*=ttty provisions and
administrative divisions into geographic reality.
The causes of territorial and boundary disputes are many and range 
from ethnic or historic irredentism, as in the Moroccan and Som U C&S6S | 612
(61) "A Geographical Analysis of Boundaries in Inter-Tropical Atn „ 
Essays in African Populations (ed. Barbour and Prothero) 1961& '
pi305« . . *
(62) 107 BFSP pp.394, 395. A similar provision existed in a ,
Belgian agreement of 1910, except that the permitted 'deviate¡5°* 
was restricted to three kilometres, ibid, p,34g, Btlon
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to the attraction of natural resources, a factor which has stimulated a 
number of boundary and territorial disputes, and to the need for a 
diversion from internal pressures. Other elements may also be involved 
such as ideological and personal antagonisms as well as political 
manoeuvrings to gain advantages often unrelated to the border issue 
itself 63 A large number of African boundary disputes are quiescent and 
only erupt as a result of some kind of specific stimulus, whether economic 
or ideological. Occasionally such claims may stimulate a counter-claim 
as a reaction This occurred, for instance, in the Algerian-Moroccan 
dispute when Algeria declared that it too could assert claims. However, 
African border disputes are in general characterised more by moderation 
than by excess, particularly when one considers the non-African 
establishment of many of the borders involved.
Africa possesses the longest total length of land boundaries of any
continent, because relative to its area it is the most „ni u i  ,most politically divided
continent. Most African States have borders with at™  witn at least or five other
States, while Niger has borders with seven other stat*« o ^states, Sudan with eight
and Zaire with nine. On the other hand, Africa has the shortest coastline
relative to area and the highest number of landlocked States of the
continents. Zaire, it should be noted, has an a w n  „.»rea of over nine hundred
and five thousand square miles and a sea front of some thirty miles 64 
However, the very instability inherent in the domestic and international 
environment of African boundary and territorial confUmf ,
lcts is a constraining
factor, since it ensures that radical change in this area could have 
widespread and unpredictable consequences,
(63) See Zartman, "The Foreign and Military P o n  .m
Boundary Problems", African Boundarv prnhl 1CS °f Afrlcan 
1969, pp. 86-9 and Cukwurah op. cit~ pp, si^iieT- ied* Widstrand),
(64) Hamden, 
Review,
"The Political Map of the New Africa" 
1963, p.418, 53 The Geographical
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II - Boundary Treaties^
Judge Bebler in the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) 
case remarked as to the general origins of international boundaries that 
they "have usually emerged by custom. They have become gradually well 
determined by mutual acquiescence and/or recognition by the neighbours 
concerned Mutual acquiescence and mutual recognition are therefore
the most general origin of existing international boundaries. Very many
of them still nowadays have no other legal foundation for their
validity".63 In the case of Africa, however, it would seem that the
role of the international boundary treaty has been somewhat more
prominent than Bebler’s views would allow. The vast majority of At
borders were laid down not as a result of prescription over a i
time, but by European treaties. The question of the validity and
determination of such boundaries is therefore connected with the stat
in law of the particular treaties, specifying such boundaries. This has
raised two particular questions. Firstly, whether it could be argued
that the demise of colonialism and the establishment n-p<jx tne principle of
self-determination have resulted in a fundamental change in circum t 
regards particular boundary treaties, thus terminating the treaty 
abling a party or a successor to a party to the treaty to terminate it 
and secondly whether, in view of the dominant "clean slate" princi i 
governing new States and State succession to the treaties of " pro**
decessor, such boundary treaties lapse upon independence.
as
en
(a) Rebus Sic Stantibus Rule
This rule states that a party to a treaty may unilaterally
- „-mind for terminating or suspending the operation of invoke as a grow *
the treaty the fact that there has been a fundamental change
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of circumstances from those which existed at the time of the conclusion 
66of the treaty. Fitzmaurice noted that few questions of treaty law
were more controversial than the place of this doctrine. One could
detect a marked reluctance by international and municipal courts act 11
to apply it, while not rejecting it in principle and professing to view
it with sympathy. Although attractive in theory and possibly necessary
in practice within limits, the rule could prove dangerous and could
reduce the concept of pacta sunt servanda to a mere form of words 6 7 68970
Elias, indeed, referred to the view that the doctrine was somewhat
frivolously invoked in the period between the World w«r«i ~ais' *ne doctrine
has been raised before international courts, in the Nationalitv
69 ~ ~
in Tunis and Morocco case, France argued that the establishment of the
French protectorate over Morocco had ipso facto extinguished certain
70Anglo-French treaties. France also raised the question of rebus sic 
stantibus in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of case
stating that the provisions of 1815 establishing the customs free zones 
had lapsed in view of the alteration of the particular factual situation 71 *
Switzerland, however, argued inter alia that the doctrine did not apply t
(66) Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties. 1974. d 17q o
The Law, of Treaties,, 1961, pp.681-91; Li^itzvn McNair.
Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus)" 61 aitt 1 ** 60(1 
Garner, "The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the’-r!!6? ’ P *895j 
Treaties" 21 AJIL, 1927, p.509; De Caviedes " I t ! *®rminatl°» of 
Sic Stantibus’ A La Clause de Revision Dans n & Llause 'Rebus 
n a tional" U S  HH. 1966, p.109 ana 
Problems of the Law of Treaties. 1973, pp.327-420—
(67) Second Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook nt +uvol.II, p.56. 01£ °f the iLC, 1957,
(68) Op.cit. p.119.
(69) PCIJ, Series B, no.4.
(70) PCIJ, Series C, no.2, pp.187-8 and 208 and 209 Th
examine the doctrine, because on the facts as f * .Court dld not 
it was unnecessary to do so. See also the Cas«°n by the c°urt, 
Denunciation of the Sino-Belstian Treatv o -p
no. 1 6, vol.i, p.52. ~  ■— — PCIJ Series C,
(71) PCIJ Series A/B, no.46, pp.155-8 and ibid S e n «  „pp.463-76. 168 C ' »0*58,
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treaties creating territorial rights. The court held that in the 
light of the particular facts, it was unnecessary to consider the 
doctrine 73 The rule has not been extensively examined in any other 
international cases,74 although the International Court in the Fisheries
75Jurisdiction cases noted the existence of the doctrine in customary law.
Its basis may be seen in the desire to prevent an unnecessary burden on
one of the parties to a treaty in the event of a fundamental change of
circumstances and thus avoid the possibility of unlawful termination.
The doctrine has also been seen by the new Afro-Asian States in particular
76as embodying a rule of ernoial concern to them.
In article 44 of the draft articles on the Law of Treaties prepared 
in 1963, it was provided that the doctrine did not apply "to a treaty 
boundary".77 This formulation was retained in the 1966 draft
72
fixing a
articles. Australia suggested that the provision h« „ nion De slightly extended to
cover all other determinations of territorial sovereignty in a
while the Netherlands suggested that the exception to the rebus i
stantibus rule should apply "to stipulations of a treaty which aff t
transfer of territory or the settlement of a bound«™senary, since such treaties
often covered other Issues as well," Waldock, th> gp.c u l  „,pport>||r
(72) PCIJ, Series C, no.58, pp.109-46, 405-15 and 578-9 »
admitted that one had to distinguish between territn that Pranc*
"personal" rights created on the occasion of a ter if rielits and
ibid, pp.463-76. Waldock regarded these Swiss and^F °rlal settlement 
correct, Second Report on the Law of Treatise, v *rench views as 
1963, vol.II, p.85. treaties, Yearbook the i l c ,
(73) PCIJ, Series A/B, no.46, p.158.
(74) McNair refers to a number of municipal law cases which
to rebus sic stantibus, op.cit. pp.69 0 -1 . roake reference
PP.368-7 2. • ' bee also Haraszti, op.cit.
(75) ICJ Reports, 1973, pp.3, 18.
(76) See Yearbook of the ILC, 1963, vol.l, p.139,
(77) Yearbook of the ILC, 1963, vol.II, p .207 Thi„
draft article 44 (3)a. P This was contained in 78
(78) Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol.II, p.39.
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agreed with these comments and felt that the provision should be revised
79to cover transfers of territories. Canada proposed adding to the 
provision the phrase "except if such a boundary is based directly on a 
thalweg or other natural phenonemon the physical location of which
onsubsequently significantly altered as a result of a natural occurrence". 
The Special Rapporteur, however, correctly felt that the Canadian 
suggestion raised questions regarding the correct interpretation and
81application of the treaty in the light of changed geographical facts 
and no more was heard of this proposal. Draft article 44 became draft 
article 59, paragraph 2 of which provided that: "A fundamental change of 
circumstances may not be invoked : (a) as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary." The ILC commentary 
with regard to this provision noted that some members of the Commission 
had suggested that the total exclusion of treaties establishing 
boundaries might be going too far and might indeed be inconsistent with 
the principle of self-determination, recognised in the Charter. The 
Commission, however, concluded that treaties establishing a boundary 
should be accepted as an exception to the rule, because otherwise the 
rule, instead of being an instrument of peaceful change, might become a 
source of dangerous frictions. With regard to self-determination, the 
Commission felt that it was, as envisaged in the Charter, an independent 
principle and that it might lead to confusion, if in the context of the 
law of treaties it were presented as an application of the rule regarding 
rebus sic stantibus. This view must be seen as accurate. To have 
permitted the revision of nineteenth century territorial arrangements, or 
those of any other era, on the grounds of the post-1945 principle of
(79) Ibid, p.44.
(80) Ibid, p , 39.
(81) Ibid, p.44.
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self-determination would have the effect not only of ignoring inter­
temporal law but of opening the door to a large number of territorial 
claims, particularly in Africa. The ILC also made the point by altering 
the phrase "treaty fixing a boundary" to "treaty establishing a boundary" 
that not only delimitation treaties but also treaties of cession were
to be covered. 82
In the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968, the United
States argued that the proposed article 59 (2)a was too restrictive and
failed to cover important groups of treaties such as those establishing
territorial status or settling territorial disputes, while not
establishing boundaries. Examples were given of the US-UK condominium
agreement over Canton and Enderbury Islands, agreements where parties
agreed not to press claims in the light of mutual concessions and
treaties dealing with the aim of settling boundary disputes in the
spirit of cooperation such as US-Mexican treaties. If the rebus sic
stantibus rule were to apply, it was argued, the object of such treaties
83would be defeated. It was suggested that the phrase "or otherwise
84establishing territorial status" be added to article 59 (2)a. However, 
this was rejected by the Committee of the Whole by 43 votes to 14, with
fte
28 abstentions. It was felt that the American formulation was far too 
broad. Cuba argued that it would be incompatible with self-determination.82 3*56 
The ILC provision regarding rebus sic stantibus and boundary treaties was
(82) Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol.II, p.259,
(83) UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First
Session, d .367.p.
(84) A/CONF.39/C.1/L.335.
(85) UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Document! 
of the Conference, p,184.
(86) UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First 
Session, p,371.
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87generally supported at the UN Conference, the need to preserve peace
88being particularly noted in this context. Afghanistan, however, stated
that boundary treaties should not be exempted from the general rule as it
might be contrary to self-determination and treaties imposed during the
colonial era for colonial or military reasons should be subject to the
89rebus sic stantibus doctrine. Morocco declared that draft article 59 
(2)a was open to objection and particularly criticised the view of the 
ILC that treaties of cession were to be included in the provision.87 90 
Syria expressed a similar criticism and noted that stability and finality 
could not be expected if they were to be achieved at the expense of 
justice and self-determination or by upholding colonial treaties, under 
which territory was ceded contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants.91 
Poland argued as against this that unequal colonial treaties were void 
ab initio as they conflicted with norms of jus cogens and they had thus 
no relevance to draft article 59. Paragraph (2)a was essential to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as provided in the UN
(87) Article 59 was adopted by the Committee of the Whole without fo 
vote, UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records 
Documents of the Conference, p.184. It had already been decided 
with regard to the organisation of the work of the Conference th»t 
the Committee of the Whole might adopt draft articles without*a 
formal vote where "there appeared to be very substantial or o 
whelming support for the text...,on the understanding that the6*" 
summary records would reflect statements and reservations expressed"
(88) See for the example the comments of Poland, UN Conference on th
Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session pD 37 1,2 „ T * .
USSR, ibid, P •374, Kenya noted that territorial’boundaries were 
inextricably interwoven with the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of States that the ILC was wholly justified in exclude 
treaties establishing boundaries from the rebus sic stantibus rul 
ibid, p.381.
(89) Ibid, p.373 and ibid, Second Session, pp.118 and 121
(90) Ibid, First Session, pp.379-80 and ibid, Second Session, pp.120-1
(91) Ibid, p.117. Sinclair notes that Syria entered a specific
reservation not accepting the non-applicability of rebus sic 
stantibus to boundary treaties, The Vienna Convention „„ «... 
of Treaties, 1973, pp.46-9. -------------
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Charter and was a direct consequence in the law of treaties of the rule 
in article 2 of the Charter regarding the territorial integrity of 
States. In the event, a proposal to delete paragraph (2)a was not put 
to the vote and article 62(2) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that "A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked 
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the 
treaty establishes a boundary".
(b) State Succession
The question of State succession to treaties has been the
subject of much debate, particularly in the light of the decolonisation
process.92 34 Ultimately, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties declared in article 16 that "a newly independent
State is not bound to maintain in force or to become a party to, any
treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession of
States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the
95succession of States relates". This marked the victory of the "clean 
slate" theory as against the view that "succession rather than non-
(92) UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Second 
Session, p.118.
(93) Sinclair op.cit. p,107.
Î94I See for er*™rie, O ’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and
' Tn+Âmational Law, two vols. 1967; Udokang, Succession of New
+ ^ "international Treaties, 1972; Castren, "Aspects Récents 
di~TTSuccession— d'Etats" 78 ¿57 1951, p.385; Lester "State 
Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth" 12 ICLQ, 1963, p.475 
and Lekocha, "The Problem of Succession of African StateB in 
Respect of Post-Colonial Boundaries in the Light of Practice"
1 Studies in the Developing Countries, 1971, p.131. See also 
Tho Effect of ti m p e ndence on Treaties published under the 
■¡^Tces of the International Law Associations 1965, and the many 
discussions in the International Law Commission, the relevant 
elements of which are noted during the course of this sub-section,
i95) "Newly independent States" are defined in article 2(1)f as former
1 1 dependent territories for the international relations of which the
predecessor State was responsible. Note that, by article 7, the 
Convention provides that it is to apply only as regards a 
succession of States occurring after the entry into force of the 
Convention, without prejudice to the application of customary rules 
which coincide with the Convention.
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succession should be the rule". Accordingly, the question is raised
97as to boundary treaties. An acceptance of the clean slate principle 
here would mean that new States upon gaining independence would be able 
to denounce treaties establishing boundaries and thus legitimately 
claim not to be bound by the former borders. It would open the way to 
claims for further territory. Of relevance also in this discussion are 
the principles of sovereign equality of States and self-determination of 
peoples.
Waldock in his first report on Succession of States and Governments
in Respect of Treaties declared that "the weight both of opinion and
practice seems clearly to be in favour of the view that boundaries
established by treaties remain untouched by the mere fact of a s
The opinion of jurists seems, indeed, to be unanimous on the point even
if their reasoning may not always be exactly the same. In state practice
the unanimity may not be quite so absolute; but the State practice in
favour of the continuance in force of boundaries established by treaty
appears to be such as to justify the conclusion that a general rule of
98international law exists to that effect".
96
(1) The Opinion of Jurists
Most writers emphasise that boundary treaties devolve upon 
successor States despite the change of sovereignty," The basic r *
•» O'Connell, "Independence and Problems of State Succession", The Hew
<96> TTr,t1   International Law and Diplomacy (ed, O'Brien), 1965,
-=^5— 5T~25 See Udokang, op,cit. pp.132-66,pp .*,*■*•»
As re ear ds treaties dealing with other territorial regimes, see 
the following section, infra, p,579.
Yearbook of the ILC, 1968, vol.II, pp.92-3. Footnotes omitted. 
c ; Bedjaoui noted that "in principle the territory devolves upon the
uccessor State on the basis of the pre-existent boundaries. These 
u undaries will have been established by a treaty, an instrument 
issuing from an international conference, a Statute or regulation 
f the predecessor State, or a de facto situation sanctioned by the 
passage of time", ibid, p.1 1 2.
_ See for example, Guggenheim, Traité de Droit International Public, 
T053-4 , vol.I, p,465; Ross, A Textbook of International Law, 1947, 
-[o? L d  McNair, Law of Treaties, 1961, pp.656-7,
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for the rule Is accepted as that of the necessity to maintain the
stability and continuity of boundaries as an essential condition of
international life as emphasised in the recognised principle of respect
100for the territorial integrity of States, A number of authors express
the process by which this is accomplished in terms of a transmutation of
the provisions of the boundary treaty into a territorial settlement
subsisting in its own right. Lester writes that upon ratification the
boundary agreement is deemed to be executed and thereafter operates as
a kind of conveyance. The successor State thus succeeds "not to the
treaty but to the frontiers of its territory as it does to the other
facts of its new international life".10 01 1023* Therefore, upon execution, the
boundary terms lose their contractual character and may be severed from
non-boundary provisions. This will not prevent, however, the parties
from referring to the terms of the treaty in any subsequent dispute as
to title. The result is that the boundary terms take on a life of
103their own, distinct from their conventional origin, Keith, in
discussing the continuity of boundary provisions, emphasised that "the
real fact is, of course, that a treaty of this sort is no longer a
contract; the contract has passed into a conveyance, and the transaction
cannot, therefore, be affected by the fact that one of the parties to the
104original conveyance has changed". Another possible explanation put 
forward is that the principle of nemo dot quod non habet applies in such
(100) Pereira, La Succession d'Etats en Matière de Traites, 1969, p . m .
(101) Loc.cit. p.492.
(102) Cukwurah, op.cit. p.106.
(103) Castren notes^that "Les traités concernant les frontières ayant
été mis en execution et établissant une situation juridique 
déterminée, celle-ci doit etre respectée par le nouveau souverain 
du territoire au même titre que tout pouvoir territorial étranger" 
loc.cit. p .437. See also McNair op.cit. p.256. ’
Mf>4V Theory of State Succession, 1907, p.22.
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cases. In other words, the predecessor State may transfer to the
successor State only the territorial extent of Its own competence.
O'Connell notes that ''since a State can acquire from another only so
much territory as that other possessed, the letter's boundary treaties
with neighbouring States delimit the extent of the territory absorbed".102
However, this Is linked with the territorial theory, f„r "if a boundary
treaty merely defines a frontier, then It la Instantly executed, and
what is inherited is not the treaty but the territorial extent of 
106sovereignty". The International Law Association adopted a series of 
eight resolutions on State succession to treaties in 1968, and the final 
one provided that "when a treaty which provides for the delimitation of 
a national boundary between two States has been executed in the 
that the boundary has been delimited and no further action needs to be 
taken, the treaty has spent its force and what is succeeded to is not the 
treaty but the extent of national territory so delimited".105 607 Where 
however, a boundary treaty provides for future action to delimit It 
provides for future reciprocal rights m  relation to the boundary, it ia 
considered that the question whether the treatv <ay 1S or 18 succeeded to
should be governed by the general presumptions of continuity envisaged 
by it for all treaties of the predecessor State.108 1US* ln a sense,
one is not considering a question of succession to boundary treaties but 
rather succession to the existing and delimited territorial dimensions
of the predecessor State.*08a
(105) '•'State Succession in Municipaj^Law and Interna+i„„n, r.. ...vol.II, p.273. ----1967,
(106) Ibid.
(107) International Law Association, Report of Mr/i
pp.603 and 605. Quoted in Yearbook of the ILC 1968»tne iLC, 1969, vol.II, p,48,
(108) Ibid.
(108a) This approach may be expanded to explain _
exempt from the clean slate rule, See tnr+h ei7 itudes Rr«» also£>ee further, infra, p.579.
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Although this exception to the clean slate rule has been virtually 
universally accepted in doctrine, some authors have tended to be rather 
cautious. Mochi Onory writes that boundary disputes often concern the 
maintenance or otherwise of rights guaranteed in connection with, and 
as a condition of, the settlement of the boundary and that the dispute 
over these rights tends to provoke the reopening of the boundary itself10 
while Udina notes that succession occurs only through the tacit agreement 
of the neighbouring State. The latter proposition would appear not to 
be supported by either international doctrine or State practice. One 
should also note at this stage that both the ILC and the UN Conference 
on the Law of Treaties held that boundary treaties constituted a special 
category forming an exception to the general rule that a fundamental 
change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating, 
withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty.
(2) State Practice
The Special Rapporteur of the ILC felt that the attitudes
adopted by States with regard to article 62(2)a of the Convention on the
Law of Treaties were extremely pertinent in the context of succession to
treaties109 11 12and that the weight of the evidence of State practice and of
legal opinion in favour of the view that in principle a boundary
settlement is unaffected by the occurrence of a succession of States was
"powerfully reinforced" by the decision to exempt treaties establishing
112boundaries from the rebus sic stantibus rule. Although certain
(109) La Succession d"etats aux Traites. 1968, pp.128-31.
(110) "La Succession des Etats quant aux obligations Internationales 
autres que les Dettes Publiques" 44 HR, 1933, pp.704, 748-9.
(111) Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol.II, p,52,
(112) Ibid, p.54.
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differences are evident between the expression of the exception to the
rebus sic stantibus rule and the provision relating to succession to
113boundary treaties, the connection between the two reinforces the
characterisation of boundary treaties as sui geneH«» eris when compared with
114other treaties.
It is also to be noted that in the Temple case 13 415 T— case, the International
Court did not appear to doubt that the 1904 treaty between France „ d  
Slaw (Thailand) establishing the boundary between Cambodia and Thailand 
was binding as between these two. Indeed, both Cambodia and Thailand 
seemed to assume that in the case of a newly independent state, there 
would be a succession not only in respect of , boundary settlement but 
also of treaty provisions ancillary to such settlement. Thailand felt 
that succession would be limited to stipulations forming part of the 
boundary settlement itself, while Cambodia considered that it would 
extend to provisions in a subsequent treaty directly linked to it 116 17
Practice reveals that in general States have accepted the principle
of succession to boundary settlements embodied in treaties The U it d
States, while not accepting that it was bound by UK treaties 
117independence, did accept the previously established boundaries. in 
1856, the US Secretary of State wrote that "the United States rega d
(113) Infra, p.570.
(114) As regards other territorial treaties, see infra p .S 79
(115) ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6.
(116) ICJ, Pleadings, 1959, vol.I, pp.145-6 (Thall»«^ „ , '
See also Yearbook of the ILC, 1972 vol IT anf 165 (Cambodia).
the Right_ofP_as8age case, the court held that Indi»0^ * * 1** in 
to the legal situation created bv a me v>* *. n<Sla had succeeded
"unaffected by the change of regime ixfreiiejni thl'T* 
territory which occurred when India b e n tile inte**vening 
Beports, I960, pp.6, 4 0. became independent", icj
(117) McNair op.cit. p.601.
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it as an established principle of the public law and of international 
right that when a European colony in America becomes independent it 
succeeds to the territorial limits of the colony as it stood in the 
hands of the present country. That is the doctrine which Great Britain 
and the United States concurred in adopting in the negotiations of Paris, 
which terminated this country's war of independence". This was
followed in US v Texas, where it was held that the Texan boundary with
the US was that established in a treaty of 1828 between the US and
. 119Mexico.
As far as African practice is concerned, the OAU has adopted a
policy of succession to boundaries. Resolution 16(1) of 1964 proclaimed
that "all member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing
120on their achievement of national independence". Only Somalia and 
Morocco did not accept this. Although Tanzania declared in 1961 that 
bilateral treaties, concluded by the UK on behalf of the territory of 
Tanganyika, were to remain in force for a period of two years and there­
after it would regard "such of those treaties which could not, by the
application of the rules of customary international law, be considered as
121otherwise surviving as having terminated", as regards boundary 
treaties it has adopted a different attitude. Such boundary agreements 
were deemed to have survived independence, for example those defining 
the Kenya-Tanzania border, and those regarding the boundaries with 18920*
(118) Manning's Diplomatic Corresponde n t  vol vrT  ^■ .
doc.2767. Cited in Cukwurah op.cit. p 106  ^ ea* ®r**ain)#
(119) 143 US 621, 633. See also McNair op.cit n -i+u
to Belgian independence from the NetherUnSsin 1830.reeard
(120) See also article 3(3) of the OAU Charter.
(121> E L Material« on S»oc...lo5 ^ _ g a a .t ST/U!a/SER.B/l4 , p.O T .
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Rwanda and Burundi. The Tanzania-Malawi border is, however,
123subject to dispute.
(i) The Somali Disputes - Somalia has two boundary disputes with
Ethiopia and one with Kenya. Its grounds for claiming Ethiopian and
Kenyan territory are based primarily on self-determination* 124 1256and not
strictly on a claim that as a successor State it is able to denounce
treaties concluded by its predecessor States. However, it did denounce
the 1897 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia and has stated that
it "does not recognise the legal validity of treaties concluded between
foreign colonial powers without the consent or knowledge and against
125the interests of the Somali people." Such unrecognised treaties
included, in addition to the 1897 one, the 1908 Ethiopian-Italian
126treaty and the 1924 Anglo-Italian treaty. The boundary between 
Ethiopia and the former British Somaliland was defined in the 1897 
agreement between the Ethiopian emperor and the U.K. By this treaty, 
Ethiopia acquired territory inhabited by Somali nomads, An exchange 
of letters annexed to this treaty provided that tribes on either side 
of the frontier would be permitted to cross for grazing purposes.127
122
22. Seaton and Maliti, "Treaties and Succession of States and
' Governments in Tanzania", African Conference on International 
r.aw and African Problems, 1967 pp.76, 81-2.
Ibid. See further infra, p.594. As regards other African 
«ractice relating to devolution agreements with the colonial 
cower see Okoye, International Law and the New African States, 
1972, pp.62-8 and Cukwurah op.cit. pp.107-8,
(124) Supra, Chapter 4, p.200 and Chapter 5, p.297,
(125) See Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p,79.
(126) Ibid, p.77.
537 H.C. Debates, 1954-5, cols.1683-4, See also Latham-Brown, 
*12 } "The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute" 5 ICLQ, 1956, 
pp.245, 249.
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However, these grazing rights were not put into effect until 1954 
when a new agreement was concluded between Ethiopia and Britain.128 12930
In April I960, the British government announced that upon the inde­
pendence of British Somaliland, the provisions of the 1897 treaty 
should be regarded as remaining in force between Ethiopia and the 
successor State while the terms of the 1954 agreement relating to
grazing rights and certain facilities accorded to British Somaliland
129with regard to Ethiopian territory would lapse. On June 5 1960,
Ethiopia declared that upon British-Somaliland's independence the
grazing rights permitted under the 1954 agreement would be regarded as
130"automatically invalid"; this was followed after Somalia^ independ­
ence by a statement that Somalia would not acknowledge the validity of 
, 131the 1897 treaty.
The boundary between Ethiopia and the former Italian Somaliland 
was less clear. By the 1896 treaty between Italy and Ethiopia follow­
ing the Italian defeat at Adowa, Italy was obliged to cede Somali- 
inhabited territory to Ethiopia. The definition of the boundary was 
left to the 1908 treaty between Italy and Ethiopia, but the failure to 
demarcate it contributed to the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1936.132 
In 1941, Britain established a military administration in the area and
(128) See Udokang op.cit, p.384,
(129) 621 H.C. Debates, 1960, 5th series, p ins ,p.481, and 8W Materials on ^ » °  °««<i.l044,
(130) Latham-Brown, "Recent Developments in the 4 *Frontier Dispute", 10 ICLQ, 1961, pp.167 pia'So,na;illand
(131) Ibid, p.171.
(132) See O ’Connell op.cit. p.284.
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defined a provisional administrative line. This became the de facto
133boundary during the trusteeship of Somalia and constituted the
border upon independence. It is Somalia's assertion that its borders
with Ethiopia are "provisional administrative boundaries pending final
134demarcation and solution of the dispute."
The boundary between Kenya and Somalia was defined in the Anglo-
135Italian treaty of 1924, by which Jubaland was transferred to
Italian Somaliland in pursuance of the treaty of London 1915, The
treaty of London had offered Italy territorial gains in Africa if it
130joined the war against Germany, This boundary was also disputed by 
137Somalia. Somalia's view has been that Ethiopia and Kenya are
"unlawfully exercising sovereignty over Somali territories to which
138they are not entitled." This is because "the de facto Somali-
Ethiopian and Somali-Kenyan boundaries are based on the provision of 
illegal treaties which are in conflict with prior treaties,of protec­
tion signed between protecting colonial powers and the Somali people,"13 4*7839
(133) Ibid.
(134) Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.ll, pt.l, p.80.
Nntes defining a section of the boundary were exchanged in 
(135> June 1925, see 36 LOTS, p.379.
see in particular article 13 of the treaty. See also McEwen, 
<136) Tnternational Boundaries of East Africa, 1971, pp.113-20.
(137) See further supra, Chapters, p.200.
(138) Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.ll, pt.l, p.80.
Ibid. See also the 1884 and 1885 agreements giving Britain 
(13 ' access to Somali territories and providing that Somalis would
not alienate territory except to Britain, 76 BFSP pp.99-106, and 
the 1886 agreements by which the UK government extended protec­
tion to the Somali tribes and their territories, 77 BFSP,
1263-9. However, the exact area of the territories covered 
by the agreements was never defined, see 537 H.C. Debates, 5th 
series, 1954-5, col.1683. See also O'Connell op.cit. p,284.
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Ethiopia and Kenya argue on the other hand that the treaties defining
the respective boundaries are valid and binding as determining the
140limits of sovereignty of the States concerned. Although it was open 
to Somalia to argue, at least, on the basis of the non-succession of 
new States to boundary treaties, it does not appear to have actually 
done so. Its basic argument has related to the supremacy of the prin­
ciple of self-determination, which it has defined to refer to the free 
choice of inhabitants of both colonial and independent States. It 
declared that "the Charter recognition of the right to self-determination
therefore prevails over rights which Somalia’s neighbours claim under
141earlier treaties." The fact that Somalia seems to have refrained
from expressing the view that as a successor State it is not bound by
the boundary agreements entered into by its predecessor States of
British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland is particularly interesting.
It appears not to have wished to establish such a precedent. On the
other hand, to have accepted unreservedly the opposite proposition,
namely that boundary agreements constitute an exception to the clean
slate doctrine of succession to treaties would have had the effect of
undermining its own position. Accordingly, it declared that "no rigid
universal principle could be laid down to govern all treaties on
boundaries and territorial regimes unless saving clauses were incor-
142porated to provide for special situations." Somalia proposed that 1402
(140) Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p.78.
(141) Ibid, p.80.
(142) UN Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
1977, Comments of Governments, (A/CONF.80/5), p,168. ’
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the draft articles relating to boundaries and territorial regimes 
should be deleted as "international boundaries and territorial arrange­
ments were matters which fell essentially within the domain of 
bilateral negotiations,conciliation and arbitration. " 143 1456 Needless to 
say, Ethiopia and Kenya took the position that boundary treaties were
an exception to the clean slate rule and therefore bound successor 
144States.
145(ii> The Algerian-Moroccan Boundary - in 1845 France and
Morocco signed the treaty of Lalla-Marnia, which defined in detail the 
146Morocco-Algerian boundary from the coast to some eighty miles inland 
Article IV provided, however, that in the Sahara, "there is no terri­
torial limit to establish between the two countries as the land cannot 
be ploughed but is used only as grazing land." Each sovereign was to 
exercise full rights over their respective subjects in the Sahara, it 
was also provided that a number of named villages were accepted as 
belonging to the parties, but that "the territory which is located 
south of the villages in uninhabitable and delimitation thereof would 
be superfluous." These grazing grounds could be used by a list of 
nomad cattle-herding groups, including those from Morocco and Algeria 147 
French forces, however, gradually moved into the area. Although an
(143) Ibid, p.169. Somalia argued that "problems arising from 
boundary treaties could not be satisfactorily solved by univer­
sal rigid rules which were in contradiction with the right of 
self-determination and independence" ibid.
(144) Ibid, p .148-9 and 156.
(145) See supra, Chapter 5, p.295.
(146) France acquired sovereignty over Algeria in 1830, see Cukwurah, 
"The Organisation of African Unity and African Territorial and’ 
Boundary Problems: 1963-1973" 13 IJIL, 1973, pp.176, 184,
(147) Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.19939; Cukwurah loc.cit. p.185 
and Udokang op.cit. pp.395-6.
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official French map of 1848 placed the oases of Tuat in Morocco,
France claimed in the 1880's they were in Algeria and militarily
148occupied them in 1899-1900. The treaty of 1901 included the
Colomb-Bechar area as part of Algeria and in 1912 the frontier was
demarcated by the so-called Varnier line between Colomb-Bechar and
Morocco, which was recognised by the Sultan of Morocco in 1928 as an
149administrative and fiscal frontier. In 1912, Morocco became a
French protectorate. French maps throughout the administration period
conflicted as to whether particular areas were in Algeria or Morocco
and the precise outline of the Varnier line was subject to various
interpretations. In 1938, Colonel Trinquet, a French administrator
in Morocco, proposed a new boundary which would have placed most of
the desert region in Morocco, but it was rejected by the French
government. However, the Tindouf area (placed within Algeria) remained
150under Franco-Moroccan administration until 1952.
Morocco recognised the treaty of Lalla-Marnia, but not subsequent
agreements and contended that French encroachments upon her territory
had violated her sovereignty and could not therefore act as a ground
151for claims by Algeria as successor to France. In its comments on 148950
(148) O'Connell op.cit. p,290. The Tindouf area was occupied by 
France in 1934, see Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.19939
(149) Ibid.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid. Cukwurah loc.cit, pp.186-7; Okoye op.cit, p.100
and Wild, "The OAU and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict" 
20 International Organisation, 1966, pp.19-22. See also 
Boutros-Ghali, Les Conflits de Frontière en Afrique. 1972,
pp.33-45, and Africa Research Bulletin, October 1966, pp.631-3.
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the draft articles dealing with succession to treaties, Morocco declared
that to take account only of treaties, many of which had been concluded
to the disadvantage of the decolonised States, was tantamount to per-
152petuating the effects of colonisation. It could be argued that
Morocco in accepting the 1845 treaty as the starting point for the
definition of its frontier line with Algeria is merely disputing the
153interpretation of that agreement. However, the Sahara area in ques­
tion was not even delimited in this treaty and subsequent agreements 
contain an element of ambiguity, unless one considers them in the light
of the actual boundary in the sense of de facto possession at the time
154of Algerian and Moroccan independence. Therefore, the principle of
territorial integrity in the light of de facto possession pending 
independence becomes crucial with regard to the definition of the 
boundary, while the narrower question of succession to boundary treaties 
does assume in the circumstances of the case a lesser role. Again, it 
is interesting to note that Morocco does not appear to have argued that 
as a successor State it may repudiate the boundary agreements of the 
predecessor State, it has argued rather that issues of historical rights 
and territorial integrity of its pre-colonial empire override the
155general principle of the Inviolability of the colonial borders.
(iii) Other Cases - A number of other cases may be cited with regard 
to the practice of States relating to succession to boundary treaties. 15234
(152) UN Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
1977, Comments of Government, (A/CONF.80/5), p.163 S ’
(153) O'Connell op,cit. p.291.
(154) See Journal Official, Debates C.R., p.2025, 3 October, 1956.
(155) See, for example, UN Conference on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties, 1977, Comments of Governments (A/CONF.80/5) pp,162-3. * ' ’ 1
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In the convention of 1930 between the US and Great Britain for the
delimitation of the boundary between the Philippine archipelago and
the State of North Borneo, certain rights and obligations were
assumed by the United States. Upon the independence of the Philippines
in 1946, the UK recognised that the former had succeeded to the US
156rights and obligations under the 1930 agreement. Following the
independence of India and Pakistan, the UK made a statement with
regard to the continuing in force of the treaty of Kabul of 1921 defining
the boundary between British India and Afghanistan. The UK noted that
whereas certain provisions, being political in nature or relating to
continuous exchange of diplomatic missions, did not devolve to the
successor State (Pakistan) "any executed clauses such as those providing
for the establishment of an international boundary or, rather, what
had been done already under executed clauses of the treaty, could not
be affected whatever the position about the treaty itself might be . " 156 57 1589
Other cases of disputed borders really appear to concern treaties not
fully delimiting boundaries or where the validity of such treaties is
questioned. The issue of succession therefore merely provides an
158opportunity for the raising of the problems. The conclusion, therefore,
that State practice has recognised that boundary treaties constitute
an exception to the clean slate principle of succession to treaties
159appears incontestable.
(156) UN Materials on Succession of States, p,190.
(157) Ibid, p .187. Afghanistan argues that the treaty itself was 
illegal and that Pakistan as a new State does not succeed to 
agreements of the predecessor State, ibid pp,2-3 Afehanist
in general strongly argued that the clean slate ¿rincipie „
to boundary treaties, see ibid and UN Conference on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties, 1977, Comments of Government 
(A/CONF,80/5), pp.139-42. overnments
(158) Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol.II p.54. Examples would inclnn
the Surinara-Guyana and Venezuela-Guyana borders and Chines 6 
claims with regard to Burma, India and Pakistan, see 0 -cnnn!,i 
op.cit. pp.274-5 and 277-82. nnelx
(159) Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol.II, p.54.
570.
(3) -The . Injeniational Law Commission and the Vienna Convpnt^n
on Succession of States In Respect of Treaties
Article 4 of Waldock's draft articles on succession to
treaties declared that "nothing in the present articles shall be
understood as affecting the continuance in force of a boundary
established by or in conformity with a treaty prior to the occurrence 
160of a succession." The point was made that the provision meant 
only that the other articles dealing with the application or cessation 
of treaties did not affect established boundaries. 160 61 in the draft 
articles prepared by the Special Rapporteur in 1972, two alternatives 
were posited with regard to the question of succession to boundary 
treaties. Alternative A noted that:
"1. The continuance in force of a treaty which established 
a boundary is not affected by reason only of the occurrence of a 
succession of States in respect of a party.
2. In such a case the treaty is considered as in force in
respect of the successor State from the date of the succession of 
States, with the exception of any provisions which by reason of their 
object and purpose are to be considered as relating only to the pre­
decessor State."
Alternative B stated that:
"1. A Succession of States shall not by reason only of its 
occurrence affect the continuance in force of a boundary settlement 
which has been established by a treaty.
2 . In such a case the boundary settlement is to be considered 
as comprising any provisions of the treaty relating to the boundary.» 162
(160) Ibid, 1968 vol.II, p.92.
(161) Ibid, p.93.
(162) Ibid, 1972, vol.II, p.44.
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The difference between the two formulations relates essentially 
as to whether it is the treaty itself or the boundary situation 
established by a treaty which devolves upon the successor State. In 
favour of the former, it could be said that treaty interpretation may 
be required in order to define the boundary properly and that certain 
ancillary provisions may be stipulated as part of the boundary regime 
created by the treaty which if held not to devolve on a succession 
of States might be said to change materially the boundary settlement. 
To support the latter, it could be argued that a boundary treaty has 
constitutive effects and it is the legal and factual situation thus
created which passes to the successor State rather than the treaty. 163
164In the event, the latter approach was adopted. Draft article 29 on 
boundary regimes provided thus that "A Succession of States shall not 
as such affect; (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obliga­
tions and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of
165 rm.4a is in accordance with practice and doctrine, it a boundary. *UiB
is believed since the succession ipso facto of a boundary treaty might 
involve the continuance of provisions not directly related to the 
creation of the boundary that might prove unacceptable to the successor 
State. More importantly, it is believed that the essence of the excep­
tion to the clean slate rule of succession is due to the centrality of 
the concept and consequences of territorial sovereignty in international 
law with regard to stability and certainty in international relations 
and the maintenance of international peace and security. It is. of
(163)
(164)
(165)
Ibid, pp.54-5.
In accordance also with Waldock’s formulation
p,92 and the views of the International Law a ’ 1968 1969, vol.II, p .48. °nftl Law Association,
» VOl.II#
ibid
Ibid 1974, vol.I, p.203. See also A/CN,4/L,l83/Add.6.
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course, also true that international society in its present form is 
firmly based upon the notion of State sovereignty, territorially 
defined, therefore, one can accept that boundary treaties in establish­
ing a particular regime give birth to an objective situation which 
constitutes a legal fact for the international community. 166
Draft article 29 as finally adopted167 168was accepted by the 
Vienna Conference on Succession of States In Respect of Treaties as
article 11. It was approved by the Committee of the Whole without a
16 Svote, and the Convention on Succcession of States In Respect of 
Treaties was adopted on 23 August 1978 by 82 votes to none, with two 
abstentions (France and Switzerland) . 169 A few further points remain 
to be considered, however, regarding the doctrine of the boundary 
exception to the general rule, embodied in article 16 of the Convention
(a) The basis of the exception to the clean slate rule was 
generally accepted to lie in the requirements of the international 
community with regard to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The Special Rapporteur in 1974, Sir Francis Vallat, declared 
that acceptance of the idea that a bilateral boundary treaty could be
(166) The Egyptian representative in the 6th Committee asked how in 
legal theory the rights and obligations of parties under a 
treaty could be separated from the international instrument 
creating them, A/CN,4/278/Add.6, para.417. The Special 
Rapporteur noted that as a matter of principle, it is the nature 
of the effects of the treaty which gives rise to the element of 
permanence rather than the general character of the treaty as 
such. The formulation of the ILC would also avoid providing a 
ground for saying that an unlawful treaty would be perpetuated 
by the articles, Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p.85.
(167) The Drafting Committee substituted "shall" for "does" in the 
first line of the text in order to emphasise that the article 
"was in the nature of what the French called une constatation 
de fait", ibid 1974, vol.I, p.261.
(168) Report of the UN Conference on Succession of States In Respect 
of Treaties, 1977, (A/CONF.80/15), Annex.II, p.21.
(169) A/CONF,80/31.
succession of States "would result in chaos. Itswept aside by a
was unthinkable that it should become necessary to renegotiate a
boundary whenever a succession of States occurred. " 170 it was
pointed out that "the disturbance of existing boundaries is much more
likely to create chaos than their maintenance.”171 *1734 This view was also
172
put by a number of the members of the ILC, and by a number of
governments. A number of members and governments175 *expressed
the view that the exception was already part of customary international
law. Zambia was gratified that the ILC was giving effect to the OAU
176
border resolution of 1964.
(b) The limits of the exception to the general rule were fairly 
clearly expressed. The Special Rapporteur noted that the article was 
a saving clause of limited character, dealing only with the effects 
of succession qua succession and not touching upon questions pertaining 
to the international law of treaties. The article was (as indeed was
(170) yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.I, p.204. The first Special R rteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, referred to the Commentary 
f the ILCwith regard to the exception to the rebus sic 
°tantibus rule constituted by treaties establishing a boundary, 
Shich nointed to the need to avoid the rule becoming a source 
of dangerous frictions, ibid, 1968, vol.II, p.92.
(171)
(172)
Ibid, 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p.83.
For example, Moreno, ibid, 1974, vol.I, 
n .216: Yasseen ibid, p.2
p.210; Ago ibid,
(173) For example, Australia, UN Conference on Succession of States
In Respect of Treaties, 1977, Comments of Governments (A/CONF 8/5) 
pp,143-4; the German Democratic Republic ibid, p.X50j Indonesia ' 
ibid, pp.152-3; and the Philippines ibid, p,166, ’
(174) For example, Sette Camara, Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.I,
p .206; Ushakov ibid, p.210; Ago ibid p.213. The Special Rapporteur 
stressed that the basis of his proposal was to be found in long- 
established customary law, ibid, p.222. Cf, Tabibi ibid, pp.206-8.
(175) For example, the German Democratic Republic, UN Conference on 
Succession of States In Respect of Treaties, 1977, Comments of 
Governments, (A/CONF.80/5), p.150; USSR ibid, p,172 and USA ibid, 
p.175.
Ibid, p.176.(176)
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the article concerning other territorial regimes) concerned with the
results of certain treaties and not with the treaties themselves. The
words -established by a treaty" meant therefore, "validly established
by a valid treaty". The intention was to refer to situations law-
177fully and validly created. In other words, the article could not
operate to legalise a boundary founded upon an unlawful treaty 17 78 179
Nor was the provision concerned with a situation created otherwise than 
179by a treaty. Hambro, as a member of the ILC, made the point that
draft article 29 did not state or imply that boundary treaties were
sacrosanct and would last forever, it simply stated that succession of
States as such would not affect those treaties 180 * Th* n• .me article did not
prevent the settlement of boundary disputes by accepted methods such
181as negotiation and arbitration. Nor could it affect boundary situa­
tions, which could be lawfully challenged. Thus, where a boundary 
treaty failed to delimit adequately and clearly the proposed boundary 
or where its validity could be challenged on any of a series groundsf
the article was of little influence one way or the other. The articl 
would be of no direct value where the boundary was contested in the 
light of other principles, such as territorial integrity or self- 
determination. The Special Rapporteur stressed that »tt,. m
1 ine mere occurrence
of a succession of States would be considered neither to ^■'‘■»naecrate the
existing boundary if it is open to challenge nor deprive it of its
(177) This point was emphasised in article 14 of th* r
provides that "nothing in the present Convention s h a n ^ ” ’ Whi< 
sidered as prejudging in any respect any question ni l * ? 6 COn'’ the validity of a treaty." q n re*ating to
(178) Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, vol.I, p.204
(179) Ibid, p.222.
(180) Ibid, p.213.
Ibid, p.204.(181)
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character as a legally established boundary, if such it was at the
182date of the succession of States."
(c) The principle of self-determination was clearly of concern 
with regard to the topic of State succession in general and the ques­
tion of boundary agreements in particular. The Special Rapporteur 
noted in 1969 that the traditional principle of State succession 
whereby a new State begins its treaty relations with a clean slate 
was certainly consistent with self-determination, while the approach
183of the International Law Association formulated in terms of a pre
sumption in favour of the transmission of the treaties of the predece
sor State to the successor State may raise questions with regard to
184self-determination. The comments made by governments in 1974 
demonstrated "overwhelming support for the clean slate doctrine" 182 3*85 *
which it was felt was the main implication of the principle of self-
determination 186 The clean slate principle was chosen by the ILC
as the basic provision of the draft articles relating to newly independ­
ent States and incorporated in article 16 of the Vienna Convention 
With regard to the exception to the rule in the case of boundary 
treaties, it was possible to argue that self-determination was being 
overridden by the continuity principle. Zambia, in particular, stated
(182) Ibid, 1972, vol,II, p54.
(183) International Law Association, Report of the 53rri1968, pp.603-5 . *ne sjrd Conférence,
(184)
(185)
(186)
Yearbook of the ILC, 1969, vol.H, p,50.
Ibid, 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p.9.
Ibid, p.7. See, for example, the comments n* rw.
Sweden and the UK expressed some reservation« &rk ibid. pp.8 and 9. nervations over this, ibid,
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that in its draft articles relating to boundary and other territorial 
regimes, the ILC had appeared to cut across the principles of self- 
determination, equal rights and the sovereign equality of States 
Under both the Vienna Convention on Treaties and customary law, a 
State could only be bound by a treaty through an act of w i n  establish 
ing consent to be bound and this also applied to boundary regimes. 187 18
The Special Rapporteur, however, correctly pointed out that in the 
case of a newly independent State, which has acquired independence by 
the exercise of self-determination, "it may well be said that it can 
only acquire the territory in respect of which self-determination has 
been exercised and not part of the territory of a neighbouring State." 
Reference was also made to the need to consider the principle of 
respect for the territorial integrity of States.18®
This approach, which is consistent with the accepted definition 
of the right to self-determination, was to some extent endorsed by 
Kenya, which stressed that "in the event of a succession, the succe 
State replaced the predecessor State as far as boundaries were con­
cerned not because of the boundary treaty, but because of the mere fact
(187) Ibid, p.76. See also the comments of Romania, ibid, p.75,
Afghanistan, Swaziland and Syria made similar criticisms UN 
Conference on Succession of States In Respect of Treaties, 1977 
Comments of Governments, (A/CONF.80/5), pp.139, 170 and 171. '
(188) Yearbook of the ILC, 1974, voi,II, pt.l, p,84, Guyana noted
that the principle of self-determination could not be extended 
to the point of removing the very foundation of the existence 
of the new State from the moment of its creation, otherwise 
"the old colonial world would become an unbounded chaos", ibid 
p.76. See also the comments of Algeria and Ethiopia, UN* ' 
Conference on Succession of States In Respect of Treaties 1977 
comments of governments, (A/CONF,80/5), pp.143 and 149, ' "
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oi the existence of such boundaries. In such a case it was irrele-
189vant and confusing to raise the issue of self-determination." It
may also be noted, that the treatment of the principle of self-
determination as an independent principle, which should not be imported
ambiguously into other branches of the law, was adopted also with
. 190
regard to the law of treaties.
(c) Conclusions
The accepted approach that neither the rebus sic stantibus
rule nor the clean slate doctrine is based in law upon the principi
191of self-determination, in addition to preventing some confusion 
obviated the need to posit exceptions to the legal right of self­
determination with regard to treaties establishing boundaries d 
boundary regimes, The centrality of the concept of territory in i 
national law, coupled with the need to ensure the stability and f
of boundaries in the interests of international ne&o«peace and security, has
produced a situation in which the delimitation of sovereignty by an
international agreement remains binding despite State succession 
a fundamental change of circumstances. Such an approach refers i 
to boundary treaties. Whether or not a legitimate territorial clai *
(189)
(190)
(191)
Ibid, p.157 *
Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol.II, p.259. Waldock * 
that "by excepting from succession in respect of treat?.!* °Ut 
boundaries established through treaties the ore r®aties 
in no way excludes the independent operation of tli art*c*e 
of self-determination in any case where the condi+? principie
its application exist", ibid, 1968, vol,H f p Q3 0ns fop
inct from being merely "confirmed" 
rr.c. 1974, vol.II, pt.l, p.8.
by it, see Yearbook
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other grounds may or may not be made is another question, as is the 
challenging of the validity of the treaty itself. But the fact that 
a treaty is the most convenient and most utilised method of resolving 
territorial and boundary issues means that the exceptions to the 
rebus sic stantibus and clean slate rules are of considerable impor­
tance. Their acceptance by African States, despite some reservations 
by a couple of African countries, reinforces the legal validity of 
colonial territorial adjustments and thus underlines the requirement 
to respect the colonial borders as at the date of independence. It 
is also noteworthy that the opposition by for example Somalia and 
Morocco to the principles examined above has been carefully formulated 
and has by no means consisted of outright hostility. It is Afghanistan 
that has appeared to reject most strongly the relevance and applicability 
of such principles. These principles may also be seen as reinforcing 
the accepted definition of the right to self-determination in inter­
national law, that is in terms of the pre-independent entity territorially 
defined by the administering power exercising its right to sovereignty
so delimited in space.
The fact that boundary agreements may establish objective legal
circumstances which may subsist independently of the particular treaty
itself means that provisions in such agreements are severable when
dealing with the creation of a boundary. This was the view adopted by
the UK with regard to the Ethiopia-British Somaliland boundary and is
192to be regarded as correct. 192
(192) See Cukwurah op.cit. p.Ill, and O'Connell op.cit, pp,302-4.
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Ill - Other Territorial Regimes
More controversial than the question of treaties establishing
boundaries is the problem of treaties creating other territorial
regimes. Such treaties have been termed "dispositive", or "real"
193or "localised". Agreements may be "localised" if they 
(a) are in the nature of objective territorial regimes created in 
the interests of one nation or the community of nations* (b) are 
applied locally in virtue of territorial application clauses;
(c) touch or concern a particular area of land ” 193 94 195 in such cases,
it is argued, these territorial provisions devolve upon a successor 
195State. Boundary treaties have been treated as a species of such 
dispositive treaties. 196 197 However, there is an important difference.
As Waldock noted, in the case of a boundary established by a treaty 
one is concerned with a legal situation resulting from the execution 
of the treaty, whereas localised treaty stipulations involve execu­
tory obligations and therefore may appear to raise a question of
succession in respect of treaty obligation as well as one of the
197continuance of a legal situation. In addition, of course, whereas 
a State may accept that it must exercise its sovereignty within 
territorial limits established by its predecessor, it may be reluctant
(193) See O'Connell op.cit. p.231; Udokang op.cit n « 7 . „ „ 
op.cit. p.656 and Lester loc.cit., d 498 P ' ’ McNair 
"servitude" has been used, but this ¿an ¿auSe confusin^ tei,,a 
O'Connell op.cit. p.231 and International Law A s s o M !? ’ Se® 
The Effect of Independence on Tread a. , l965> p“ J£U t l o n *
(194) Ibid.
(195) See Oppenheim, International Law. 8th ed 195*
Brownlie argues that "there is insufficient p,159‘
principle or practice for the existence of^his e v ^  I? either 
the general rule", Principles of Public Inter««**if!?\ion to 
2nd ed., 1973, p.646. See
Brierly. The Law of Nations. 6th ert iggj p 154 p p *448”9 and
(196) Udokang, op.cit., pp.328-9 and The Effect «rTreaties, p.361. ------- ~~S£Jjadg£gndence on
(197) yearbook of the ILC, 1968, vol.Ii, p .93
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to accept the limitations upon its sovereignty by restrictions imposed 
by a previous authority which continue in an open and apparent fashion. 
In a sense, the principles of self-determination and the sovereign 
equality of States may appear more offended in the instance of dis­
positive treaties than with regard to boundary agreements 198
The International Court in the Pree_Zones case appeared to endorse 
the principle that certain treaties of a territorial character are 
binding ipso jure upon a successor State, 199 although the extent of 
the principle was in doubt. 200 201 The Committee of Jurists dealing with 
the Aaland Islands question felt that Finland was bound to respect 
the provisions of the 1856 treaty between France, the UK and Russia 
according to which the latter agreed to the demilitarisation of the 
Aaland Islands. These provisions "constituted a special international 
status relating to military considerations, for the Aaland Islands " 
Finland, by declaring itself independent and claiming recognition could
not escape from "the obligations imposed on it by such a settlement
' ■ . „201of European interests."
(a) African Practice
0S - In 1950, France and the United
States signed an agreement, providing for five US military bases in
it is also to be noted that the exception in article 62(2) of 
<198) the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies only with 
regard to treaties establishing boundaries and not to other 
territorial treaties.
(199) FCIJ, Series A, no.24, p.17, and ibid, Series A/B, no.46, p,145.
g e Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol.II, p.50. See also Brownlie 
(2°0> op.cit., p.646.
tmoj Special Supplement no.3, 1920, p.18 The Committee of
(201) L also held that "the recognition of any State must always
h Subject to the reservation that the State recognised will 
spect the obligations imposed upon it either by general inter- 
^tionsl law or by definite international settlements relating to 
^rritory" ibid. See also the Temple case. ICJ Reports, 1982,
6 and Right to Passage case, ibid, 1960, p.6 . The latter 
case however, dealt with the succession of customary rights over*territory.
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Morocco. 202 203 This was deemed to be pursuant to the treaty of Fez of 
1912 by which Morocco became a French protectorate* permitting it 
"to proceed to such military occupation of the Moroccan territory as 
it might deem necessary for the maintenance of good order and the
ono
security of commercial transactions." Upon Moroccan Independence
In 1956, the government declared that It did not recognise the 1950
agreement, which constituted a violation of its sovereignty 204 The
Franco-Moroccan Declaration of 1956 terminated the treaty of Fez whil
the protocol annexed to it provided that pending the conclusion of
new agreements the "present status of the French army in Morocco shall
remain unchanged. " 205 It was accepted that the continued rights
of the US forces were dependent upon the status of the French army 2 0 6
In the Franco-Moroccan accord of May 1956, it was suggested that
Morocco would not maintain those treaties concluded by France on its
behalf which had been the subject of Moroccan comment,207 2089while in
note to France, Morocco reserved its position with regard to the 1950 
208agreement. The United States recognised Moroccan sovereignty over
209the US bases in 1957 and 1959 and agreed to withdraw all its forces
(202) This agreement was not published, see Udokang OD cit „
0 'Connellop.cit. p.257 and Esgain, "Military ServitiidL '^  
the New Nations", The Ne. Nations In I n , . » ? . , - , “ d 
Diplomacy (ed. O'Brien), 1965, pp,72-6. ~---- -------- -Hi*
(203) Article II,
(204) Udokang, op,cit, p.355, and O'Connell op.cit. p.257
(205) See 51 AJIL, 1957, p.676.
(206) O'Connell, op.cit. p.258,
(207) 51 AJIL, 1957, p.679-81.
(208) Ibid, p .682. The French admitted that the 1950
mads on behalf of France and not In the n L f “er»eme"‘ »*■ 
O'Connell op.cit, p.258. 8 «Morocco,
(209) 37 Department of State Bulletin, 1957. n 95« ~
of State Bulletin, 1959, p.723. ’ P and 41 “e p m a e n t
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by the end of 1963. The US did not seek to recover the 410 million
211dollars invested in the base. However, as Udokang rightly notes,
neither France, Morocco nor the United States seemed to hold that the
1950 agreement had created a "real" or "localised" right on Moroccan
territory in favour of the US, which would be binding upon Morocco.212
It may be suggested that the personal and political nature of military
agreements is such as to override any territorial aspects and thus
prevent the operation of any principle of devolution to a successor 
213State.
(ii) The-Belbase-Agreements of 1921 and 1951 - Following the
First World War, the former German East African territories were
given to Britain and Belgium as mandated territories. The fact that
the eastern region, Tanganyika, was awarded to Britain meant that the
Belgian-administered territories of Ruanda and Urundi, as well as the
Congo, were cut off from their natural port of Dar-es-Salaam. ln 1921
Britain and Belgium concluded an agreement whereby the latter was
granted a lease in perpetuity of port sites in Dar-es-Salaam and
Kigoma (on Lake Tanganyika). Various transit facilities and customs
214exemptions were also provided for. In 1951, a further agreement was
210
(210) 45 Department of State Bulletin, 1961, p.973
(211) O'Connell op.cit. p.258.
(212) Op.cit. p.357. As regards the US military bases in h . »
Indies acquired under an agreement in 1941 with th« 2 °  ^®St 
the US and the West Indies appeared to accept thit b°th 
status on independence would depend udoji on % their fu*ure
Pai2598628ee ESeaiD l0C‘Cit* P P t78~9 and 0 'C o n n e l l ^ . c i t ^
(213) See Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol.U, p.56,
(214) O’Connell op.cit. pp.241-2; Udokang op.cit nn ^-7
Seaton and Malltl loc.clt. pp.93-4. See also i Uiis ,“ 319-2 7 .
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entered into which provided for a change ln the site at Dar-es-Salaam,
but otherwise the 1921 treaty was continued.215 Belgium spent a
considerable sum in developing the port facilities at the leased
sites. Nine days before independence, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika
declared that it intended to treat both agreements as void and to
216resume possession of the sites. However, Tanganyika's objection 
was not with regard to all pre-independence agreements dealing with 
territorial rights. It noted that it had no objection to the enjoy­
ment by foreign States of special facilities in its territory, if such 
facilities "had been granted in a manner fully compatible with our 
sovereign rights and our new status of complete independence.1'217 The 
problem with regard to the Belbase agreements was that they had been 
granted "in perpetuity" by a mandatory authority that did not have the 
competence to bind the territory in perpetuity. The Prime Minister 
stated that "in appearing to bind the territory of Tanganyika for all
time, the United Kingdom was trying to do something which it did not
218have the power to do." In 1962, Tanganyika gave notice of its 
request for the evacuation of the sites, but the now independent States 
of Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda and Burundi claimed to have succeeded 
to Belgium's rights under the 1921 and 1951 agreements.219 Discussio 
were held between the parties as regards the use of the port facilities 
but it does not appear that new arrangements have been concluded and
(215) 110 UNTS, p.3.
(216) UN Materials on Succession of States, pp.187-8
(217) Seaton and Maliti loc.cit, p.93.
(218) Ibid.
(219) O'Connell op.cit. p.243 and Yearbook of the ILP 1070 , „
p ,56. • 1 9 7 2 * v o l * n .
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de facto the port facilities are being operated as before 220 ln 
the event, the fact that Tanganyika rested its argument on the 
limited competence of the mandatory power to bind the territory 
might appear to mean that it accepted that binding territorial pro­
visions could devolve upon successor States in other circumstances.
(ili) Th.e l 1 2l e-WateJ-s Agreement of 1929 - This agreement between
Britain and Egypt provided that save with the previous agreement
of the Egyptian government no works were to be undertaken by Britain
in its territories which would affect adversely the quantity of
221water arriving in Egypt from the Nile. Egypt was given the right 
to construct in the Sudan works on the Nile, subject to prior agree­
ments with the local authorities to safeguard local interests. Such 
works would, however, remain under the direct control of the Egyptian
government. Upon independence, the Sudan denied the continued validity
222of the 1929 agreement. Sudan did not dispute Egypt's rights in 
the Nile Waters, but denied that it was bound after independence with 
regard to the burdensome incidences of the agreement. 223 jn 1959 
Sudan and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for additional regula 
tion of the Nile waters on the basis of existing rights. 224
(220) Ibid.
(221) 93 LNTS pp.43, 46.
(222) The NileJTaters.Question (Ministry of Irrigation Suda^
1955, pp.2-3, and 596 H.C. Debates, 5th Series ' 1 3 S  '
Egypt upheld the validity of the 1929 agreement, ibid '
(223) O'Connell op.cit. p,246. In 1958, Sudanthe agreement, ibid. . ^dan formally repudiated
(224) Udokang op.cit. pp.365-6. See as regards /
attitudes, O'Connell op.olt. pp.246-? L d  ^  “ ‘J 5‘,te*'
Tanzania, Seaton and Maliti loc.cit. p ,95 regard to
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(b) The Vienna Convention on Succession of States In Respect 
of Treaties, 1978
Practice would appear to accept that territorial treaties
may devolve upon successor States although the precise definition of
225such treaties remains the problem. The ILC took the view that such
treaties constituted another exception to the clean slate rule.
.... , 226 227 Despite some reservations by ILC members and some governments,
the Vienna Convention accepted the concept. Article 12 provides that:
"1. A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) obligations relating to the use of any territory, or to 
restrictions upon its use, established by a treaty for the benefit of 
any territory of a foreign State and considered as attaching to the 
territories in question;
(b) rights established by a treaty for the benefit of any 
territory and relating to the use, or to restrictions upon the use, 
of any territory of a foreign State and considered as attaching to 
the territories in question.
2. A succession of States does not as such affect;
(a) obligations relating to the use of any territory, or to 
restrictions upon its use, established by a treaty for the benefit of 2567
(225) See, for example, Zemanek, "State Succession After Decolonisation" 
116 HR, 1965, pp.180, 242-3.
(226) Particularly by Tabibi, who felt the draft article was politically 
oriented and insufficiently supported by State practice, Yearbook 
of the ILC, 1974, vol.I, pp.206-7. But cf. Sette Camara ibid,
pp.205-6,
(227) For example, Botswana, UN Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties, 1977, comments of governments (A/CONF.80/5), 
p.145; Iran, ibid p.153; Mexico, ibid p.161; Romania, ibid p.167; 
Swaziland, ibid p.170; Syria, ibid p.171 and Cameroon, ibid p.173, 
Kenya declared that in cases of localised treaties, a newly 
independent State did not inherit the territorial regime created, 
but it did inherit an obligation where necessary to renegotiate 
the provisions of such a treaty so as to achieve the protection 
of the vital interests of a beneficiary State while not jeopar­
dising the successor State's independence, ibid, p.157.
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a group of States or of all States and considered as attaching to 
that territory;
(b) rights established by a treaty for the benefit of a group 
of States or of all States and relating to the use of any territory, 
or to restrictions upon its use, and considered as attaching to that 
territory.
3. The provisions of the present article do not apply to treaty 
obligations of the predecessor State providing for the establishment 
of foreign military bases on the territory to which the succession of 
States relates."
228IV - The Delimitation and Demarcation of African Boundaries
In the definition and recognition of international boundaries in 
the interests of stability and finality, a number of factors are or 
may be crucial. Where a boundary has been delimited by treaty and 
demarcated on the ground, a State may yet seek to maintain that it is 
not bound by that arrangement on the grounds of, for example, ethnic 
or historical claims. Where a boundary has been delimited but not 
demarcated, problem may arise as to the application in practice of the 
treaty provisions. Thus issues of treaty interpretation, acquiescence 
and estoppel and the relevance of particular administrative acts will 
be of relevance. But where a boundary has not been delimited, the 
question of its positioning will basically depend upon either mutual 
agreement or actual practice on the ground. In all cases, the value 
of acts of sovereignty is high, although the role played by such acts 
will depend upon all the circumstances of the case in question. 28
(228) Supra, p.546.
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(a) Delimitation Disputes
In some cases, there may be no delimitation of the boundary 
at all or a disputed delimitation.
<*> The Ethiopian-Somali Dispute - In 1884 and 1886, the British 
government concluded a series of agreements with the leaders of the 
five tribes inhabiting the Somali coast region. One group of agree­
ments involved a pledge by the Somalis not to cede or otherwise
alienate any portion of the tribal lands to anyone except the British 
229government, while a second group of agreements provided for the
protection of such tribes by the British Crown. The tribes also
pledged not to enter into relations with foreign powers without the
knowledge and approval of the British government. However, the
extent of the land owned by the Somali tribes was unclear since written
records of tribal limits apparently did not exist. This resulted
in border disputes with Ethiopia. Certain of the claims made by the
parties overlapped. Accordingly, the UK-Ethiopia treaty of 1897 was
concluded, and the boundary delimited by notes exchanged between a
British representative and an Ethiopian representative in accordance
232with article 2 of the treaty. The Haud, one of the main grazing 
areas of the Somali tribes, was divided between the protectorate and 
Ethiopia and the so-called "reserved area" to the north-west also 
incorporating grazing grounds was given to Ethiopia.233
(229) These agreements also provided for free access for British 
shipping to the Somali coast and the suppression of the slave 
trade, see eg, 76/BFSPpp. 101-6 for a series of such agreements 
See also 537 H.C. Debates, 5th Series 1954-5, col.1683 and 
Sharma op.cit. p.97,
(230) See, for example, 77BFSP pp.1263-9.
(231) But tribal tradition defined such areas reasonably clearlv 
Latham-Brown, "The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute” 5 'icro
“ l u e ” . ' 249 ' “l 8 °  537 " 'C- » t i
(232) 89/BFSP pp.31 and 36-7.
(233) Britain was negotiating under a militarv Hi..,, M *
of the situation at that time in the Sudan, see sJa™. op!«t!lp“ 8
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Somalia declared that the 1897 treaty was invalid as it was inter 
alia inconsistent with the earlier agreements. It was contended that 
the UK could not cede in 1897 what by the 1884-6 agreements it did not 
have 234 However, the UK had general authority under the protectorate 
agreements to determine borders, it would appear, and it may be 
possible to infer Somali consent from those earlier agreements.
In addition, the status of the 1884-6 agreements is BUbject to doubt. 
Sharma declares that they were of a lower status than international 
agreements 235 236but one has to be careful of this type of approach of 
grading treaties. Certainly the type and level of control exercised 
by the UK over the area subsequent to the 1884-6 agreements would 
appear to suggest quite strongly that the UK did possess the competence 
to define the boundaries of the region. The 1897 treaty was a binding 
and valid treaty in law and was acted upon by the parties in the 
d cades that followed. Subsequent conduct may be taken as confirmation 
of the treaty.
In 1935 as a consequence of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the 
Baud was incorporated into Italian Somaliland. An agreement between 
the Italian government and the authorities of British Somaliland pro­
vided for the protection of grazing and watering rights "on either
23Gside of the frontier of British Somaliland.” This presupposed that 
the 1897 delimitation was both valid and operative. An Ethiopian-UK 
agreement in 1942 provided that those parts of Ethiopia included in the
(234)
(235)
See 537 H.C. Debates, 5th Series, 1954-5, 
Brown loc.cit. p.255. See also Somalia's 
to this effect, Yearbook of the ILC, 1974,
col.1679 and Latham- 
commenta to the ILC 
vol.II, pt.l, p.77.
Op.cit. p.101.
(236) Cmnd. 5775.
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Italian Somaliland region would be temporarily administered as part
of British Somaliland, following the defeat of the Italian forces.
By the 1944 Ethiopian-UK agreement, this arrangement was confirmed
21"without prejudice to their /ie. the Ethiopians'^ underlying sovereignty." 
Negotiations for the return of the areas commenced in 1946 and the 
treaty concluded in 1954 provided for the resumption of Ethiopian 
control and the legal regime created by the 1897 agreement was officially
OOQacknowledged. The Secretary of State for the Colonies declared
that "although these areas are used predominantly by members of British
protected tribes from the Somaliland protectorate they have been
Ethiopian territory in international law since the Anglo-Ethiopian 
240treaty of 1897."
A difference in the interpretation of the 1908 Ethiopian-Italian
treaty concerning the delimitation of the Ethiopian-Italian Somaliland
boundary has also manifested itself. The treaty delimited the boundary
241in the light of the territorial extent of particular tribes.
However, the extent of such tribal areas was in doubt. Accordingly,
an Italian-Ethiopian demarcation commission in 1910 was unable to complete
its task.237 8940142 243 The details of the 1897 Ethiopian-Italian agreement were
243ambiguous and thus of no help. The conclusion with relation to this 
boundary must be that no clear delimitation was laid down. Thus, the 
boundary has to be inferred from practice and acts of administration 
and any acts of acquiescence.
(237) Cmnd. 6334.
(238) 145/BFSP, pp.460, 462.
(239) Cmnd. 9348. See also Latham-Brown loc.cit. p.259.
(240) 537 H.C. Debates, 1955, col,1281.
(241) See Mariam "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary 
Dispute" 2 JMAS, 1964, pp.189, 203-6. See also Africa Research 
Bulletin, May 1966, pp.531-2.
(242) Sharma, op.cit. p.105.
(243) Mariam loc.cit, p.200. See also Sharma op.cit, pp.106-9,
237
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<**> The Algerian-Moroccan Dispute - As noted above,244 the 1845 
treaty between France and Morocco did not delimit the area beyond 
Teniet-El-Sassi, some eighty miles from the coast, since the delimita­
tion of uninhabited territory was deemed to be superfluous.245 in 1901 
a protocol signed in Paris extended the border between Algeria and 
Morocco from Teniet-El-Sassi (or Teniet-ess-Assi) to the Hammada du 
Guir. The delimitation in this area was by tribal lands rather than 
geographical features. Provision was made for military and customs 
posts along the border to be controlled by both powers.246 247 in 1902 
by the agreement of Algiers, the 1901 provisions regarding these posts
were abrogated except at Figuig, and instead areas of Joint authority
247were created along the border. France occupied further areas, but 
these were returned to Morocco by an arrangement in 1910. Varnier 
a French High Commissioner was deputed to execute this arrangement 
and his line (the Varnier line) coincided with the 1901 Protocol bound­
ary between Teniet-El-Sassi and Figuig, however to the south-west 
of Figuig the line running north and west of the former boundary 
enlarged Algeria by several hundred square miles. The Varnier line 
was adopted by a French ministerial decree of 1912.248 in 1912,
Morocco became a French protectorate. In 1938, the Trinquet line was 
proposed which would have enlarged Morocco, but it was not accepted
(244) Supra, p.530.
(245) See Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundaries: A Factual 
Background" 1 JMAS, 1963, p.315,
(246) Sharma op.cit. p.110, and Reyner loc.cit. p.317,
(247) Ibid.
(248) Ibid.
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It became, however, the basis of Moroccan claims over Algerian
249territory in the 1960's. French maps were inconsistent through­
out this period and the precise outline of the Varnier line was 
subject to various interpretations. Since the Varnier line was 
based on the 1910 agreement, it must be accepted as the correct 
delimitation of the boundary in the region in question. But since 
there were different French views as to the placement of this line 250 
the presumption must lie in favour of the line deemed by France to 
constitute the boundary on Algeria's independence. This would appear 
to be in accord with French acts of administration during the period 
pending independence. In the event, Morocco accepted the boundary 
as colonially defined (ie. during the latter stages).251
<ili> The Sudanese-Egyptian Dispute - In the agreement of 1899 
between Egypt and the UK, it was provided that Sudan included all 
territories to the south of the 22nd parallel of latitude which had 
never been evacuated by Egyptian troops, which had been lost as a 
result of the Sudan rebellion and reconquered or "which may hereafter 
be conquered by the two governments acting in concert."252 it was 
also provided that Wadi Haifa and Suakin could be most effectively 
administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces (of Egypt) 
to which they were respectively adjacent. Suakin was later excepted 
from the regime of martial law proclaimed over Sudan.253 The distineti
(249) Ibid, p .318.
(250) See Sharma op.cit, p.112.
(251) Supra, p.530.
(252) See Abdalla, "The Sudanese Boundary Conflict" 
de Droit International, 1958, pp.l, 3. 14 Revue Egyptienne
(253) Ibid. This area was kept for some time under 
of the Egyptian courts, ibid, p.4. the jurisdiction
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here between the establishment of a political boundary and administra­
tive control is particularly to be noted. In the years that followed, 
a number of other administrative arrangements were entered into which 
resulted in Sudanese administration of Egyptian areas to the north
of the 22nd parallel and Egyptian administration of some Sudanese
254territory to the south of this latitude. On 1 February 1958, Egypt
sent a note to Sudan requesting the return of all territory north of
the 22nd parallel being administered by Sudan. In return, Egypt would
transfer the territory it was administering south of the parallel to 
255Sudan.
Egypt claimed that the territories north of the parallel were 
under its sovereignty being merely administered by Sudan under a 
bilateral arrangement, "on a strictly local level, confined to admin­
istrative agents on either side of the frontier"256 or through unilateral 
Egyptian acts, such as the arrêtés of 1899 and 1902.257 Sovereignty 
could not be transferred either by such local acts or by unilateral acti 
It was also noted that no actual delimitation had taken place to give 
effect to the administrative arrangements, and that the outcome of dis­
cussions between the Survey Administration of Egypt and the Sudanese 
authorities in 1909 was a line on the map showing the political inter­
national boundary based on the 22nd parallel and a separate line showing
(254) For example, the arrêté of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior 
of 1902 implemented by a decree that year aimed at facilitating 
the administration of nomadic tribes along the boundary and 
retaining the continuity of certain tribal areas, see Sharma 
op.cit. p.192, and Abdalla loc.cit. pp.13-14. See also the 
arrêté of 1899, ibid, p.ll.
(255) Sharma op.cit. p,192 and Touval, The Boundary Politics nt
Independent Africa., 1972, p.194, Egypt wished the inhabitants 
of the area it was claiming to vote in the plebiscite scheduled 
for February 21, 1958, ibid.
(256) Abdalla,loc.cit. p.4.
(257) Ibid.
Abdalla notes that "the renunciation of any right must be so 
K * manifest as to exclude any other interpretation", ibid p.5,
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the administrative boundaries.
The Sudanese argument was based on effective possession, and 
Egyptian acquiescence in it for some fifty years, of the areas it 
was administering. The sovereign acts it had performed in the ter­
ritory had gone unchallenged by Egypt until 1958, while Egypt had 
denounced the 1899 agreement and recognised the independence of Sudan 
without comment. In addition, Egypt had received a note from Sudan
in January 1956 dealing with the Sudanese position relative to exist-
260ing agreements and had not formally protested. It does seem as if 
Egypt had clearly acquiesced in Sudanese control of the area in 
question and that this administrative line had altered the international 
boundary having ripened into sovereignty. Sudan's case is also 
strengthened by the border principle adopted by the OAU, whereby all 
States in the organisation were to accept and respect the colonial 
borders. Sudan, which had existed as a distinct entity prior to 
independence, thus inherited the borders from its Anglo-Egyptian pre­
decessor including the administered area.
Egypt sent in troops to the area in February 1958 and Sudan com­
plained to the UN Security Council. However, Egypt declared its
readiness to postpone the settlement of the issue until after Sudan's
261elections at the end of February. The boundary issue had really been 
precipitated as a result of a deadlock in the negotiations on Sudanese 
claims resulting from the construction of the Aswan Dam (which particularly 259601
(259) Ibid pp.4 and 17-18. The map demonstrating these lines appears on ibid, p.8.
(260) Sharma op.cit. p.193.
(261) Touval op.cit. p,194. See also 12 International Organisation1958, pp,333-5. B n*
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affected the Wadi Haifa area). Touval regards the raising of the
border issue at that time as an attempt to pressure Sudan into accept-
, 262ing Egyptian proposals for a settlement. In the event, the
countries agreed in 1959 on questions related to the Nile waters and 
263Aswan dam issues and the boundary problem does not appear to have
been raised again. In the light of all these factors, it is clear
that Sudan has title to the disputed territory on the basis of the
modification of the delimitation line by the accepted administrative
264arrangements and Egypt's acquiescence in the same, coupled with 
the succession of Sudan and Egypt to the borders as colonially admin­
istered.
265(iv) The Libya-Chad Dispute - As from June 1973, Libya began
occupying a strip of Chad, called the Aozou strip, parallel to the
Libyan border. The area occupied was within a short time, some 800
266kilometres long by 100 kilometres wide. In September 1976, Libya
issued new official maps showing inter alia that it included some 37,000
267square miles of Chadian territory. Libya claimed that the correct
boundary between it and Chad was that as delimited by the Italian-French
268(Laval-Mussolini) treaty of January 1935. However, this treaty 2634578
(262) Op.cit. p.195.
(263) Ibid.
(264) See the Temple of Preah Vihear case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p,6.
See also the Venezuelan Preferential Claims case (1904), In Scott 
p.56, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951, '
p.116 and the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutchï 
case, 50 ILR, p.2.
(265) Supra, Chapter 7, pp.506 and 530-1,
(266) Rousseau, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1978, 
p.298. See also Africa Contemporary Record 1975/6, 1976, pp.B70
and B465-6.
(267) Ibid 1976/7, 1977, p.B75 and Rousseau, Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public, 1977, p.564,
(268) I b i d ,  1978, p.298; Africa Contemporary Record 1975/6, 1976,
B465-6 and Africa Research Bulletin, October 1975, p.3784 and 
ibid Au^st 1977, pp,4524-5.
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although in fact ratified by France on 26 March 1935 was never
ratified by Italy and indeed the instruments of ratification were 
269never exchanged. In other words, the agreement never came into 
force. France maintained that it recognised only those borders 
existing upon Chad's independence in 1960, which were not challenged 
upon the latter’s entry into the United Nations.269 70 271 Chad points to 
the OAU border principle as supporting its case. The Libyan claim 
to an alternative delimitation of the boundary with Chad based upon 
an agreement that never came into force is clearly untenable in law 
and the colonial border as at 1960 is the valid one.
(v) The Tanzanian-Malawi Dispute over Lake Malawi - The lake forms
about three-quarters of the length of the boundary between the two
States and extends some 180 miles. The Anglo-German agreement of July
1890 defined the British and German spheres of influence in East
Africa and clearly placed the lake within the British protectorate of
Nyasaland, by describing the border as running along "the eastern
northern and western shores of the lake to the northern bank of the River
271Songwe." McEwen notes that the shoreline boundary was due to a 
number of factors, including Britain’s determination to control the 
lake as a means of protecting its missionary and commercial interests and 
to eliminate the slave trade and Germany’s concentration upon the Indian
(269) Rousseau, Revue Generale de Droit International Public 397»
pp.299-300. ’
(270) Africa Research Bulletin, August 1977, pp.4524-5. See also 
ibid, October, 1975, p.3784.
(271) Hertslet, Map, of Africa by Treaty. 3rd ed. 1909, vol II « gon
The shoreline part of the boundary was not the subject of à 
further agreement, but ’’this fact may have little significance 
since a shoreline may not have been considered susceptible to 
further delimitation’,’ Brownlie, "A Provisional View of the Disnut« 
Concerning Sovereignty over Lake Malawi/Nyasa" 1 East A*^«« »
Review, 1968, pp.258, 259 * AXrica** •
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Ocean coast. It is also to be noted that Germany was given access to
272and right of transit upon the lake.
The border was not modified by any subsequent agreement but in
later years official maps and documents demonstrated considerable
uncertainty as to whether the boundary line was in fact on the eastern
shoreline or a median line. The British Central Africa Order in
Council of 1902 described the Protectorate of Central Africa (renamed
the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1907) as bounded by German East Africa
and, although no boundary was defined, taken in con junction with the
1890 treaty, it would clearly appear to refer to the shoreline boundary.
However, as Brownlie notes, in the years before 1914, "the British
authorities appeared to have acquiesced in a continuing pattern of
273public and official German activity on the waters of the lake."
British assistance was given to transport German steamers to the lake,
which were used for administrative purposes and travel between the
German and British ports on the lake. German activity occasioned no
274British protest until the outbreak of war in 1914. It is to be 
noted however that the 1890 treaty provided for freedom of trade and 
navigation with respect inter alia to the lake.
German maps prior to 1920, the date at which Britain established 
civil government in Tanganyika, showed either a shoreline boundary 
or a middle line, while British maps of the period demonstrated a 
similar uncertainty.* 273475 German East Africa was occupied towards the end
£272) international Boundaries of East Africa, 1971, p.179.
(273) Loc.cit. p.26l,
(274) Ibid.
Ibid P.262 and McEwen op.cit. pp. 184-9. The Handbook of German 
East Africa produced by the Admiralty War Staff Intelligence 
Division, 1916, contained a map showing a middle line boundary, 
■ibid p 185, while a British War Office map of 1918, showed a 
shoreline boundary, Brownlie loc.cit. p.262.
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of the First World War and until 1922, when the mandates were created,
annual reports on the territory were published. The first report
covering the period from the conclusion of the armistice to the end of
2761920 was ambiguous as to the placement of the boundary. A map
277appended to the report seemed to show a middle line. The reports
for 1921 and 1922 are similarly ambiguous. On July 20, 1922 the mandate
agreement was concluded. Article 1 of the British mandate defined the
territory in terms of German East Africa east of the line dividing
Tanganyika from Ruanda-Urundi, but contained no detailed description of 
278the borders. With the establishment of the mandate, the boundary
crystallised for no alteration of the limits could occur without the
279consent of the League of Nations. The vital period is, therefore, 
from 1890 to 1922. The Tanganyika annual reports to the League from 1924 
to 1934 all refer to a middle line boundary in the lake and accompanying 
maps illustrate this. However, from 1935 onwards a shoreline boundary 
was presented. On 13 December 1946, the UN General Assembly approved 
the trusteeship agreement for Tanganyika within the bounds of the former 276890
(276) It noted that the western boundary of the former German territorv
ran "south-east to the northern end of Lake Nyasa. Rather less y 
than halfway down the lake it turns east and joins the Ruvuma 
river, whose course it follows to the sea", cmnd.1428 Se« 
Brownlie loc.cit. p.263. ’ °
(277) However, McEwan's view is that the map appears to show an east«™
shoreline boundary on the lake. He also notes that the eastern 
shore of Lake Tanganyika is incorrectly shown as the internet!« 
boundary, op.cit. pp.187-8. nai
(278) See Hudson, International Legislation. vol.I, 1931, pp 84-99
That line was in fact amended, see 54 LNTS p.239 and 190 LNTS 
P .95. The Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, was similarly 
imprecise as to the boundary. y
(279) Article 12 of the mandate agreements.
(280) Nyasaland sources during this period were ambiguous, but a
of reports and handbooks did refer to a middle line, see BroJlil 
loc.cit, p.265. 16
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British mandate. UK reports to the General Assembly, submitted 
annually from 1947-1961, all included maps showing the boundary on the 
eastern shoreline. The texts of the reports for 1947 to 1952 specifi­
cally noted a shoreline boundary, while later reports omitted such
282textual references.
In 1959, the Minister of Lands and Surveys reported to the
Tanganyikan Legislative Council that the opinion of legal advisers was
283that no part of the lake was within the bounds of Tanganyika. Six
months after independence, the Tanganyikan Prime Minister declared that
no part of the lake was within the boundaries of German East Africa
and accordingly no part of the lake was within Tanganyika. He noted
that there was no question of any change in the boundaries by agreement
284after the assumption of the mandate by the UK in 1922,
With increasing tension between Malawi (formerly Nyasaland) and
Tanzania (ie. the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar) particularly over
285South Africa, the lake issue was raised. The period of maximum
Tanzanian agitation occurred between May 1967 and September 1968 after
286which time the issue became relatively quiescent, Tanzanian arguments 2813456
281
(281) 8 UNTS p.116.
(282) Nyasaland sources during the 1940's and 1950's show a shoreline 
boundary, see Brownlie loc.cit. pp.267-7,
(283) McEwan op.cit. p.189. See also Mayall, "The Maiawl-Tanzanian 
Boundary Dispute" 11 JMAS, 1973, pp.611, 612,
(284) Tanganyikan Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly, Official 
Report, 1st Session, June 11, 1962, col.264.
(285) See Mayall loc.cit. p.611.
(286) Ibid p .612.
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centred around British acquiescence in German use of the lake before
1914 and the consequent modification of the boundary as delimited by
the 1890 agreement. It was also noted that in the absence of treaty
provisions and presumably in cases of ambiguity the principles of
customary international law would apply and these would provide for
287a middle line boundary.
Brownlie's view is that by the time the mandate came into being,
the boundary was the middle line of the lake by virtue of British
acquiescence in German use of the lake and in the light of those
publications which before and after the establishment of the mandate
referred to a middle line. Since this was so, Britain could not
unilaterally modify the boundary and accordingly, Tanzania was entitled
288to a median line boundary on the lake. However, it is to be doubted 
whether the issue is this clear. The 1890 treaty provided for freedom 
of trade, navigation and passage of goods within the free zone area 
as defined by the Berlin Act of 1885, which included Lake Nyasa/Malawi. 
The ensuing confusion as to the border on the lake may be attributed to 
a number of causes ranging from genuine uncertainty resulting from 
growing German usage to the fact that the treaty was only dealing with 
spheres of interest. Other factors such as colonial unconcern and 
paucity of geographic knowledge may also have been of relevance. German 
activity on the lake and the British attitude thereto may be explained 
in law in terms of a comprehensive and growing exploitation of the 
freedom of navigation and trade clauses in the 1890 agreement. As far as 
the maps are concerned, the long list of equivocal maps should militate 287
(287) Seaton and Maliti, loc.cit. p,82,
(288) Loc.cit. p.267. See also Okoye, International Law the Ne
African States, 1972, pp.102-3. ' " ”  ------ —
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against a definitive judgement either way. Wartime maps should be
treated in particular with great circumspection. Excluding these
from consideration, the weight of evidence would appear to veer
towards the shoreline boundary, although many inconsistencies remain.
British maps showing a middle line up to July 1922 are especially
289important since they are evidence against interest. The maps 
published in the Nyasaland and Tanganyikan annual reports of the inter­
war years showing a middle line boundary are particularly to be noted.
The statements of the Tanganyikan Prime Minister in 1962 coupled
with the fact that until 1965 Tanzanian maps showed a shoreline
boundary might be treated as creating an estoppel since they marked
290acceptance of a particular boundary. Brownlie's argument that
independent States should be treated differently in the early years of
291their independence in respect of such statements must be regarded 
with some caution. Statements against interest are particularly impor­
tant as evidence and should not be minimised on the grounds that the 
State in question has only recently acquired its sovereignty. It is 
believed that in the light of the ambiguity that clearly exists in 
relation to the lake boundary, the presumption in favour of the delimits 
tion of 1890 is to be supported and that British acquiescence in German 
activities on the lake cannot be unequivocally seen as altering that 
boundary. The Tanganyikan government statements of 1962 are of especial *2901
See Huber in Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 852. See 
also the Labrador Boundary(1927) 43 TLR 289, 298-9,
(290) See the Temple case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6 .
(291) The OAU border resolution of 1964 is not really of any help in 
circumstances of genuine doubt as the existence of a boundary, 
but in this case it could indeed be argued that the resolution 
supports the shoreline boundary, since the Tanganyikan government 
soon after independence made its view known as to the placement 
of the colonial border, which it was bound to accept upon inde­
pendence .
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importance in this context. The fact that the Tanzanian claim has
been suspended since 1968 would appear to support the proposition put 
292forward.
293(vi) The Dahomey - Niger Dispute - This dispute over the inter­
pretation of the administrative delimitation by France concerned the 
island of Lete in the river Niger with both sides claiming exclusive 
jurisdiction over it. On 1 January 1964, the Head of the provisional 
Dahomey government cabled the UN Secretary-General over the "inhuman 
treatment" of its nationals in Niger and the occupation by the latter 
of the island of Lete, "an integral part of Dahomaian territory. " 29 394 
The problem was exacerbated by the overthrow of the previous Dahomey 
president, with whom the Niger authorities had established warm relations. 
Suspicions of Niger's involvement in a suspected counter-coup led to 
the killing and arrest of Niger nationals living in northern Dahomey. 295 296
Both sides accused the other of preparing to seize the island of Lete and 
mobilised. The problem was discussed at a conference of Heads of State 
of the Union Africaine et Malgache in Dakar and a reconciliation agreement 
initialled. This provided for the protection of the nationals of the
parties and for the reference of the Lete dispute to a commission for 
oq a
re-examination. Following the growth of internal political instability,
(292) In the case of the Tanzanian-Zambian boundary on Lake Tanganyika 
some doubt has existed as to its exact position. Only the 
boundary terminal points were defined by agreement and the point 
at which Zaire reaches the western shore of the lake is open to 
dispute. I n  the event, a median line boundary between Tanzania 
and Zambia on the lake has been accepted, it appears, de facto 
by the parties and this is shown on maps. The line takes the 
form of a curve down the centre of the lake from the Kalambo 
river to the Zaire tripoint, see McEwen op.cit. pp.225-7.
(293) Later renamed Benin.
(294) Africa Research Bulletin, January 1964, p.4.
(295) rnrtr«", international Relations in the New Africa, 1966, p,114. 
See also Touval op.cit. pp.198-9.
(296) Africa Research Bulletin, March 1964, pp.36-7 and ibid April 
1964 p.53.
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talks were suspended, with Dahomey complaining of the expulsion of
its nationals and Niger emphasising the Lete i s s u e . A  settlement
of the dispute, however, was proclaimed at a joint meeting of the parties 
298in June 1965, following a meeting of the Conseil de 1'Entente at
299Cotonou the previous January, which included a provision for dual
citizenship for the inhabitants of Lete . 300 The problem of sovereignty
over the island was not settled but the de facto situation was, as it 
, 301were, formalised.
(vii) The Ghana-Upper Volta Dispute - This issue also turned on
the interpretation of documents from the colonial era, compounded by
the fact that Upper Volta's border had never been demarcated, Political
antagonisms exacerbated this relatively minor dispute, which concerned
an area regarded by Upper Volta as within its territory, in which Ghana
302had built a school in 1963 and a road leading to it. After a number
of meetings over the problem, Ghana proceeded to raise its flag in the
area and establish a police post. At Upper Volta’s request, the issue
came before the OAU Council of Ministers. Ghana expressed its willingness
303to withdraw and called for the border to be demarcated, and this was
(297) Ibid July 1964, p.HO,
(298) Ibid, June 1965, p.313.
(299) Rousseau, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1965, 
pp.465-6.
(300) Zartman op.cit. p.115.
(301) Touval op.cit. p.201. The island dispute was never important 
in itself, it was a symptom of the crisis in relations between 
the States generated by internal political instability rather 
than its cause, ibid, p.198.
(302) Touval, "The Organisation of African Unity and African Borders"
21 International Organisation, 1967, pp.102, 120.
(303) Ibid, p.121.
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duly noted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 304 305
However, subsequent meetings of Ghanaian and Upper Voltan commissioners,
appointed in 1963 to study the problem, failed to reach agreement on the
305demarcation of the border. At the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the 
OAU Council of Ministers in 1965, Ghana noted that its nationals had 
lived for many years in the disputed area, but reaffirmed its willingness 
to withdraw after criticising the methods of demarcation adopted by 
Upper Volta . 306 307 Ghana, in fact, withdrew, but challenged the interpre­
tation of the Anglo-French treaty of 1893 delimiting the border. In 
June 1966, following the overthrow of President Nkrumah of Ghana, 
agreement was reached on the 1893 delimitation and in 1970 the final 
report of the border demarcation commission was signed by both States 308 *
In April 1977, a treaty was signed formally demarcating 135 miles of the
joint border. Since 1975, some 230 miles had been surveyed by the
309joint border commission. The 1893 delimitation, was therefore accepted 
by the parties, once the political antagonisms between them had died 
down and speedy progress made on actually demarcating the border.
(viii) The Mali-Upper VoltaDispute - This dispute concerned the 
Oudalen region, some 150 kilometres long and 15-20 kilometres wide 
claimed by Mali. The issue had been in existence, though quiescent, since
(304) AMG/Res.19(1).
(305) Touval loc.cit. p.121.
(306) Ibid pp.121-2.
(307) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1966, p.549.
(308) Ibid, February 1970, p.1665.
Ibid, April 1977 p.4384.(309)
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the independence of the two countries, but reports of the presence of
minerals, oil and gas caused the problem to become acute. Upper
Volta had first been created by France from the Soudan territory in
1919, divided between Mali, Niger and the Ivory Coast in 1932 and
310re-established in 1947. Mali's claim was based on an arrêté of the 
governor of Soudan in 1935 putting the disputed area in Mali, but Upper 
Volta argued that the French National Assembly law of 1949 reconstituting 
the territory of Upper Volta put the region within its borders.310 11 a 
series of clashes on the border occurred at the end of 1974 312 31
followed by talks in Lome with the Presidents of Niger and Togo as 
mediators. A mediation commission was established consisting of Togo 
Niger, Guinea and Senegal, and it was agreed that the dispute was to be 
resolved on the basis of existing documents, the withdrawal of troops
from the border zone and the guaranteeing of the safety of the nationals 
313of both parties. A series of documents were sent from France314 and 
a military disengagement agreement was announced. 315 in June 1975 a 
neutral technical committee was set up consisting of cartographers an 
ethnologist, an army officer and a jurist to determine the nationality 
of five border villages and define the border316 * and a peace agreement 
was signed at Conakry on 11 July 1975. In other words, the validity
(310) Rousseau, Revue Générale de Droit International Public 197«; a»*
(311) Ibid, pp.835-6. A series of maps in 1923, 1925, 1926 and 1960
the French National Geographical Institute supported the U m e r  7 
Voltan case, ibid. pp
(312) Africa Research Bulletin, December 1964, pp,3452-4,
(313) Ibid, p,3454.
(314) Ibid, January, 1975, p.3487.
(315) Ibid, February 1975, p.3525.
(316) Ibid, June 1975, p.365Q.
Ibid, July 1975, p.3687.(317)
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of the colonial delimitation was reaffirmed upon the basis of the 
superiority of a National Assembly law over a governor’s ordinance, 
reinforced by French maps. The possibility of minor adjustments was 
raised in the light of the composition of the committee.
ilx> The Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Dispute - In August 1972, Gabon 
extended its territorial waters to 100 nautical miles distance from 
its coasts and occupied a series of islands off the Equatorial Guinea 
coast. Equatorial Guinea sent a series of messages to countries parti­
cipating at the Dar-es-Salaam meeting of Eastern and Central African 
States, declaring that it had been invaded by Gabon, while Gabon sent a 
letter to the UN Secretary-General on 8 September stating that fishing
camps on the uninhabited islands of Mbanie and Cocotiers had been attacked
318by a force from Equatorial Guinea. The dispute was concerned with 
conflicting interpretations of the Franco-Spanish treaty of June 1900 
delimiting the boundary between Gabon and Spanish Guinea. According to 
Equatorial Guinea, this implicitly recognised Spanish sovereignty over 
the coastal islands, while Gabon declared that it had referred only to 
the islands of Corisco and Eloby as Spanish and that it had therefore 
recognised French sovereignty over the uninhabited islands of Mbanie and 
Cocotiers. France and Spain were asked to help clarify the treaty ^19
At a meeting in Kinshasa between the parties, with Congo and Zaire 
an agreement was reached on the establishment of a commission of repre­
sentatives of the four States to draw up a set of measures to ease the 318*
(318) Ibid, September 1972, p.2596. See also Cukwurah, ’’The OreaniR»*« 
of African Unity and Boundary Problems: 1963-73" 13 tttt
pp.176, 201-2. ’ 1973*
(319) Africa Research Bulletin, September 1972,
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situation. However, Equatorial Guinea declared that it would not 
accept the unilateral extension of Gabonese territorial waters to
320
100 miles'*21 and delivered an ultimatum that Gabon was to be removed 
from the islands by October 17. Another meeting was thereupon arranged 
by representatives of the Congo and the OAU assistant secretary-general 
at Brazzaville, at which neutralisation of the Bay of Corisco was
agreed upon as well as the establishment of an OAU commission to delimit
322the boundary between the two States. In April 1974, Gabon declared
323Mbanie island a Gabonese military zone and in July the President of 
Equatorial Guinea announced that he accepted the present boundaryies
as legitimate and the dispute subsided. 324
Conclusions
325Where a boundary has been delimited by the colonial powers by 
international treaty, the doctrine of State succession, coupled with the 
African uti possidetis principle as laid down in the OAU border resolu­
tion of 1964, will ensure that this boundary will be binding upon the 
post-colonial independent African successor States. The only exception 
to this is where the colonial power has acquiesced in a modification of 32014
(320) West Africa, 29 September 1972, p.1302 and ibid 13 November 1972
(321) Ibid, 29 September 1972, p.1302.
(322) Africa Research Bulletin, November 1972 n 9«*»Cukwurah, loc.cit. p.204. P.2658. See also
(323) Africa Research Bulletin, April 1974, p .3193
(324) Ibid, July 1974, p.3294, Nigeria and Cameroon w e ™  ■. ,
dispute over territorial waters in the Calabai estuai, ln a
apparently settled, see ibid July 1970, » 180<5- i kH  which Waa 
p.2070 and ibid June 1975, p,3650. Parts of the 1 * February 191 
between the two were also in dispute because of
« e  ibid Hay »72, P.2467; ibid July 1973 Z i  T h ^ Y ““8
19 7 3, p.2951, : ana lbld August
(325) As De Visscher notes, delimitation is a lurid/ 
operation. Problèmes de Confins an + V  , Caf, ^  Political
1969, p.28. A series of dellmlV«rn^~-^--r~~ 
developed, see Cukwurah, TheSettlement n* n U6Ü bave been 
International Law, 1967, pp".40-787 -------- ^ ¿ H Q lsputes in
the delimited boundary. This is shown in the Egypt-Sudan border case
and was argued with regard to Lake Malawi where the evidence would not 
appear to have supported the claim. Assertions by for example 
Libya and Mali of sovereignty over areas beyond the former colonial 
borders and thus in neighbouring States supported only by ethnic affilia­
tion or inferior documentary material, such as an unratified treaty or 
a governor’s ordinance, faced with clear delimitations by the colonial 
powers concerned, are clearly not valid in law and are extremely 
hazardous and destabilising in practice. However, where there has 
either been no delimitation of the area in question or it is ambiguou 
and thus disputed, other factors necessarily intrude in an attempt 
to achieve that stability and finality of boundaries that is of such 
significance in international law and relations. Of importance will be 
any acts of sovereignty, governmental activities or administrative actions 
in the disputed area. Should these be proved and accompanied by the
absence of protests from the other party, this should muffin *auitice to establish
a boundary on a disputed territory. Where the other party has objected 
to the activities in the area, the issue will not be resolved, but in 
such cases a presumption will be in favour of the limits of de fact 
possession transmitted by the colonial power to the successor State 
This is demonstrated by the Algerian-Moroccan dispute. The intentions 
if ascertainable, of the colonial parties to the treaty in dispute will 
provide valuable evidence as to the interpretation of the problematic 
delimitation, as will any subsequent practice of the parties relative to
it, while in the absence of any delimitation the issue .rest upon
sovereign activities and acquiescence. In these instances, the principles
of recognition and estoppel will also be relevant in attemptin ta o define
an acceptable boundary line. In the absence of any clear indicatio 
to the placement of the boundary in colonial times, the issue will fall
to be resolved by the States concerned, for the consent of the parties 
is the most important element in the achievement of a stable and final
. . 326boundary.
A number of the cases surveyed briefly in this section also 
demonstrate that territorial issues are a keen indicator of political 
relations. A boundary dispute may be seized upon or may provide the 
opportunity for the expression of personal, political or ideological 
hostility by the parties concerned and may just as easily be resolved or 
suspended in the face of reconiliation, however brought about. It is 
also clear that a number of quiescent boundary differences have become 
acute as a result of a re-evaluation of the value of the disputed region 
itself. Discoveries of, or indications of the existence of minerals, 
oil, gas, water and so forth will stimulate a desire to resolve the 
border issue and settle the question of the sovereignty of the territori 
involved, one way or the other.
The fact that the initial delimitation of many of Airica'a present 
day borders took place upon the background of poor geographical knowledge 
has meant that the task of interpreting such delimitation provisions is 
that much more difficult and renders the demarcation of the agreed 
boundary both crucial and complex.
(326) See as regards the value of maps in such cases; Weissbere Evidence in International Boundary Disputes* k ’
"  *  * T  J |  -  m i _______ _________"Map» »» a j i l p.781 and Hyde, ’’Maps as Evidence in
Reappraisal 0 Dl8putes" 27 AJIL, p.311. See also
international # case, 2 RIAA, pp.829, 853; the Guatemala-
the — 2_RIAA, p.1307; the Temple case, ICJ Reports,
ILR,
f“ ?“: trooBtino-Chll« C..O, 38 ILK pp.10, 84-5,
1962, p. ^ „  western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) case 50
the Tn o- ^  a u-b^the Frontier Lands'' case, ICJ Reports, 1959, 
PP 0A0 220 216 and 225-6 and the Beagle Channel case, HMSO,
pp,81-100.
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(b) Demarcation Problems
Cukwurah has called demarcation, the physical marking out of
327the delimited boundary line, the ’’crux of all boundary making" and
while this is perhaps something of an exaggeration within the context
of title to territory in African States, it is clear that it is during
the process of transcribing the boundary onto the ground that many
issues not apparent during delimitation arise. A number of African
boundaries were not demarcated for reasons of expense or lack of trained
personnel while in the case of boundaries between two colonies (or two
parts of one colony) belonging to the same State, demarcation was often
328deemed unnecessary.
Another problem has been that once a boundary is demarcated, 
usually by means of posts, poor maintenance has led to uncertainty as
■ runs This occurred with regard to the Kenya-Somalito where the line ruua.
border demarcation referred to in the 1927 agreement. The demarcation 
was accomplished by means of principal boundary beacons supplemented 
by a number of secondary cairns. After only a short time, it was
J ^  ^  29 beacons only 4 were in good condition, while thenoticed that ox xne **
cairns had disappeared and that lines cut through vegetation were no
329longer traceable due to new growth. The problem also arose in the 
case of the Nigerian-Dahomey demarcation of 1911-2, following an agree-
_  ' line was marked by a series of low concrete pillars,ment in 1906. The
„ »,«« noted, were to be found being used by the local which, as Anene has vv u 32789
(327) Op.clt. p.78.
(328) This was particularly so with regard to the former French pos­
sessions in west and equatorial Africa. The boundaries of Upper 
Volta, for example, were never demarcated, see Zartman op.cit. 
p.115.
(329) McEwen op.cit. pp.121-2,
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inhabitants for the sharpening of cutlasses. 330
An ambiguous delimitation can cause great problems when it comes 
to executing the demarcation process. This was illustrated in the 
Kenya-Sudan border situation. By an order of 1914, following a 
boundary commission report two years earlier, the Uganda-Sudan border 
was delimited. The delimitation defined the eastern limit of the 
boundary by utilising an imaginary line drawn "due east of the northern 
most point of the northern most crest of the long spur running north 
from Mount Lubur. " 331 32 However, that description could be interpreted 
in a number of different ways, while the boundary continued by reference 
to what proved to be a false assumption as to the relative position of 
certain grazing lands. Problems arose after the transfer of land from 
Uganda to Kenya in 1926 and this boundary formed the Kenya-Sudan border. 
In 1931 agreement was reached between the provincial commissioner of 
Kenya's Turkana province and the district commissioner of the eastern 
district of Mongolia province of Sudan on the basis of the northern 
limits of the relevant grazing area and this became known as the Red 
Line The delimitation was altered northwards a number of times in sub-
t- iq<»a the demarcation of the line was commenced. To sequent years, m
,  ^ is no finally agreed line, but Kenya has maintainedthis day» xxic?.*«'
to and beyond the Red Line with Sudanese consent. The police posts up ^
1914 order contains the only valid delimitation, but the two States have 
arently accepted the Red Line de facto as the basis of the boundary.
(330) The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1970
report of theGhana-Upper Volta demarcation coJni«c? ‘ Th® final 
1970 that many of the border pillars were frern.m,^l0" noted ln 
Africa Research Bulletin, February 1970, p.1665 ^  removed*
(331) The Uganda Official Gazette, 30 May 1914, p.256
(332) See McEwen op.cit. pp.132-4.
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Many of the demarcations took place in Africa many years after 
the original delimitation agreements. The Ethiopian-British Somaliland 
boundary was delimited in 1897, but demarcated only in the years between 
1933 and 1935, while the Kenya-Ethiopian border was delimited in 1907 
and demarcated in the 1950-s. In the latter case, what occurred was 
that the 1907 delimitation was not demarcated for a number of decades, 
until a new delimitation was proposed in 1947.333 A mixed demarcation
Q  q  A
commission was established in 1950 and it finally reported in 1955 
However, the Ethiopian government refused to ratify the work of the 
commission and the agreement failed to come into operation. Further 
discussions followed after Kenya’s independence and the dispute cen­
tring upon the Gaddaduma and Godama Wells was resolved in 1970 with 
the former being allocated to Ethiopia and the latter to Kenya The 
agreement also provided for the nationals of both parties to use the 
wells and the surrounding areas for watering and grazing. 335
.fithj ogian~Sudan_Dispute - The Sudan-Eritrean border was defined 
by a series of Anglo-Italian agreements in December 1898, June 1899 
April 1901 and November 1901 and by the Anglo-italian-Ethiom«« »«iujuua agreement
of May 1902. The Ethiopian-Sudan border was delimited in the Anglo 
Ethiopian treaty of May 1902, which declared that a red line drawn 
two maps was to constitute the boundary. This was to run from Khot 
Um Hagar to Galbar, to the Blue Nile and thence, via the Baro Pibar 
and Akoho rivers to Melile. From there, the border was to reach to the 
point where 6 degrees north crosses 35 degrees east. Persons were 
appointed to demarcate the border} however, no Ethiopian boundary com 
mission was appointed, nor was the treaty ratified by either side A
(333) 82 UNTS, p.191.
(334) 99 UNTS, pp.338,348.
(335) Africa Research Bulletin, June 1970, p .1775
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Major Gwynne was sent by the British to survey the border and his line 
has operated as the boundary.
A series oi issues led to strained relations between the two
States336 and a number of meetings were held in the 1960's, during
which the Eritrean-Sudan border line was reaffirmed and it was agreed
to accept the 1902 treaty as the basis of the boundary further inland,
particularly with regard to the 6 degrees north, 35 degrees east
point 337 In July 1972, the border dispute regarding the undemarcated
areas was declared resolved and Major Gwynne’s demarcation line was in
fact to be followed. North of Mount Takle the border was to be
redemarcated in order to pass along the peaks of certain mountains. A
joint special committee was also to be set up to deal with settlement
ooo
and agricultural questions. Thus, agreement confirmed a previous 
unilateral demarcation, with certain minor alterations, and provided
339for the cases where the populations of the two States intermingled.
The Ml11_uQ„ ^ t ftnian Dispute - In this case, the mixture of nomadic 
and semi-nomadic populations in the desert and savannah border region 
caused problems as to the exact line of the boundary between the two 
States In 1944, France transferred the Hodh region from Mali (then 
known as Soudan) to Mauritania, but the demarcation was haphazard.
B tween 1958 and I960 representatives of the two autonomous territories
(336) Primarily, the Eritrean and Southern Sudanese rebellions
(337) Africa Research Bulletin, February 1968, pp.9 7 5 -7 an*
March 1971, p.2036. .
(338) Ibid, July 1972, p.2530.
(339) A joint Sudan-Chad committee was established in 1962
the border, but problems arose because of dio« + &Z to demai*cate 
tribes over water, pasture and cultivation issU &B &ni0ng the 
1964, p.38. There was agreement regarding 860 ibid March
border following a s e r f « « ^ « » « c a t i o n  of the1964, p.38. icgitraing the demarcation Sudan-Uganda border following a series of incidents in the 
undemarcated border areas, see McEwen op.cit. pp.257-64,
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sought to demarcate the boundary but unsuccessfully. From the date
of independence until 1962, a series of minor incidents occurred,
while until 1963, official maps showed the border in two different
places. In 1963, however, the two sides came to an agreement and an
exchange of territory took place. The new border was purely political,
340being based on no natural geographic or ethnic line.
The usual method of demarcating a boundary is by means of a joint 
commission and in most cases the degree of discretion possessed by 
those marking out the delimited line is very limited. Demarcation 
involves a number of specific techniques that will be employed in the 
process of transferring a line from a map onto the ground. Where no 
agreed demarcation takes place, the parties may acquiesce in a de facto 
line pending final agreement. If they fail to do so, incidents are 
likely to occur, depending always on the value of the land concerned and 
the state of relations between the parties.
(340) Zartman op.cit. p.115 and ibid, "A Disputed Frontier is Settled"
8 Africa Report, 1963, pp.13-4. See also Touval, op.cit. pp.249-51 
and Africa Research Bulletin, June 1969, p.1434.
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